Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era (1992-1997) by Alexandrov, Mikhail V
RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN 
IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA (1992 - 1997)
by
Mikhail V. Alexandrov
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
of the Australian National University
March 1998
Declaration
I hereby declare that this is my work and that, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person 
nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any 
other degree or diploma of a university or institute of higher learning, except 
where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. I hereby also certify 
that the work contained in the thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to 
any other university or institution.
Mikhail Alexandrov Date:
Acknowledgments
Professor Amin Saikal, Director of the Centre for Middle Eastern and Central 
Asian Studies (CMECAS) of the Australian National University, was the 
supervisor of this doctoral thesis. It will not be an exaggeration to say that 
without his assistance the successful completion of the thesis would have been 
impossible. I am particularly grateful to him for allocating funds for my field trip 
to Russia and Kazakhstan, which allowed me to collect essential new source 
materials unavailable elsewhere.
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Mr Geoffrey Jukes, whose guidance and 
counsel played an essential part in writing and editing the thesis. Mr Jukes 
showed unprecedented commitment to giving detailed and elaborate advice to his 
Ph D students, myself included, despite the fact that this workload put substantial 
strains on him and his personal time.
I would like to note the role of Mr John Miller from the Department of Political 
Science at La Trobe University, who contributed by means of advice and 
comments to the success of my work.
I want to express my sincere gratitude to Doctor of Political Science from 
Kazakhstan Reykhan Kalieva, who gave me essential assistance during my visit to 
Almaty.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the role played in the preparation of the thesis by 
my wife Elena. Not only did she give me moral support which was in itself most 
important for the progress of my work, but made a direct contribution to its 
earlier completion by designing the wonderful maps and assisting me to compile 
the Bibliography for the thesis.
Abstract
This thesis examines the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan as they 
emerged and developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The study 
concentrates on the period between 1992 and 1997. However, the first chapter is 
of a background nature. It embraces the period between 1985 and 1991, and 
shows how the process of disintegration was building up in relations between 
Moscow and Kazakhstan, as well as the roles played in this process by the 
Kazakh and Russian national elites.
Subsequently the thesis examines the following groups of issues: policy of 
national state building in Kazakhstan and its effects on the Russian population of 
the republic and on relations between Moscow and Almaty; Kazakh and Russian 
attitudes to post-Soviet economic and political integration, either within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or on some other basis such as a 
Eurasian Union or within the Customs Union, including Russia, Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan’s nuclear disarmament, the problem of 
Baykonur cosmodrome, Kazakhstan’s participation in the CIS collective security 
system and Russian-Kazakh bilateral relations in the military sphere; Russian 
energy policy towards Kazakhstan, the problem of the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC), Tengiz and Karachaganak oil and gas projects and the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea.
Note on Transliteration
In writing the thesis the author relied on both Russian and English language 
sources. All Russian language sources in the footnotes are given in transliterated 
form. When necessary the author used transliteration of Russian names and terms 
in the text.
Transliteration of Russian words follows the standard system of the British 
Permanent Committee on Geographical Names (PCGN) at the exception of cases 
when a particular name has already acquired an established transliteration in 
English (for example, Trotsky).
The author tried to achieve maximum possible degree of translation of specific 
Russian (Soviet) terminology into English, avoiding where possible russification 
of the text. However, when practical, Russian terms well known and frequently 
used in English (e g. perestroykd) were retained in their original transliterated 
form without translation.
To make understanding of the Russian sources easier to a reader unacquainted 
with Russian language, the author made full translation of all such sources into 
English in Bibliography. Besides, the Introduction to the thesis contains a short 
overview of the main sources and literature used in the thesis.
Since Kazakh and other Turkic names and terms were taken from Russian 
language sources their transliteration is given on the basis of their Russian 
language transcription.
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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new geopolitical reality on the 
vast spaces of Eurasia. Instead of one superpower, fifteen new independent states 
emerged, each with its own national identity. Kazakhstan was the second largest 
republic of the former USSR, and consequently the second largest new 
independent state to appear in the wake of the USSR’s collapse. The importance 
from both economic and geostrategic perspectives of this new player on the 
international scene can hardly be exaggerated. Possessing huge mineral resources, 
including large deposits of oil and gas, Kazakhstan has already become the focal 
point of a diplomatic struggle between world powers including the United States, 
Russia, the European Union and China, and important regional countries such as 
Iran and Turkey.
The subject of Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia, the former imperial 
power which controlled various regions of Kazakhstan for more than two 
centuries, is of interest from both academic and practical policy perspectives. 
Undoubtedly Russian-Kazakh relations will be of exceptional importance for 
Kazakhstan’s development as a new independent state, and for the general 
geostrategic situation in Eurasia in the 21st century. In other words maintenance of 
the existing geopolitical equilibrium on the Eurasian mainland will to a large degree 
depend on the direction taken by Russian-Kazakh relations, and whether 
Kazakhstan survives as an independent state.
Post-Soviet Western and Russian books on post-independence Central Asia 
have tended to concentrate on issues such as Russian policy to Central Asia or the 
CIS as a whole, or the political and economic development of the Central Asian 
States, and to touch on specific issues such as Russian-Kazakh relations only in 
passing. Research on that issue is rare, and consists mainly of articles, reports and 
essays published in journals or collective works. Some of these publications are of 
substantial academic value, but they usually address individual issues of Russian- 
Kazakh relations, cover short time frames, and do not attempt to depict or draw 
conclusions about the relationship as a whole.
So far no book entirely devoted to post-independence Russian-Kazakh 
relations has appeared, except for one by T.Mansurov Kazakhstan’s Ambassador 
to Moscow.1 But it is primarily an academic representation o f Kazakhstan’s official 
position, and is valuable mainly for its collection of factual material on Russian- 
Kazakh relations which can be of use to other scholars.
1 Mansurov T., Kazakhstan - Rossiya: suverenizatsiya, integratsiya, opit strategicheskogo partnerstva (1991 - 1995), 
Moscow, 1996.
2The conceptual basis
The central operational concept in this thesis is ethnicity and nationalism. 
Without undertaking a theoretical examination of the nature of ethnic nationalism, 
the author perceives it as a major motivating and mobilising force which has driven 
and continues to drive domestic and international politics. Attempts by the Soviet 
Communists to subdue this force and subordinate it to “higher order” values 
represented by the ideology of proletarian internationalism experienced a most 
dramatic failure. This failure not only proved the inadequacy of Marxist theory, but 
had very direct consequences for the fate of the USSR.
The reasons for the USSR’s disintegration were manifold, some of them 
the product of subjective factors and specific policies applied by the last Soviet 
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. However, the major reason, the driving force of the 
disintegration process, was ethnic nationalism, the rise of which in the former 
USSR was predetermined by the very essence of Bolshevik nationality policy, 
which divided the former Russian empire into ethnic-territorial units. The various 
territories were assigned the status of national republics, provinces and districts, 
named after a certain nationality which had a majority or plurality in them. 
Subsequently representatives of this “titular” nationality were given preferential 
treatment in appointments in various spheres of the local administration, and this 
led to the emergence of solid networks, based on kinship, connections and mutual 
gain. This initiated a process of formation of powerful national elites. Instead of 
eliminating ethnic divisions in the multinational state, the Bolsheviks laid the 
grounds for their exacerbation.
In the 1920s and 30s ethnic nationalism did not gain ground, because 
national elites in the republics and other territories of the USSR were still relatively 
weak. The previous leaders had disappeared in the battles of the Civil War, and the 
new ones put in charge by the Soviets lacked their own power base and derived 
most of their authority from Moscow. In that situation it was easy for Stalin to 
introduce a highly centralised, pyramidal administrative system, where the local 
state or Party official’s role was nothing more than implementation of Moscow's 
directives. When Stalin noticed even the slightest symptoms of dissent among 
ethnic leaders, he ruthlessly destroyed them in a purge of “bourgeois nationalists”. 
In all, Stalin’s policy effectively prevented new national elites developing into 
coherent political entities.
The Second World War led to a dramatic shift in public perceptions on 
proletarian internationalism. Firstly, Germany’s attack on the USSR dealt an 
irrevocable blow to the whole concept of internationalism. Secondly, in the prewar 
and wartime periods a new, younger generation of politicians, government officials 
and business executives came into being. This new generation, brought up under 
the existing system of ethnic-territorial divisions, had loyalties divided between 
their own republic and the USSR as a whole.
3Stalin’s death brought a certain relaxation of totalitarian control over the 
society, and Khrushchev made very significant concessions to national elites. Many 
national communist leaders and some ethnic groups which had been oppressed 
under Stalin were rehabilitated. This period saw the consolidation of national elites, 
and their formation into coherent political entities. When Brezhnev came to power 
in October 1964 he had to acknowledge the existence of this new factor in the 
Soviet political system. To return to Stalin’s policies would have meant a new 
wave of repression, an option which promised no bright future for the Soviet 
political elite, nor for himself personally.
It must be acknowledged that Brezhnev managed to find a response to the 
challenge. It was under him that a very elaborate and subtle system of managing 
nationality relations in the USSR came into being. Apparently sceptical about the 
"unifying force" of Marxist-Leninist ideology, Brezhnev found a way out in 
reanimating traditional practices of the earlier Russian empire. These were 
unattractive but reliable and time-tested methods of administering the vast spaces 
of the Eurasian mainland, and entailed a political compromise between national 
elites and Moscow. The elites received a free hand in running domestic affairs in 
their respective regions, and could enjoy all sorts of privileges and benefits, 
provided they did not violate the law, were not conspicuously overindulgent, and 
did not provoke public discontent. In fact maintenance of order and stability in 
their localities was now their own responsibility. All external relations, defence and 
security issues, naturally, remained in Moscow's hands, and regional elites had to 
ensure their region's appropriate input to the common all-Union economic 
complex. Provided they kept their part o f the bargain, Moscow did not interfere. If 
they failed, a regional scapegoat was found and dismissed, and someone new 
appointed, usually from the same elite. Whatever its pluses and minuses, the system 
created by Brezhnev enabled the ethnically complex USSR to develop in a modest 
but sustainable way, in conditions of relative stability. This was the situation when 
in March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev took up the office of General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
Sources and literature
The author began this study by examining the history of pre-Soviet 
Russian-Kazakh relations, since most of the problems that characterise their 
current relations are rooted in the historical past, some of them as early as the late 
18th century. Fortunately a substantial number of works on the topic have been 
published both in the West, former USSR and Kazakhstan.
The most authoritative Western work on the history of Kazakhstan is 
M.Olcott’s “The Kazakhs”.2 The author used it extensively as reference material 
and a source of ideas. Among other Western academics who wrote on various
2 All sources mentioned in this overview are listed in the Bibliography.
4aspects of Kazakhstan’s history the author would like to mention G. A .Vernadsky, 
GJ.Demko, L.Krader, GJukes and R.Davis. The author also made extensive 
study of the Soviet literature. Of most utility for preparation of the thesis were the 
five-volume “History of Kazakhstan from Ancient Times to Our Days”, produced 
by the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences3 and works by S.E.Tolybekov, 
J.K.Kasimbayev, R.S.Suleimanov and V.I.Moiseev, N.A.Khalfin, 
N.E.Bekmakhanova, Kh.Tursunov, S.Zimanov, N.Kiykbayev. Unfortunately, after 
the collapse of the USSR research in Russia on Kazakhstan’s history virtually 
ceased and no new books were published. This, however, was compensated by a 
plethora of new publications in independent Kazakhstan. They include a new one- 
volume version of the “History of Kazakhstan from Ancient Times to Our Days”4, 
and books by A.Abdakimov, A.Feoktistov, S.Maduanov, K.A.Jirenchin, 
S.Maduanov, D.A.Amanzholova and R.Masov.
The combination of books by different authors from different countries, 
and published at different times, enabled a fairly balanced picture of the history of 
Russian-Kazakh relations to be formed. There are, of course, still a number of 
“black spots” in the Soviet history of Kazakhstan, requiring further examination 
on the basis of new material which became available only after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. These include: the history of the Alash Orda movement5, especially 
its post-civil war cooperation with the Bolsheviks; the Kazakhs’ position on the 
Soviet delimitation of Central Asia, and the results of this delimitation for 
Kazakhstan; the famine in Kazakhstan during the collectivisation of Soviet 
agriculture, with particular emphasis on the role of Moscow and Kazakhstan’s 
local authorities; repressions against “bourgeois nationalists” in Kazakhstan; 
migration to Kazakhstan in Soviet.6
3 Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney, Vol.1-5 / Ed. Akademiya Nauk Kazakhskoy 
SSR, Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1977-1981.
4 Istoriya Kazakhstana s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney / Ed. Natsional’naya Akademiya Nauk Respubliki 
Kazakhstan, Almaty: Deuir, 1993.
5 Alash Orda - Kazakh nationalist movement established in December 1905 in the time of the first Russian 
revolution. It had close links with Russian Constitutional Democratic Party and shared its political platform. The 
movement had elected deputies in the first Russian parliament (State Duma). After the overthrow of the Russian Tsar 
in February 1917 the movement supported the Provisional Government and opposed Bolshevik takeover in October 
1917. In the Civil War Alash Orda supported anti-Bolshevik forces, but in the end swithched sides and joined the 
Soviet Government. The core of the movement’s political program was autonomy for Kazakhs within Russian 
federation. In late 1920’s - early 1930’s most of the Alash Orda leaders perished in purgers directed against 
“bourgeois nationalists”.
6 The author made a modest contribution to the research of the latter issue. See: Alexandrov, M., Russian Migration 
to Kazakhstan // Russian and Euro-Asian Economic Bulletin, Vol.5, No.6, 1996, Melbourne: University of 
Melbourne, 1996, pp. 1-12.
5In writing about contemporary Russian-Kazakh relations the following 
types of sources have been used. First and most important were documents and 
other official materials. A very valuable source was a collection of Russian- 
Kazakh treaties and agreements published by Kazakhstan’s Embassy in Moscow. 
Another valuable source was a set of documents prepared for the April 1995 
hearings on Russo-Kazakh relations of the Russian State Duma Committee on 
CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots. Besides several significant agreements 
between Russia and Kazakhstan not included in the Kazakhstan Embassy 
publication, the collection contained official reports by Russian government 
agencies on the status of relations with Kazakhstan in their respective fields, 
documents prepared by Russian community organisations in Kazakhstan, and 
several analytical reports prepared by the Duma’s own experts. Of primary 
importance to the thesis were the minutes of the hearings themselves. They 
included testimony by high-ranking Russian officials from various government 
departments. The opinions voiced by them helped to form an impression on the 
Russian government’s real attitude to relations with Kazakhstan. The hearings 
were also attended by Kazakhstan’s Ambassador Mansurov, and representatives 
of Russian community organisations in Kazakhstan and of several Russian 
research institutions.
The author also made use of documents published in various Russian and 
Kazakhstan official bulletins and periodicals, such as the Diplomaticheskiy vestnik 
of the Russian and Diplomaticheskiy kurier of the Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Bulleten' Mezhdunarodnykh Dogovorov of the Russian Presidential 
Administration and Informatsionnyy Bulleten’ of the CIS Parliamentary 
Assembly, as well as documents published from time to time in Russian and 
Kazakhstan official newspapers such as Rossiyskaya gazeta, Rossiyskie vesti and 
Kazakhstanskaya pravda. A valuable source for research into the Gorbachev 
period was a collection of documents on the nationalities question in the USSR, 
prepared by Ch.F.Furtado and A.Chandler. Official materials such as publications, 
statements and interviews by Presidents Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, the Prime 
Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two countries, or other ministers and high-
6ranking officials were also used, as were impersonal official materials such as 
statements, resolutions and publications by various government agencies.
With regard to actual facts and developments in Russian-Kazakh relations 
the author extensively used the second type of sources - reports by information 
agencies, especially Reuters, ITAR-TASS, Radio Liberty, USIA and publications 
in the Russian, Kazakhstan and sometimes Western periodical press. The author 
would like to particularly single out the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
which contained very valuable material on events in Kazakhstan. Also of great 
utility was the monthly bulletin of the Russian Institute for Scientific Information 
on Social Sciences “Russia and the Muslim World”, which publishes summaries of 
almost all articles pertaining to post-Soviet Central Asia appearing in the Russian 
press.
The third group of sources comprised memoirs, books, brochures and 
academic journal articles related to the subject of the research. The memoirs gave 
an insight into some events that took place behind the scenes. The author drew 
extensively on the memoirs of Kunayev, Nazarbayev and Gorbachev, and to a 
lesser extent on those of Boldin, Pavlov and Ligachev. To the same category of 
literature the author relegates a biographical publication on Nazarbayev, by 
D.Valovoy and an essay by a Russian journalist, N.Kuzmin, giving his impressions 
of life in Kazakhstan before the collapse o f the USSR .8 As memoirs are usually 
very subjective sources, the reminiscences of each memoirist were checked against 
those of others wherever possible.
Among works by Western scholars, particular attentions was paid to those 
addressing issues of nationalism, the role of political elites and political processes 
in Central Asia within the chronological limits of the thesis, Russian policies 
towards Central Asia and the CIS as a whole, and the foreign policies of the new 
independent states of Central Asia. Of special interest to the author were several 
recent publications on Central Asia by M.B.Olcott. Other scholars, whose works 
were useful for the purposes of the research include J.Lepingwell, R.Dannreuther, 
A.Dixon, CD.Harris, C.Undeland, N.Platt, S.Adshead, B.Fowkes,
R.D.McChesney, M.Rywkin, T.H.Rigby, G.Parry and C.W.Mills.
In Russia the one and only major publication on post-Soviet Kazakhstan 
was produced by the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) . 9 It was a 
collective work, covering topics such as Kazakhstan’s economic situation 
(G.D.Bessarabov), stages of economic development (Yu.I.Puzanov), prospects for 
economic union with Russia (EM Ivanov), oil and gas industry (AN.Loginov), 
military issues (G.G.Tishchenko, A.G.Onopko, A.A.Makunin, AT.Volkov), 
political parties (A.A.Kurtov), the ethnic and political situation (M.N.Guboglo), 
and some other problems. It contained many interesting facts and some valuable 
assessments. The institute, though not formally affiliated with any government 
agency, is closely linked to the Russian defence and security establishment.
8 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy (Nocturnal conversations) // Molodaya Gvardiya, No.2, 1997, pp. 249-350.
9 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: 
Rossiyskiy institut strategicheskikh issledovaniy, 1995.
7Issues of Russia’s relations with Central Asian states, including 
Kazakhstan, found reflection in publications (brochures and articles) by 
M.Khroustalev, A.Zagorsky, D.Trofimov and S.Solodovnik produced by the 
Centre for International Studies at Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations (MGIMO). Since MGIMO is a subdivision of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry, it is not surprising that their views reflect the attitudes prevalent among 
Russian diplomats. Another Moscow academic who specialises in Kazakhstan is 
Professor Bagramov, chief editor of the journal "Eurasia", subsidised by 
Kazakhstan's government. In all, the number of Russian academic publications both 
on Russian-Kazakh relations, and on Kazakhstan as such is insignificant. Serious 
research and production of quality academic material is hampered by the 
unavailability of funds and the government’s refusal to increase budget allocations 
for scholarship.
Far more publications on Russian-Kazakh relations are produced in 
Kazakhstan. There are two main think-tanks producing literature on the issues of 
foreign policy, defence and security: The Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies 
(KISI), and the Institute for Development of Kazakhstan (IRK). Both are closely 
linked to the government. KISI is a subdivision of the presidential administration, 
and IRK was founded by the cabinet of ministers. Each has its own periodical 
publications. KISI issues a journal Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobschesU’o and IRK 
two journals Politika (Sayasat) and Evraziyskoe soobschesh’o: ekonomika, 
politika, bezopasnost'. Both institutions regularly publish separate brochures and 
reports.
The major expert on Russian-Kazakh relations is KISI’s Director, 
U.T.Kasenov, who has published far more on the subject than any other Kazakh 
scholar. Other KISI researchers who contributed to the study of the subject are 
B.B.Abdigaliev, A.K.Sultangalieva, M.Laumulin, Sh.E.Zhaksibekova, 
M.Zaslavskaya. Among works by IRK’s academics are those by its President 
E.M.Arinov, Director R.K.Zhulamanov and researcher M.U.Spanov, and by 
outside experts who actively participated in IRK’s publications, such as L.Bakaev, 
Head of a Branch in the Division of International Security of the Kazakhstan 
Foreign Ministry, or B.T.Ayaganov, A.U.Kuvandikov, and S.Z.Baimagambetov, 
senior Kazakhstan government officials. Valuable information was contained in a 
publication by M.Arenov and S.Kalmikov. Naturally, the views and concepts 
expressed by all the above authors conform to the official ideology of 
Nazarbayev’s regime. But they also have the advantage of expressing the 
government’s position more bluntly, without excessive regard for inter­
governmental civilities. In other words, Kasenov can say publicly what Nazarbayev 
cannot. And this gives a clear hint of the lines along which Kazakhstan’s president 
and government are thinking.
More independent in expressing their views are academics of the 
Kazakhstan National University, for example, Doctor of Political Science 
R M.Kaliyeva. The university also harbours individual scholars steadfastly opposed 
to Nazarbayev’s regime, such as professors N.E.Masanov and N.Amerkulov. But
8such academics are rare; Masanov, for example, has had difficulties in publishing 
his works in Kazakhstan, and has to approach Russian and Western publishers.
The scope and limits of research
The thesis deals primarily with Russian-Kazakh relations after the collapse 
of the USSR, and covers the period 1992-1997. However, the first chapter is of a 
background nature. It examines the period 1985-1991, the last years of the USSR, 
known as Gorbachev’s perestroyka. The reason for this is that the Gorbachev 
period saw the initiation of certain processes in Russian-Kazakh relations which 
developed to a new stage after independence, and will influence the nature of the 
relationship for many years to come. The author considered it important to show 
how the process of disintegration built up in relations between Moscow and 
Kazakhstan, as well as the roles played in this process by members of the Kazakh 
and Russian national elites.
The remaining four chapters deal with the post-Soviet period. They pursue 
the following goals. The first goal was descriptive - to tell the reader what actually 
happened in Russian-Kazakh relations in 1992-1997. The second was selection -to 
identify the most important problems (or groups of problems) in Russian-Kazakh 
relations, giving priority to those issues which contained essential, long-term 
components of these relations, and exercised a decisive influence on each state’s 
attitude to the other. The author identified four such groups of problems, which 
predetermined the structure of the thesis, each giving its name to a chapter:
The first group of problems (Chapter Two) concerns the status of the 
Russian community in Kazakhstan. It examines such issues as the Kazakh 
leadership’s policy of nation-state building and its effects on Kazakhstan’s Russian 
population and on relations between the two countries. This set of problems was 
put first because the author considers it the most important issue in Russian- 
Kazakh relations, determining in each country the attitude to each other not only of 
the government but of the people. In analysing this problem the term “Russian” is 
used in an extended fashion, to include not only ethnic Russians, but people who 
associate themselves with the Russian cultural heritage. An accepted term in Russia 
for this group is “Russian-speaking”, but the term is not entirely accurate, because 
many Kazakhs, especially in the political elite, are Russian-speakers. Generally, this 
group includes other Slavs - Ukrainians and Belorussians - as well as some ethnic 
Germans.
The second group (Chapter Three) of problems comprises such issues as 
Kazakh and Russian attitudes to post-Soviet economic and political integration 
between the two countries, either within the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), or on some other basis such as the Eurasian Union (EAU) proposed by 
Nazarbayev, or in the framework of the Customs Union of Russia, Belorussia, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Moscow’s and Almaty’s attitudes towards post- 
Soviet integration are important for two reasons. Firstly, they are a significant
9indicator of the extent of cooperation between the two countries - to what degree 
they trust each other. Secondly, these countries as two major players among the 
post-Soviet states will have a decisive role in determining the future geopolitical 
architecture of the Eurasian mainland: will it develop along an integrative path 
leading to the formation of a new supranational entity, or will it move towards 
greater separation and consolidation of national states?
Chapter Four deals with a set of military and strategic issues in Russian- 
Kazakh relations. In the past Russia had substantial military and strategic interests 
in Kazakhstan, and these did not disappear with the USSR’s collapse. Moreover, it 
may be said that they became even more acute. Kazakhstan became the country 
with the longest common border with Russia, and at the same time a buffer state 
between Russia and the turbulent Muslim world. Some military and other defence- 
related installations in Kazakhstan are still of importance to Russia’s defence 
capabilities. Hence Russia’s long-standing interest in keeping Kazakhstan in the 
zone of its military and strategic influence. The issues examined in the chapter are 
Kazakhstan’s nuclear disarmament, the problem of the Baykonur cosmodrome, 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the CIS collective security system, and bilateral 
relations in the military sphere.
Chapter Five addresses a group of issues related to Kazakhstan’s energy 
resources. After independence, Kazakhstan a country with large deposits of oil and 
gas, attracted the attention of major international oil companies. This originated a 
vigorous diplomatic struggle for access and control of Kazakhstan’s energy 
resources. Russia has a very important stake in the game - the ability to keep 
Kazakhstan and the whole of the Caspian basin in the sphere of its economic and 
political influence. The outcome of this struggle will to a large degree determine 
Russia’s future role on the Eurasian mainland. The chapter examines such 
questions as Russian energy policy towards Kazakhstan, the problem of the 
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), Tengiz and Karachaganak projects and the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea.
The author saw his third task as analysis of these issues. This task consisted 
in identifying major contradictory and concurrent interests within each group of 
problems, and how they extrapolate to real policies versus the declaratory policies 
proclaimed by the leaders of both countries. This was not always easy, because the 
foreign policies of both Kazakhstan and Russia (due to the background of the 
present Russian and Kazakh leaders) are strongly influenced by the old Soviet 
practice applied in relations with the countries of the former “socialist community”, 
namely keeping quiet about differences and giving the public a sanitised version of 
events. To what extent these tasks have been fulfilled is for the reader to judge.
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CHAPTER 1
THE EMERGENCE OF INDEPENDENT KAZAKHSTAN.
Gorbachev’s reforms had a most significant impact on Russian-Kazakh 
relations in the post-Soviet era, and not simply because independent Kazakhstan 
emerged only as a result of USSR’s collapse. Gorbachev’s policy towards 
Kazakhstan and especially its consequences have very directly influenced the 
current attitudes of Russians and Kazakhs to each other. When Gorbachev took 
office in March 1985 he, as he himself admits, had no clear vision of future 
reforms, only a general idea that the Soviet system should be made more viable and 
effective.1 He approached this problem in typical Soviet style by applying 
traditional administrative mechanisms. Hence the concept of "acceleration", 
accompanied by such measures as an anti-alcohol campaign and struggles against 
corruption and protectionism in public service. These measures all entailed more 
centralisation and control, and had nothing to do with democratising political or 
economic life.
At the centre of Gorbachev’s effort was a personnel policy directed at 
cardinal renovation of the state and party apparatus. At the Politburo meeting on 1 
December 1985 he said that the main reason for “stagnation” was “ossification of 
leading personnel”, and “If we want to improve the situation we should change 
personnel, personnel policy”. On another occasion, referring to personnel policy, 
he noted that moving ahead was impossible without a “small revolution in the 
party”. He advocated tough personnel measures, because he was convinced that his 
policies were being “directly sabotaged”. There was, however, another important 
reason for Gorbachev’s personnel policy. As he mentioned in his memoirs, he 
feared removal from office, and strove to consolidate his personal power base by 
removing Brezhnev’s associates, who could oust him as they had ousted 
Khrushchev.2
Overall, Gorbachev's personnel policy boiled down to a large-scale purge 
of the state and party apparatus, very reminiscent of all his predecessors. During 
his first year in power Gorbachev ousted three influential Politburo members - 
G.Romanov (July 1985), Prime Minister Tikhonov (September) and Moscow Party 
chief V.Grishin (December). Moreover 45% of USSR government ministers and 
30% of the powerful regional Party First Secretaries were replaced. By March 
1986 some 42.7% of voting members of the CPSU Central Committee were new.3 
To legitimise the purge politically, Gorbachev put forward two slogans popular 
with the public - struggle against economic mismanagement, and corruption.
1 Gorbachev, M., Zhiziv i reformy, Kmga 1, Moscow: “Novosti”, 1995, p. 293.
2 Ibid., pp. 297-298, 305, 307.
3 Kaiser, R., Why Gorbachev Happened: His Triumph and His Failure, New York: Simon &. Schuster, 1991, p. 
115.
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A massive anti-corruption campaign began in early summer 1985, after 
A.Yakovlev became Head of the CPSU Central Committee for Propaganda. 
Central Asian republics figured very highly in the campaign, probably because they 
were considered soft targets. Gorbachev had solid reasons to expect Central Asian 
leaders’ morale to be low, following Andropov’s large-scale crackdown on 
corruption in Uzbekistan in 1983. His calculations soon proved mostly justified. By 
the end of 1985 he had smoothly removed the leaders of three Central Asian 
republics - Kyrgyzia (T.Usubaliev), Turkmenistan (M.Gapurov) and Tajikistan 
(R.Nabiev). Uzbek Communist Party First Secretary I. Usmankhodzhaev survived 
simply because his appointment was very recent, after the corruption case in 
Uzbekistan had already ended.
The charges against Usubaliev, Gapurov and Nabiev were almost identical. 
An impression of them can be gleaned from the report by A.Masaliev, the new 
leader of Kyrgyzia, to the 18th Congress of the Kyrgyz Communist Party in 
January 1986. Masaliev said: "...Leninist principles of personnel policy were 
seriously violated. Many officials were chosen on grounds of personal loyalty, 
kinship or common origin". Usubaliev, he claimed, "essentially decided personnel 
and other matters by himself, did not permit objections, tolerated no opinion that 
did not agree with his own, and did not hesitate to persecute those who were 
recalcitrant... to justify his mistaken decisions he forced officials to be insincere or 
even fiddle with facts..., criticism and self-criticism were lacking while servility, 
sycophancy and flattery spread..., there were groundless promotions and receipt of 
academic titles, degrees and awards” .4
The report reflected Moscow's position and thus revealed Gorbachev's 
views on what should be done in Central Asia. The impression is that Gorbachev 
failed to comprehend the importance of clan politics in Central Asian societies. 
What Masaliev singled out as unacceptable behaviour was in fact a centuries-old 
characteristic of the life of Central Asian peoples. To attack it was to attack their 
traditions, values and culture. Thus Gorbachev’s personnel policy had one 
significant fault, which proved fateful. It was based on the concept of uniformity, 
took no account of the complexity and diversity of the former Soviet society, and 
also ignored a basic fact of the Soviet system, that personnel policy in ethnic 
republics was always an unalienable part of nationality policy, and should be 
subordinate to it. However, it soon became clear that Gorbachev’s leadership 
altogether lacked a coherent nationality policy.
Though Gorbachev denies this in his memoirs,5 his experience in nationality 
affairs was very limited, and much less that that of Stalin, Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev. Gorbachev came from Stavropol region, a territory of Russia proper, 
where inter-ethnic relations were not a real problem. The region was not ethnically 
homogeneous, having, besides a Russian majority, a small autonomous province 
inhabited by two minor nationalities - Karachai and Cherkess. But the status of
4 Brown, B., Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of Kirgizia: An Attack on the Past, Radio Liberty 
Research Bulletin RL 88/86, February 20, 1986, pp. 1-2.
5 Gorbachev, M., Zhizn' i reformy, Kniga 1, Moscow: '"Novosti”, 1995, p. 492.
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autonomous provinces was very low, in no way comparable to a Union Republic 
with its own government, state symbols and other attributes of statehood. 
Autonomous provinces were subordinate to regional administrations, and their 
elites intermingled with that of the region. Throughout his career in Stavropol 
Gorbachev apparently never experienced any particular problems with the Karachai 
or Cherkess.
Gorbachev did not accept, or more precisely did not understand, the 
essence of Brezhnev’s nationalities policy, which was based on a social concord 
with republics’ national elites. He wrote in his memoirs: “Brezhnev could not be 
unaware of abuses, which were taking place in Uzbekistan, malfeasances in other 
republics and Russian provinces, but he preferred not to raise Cain and not to foul 
his own nest. He went no farther than talking privately like a Dutch uncle to a 
miscreant leader, and in the last resort sending him somewhere as an ambassador”.6 
This shows that Gorbachev considered Brezhnev’s behaviour not as a well- 
conceived policy (sometimes described as “stability of cadres”), but as a major 
deviation from the basic principles of Communist doctrine which he, Gorbachev, 
was destined to correct.
Gorbachev’s approach to nationalities policy was rooted in his close 
association with Marxist theory. As distinct from Stalin and Brezhnev, who applied 
Marxism in a politically expedient way to suit their domestic and foreign policy 
objectives, Gorbachev’s adherence to Marxism was genuine. In this he stood much 
closer to such leaders as Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and later Khrushchev.
Not surprisingly, Gorbachev’s ‘purification’ campaign was accompanied by vocal 
claims of the necessity to revive the true spirit of Marxism-Leninism. As witnessed 
by Gorbachev's Chief of Staff Boldin, in 1986 and 1987 Gorbachev “was strongly 
under the influence of Lenin's writings... It was my impression that he was anxious 
to propose some concept that might continue Lenin's thinking, and perhaps shake 
the world as powerfully as anything the Soviet Union's founding father had done".7
But Marxist theory of nationalities relations contained very little of 
relevance. It was based on the illusory postulate that class is a more powerful 
factor than nation, and deduced from this an erroneous doctrine of proletarian 
internationalism. Neither Stalin nor Brezhnev took it seriously, but for propaganda 
purposes both stopped short of denouncing it. Gorbachev had a different vision.
He surrounded himself with people immersed in dogmas of Marxist theory, and 
this was the second factor that caused his nationality policy to fail. The leading 
figure among them was Alexander Yakovlev, long known for his fierce opposition 
to nationalism, particularly Russian nationalism.8 Views close to Yakovlev's were
6 Ibid., p. 283.
7 Boldin, V., Ten Years That Shook the World, New York: Basic Books, 1994, p. 96.
8 hi November 1972, while heading the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda Department, Yakovlev wrote a long 
article in Literatumaya gazeta attacking as anti-Leninist Russophile tendencies in literature, journalism and 
historical writings. He also criticised the "extra-class and extra-social approach" of tire nationalists to history, and 
censured any dabbling with religion, such as excessive admiration for old icons and chinches. Yakovlev's article 
caused much controversy among the Soviet leadership, and a few months after its appearance he disappeared into 
honourable exile as Soviet Ambassador to Canada. [Sheehy, A., Gorbachev's New Propaganda Chief a Critic of 
Russian Nationalists, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 357/85, October 31, 1985, pp. 2, 5],
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held by Gorbachev's other principal advisers - A.Chernyaev, V.Zagladin, 
G.Shakhnazarov and I.Frolov. This team’s combined efforts produced a strange 
but logically interrelated mixture of Marxism (international communism) and 
liberalism. According to Boldin, "the notion of perestroika, together with all its 
basic components, was mainly Yakovlev's work".9
Like anything else emanating from Marxism the doctrine of "new political 
thinking" was globalist. At its core lay an assumption of growing economic 
interdependence of the world’s peoples and nations, that should lead to 
interdependence in all other spheres. Therefore the role of national states in world 
politics would progressively diminish, and that of supranational structures (UN; 
EEC; OSCE etc.) increase. New transnational organisations would appear, some 
with Soviet participation, such as the "Common European Home" advocated by 
Gorbachev. The trend to interdependence would inevitably lead to universalisation 
of life in general, and most specifically to the emergence of "universal values" 
common to all nations. International contradictions would become less acute, 
conflict potential in the world system would abate, creating prerequisites for 
relinquishing power politics, achieving "balance of interests" among nations, and 
prevalence of the rule of law in international conduct.
The problem of nationalism was very inconvenient to the "new political 
thinking". Nationalism contravened the doctrine’s basic postulate - the growth of 
interdependence; on the contrary, it demonstrated diversity and contradictions 
among nations. Accentuating issues of nationality relations could place 
Gorbachev's entire scheme in jeopardy, and with it his own political standing. 
Hence Gorbachev tried to avoid addressing the topic of nationalism, evading a 
search for real solutions by sticking to traditional Soviet formulas and cliches. For 
example, his statements on the nationality question at the 27th CPSU Congress 
were entirely routine, and no new ideas found their way into the new party 
program. At the January 1987 Central Committee plenum he admitted the 
existence of problems in nationality relations, but blamed them on former leaders’ 
mistakes.10
Meanwhile by alienating national elites, Gorbachev ruined Brezhnev's 
mechanism for running Soviet nationality affairs, without creating one of his own. 
Elites moved into opposition to the union centre, and Gorbachev began losing 
control over the republics. He apparently believed sincerely that the trend to 
interdependence would overwhelm nationalist sentiments, and the best policy was 
just to wait while the "objective laws of history" did their work.
The Kazakh national elite was the first to pose a direct and open challenge. 
Initially this assumed the form of a personal clash between Gorbachev and 
Kunayev. Gorbachev was interested in Kunayev’s speedy removal for several 
reasons. Firstly, Kunayev was a very close associate of Brezhnev from the mid- 
1950s, and Gorbachev's strategy for building his own popularity consisted in
9 Boldin, V., Ten Years That Shook the World, New York: Basic Books, 1994, p. 113.
10 Kommunist, No.3, 1987, p. 29.
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denigrating all Brezhnev's heritage. Besides, Kunayev belonged to the so called 
"war generation" o f Soviet leaders,11 which obviously made his vision of the world 
very different from Gorbachev's. Kunayev also headed the territorially second 
largest republic of the USSR, and was a full member of the Politburo. All this made 
his position in the party especially strong. Gorbachev had little doubt which side 
Kunayev would take in the event of a showdown with the conservatives on the 
Central Committee.
Gorbachev had been General Secretary for just three months when he 
delivered his first attack. The victim was A. Askarov, First Secretary of Shymkent 
province party committee, and a distant relative o f Kunayev. He was removed from 
office on 10 July 1985.12 There was an interesting discrepancy in comments on the 
event by Kazakh and Moscow media. The former criticised the provincial party 
organisation under Askarov’s leadership for not succeeding completely “in 
reconstructing its style and methods of work in directing the economy”, criticism 
not going beyond very general and vague hints o f economic mismanagement,13 and 
not unusual even in Brezhnev's time. But a Pra\>dct article three days later 
mentioned not only economic failures, but mismanagement and corruption ignored 
by local party officials. Though not accusing Askarov himself of corruption, it gave 
the impression that he had somehow benefited by surrounding himself with the 
corrupt.14 The striking difference between the two accounts was a clear indication 
that Moscow was trying to embarrass the Kazakh authorities, above all Kunayev.
Kunayev, however, did not lose his nerve. He personally had nothing to 
fear; subsequent investigations proved beyond doubt that he was not involved in 
corruption. Moreover, he himself telephoned the USSR Attorney-General in 
Moscow and asked him to send an experienced investigator to Kazakhstan, to deal 
with corruption there. The investigator, sent without delay, was V.Kalinichenko, a 
member of the group which had cracked down on corruption in Uzbekistan.15
Kunayev’s political position inside Kazakhstan was exceptionally strong. 
He was not just another First Secretary, he was a leader of a national elite he 
himself had helped create, and whose allegiance to him was very strong. Besides, in 
Kunayev’s years Kazakhstan had made notable economic and social progress, and 
living standards of ordinary citizens had also improved, to a level well above those 
of the mid-1950s, when he first came to office. This won Kunayev the respect of 
not only the national elite but also of rank and file party members. Inter-ethnic 
relations in Kazakhstan under Kunayev were quite stable. Like any other First 
Secretary in a Union Republic, Kunayev had control of his own propaganda 
machine. He skilfully used it to tone down Moscow's criticisms in the local, 
especially Kazakh language, mass media, but stopped short of anything which
11 The generation that lived through the Second World War. (Kunayev was bom on 12 January 1912).
12 Pravda, 11.07.85.
13 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 14.07.85.
14 Pravda, 14.07.85.
15 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy // Molodaya Gvardiya, No.2, 1997, p. 312, 318.
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would enable Gorbachev to accuse him of deviation from the party line. Thus it 
was very difficult for Gorbachev to remove Kunayev by democratic means.
Gorbachev chose tactics which comprised undermining Kunayev from 
within Kazakhstan, firstly by discrediting him in the eyes of public opinion, and 
secondly by destroying his power base. Subversive rumours against Kunayev began 
to be spread through unofficial channels,16 while at the official level Gorbachev 
attacked Kazakhstan’s economic performance. In September 1985 he visited 
Tselinograd, capital of the Kazakhstan Virgin Lands region, to address an inter­
provincial conference of Party and business executives on agriculture, and there 
specifically singled out Kazakhstan for not meeting agricultural production targets.
17
Gorbachev also sought allies against Kunayev among high-ranking 
members of the Kazakh elite. He found at least two such persons, Premier 
N.Nazarbayev and First Secretary of Kzyl Orda province party committee 
E.Auyelbekov. Both were young and ambitious, looking to succeed Kunayev in 
Kazakhstan’s highest post, and Gorbachev exploited their vanity. Nazarbayev 
admitted in his memoirs that Gorbachev supported him against Kunayev because 
“he needed allies in the struggle with the old generation o f Politburo members”.18 
Nazarbayev attracted Moscow’s attention by becoming an ardent supporter of all 
sorts of economic experiments in Kazakhstan, but Kunayev objected to his 
initiatives, and their relations deteriorated 19 Significantly, Kunayev wrote in his 
memoirs that Nazarbayev’s work in the republic’s Council of Ministers “did not 
always go smoothly”, and it had been necessary “to correct him and point out his 
shortcomings”.20
Although it was Kunayev who had promoted Nazarbayev from the lowly 
position of Party Secretary at the Karaganda metallurgical plant to the second 
highest post in Kazakhstan, the new Premier displayed only transient loyalty to his 
patron. By late 1985 he was already discussing anti-Kunayev strategy in Moscow 
with Prcn>da ’s Deputy Chief Editor Valovoy, whom he told that he would have a 
final talk with Kunayev on “improving the situation in the economy”, and if they 
failed to agree he would voice his criticisms at the forthcoming 16th CPK 
Congress.
In his report to the congress on 8 February 1986 Nazarbayev did in fact 
criticise Kunayev, though in veiled form. He said that “highlighting of successes 
and unfounded praise for leaders, which had been imposed from above for years
16 A characteristic example is "unofficial" Marxist historian R.Medvedev, who had been expelled from the CPSU 
in 1979 and since then regarded as a dissident. Said Medvedev: "Through Kunayev's personal connections, the 
corruption even spread to Moscow, even inside the Brezhnev clan... Kunayev would go to Moscow bearing 
expensive gifts for Brezhnev and his family, and for many other government leaders. These gifts frequently came in 
the form of hard cash...". [Medvedev, R., & Chiesa, G., Time of Change: An insider's view of Russia's 
transformation, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989, p. 55.]
17 Pravda, 11.09.85.
18 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, Almaty: "Oner", 1996, p. 54.
19 Valovoy, D., Kremlevskiy tupik i Nazarbayev, Moscow: “Molodaya Gvardiya", 1993, p. 70.
20 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, pp. 277, 284, 
289, 293, 305.
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led to fading criticism and self-criticism, weakening of ties with the masses”, and 
“Faulty methods of administration are not nipped, which does tremendous damage 
to the economy”. But the major point in his criticism was a personal attack against 
Kunayev's younger brother Askar Kunayev, President of the Kazakh Academy of 
Sciences, who, he said, “has opted out of work and does not even attend meetings 
of the Council of Ministers”. It was obvious to all that this was an indirect attack 
on Kunayev himself. In his autobiography Kunayev subsequently described 
Nazarbayev’s criticism of his brother as “not objective”.
Interestingly, Nazarbayev promptly passed the text of his report to 
Valovoy, who had come to Alma-Ata specially to observe the Congress, and 
Valovoy used it as the basis for an article, “Time Demands”, very critical of 
Kazakhstan’s realities. He claimed that after Nazarbayev’s speech a smear 
campaign against him started to unfold in Kazakhstan, with fifty complaints 
orchestrated within a month, alleging that Nazarbayev was a power-seeker, whose 
major aim was to unseat and succeed Kunayev.21
Auyelbekov also criticised Kunayev at the Congress. During discussion of 
Kunayev's report, Auyelbekov referred to instances of corruption, window- 
dressing, “highlighting of successes and hushing up of shortcomings”, and 
promotion of officials on the basis of personal loyalty, kinship and geographical 
origin in his province under its previous leadership. He said that the situation had 
existed for years, and implied that the republic’s leadership knew this, but did 
nothing about it 22 However, neither Nazarbayev nor Auyelbekov could muster any 
significant opposition to Kunayev. He was re-elected unopposed as Kazakhstan’s 
First Secretary and as such led its delegation to the 27th CPSU Congress, which 
opened in Moscow on 25 February 1986.23
In Moscow Kunayev again became subject to criticism, this time from 
Gorbachev himself. Kazakhstan was one of very few regions specifically mentioned 
in the Central Committee report as failing to pay enough attention to “raising 
production efficiency" and producing "national income per unit of fixed capital one 
third lower than on average in the economy". That Gorbachev had to use such an 
abstract indicator tends to suggest that he had difficulties finding anything really 
incriminating against Kunayev. The general economic slowdown affected every 
region, and Kazakhstan was not conspicuously less successful than other republics. 
Gorbachev coupled his criticism of Kazakhstan with that of Turkmenistan, where 
the Party First Secretary had recently been dismissed, a clear hint to the delegates 
that Kunayev must follow suit.24 But at that time Gorbachev refrained from 
sacking Kunayev, probably because he had no obvious successor in mind to head 
such a large and important republic.
21 Valovoy, D., Kremlevskiy tupik i Nazarbayev, Moscow: "Molodaya Gvardiya", 1993, pp. 71-74, 77.
22 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 08.02.86.
23 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 9.02.86.
24 XVn S ezd Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Stenograficheskiy otchet, t.l, Moscow: Politizdat, 
1986, pp. 59, 159-161.
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Media attacks against Kunayev continued after the Congress. In July 1996
Pravda
published two very critical articles, one citing instances of corruption among senior 
Kazakh officials, the other using Kazakhstan party officials to exemplify 
undesirable work styles.25 Kunayev was deeply offended by the Moscow press’ 
ignoring of successes in Kazakhstan’s social and economic development, and 
exclusive concentration on shortcomings. Later he wrote that this “conspiracy of 
silence” was one reason that forced his retirement.26 Meanwhile in Kazakhstan, 
career-minded party leaders and government officials began betraying their leader 
to save their own jobs. In his memoirs Kunayev referred to “double-dealing 
members” o f the republic’s Central Committee who sent false information about 
him to Moscow.27 Gorbachev also noted in his book that he had been visited more 
than once by province party committee secretaries, and later by a group of CPK 
Central Committee secretaries, led by Second Secretary Miroshkhin, which 
reported that “things were not going well in the republic” .28
Among such “dishonest” people and “time-servers” Kunayev named only 
Miroshkhin, Mukashev, Kamaledenov and Mendibayev. He did not mention 
Nazarbayev. Meanwhile it was no secret that Kunayev actively tried to get rid of 
Nazarbayev. More than once he proposed removing him from the Premiership, but 
the CPSU Central Committee rejected the proposal. These facts are substantiated 
by Gorbachev, who explained Kunayev’s enmity to Nazarbayev by Nazarbayev’s 
exposure of some irregularities in allocation of funds 29 If Nazarbayev was not 
allied with Gorbachev against Kunayev, he would have surely lost the Premiership 
after Kunayev’s retirement.
Why did Kunayev not mention Nazarbayev’s intrigues against himself? The 
probable answer is that when Kunayev’s memoirs came to be published, 
Nazarbayev was already Kazakhstan’s President, and in that situation Kunayev had 
several reasons not to write negatively about Nazarbayev, who acknowledged his 
restraint.30 This may be called a tactical compromise between the old and the new 
leader. Nazarbayev received carte blanche to create an image of himself as 
Kunayev’s worthy successor, and Kunayev ensured posthumous status for himself 
as a great leader of Kazakhstan.
In August 1986 the CPSU Central Committee passed a highly critical 
resolution on the state of Kazakhstan’s agriculture. The resolution was not always 
objective in blaming all the alleged failures on Kazakhstan's leadership.31 Kunayev 
understood that pressure for his resignation was building up. Indications of this 
were everywhere. Despite his membership of the Politburo, he was conspicuously
25 Pravda, 7.07.86; 22.07.86.
26 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: "Sanat”, 1994, pp. 287-288.
27 Ibid.,’ p. 289.
28 Gorbachev, M., Zhiziv i refonny, Kniga 1, Moscow: "Novosti”, 1995, p. 497.
29 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: "Sanat", 1994, pp. 284, 293- 
294; Valovoy, D., Kremlevskiy tupik I Nazarbayev, Moscow: "Molodaya Gvardiya”, 1993, p. 78; Gorbachev, M., 
Zhizn' i refonny, Kniga 1, Moscow: “Novosti”, 1995, pp. 497-498.
30 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, Almatv: "Oner”, 1996, pp. 50-51.
31 Pravda, 28.08.86.
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not invited to its meeting held in early November 1986 to discuss the economic 
development plan for 1987. Moreover, the report delivered by Ligachev on the 
69th anniversary of the October revolution did not even mention Kazakhstan as a 
major contributor to Soviet grain output, except for mentioning Kustanay and 
Kokchetav provinces, which Gorbachev had visited, as fulfilling the economic plan.
In late November Kunayev came to Moscow for the USSR Supreme Soviet 
session, and had a long meeting with Gorbachev, at which he gave his views on 
various political matters and expressed dissatisfaction with some aspects of 
Gorbachev’s policy. “As I was leaving him I reached the final decision to retire”, 
he recalled.32 According to Gorbachev, Kunayev himself requested the meeting, 
during which he tried to convince Gorbachev that the complicated situation in the 
CPK Central Committee Bureau was the result of “intrigues” by Nazarbayev who 
was “yearning for power”, spoke very negatively of him, kept repeating: ‘This is a 
dangerous man. He must be stopped”, and finally asked Gorbachev to transfer 
Nazarbayev to Moscow, or send him abroad as a Foreign Ministry representative. 
But Gorbachev was not convinced. It would be strange if he was, because it was 
he who had masterminded the intrigues against Kunayev. He told Kunayev he 
disagreed on the reasons for the current situation, accused him of serious errors in 
personnel policy, encouraging kinship or common origin ties, protecting 
embezzlers, and persecuting internal dissidents, and suggested they continue the 
discussion at a joint meeting of the Politburo and CPK Central Committee Bureau. 
Kunayev then offered his resignation,33 to be formally submitted after Gorbachev’s 
return from India.
In early December 1986 Kunayev visited Gorbachev for the last time, and 
claims that when he asked who would replace him, Gorbachev replied: “Leave the 
decision on this matter to us. A good Communist will be recommended and sent to 
the republic”.34 Gorbachev gave a completely different account, according to 
which he asked Kunayev whom he would recommend, Kunayev replied “nobody, 
especially among local Kazakhs”, and advised that “in this difficult situation the 
position of First Secretary must be held by a Russian”.35 Which of the two was the 
more truthful can never be established, but Gorbachev’s credibility is the more 
dubious; his ousting of Kunayev provoked rioting in Kazakhstan, and his 
replacement proved a bad choice; so he had an incentive to shift some of the blame 
for some very poor decision-making.
Kunayev’s retirement was formally approved at the Politburo meeting on 
11 December 1986, to which Kunayev was not invited, though formally still a 
member, and though the meeting appointed his successor. Gorbachev selected 
Gennadiy Kolbin, who was not an ethnic Kazakh, and had no previous ties with
32 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, pp. 287-288.
33 Gorbachev, M , Zhizn' i refonny, Kniga 1, Moscow: “Novosti", 1995, pp. 497-498.
34 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, pp. 9-10.
35 Gorbachev, M., Zhizn' i refonny, Kniga 1, Moscow: “Novosti”, 1995, pp. 497-498.
19
Kazakhstan36, a circumstance which proved crucial for subsequent events. Only 
Gaydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan’s First Secretary, expressed doubts about Kolbin’s 
appointment; Gorbachev ignored them, and Kolbin’s candidature was approved.37 
Later Gorbachev admitted that Kolbin’s appointment was a mistake. “We were at 
the start of perestroika, and acted in a certain degree by old methods”, he w rote.38
On 16 December 1986 a plenum of the CPK Central Committee took 
place. It was attended by Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee for 
organisational matters Razumovsky. The plenum was extraordinarily short - 18 
minutes.39 Razumovsky announced the Politburo decision on Kunayev’s retirement 
and recommended Kolbin as new First Secretary. Nobody objected, and Kolbin 
was unanimously elected. Nothing foreshadowed trouble. It was like thunder on a 
clear day when on 18 December TASS announced that "a group of students, 
incited by nationalistic elements..., took to the streets o f Alma-Ata expressing 
disapproval of the recent plenum of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central 
Committee”.40
Subsequent disclosures suggest that the riots were not spontaneous. 
Turmoil started in student dormitories on 17 December, with student activists 
running from one room to another, shouting “All to the square! Let’s save 
Kunayev!” Those who refused to go were called “traitors” and beaten up. Parked 
near the dormitories were white Volga cars, a type available only in the Kazakhstan 
Council of Ministers’ garage, loaded with cases of vodka which was handed out 
free to students who rushed out to the streets;41 this at a time when Gorbachev’s 
anti-alcohol campaign was in full swing, vodka very difficult to get, especially in 
large quantities.
Soon a large crowd arrived at the Central Committee building in the centre 
of Alma-Ata, and its occupants locked themselves in. At 11 a m. Miroshkhin 
telephoned Kunayev and said that a group of young people has gathered on the 
central square. “They have asked to have the decisions of yesterday’s Central 
Committee plenum explained to them. It would be good if you would speak to 
them and explain the gist of the matter”, he said. When Kunayev arrived to the 
Central Committee he went straight to Kolbin’s office, where all members of the 
Bureau were present. They discussed what to do. Kolbin suggested Nazarbayev 
and Kamaledenov speak to the protesters. Kunayev was not invited to speak. After 
talking to Moscow, Kolbin advised Kunayev to go home, saying “We will take 
measures ourselves and establish order”. At the CPSU Central Committee plenum 
in June 1987 Miroshkhin confirmed that Kunayev had not been allowed to speak to
36 Kolbin, Gennadiy Ethnic Chuvash. An engineer by profession. Started his party career in 1959 in Sverdlovsk, hr 
1975 appointed Second Party Secretary' in Georgia, hr this capacity worked closely with E.Shevardnadze, 
Gorbachev's Foreign Mrnister, who headed Georgia in those days, hr December 1983 appointed First Secretary in 
Ulianovsk province, the post he held until the transfer to Kazakhstan.
37 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazaklrstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, pp. 272, 290.
38 Gorbachev, M., Zhizir' i refomry, Kiriga 1, Moscow: ^Novosti”, 1995, p. 498.
39 Pravda, 21.09.89.
40 Sheelry, A., Earlier Instances of Nationality Unrest in the USSR, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 475/86, 
December 19, 1986, p. 1.
41 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy // Molodaya Gvardiva, No.2, 1997, p. 249.
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the protesters. At 1 p.m. when Kunayev was already home, Gorbachev telephoned 
to ask the reason for the demonstration and who had organised it. Kunayev replied 
that he did not know the organisers and referred Gorbachev to the republic’s 
leadership.42
Meanwhile the protesters besieging the Central Committee building became 
restive at the lack of any response. Some of them moved to the TV centre, 
obviously planning to broadcast to the rest of the republic and incite similar 
demonstrations in other provinces. Such attempts were in fact made, through 
distributing leaflets and appeals in twelve of Kazakhstan's provincial centres, but 
they were unsuccessful.43 The crowd burst into the TV centre, knocked out the 
policeman guarding the entrance and disarmed him. At the door to the studio, 
engineer Savitskiy, Russian by nationality, attempted to block their way. He was 
beaten to death. But the protesters did not know how to use the TV equipment, 
and failed to make any broadcasts. The disarmed policeman managed to telephone 
and report what was happening, 44 After which events began to unfold with 
increasing speed.
The Moscow newspapers reported that the protesters "set fire to a food 
store and private cars" and committed "insulting actions against citizens of the 
city".45 They allegedly carried banners with nationalistic slogans and were later 
joined by "hooligans, drunkards and other anti-social individuals... armed with 
metal rods, sticks and stones", who "beat up and insulted citizens, overturned cars 
and set them on fire, and broke windows in stores, dormitories and other public 
buildings".46. One report said they had been "excited by alcohol and narcotics", and 
threw "pieces of marble at unarmed volunteer police aides and policemen".47 
Leaders of party committees in districts of Alma-Ata inhabited by ethnic Russians 
formed self-defence units of Russian workers, armed with metal bars, lengths of 
cable and sticks. Soon clashes between the protesters on one side and Russian 
volunteer detachments and local police on the other were raging throughout Alma- 
Ata. The report of the Kazakhstan parliamentary commission of inquiry into the 
Alma-Ata events, released on 28 September 1990, admitted that “the behaviour of 
some of the demonstrators was frequently outside the law...In disobeying the 
forces of order they insulted them, skirmished and fought with them, stoned them 
and caused them bodily harm. There were irresponsible and provocative calls for 
illegal actions. Cars were set alight and buildings damaged”.
Late on 17 December Ministry of Interior troops entered the city and began 
suppressing the riots. Moscow sanctioned this operation, codenamed "Metel" 
(Snowstorm)-86, at the request of Kazakhstan’s leadership, obviously Kolbin in 
the first instance. The troops did not employ firearms, but used sticks, entrenching 
tools and dogs. According to official figures, from 2212 to 2401 participants in the
42 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, pp. 2911-292.
43 Izvestiya, 07.06.88.
44 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy // Molodaya Gvardiya, No.2, 1997, p. 323.
45 Pravda, 19.12.86.
46 Literatumaya gazeta, 01.01.87.
47 Komsomolskaya pravda, 10.01.87.
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riots were detained. The Kazakhstan parliamentary commission of inquiry gave A 
figure of 8500, including those who were taken outside o f the city and detained 
there for several hours. Figures ranging from 763 to 1137 were given for the 
numbers injured. In the commission’s assessment over 1700 people sustained 
bodily harm, but it did not say how many of them were Russians and how many 
Kazakhs. Three Kazakhs, all students, died in the events: M.Spatayev, of the 
Alma-Ata Institute of Power Engineering, S.Mukhamedzhanova, of Ust- 
Kamenogorsk Pedagogical Institute, and L.Asanova, of Alma-Ata Academy of 
Music.48
In the wake of the Alma-Ata events a total 99 people were convicted. One 
of them K.Ryskulbekov, a student at Alma-Ata Architectural College, was 
sentenced to death, for murdering Savitskiy.49 Those tried together with 
Ryskulbekov were T.Tashenov, sentenced to 15 years as accessory, and another 
student, Zh.Taidzhumaev, for arson and attempted murder. K.Kuzembaev, a 
welder, was given 14 years for seriously injuring Police Major I.Zimulkin, and 
E.Kopesbaev four years for beating up Police Sergeant A.Almabekov.50 The non­
political nature of these cases is attested by the relatively long duration of the 
investigations. The situation was different with trials over so called "instigators" of 
the riots, which were held in January 1987. Zh.Sabitova, a school teacher, was 
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for having prepared "a poster and leaflets of 
provocative content".51 K.Rakhmetov, student and Young Communist League 
leader from Kazakhstan State University, received a seven year sentence for 
"inciting students to flagrantly violate public order".52 And M.Asylbaev, 
unemployed, was sentenced to ten years for "inciting" young people "to violate 
public order, refuse to obey representatives of the bodies of power and assault 
policemen, servicemen and volunteer police aides".53 These were clearly political 
convictions. By September 1990 of those convicted 46 persons were rehabilitated 
and some of thosejw t rehabilitated had their sentences reduced.54
The Alma-Ata/events were a serious setback for Gorbachev, raising for the 
first time a question nark over his political judgement and handling of nationality 
affairs. The Moscow leadership was destabilised, and a clear indication of this was
48 Conclusions and Proposals of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for Final Appraisal of the 
Circumstances Linked to the Events in tire City of Alma-Ata on 17th and 18th December 1986, BBC Monitoring 
Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third Series, 26.10.90.
49 Ryskulbekov's sentence was later commuted to long-term imprisonment, obviously to avoid further inflaming of 
inter-ethnic enmity. But following that he suddenly died in a supposed suicide. [Brown, B., Alma-Ata Commission 
o f Inquiry Publishes Report // Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, Vol.2, No.42, October 19, 1990, p. 20.] It is 
quite possible that he was simply eliminated by Interior Ministry personnel, who wanted to avenge the death of a 
Russian.
50 Izvestiya, 27.07.87.
51 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 07.01.87.
52 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.07.87.
53 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 04.02.87.
54 Conclusions and Proposals o f the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for Final Appraisal of the 
Circumstances Linked to the Events in the City of Alma-Ata on 17th and 18th December 1986, BBC Monitoring 
Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third Series, 26.10.90.
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the abrupt postponement of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on personnel 
issues.55 Kolbin later admitted the gravity of the situation; in his speech at the 19th 
CPSU Conference he said: "...The situation that arose in Kazakhstan 18 months 
ago caused serious concern. In that time a real threat emerged to the intended 
perestroyka reforms".56 Gorbachev feared that events in Alma-Ata could turn the 
majority of the Central Committee against him. He needed some time to prepare 
the plenum and formulate a version of the events that suited him.
On 25 December Politburo drew its verdict. It claimed inter alia that 
"working people are vigorously condemning the manifestations of nationalism".57 
This reference to "manifestations of nationalism" was the first formal definition of 
the nature o f the Alma-Ata events. Before that official reports had avoided political 
assessments. The Politburo version was soon upheld by the semi-official Moscow 
media, which started to muse on the subject of Kazakh nationalism.58
Gorbachev used the time preceding the plenum to "persuade" other 
members of the Central Committee, that despite the Alma-Ata events his policy 
was correct.59 Plenum which was held on 27 January' 1987, resulted in Kunayev's 
losing his Politburo membership, but the reason for his removal was given as 
"retirement on pension", and for the time being he retained his CPSU Central 
Committee seat. Plenum documents contained no criticism of him.60 It was only in 
early June that Politburo officially condemned "violations o f Leninist principles of 
nationality policy that occurred in Kazakhstan".61
At the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 25 June 1987 Kunayev was 
openly attacked for his policy in the field of nationality affairs. The attack was led 
by Kolbin, who, according to Kunayev, presented to the plenum “unchecked, 
unfounded data and sometimes blatant lies”. Those who assisted Kolbin in 
preparation of this report were Kamaledenov, Mukashev and Mendibayev . 
Kunayev wrote that he had been portrayed as one of the principal organisers of the 
Alma-Ata events, though he had had absolutely no relation to it. Nevertheless this 
accusation served as the main reason for his dismissal from the CPSU Central 
Committee and a month later the CPK Central Committee.62 This time the official 
formula sounded as follows: "For serious failures, committed in leading the 
republican party organisation".63
Kunayev was definitely not responsible for organising the protest action in 
Alma-Ata. Basically Kunayev had nothing to gain out of these events. He was
55 Pravda, 24.12.86.
56 XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, Stenograficheskiy otchet, t.l, 
Moscow: Politizdat, 1988, p. 104.
57 Pravda, 26.12.86.
58 See: Konrsomolskaya pravda, 10.01.87, Literatumaya gazeta, 14.01.87, Izvestiya, 24.01.87, Pravda, 11.02.87.
59 For more information on this see: Kaiser, R., Wlrv Gorbachev Happened: His Triumph and His Failure, New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, pp. 151-152.
60 Kommunist, No.7, 1987, p. 4.
61 Pravda, 12.06.87.
62 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat"’, 1994, pp. 294-295; 
Pravda, 28.07.87.
63 Kommunist, No. 10, 1987, p. 4.
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retired honourably and any subsequent trouble in the republic could only damage 
his reputation. He understood pretty well that under no circumstances would he 
get his job back, and moreover he himself did not want to stay in office any longer 
because of old age. Of course, Kunayev could be motivated by petty 
revengefulness in relation to Gorbachev, but the Alma-Ata events were clearly out 
of proportion with settling personal scores. Moreover, if Kunayev was really 
responsible for organising the events nothing could prevent him for openly 
announcing it after Kazakhstan became an independent state, but he did not do so. 
Moreover he continued to deny it.
If it was not Kunayev, then who was the major player behind the scenes? 
The answer to this will be, probably, never found. But one indication is contained 
in the minutes of the CPSU Central Committee plenum on 25 June 1987, which 
are still not made public. Though Kunayev in his memoirs asserted that he did not 
speak at the plenum, eyewitness accounts indicate otherwise. He did take the 
floor, disagreed with accusations against himself and said that it was Nazarbayev 
who had masterminded Alma-Ata riots. Though Gorbachev did not let Kunayev 
finish his speech, its effect on Nazarbayev was so strong that straight after the 
plenum he was taken to a hospital.64
From the technical point of view there were only two persons in 
Kazakhstan’s leadership who had both the reason and resources for organizing the 
Alma-Ata events - Nazarbayev and Kamaledenov, both contenders for Kunayev’s 
position.65 The latter was not mentioned by Kunayev as the organizer, despite all 
the negative personal attitude to him. Besides, Kunayev described Kamaledenov 
as an active participant of the investigations of the events and the purge that 
followed them. Moreover, after the collapse of the USSR nothing could prevent 
Kamaledenov from reveling his true role in organising the events, if it had been 
the case, and through this portray himself as Kazakh national hero. But this never 
happened. On the other hand, Nazarbayev’s policy of cultivating an image of 
Russia’s friend and the one, who is treating fairly Kazakhstan’s Russian 
community, can be still interested in not revealing the truth about his actual role in 
the Alma-Ata events.
The June plenum resulted in CPSU Central Committee resolution “On 
Work of Kazakh Republic Party Organisation in Internationalist and Patriotic 
Upbringing of Working People”, which confirmed the definition of the Alma-Ata 
events as "manifestation of Kazakh nationalism". The resolution was very critical 
of Kunayev’s record in the field of nationality affairs. The charges of nationalism 
were as follows. First, Moscow was dissatisfied with Kazakhstan's contribution to
64 Kunayev, D., Ot Stalina do Gorbacheva (V aspekte istorii Kazakhstana), Almaty: “Sanat”, 1994, p. 294; Valovoy, 
D., Kremlevskiy tupik i Nazarbayev, Moscow: “Molodaya Gvardiya”, 1993, p. 80.
65 For example, Auyelbekov, another contender for Kunayev’s job, was based in Kzyl Orda and could not very much 
influence the situation in the capital.
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the common all-union economic complex.66 While being formally true, this charge 
can hardly be applicable to the case of nationalism. In the former USSR it was an 
open secret that every republic, or territory, disregarding its national composition, 
tried to keep as much economic resources as possible to themselves, while 
contributing to the common economic complex as little as possible.
The second set of accusations dealt with personnel policy. Kunayev was 
charged with creating "preferential conditions” for Kazakh young people in 
admission to tertiary educational institutions.67 This was definitely true, but it is 
was hardly the result of Kunayev’s purposeful actions. It is more likely that this 
situation developed in a de facto manner. The growing number of Kazakh 
intelligentsia, who staffed major colleges and universities in accordance with 
eastern tradition facilitated admission to tertiary education of their relatives, 
friends, acquaintances and simply persons giving bribes.
Another charge was that the republic's leadership did not do enough to 
channel Kazakh youth to industrial professions and the number of industrial 
workers among Kazakhs decreased. In principle this was true, because Russians 
comprised 79% of those employed in industry in Kazakhstan.68 But this was also a 
classic example of Gorbachev's attempts to explain Kazakhstan’s realities in terms 
of Marxist dogma. Meanwhile it was only natural that Kazakhs, with their 
nomadic/pastoral background, were disinclined to work in industry.
The next fault cited in the resolution was the most serious one: "Proper 
representation of the nations and nationalities living in the republic was not ensured 
at all levels of the public and political structure. National-group distortion occurred 
in the formation of the party and state apparatus, law enforcement agencies and 
scientific and cultural institutions..., in admission to the Party, and in submitting 
names for state awards". If true, this accusation alone would be enough to justify 
Kunayev's removal. The principle of proportional representation in party and state 
apparatus was the foundation on which the whole edifice of Kazakhstan statehood 
had been built. For decades it had maintained stability and ethnic peace in 
Kazakhstan. But this allegation was not really deserved. True, Kunayev increased 
Kazakh participation in the leadership of both party and state apparatus, but he 
simply corrected distortions made in Krushchev’s times. Under Kunayev the 
balance of Russians and Kazakhs in the leadership reflected the balance of these 
two nationalities in Kazakhstan’s population.
The above might not have been true for scientific and cultural institutions, 
but that was a different matter. While Kazakhstan was part of the USSR Russian 
intellectuals, residing in Kazakhstan, could join respective unions in Russia or in 
the USSR as a whole. Many preferred to do so, since it was more prestigious and 
more logical, because they represented Russian, not Kazakh, culture. For Kazakhs
66 Pravda, 16.07.87.
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it was more logical to join unions in Kazakhstan and this was the major reason for 
the disproportion. Where admission to the party was concerned, the preferential 
treatment of national minorities had been a long-term CPSU policy since the 
1920s, designed to draw into the party more national cadres, who were initially 
more reluctant than Slavs to join. In time this policy became outdated, but it stood 
unchanged up to Gorbachev's period. It was, of course, not Kunayev's creation, 
and accusing him of initiating it was inappropriate.
The third group of charges brought against Kunayev concerned ideology. 
The resolution blamed the CPK Central Committee and lower-level party 
committees of failing "to examine questions of internationalist education for years". 
The "faults" depicted in the resolution can be summarised as follows:
1. In historical research, literature and art, the Kazakh people's past was 
"frequently idealised", and attempts were made to rehabilitate "bourgeois 
nationalists".
2. The revolutionary past of the people of Kazakhstan, and their struggle to 
establish Soviet power and socialism, were "essentially passed over in silence".
3. The struggle against "feudal-bay" and "patriarchal-tribal" customs was 
allowed to slacken.
4. No effective measures were taken "to expose the reactionary essence of 
Islam and its attempts to preserve outmoded traditions".
It is obvious, that certain idealisation of Kazakh past did take place in 
historical research. But such a situation is not uncommon for most other nations, 
including Russia. Moscow was only itself to blame that under the practices of a 
totalitarian society, Gorbachev himself still adhered to, no free polemics on 
historical issues, including that of Kazakh nation had been allowed.69 In all, the 
resolution made a controversial impression. It contained a number of observations 
that were certainly true, but presented them through a prism of Marxist dogmatism 
creating a distorted picture of a socially complex phenomenon. The document was 
strongly influenced by Gorbachev’s vendetta against Kunayev, which had by than 
become personal and could not contribute to a fair analysis of facts. Besides, the 
resolution had a clear political designation - by making Kunayev a scapegoat, 
shield from criticism Gorbachev and his lieutenants for the outbreak of the Alma- 
Ata events.
Moscow’s official assessment of the Alma-Ata events caused hidden and 
later open resistance by the Kazakh elite. At the eighth CPK Central Committee 
plenum in March 1987 no Kazakh leader used the definition "nationalism", when 
characterising the situation in the republic. Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Mukashev attributed the riots to "Comrade Kunayev's 
personality cult" and described the protesters as "inexperienced, politically 
immature young people". Only Kzyl-Orda province Party Committee First 
Secretary Auyelbekov, referred to "nationalism". But even he mentioned it in a
69 Pravda, 16.07.87.
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casual, incidental manner, not attributing it to Kazakhs as such, but describing 
"propagating nationalism" as a fault of Kunayev.
Kolbin clearly sensed this mood, and could not ignore it. On the other hand 
he had to advance the official line. Hence his compromise formula: “...Extremist- 
minded nationalistic elements are few in number and do not constitute any sort of 
organisation... we have no right to, pin a label of nationalism on the Kazakh people 
as a whole" .70 The plenum consequently adopted the formula that Kunayev must 
be held accountable "for flagrant violations of the norms of party life, creation of a 
personality cult, distortion of personnel policy and manifestation of an "anything 
goes" attitude which led to the development... o f favouritism, abuse of office, 
bribe-taking and to nationalistic and other negative manifestations" .71 That 
"nationalistic manifestations" were submerged among other faults, and equated 
with "other negative manifestations" was a victory for the Kazakh elite. It met their 
wishes by not making nationalism the major issue.
Not surprisingly the CPSU Central Committee resolution’s accusation of 
“Kazakh nationalism” was received very negatively by the Kazakh elite. Thereafter 
various Kazakh politicians, officials and intellectuals insisted on its revocation. 
According to Gorbachev, Nazarbayev was very active in lobbying Moscow for this 
purpose. Finally Gorbachev agreed, and the accusation of “Kazakh nationalism” 
was partially acknowledged as mistaken. The new formulation said that there were 
demonstrations by young people, provoked by extremist and nationalist elements.
Thus the formula was mitigated, but in essence unaltered Moreover, the Politburo 
decision revoking the previous formulation was published only in the restricted- 
circulation CPSU Central Committee bulletin Iz\>estiya CK KPSS, while the initial 
resolution had been published in central Moscow newspapers with circulations in 
the tens of millions. This prompted sharp criticism by the Commission of Inquiry 
into the Alma-Ata events, established by the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet 
Presidium. It said that the decision “does not contain so much as a hint that the 
authorities even partially admit their guilt” . In the commission’s own assessment 
the Alma-Ata events “were not nationalist...They were a first attempt to exercise 
the right freely to express a civic and political position”. Gorbachev, however, 
remained unmoved by the commission’s findings. He clearly remains convinced 
that the initial definition of the events was right. “A word is not a sparrow, history 
cannot be corrected”, he concluded in his memoirs. 72
The official Kazakh interpretation of the nature of the Alma-Ata events is 
indeed very contradictory. On the one hand they continue to maintain that the 
events were not nationalist, but on the other it is difficult to deny facts known to 
every citizen of Alma-Ata who saw them. The crowd carried banners, which said 
“Kazakhstan for Kazakhs!”, and “Russians, Go Home!”, attacked and insulted only
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Russians, overturned and burned a car driven by a Russian,73 and finally killed a 
Russian TV engineer. Moreover, after independence the Kazakh authorities 
themselves showed an inclination to attach nationalist overtones to the Alma-Ata 
riots. Kazakhstan’s independence was symbolically proclaimed on 16 December, 
the anniversary of the day when they began; since then the day has become 
Kazakhstan’s national holiday and the riots are always commemorated in that 
context. Most controversially, on 9 December 1996, just before the tenth 
anniversary of the events, Nazarbayev conferred Kazakhstan’s highest award 
posthumously on Ryskulbekov, who was executed for killing the Russian TV 
engineer.74 Referring to the riots in his memoirs, he asserted that they showed “to 
what extent the self-awareness of Kazakh youth has grown... The youth, on behalf 
of the people, openly stated that it will no longer tolerate trampling on the national 
pride”, he wrote.75 Kazakhstan’s State Secretary A.Kekilbaev, in a tenth- 
anniversary commemorative article, went even further, characterising the riots as a 
popular “national-liberation” and “anti-colonial” uprising, "the first quake in the 
process of disintegration of the “Red empire” .76 It seems the Kazakh authorities 
want to have it both ways not wanting to admit the presence of nationalism in the 
riots, but at the same time portraying them as a major milestone on the way to 
independence.
Following the riots Kolbin faced the difficult task of putting in order what 
proved to be an unstable republic. He approached the problem with a vigour 
typical for a myopic bureaucrat One of his first steps was a vigorous campaign 
directed against “parasitic”77 elements and alcohol abuse, similar to that staged 
elsewhere in the USSR. The campaign’s primary purpose was to remove potential 
troublemakers, primarily Kazakh youths, from major cities, for fear of repetition of 
the Alma-Ata events.
However, his main effort was concentrated on intimidating the Kazakh 
national elite. Kazakhstan's party and state apparatus was substantially purged. In 
all, 1836 members of party committees and bureaus and 450 secretaries of primary 
Party organisations were removed from office.78 The purge strongly affected 
Kazakhstan's tertiary education system, which seemed reasonable to Kolbin, since 
most of the demonstrators were students. Many government officials responsible 
for education, senior academics in universities and active participants in the riots 
were either sacked or reprimanded. Some 787 persons were expelled from the 
Young Communist League, and 1138 received lesser penalties.79
Another feature of Kolbin’s policy was populist measures in the socio­
economic sphere. He began taking steps aimed at producing an immediate positive
73 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy // Molodaya Gvardiya, No.2, 1997, pp. 249-250.
74 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.12.96.
75 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, Almaty: "Oner”, 1996, p. 37.
76 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 12.11.96.
77 By “parasites” officials meant people refusing to work. In Kazakhstan this term applied to a large number of 
young, poorly educated Kazakhs from aids, who flocked to large cities but were unable to find jobs and formed a 
sort of city "underclass”.
78 Pravda, 24.04.87.
79 Komsomolskaya pravda, 18.07.82.
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impact on public opinion, and at the same time indirectly decrying Kunayev’s 
record as a leader. They included a program of housing construction, decree on 
improving study of the Kazakh Language and elimination of some privileges 
enjoyed previously by party and government officials.80 However, these superficial 
measures could not improve the economic situation; they engendered increasing 
hatred of Moscow among the Kazakh elite, but did nothing to make ordinary 
people better off. More substantial long-term policies were needed, but were not 
forthcoming. Kolbin failed to achieve any positive results in the sphere of livestock 
breeding, and the 1987 grain harvest was plagued by bad weather. In the 1987- 
1988 economic year Kazakhstan failed to attain the national income growth rates 
envisaged by the five-year plan.81
Kazakhstan’s unimpressive economic performance, and the emergence of 
nationalist movements elsewhere in the USSR, created a favourable atmosphere for 
revival o f anti-Russian opposition in the republic. But intimidated by the brutal 
suppression of the Alma-Ata riots and subsequent purges, it acted with exceptional 
caution, most of its resistance taking passive forms. On 4 February 1988 
Kazakh stem skaya prcn>da reported the activities o f S.Adenov, a lecturer in 
Marxism-Leninism, who wrote a manuscript on the nationality question, and 
distributed it in many cities of Kazakhstan. Adenov skilfully used Lenin's criticism 
of Russian great-power chauvinism to condemn Gorbachev's nationality policy in 
general and particularly in Kazakhstan, where he claimed the Alma-Ata riots were 
its direct consequence 82 In December 1988 the “Akikat” historical and educational 
club came into being. Its aim was revival of Kazakh folk customs and learning of 
Kazakh history, with a view to restoring the truth about the “genocide against 
Kazakhs in the 1920’s-30’s” and the fate of Kazakh national organisations.
On 3 November 1988 activists of ecological organisations “Green Front”, 
“Initiative” and “Referendum” proclaimed establishment of a political organisation, 
the Alma-Ata People’s Front. But it did little, and on 30 April 1989 it self- 
liquidated. Probably the most serious organisation representing Kazakh national 
sentiments in that period was the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” anti-nuclear movement, 
created on the initiative of Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov. It staged public 
meetings, demonstrations, congresses, and addressed resolutions to the authorities. 
Its proclaimed goals were the elimination of nuclear weapons and socio-economic 
rehabilitation of regions adversely affected by nuclear tests. But its main purpose, 
termination of nuclear testing at the Semipalatinsk test site, reflected opposition to 
M oscow’s administrative control of Kazakhstan.83
80 See: Izvestiya, 15.03.87; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.01.87; Kazaklistanskaya pravda, 05.03.87; Brown, B., New 
First Secretary in Kazakhstan Notes Some Successes, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 258/87, July 2, 1987, p. 
1- 2 .
81 Izvestiya, 28.10.95.
82 Sheehy, A., Kazakh Lecturer Disseminates Unorthodox Views on Nationality Question, Radio Liberty Research 
Bulletin RL 81/88, February 18, 1988, p. 2.
83 Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennyye ob iedmemya Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape 
razvitiva, Almaty: KISI, 1994, pp. 7, 9-10, 16-17.
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Another form of opposition was a campaign started by influential Kazakh 
literary personalities for rehabilitation of Kazakh poets and writers who had been 
branded "bourgeois nationalists" in Stalin’s years. In late February 1988 Kazakh 
writer A.Nurpeisov called for rehabilitation of Qudayberdiev, an outstanding early 
twentieth century Kazakh poet.84 Then at the USSR Writers' Union Board plenum 
on 1-2 March, Kazakh writer M.Shakhanov called for "objective critical 
assessment" of the works of several Kazakh literary figures - Qudayberdiev, 
Aymautov, Baytursynov and Zhumabayev.85 The last three had been Alash Orda 
leaders. Another Alash Orda leader to become a focus of public attention was 
Tinishbayev, the subject of a full-length film entitled "Turksib" (the Turkestan- 
Siberia Railway, a major construction project of the late 1920s). The Kazakh press 
enthusiastically praised the film.86 At the CPK Central Committee plenum on 4 
June 1988, Kazakh Writers' Union President Suleimenov proposed establishing a 
commission to study the works of writers and scholars repressed in the 1930s.87 In 
April 1989 “Adilet”, a society for the rehabilitation of victims of political 
repression, was formed. Its aims included rehabilitation of participants in the Alma- 
Ata riots.88
The major objective pursued by the Kazakh national elite in that period was 
Kolbin’s removal. Attacks against him started at the CPK Central Committee 
plenum in late January 1988, when some Kazakh party officials, portraying 
themselves as supporters of Gorbachev’s reforms, accused Kolbin of issuing too 
many directives, holding too many conferences, and too closely monitoring the 
work of agencies and party committees. Several speakers claimed that his 
administrative techniques shackled Party bodies, and robbed them of autonomy.89 
In this Kolbin's critics artfully used Gorbachev's initiatives, some of which implied 
limiting bureaucratic procedures.
A real chance for Kolbin’s removal arrived in mid-1989, sparked by events 
in Tbilisi on 9 April, when sixteen people were killed and over 200 injured in 
clashes with army troops. The events, very reminiscent of the December 1986 
Alma-Ata riots, were widely publicised in Moscow's liberal press, while Gorbachev 
denied responsibility for what had happened. They occurred shortly before the 
convening on 25 May of the First Congress of USSR Peoples' Deputies, the new 
highest body of power created by the political reform. The Congress convened in a 
politically tense atmosphere. Opposition deputies demanded proper investigation of 
the Tbilisi events, and on 31 May the Congress voted to create a commission of
84 Sheehy, A., Renewed Appeal for Rehabilitation of Kazakh Poet, Radio Liberty Research Bulletin RL 107/88, 
March, 10, 1988, p. 1-2.
85 Literatumaya gazeta, No. 10, 1988.
86 Sheehy, A., Kazakh Party Scholar Condemns Rehabilitation of Muhametjan Tinishbayev, Radio Liberty 
Research Bulletin 266/88, June 16, 1988, p. 2.
87 hi mid-December 1988 a brief formal announcement from the Attorney-General stated that the Kazakhstan 
Supreme Court had annulled the convictions of Zhumabayev, Baytursynov and Aymautov on grounds of lack of 
evidence. [Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 08.07.88]
88 Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obschestvennie obiedineniva Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape 
razvitiya, Almaty: KISI, 1994, p. 12.
89 Pravda, 4.02.87.
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inquiry. Kazakhstan was represented on the Commission by Nazarbayev and 
Miroshnik.90
This gave the Kazakhs their chance. On 6 June Kazakh writer Shakhanov, 
speaking on behalf of 19 deputies from Kazakhstan, requested establishment of a 
commission to investigate the Alma Ata events.91 Gorbachev, already on the 
defensive over Tbilisi, was eager to avoid the embarrassment establishment of a 
second commission would entail. The Kazakh delegation's price for dropping the 
issue was Kolbin’s removal. On the next day, 7 June, Gorbachev successfully 
proposed Kolbin's election as Chairman of the People's Control Committee, which 
meant transferring him to Moscow. The next important issue was: who would be 
Kazakhstan’s new leader? The Kazakh elite did not want a repetition of the 
December 1986 appointment of an outsider as First Secretary. But nobody knew 
precisely what Gorbachev had in mind, so pressure had to be applied, and 
subsequent events in the town of Novy Uzen, repeating the pattern of those in 
Tselinograd in 1979 and Alma Ata in 1986, most suited that purpose.
On the night of 16-17 June disturbances were sparked by a dance-floor 
fight between Kazakh youths and Azerbaijani, Lezgin and other migrant oilfield 
workers in Novy Uzen. The police suppressed it, and made several arrests. A 
group of Kazakh youths then tried to break into the police station, but fled after 
warning shots were fired.92 This incident may have been spontaneous, but what 
happened next implied some kind of organisation. Next morning a rally was held in 
the central square of Novy Uzen, at which protesters, 5000-7000 strong, 
demanded release of those arrested, expulsion of migrant contract workers, and 
jobs for all unemployed Kazakhs. Groups of Kazakhs then began attacking market 
stalls and homes, and setting cars on fire. Altogether 51 facilities were damaged, 5 
vehicles burned, 5 persons killed and 20 hospitalised. 3,516 people fled to the 
Caucasus. According to Kazakhstan Internal Affairs Minister Knyazev, the rioters’ 
actions were well organised.93 Interior Ministry troops and police reinforcements 
were dispatched to Novy Uzen, and a curfew imposed. The disturbances then 
began spreading to nearby areas, and tension increased throughout Kazakhstan.94
In this situation, selection of Nazarbayev as Kazakhstan’s leader seemed 
almost inevitable. The events in Novy Uzen had driven Gorbachev into a corner; an 
appointment from outside Kazakhstan was now out of the question, and in the 
tense situation even appointing a Russian from Kazakhstan problematic. The 
message to Gorbachev was clear: if he wished the inter-ethnic tension to subside, 
he must select a Kazakh capable of controlling the indigenous nationality. And 
what better choice than Nazarbayev, who had helped Gorbachev to remove 
Kunayev and ardently supported Gorbachev’s reforms? On 22 June 1989
90 Pravda, 1.06.89.
91 Izvestiya, 8.06.89.
92 Pravda, 20.06.89; Izvestiya, 20.06.89.
93 Izvestiya, 21.06.89; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 27.12.89; Pravda, 23.06.89.
94 Izvestiya, 23.06.89; Izvestiya, 24.06.89, Pravda, 25.06.89.
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Nazarbayev was elected First Secretary of the CPK Central Committee,95 and the 
disturbances in Kazakhstan immediately ceased.
Straight after his election Nazarbayev took steps to boost his popularity, by 
appealing to Kazakh national sentiments. On 26 June 1989 the Presidium of 
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet established a Commission of Inquiry into the Alma- 
Ata events. Eight of its fourteen members were Kazakhs, including all three co- 
Chairmen, versus only four ethnic Russians and two from other nationalities. Thus 
Kazakhs were in a position to reach whatever findings they saw fit, and Russian 
representation little more than token.96
Nationalist overtones were also perceptible in Kazakhstan’s Law on 
Languages, enacted by the Supreme Soviet on 29 August 1989. Article 1 
proclaimed Kazakh the only state language in Kazakhstan, assigning to Russian a 
secondary status, as the "language of inter-ethnic communication" 97 This was 
probably Nazarbayev’s first move that contributed to the growth of inter-ethnic 
tensions, as Kazakhs were not a majority of Kazakhstan’s population. The 
following table shows its ethnic composition at the 1989 census.
Table 1.1
Population of Kazakhstan by Nationality in thousands and as 
a percentage to the total (1989 census)98
Nationality K azakhs R u ssia n s Ukrainians B elo ru ssia n s Tatars U zb ek s G erm ans O thers
Num ber of 
p eo p le
6 5 3 4 .6 6 2 2 7 .5 8 9 6 .2 182 .6 3 2 8 .0 33 2 .0 9 5 7 .5 8 4 0 .7
A s % to the  
total
39 .7 3 7 .8 5 .4 1.1 2 .0 2 .0 5 .8 6 .2
The table shows that Kazakhstan was a typical multinational state, in which 
Kazakhs were the largest ethnic group, but not a majority. Moreover they were 
still numerically inferior to the combined Slavic population, who generally 
identified themselves as Russian-speakers. Naturally those were unimpressed by a 
Law on Languages which did not assign Russian equal status with Kazakh. A small 
group of Russian deputies in the Supreme Soviet protested, and Ust-Kamenogorsk 
City Soviet even passed a special resolution on the need for two state languages. 
But all that was ignored.99
95 Pravda, 23.06.89.
96 Conclusions and Proposals of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Commission for Final Appraisal of the 
Circumstances Linked to the Events in the City of Alma-Ata on 17th and 18th December 1986, BBC Monitoring 
Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third Series, 26.10.90.
97 Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on Languages, 22 August 1989 // Perestroika in the Soviet 
Republics, Documents on the National Questions / Ed. Ch.F.Furtado & A.Chandler, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992, 
p. 479.
98 Source: Brown, B., Kazakhs Now Largest National Group in Kazakhstan, Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, 
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Nazarbayev’s ascendancy also opened the way for nationalist parties and 
movements to emerge. In June 1989 Kazakhs who had taken part in the Alma-Ata 
riots formed the Zheltoksan (December) political society. Its initial aim was to 
achieve the rehabilitation of those convicted following the riots. A year later 
Zheltoksan conducted a founding congress at which it renamed itself the National 
Democratic Party Zheltoksan. Members of it advocated excluding Russian from 
official use, even for inter-ethnic communication, banning Russian immigration to 
Kazakhstan, and adoption of legislation creating Kazakhstan citizenship.100
In April 1990 the founding congress of the Alash party took place. Its 
political program was based on Muslim solidarity and pan-Turkism, and envisaged 
creation of a Greater Turkestan (Land of Turks), including Kazakhstan, Central 
Asia, Azerbaijan and ultimately Turkic republics within the Russian Federation. 
Among its more immediate goals the party named state regulation of migration, 
assisting Kazakhs residing in other states to immigrate to Kazakhstan, and 
encouraging non-Kazakhs, especially Russians, to leave. Though the party 
proclaimed itself successor to Alash Orda, its aims were conspicuously different.101
In May 1990 another public movement, Azat (Freedom) came into being. It 
proclaimed such slogans as freedom, equality and fraternity of all citizens of 
Kazakhstan, creation of civil society in the republic, but its major aim was 
achieving Kazakhstan’s sovereignty, i.e. independence. Azat leaders vehemently 
denied that their movement was nationalist, and tried to prove its “democratic” 
nature, but some of its actions and statements by its leaders offensive to (and 
about) ethnic Russians indicated otherwise.102
Nazarbayev encouraged the “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” movement’s 
activities, either out of agreement with its objectives or through unwillingness to 
risk losing the political initiative to Suleimenov, another prominent personality in 
Kazakh politics. Whichever is the case, Kazakhstan’s official position on nuclear 
testing was only slightly less radical than that of “Nevada-Semipalatinsk” . In early 
June 1990 the 17th CPK Congress, and in early August 1991 the CPK Politburo, 
adopted resolutions demanding closure of the Semipalatinsk test site.103 
Nazarbayev closed it by decree on 29 August 1991, as soon as the changed 
political situation in Moscow undermined the USSR Government.
The creation of various Kazakh nationalist parties and movements 
promoted similar actions by Kazakhstan’s Russian population. On 29 August 1990
100 Azat Leader on Need for Unified Democratic Movement in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, Tire 
USSR, Third Series, 04.12.91; Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennyye ob’iedineniya Kazakhstana 
na sovremennom etape razvitiva, Almaty: KISI, 1994, p. 12.
101 Alash Orda's leaders were European-educated Kazakhs, many of them members of the Russian State Duma and 
of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which espoused Western liberal ideas. Their program envisaged Kazakh 
autonomy within the empire, not secession from it. Pan-Turkism was alien to them, and not even mentioned in their 
program. [For more information on this issue see: Alash Orda: Sbomik dokumentov / ed. N.Martinenko, Alma-Ata: 
"Aykap”, 1992; Amanzhalova, D.A., Kazakhskiy avtonomizm i Rossiya: istoriya dvizheniya Alash, Moscow: 
"Rossiya MolodayaT 1994],
102 Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennyye ob'iedineniya Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape 
razvitiya, Almaty: KISI, 1994, pp. 13-15.
103 CP of Kazakhstan Congress: Independent Platform Adopted, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third 
Series, 18.06.90
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the founding conference of the Edinstvo (Unity) movement took place in Alma- 
Ata. It united mostly Russian industrial workers, and established branches in 
several provinces, mostly among workers in defence industries. Edinstvo 
proclaimed its major goals to be promotion of the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and prevention of inter-ethnic violence, but also 
warned that it would fight “aggressive manifestations of chauvinism and 
nationalism”. Edinstvo insisted that both Russian and Kazakh be recognised as 
state languages.104
The year 1990 also saw the emergence of the first Cossack formations in 
Kazakhstan. They began to register in provincial centres as national and cultural 
associations, but their activities were clearly political. In summer 1990 in the 
northern provinces the “Gorkaya Liniya”105 Cossacks formed an organisation, and 
elected V.Achkasov as ataman (leader). At about the same time the 
“Vozrozhdeniye” (Rebirth) Cossack committee was established in Uralsk. It 
demanded revoking of all decrees on the basis of which the territory of the Ural 
Cossacks was transferred from Russia to Kazakhstan.106 In an article in 
Moskovskiye tiovosti in June 1991 “Vozrozhdeniye5 s” ataman, Alexander Galagan, 
proclaimed northern Kazakhstan and Alma-Ata province zones of Cossack 
interests and ancient Russian lands erroneously allotted to Kazakhstan.107 In early 
1991 the Union of Semirechye Cossacks came into being. For some time it was 
headed by V.Ovsyannikov, a former Airborne Forces officer, but later he was 
replaced by N.Gunkin 108 The Cossack formations were the most dynamic and 
best-organised among the Russian groups in Kazakhstan. From the outset they 
established firm links with their counterparts in Russia. For example, 
representatives of the Ural Cossacks took part in the founding congress of the 
Union of Cossacks of Russia held in Moscow on 28 June 1990.109
The Cossacks were not alone in expressing separatist views. Non-Cossack 
representatives of the Russian community voiced similar sentiments. For example, 
in September 1989 the East Kazakhstan province newspaper Rudnyi Altai 
published an article by USSR People's Deputy S.Vasilyeva, who argued that the 
lands along the right bank of the Irtysh river were wrongly allocated to Kazakhstan 
in 1920, as their indigenous population was Russian. This article received an 
indignant response from the Kazakhstan Communist Party newspaper,
104 Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvemiyye ob'iedinemya Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape 
razvitiya, Almaty: KISI, 1994, pp. 15-16; Rabochaya tribuna, 27.04.91. Azat Chairman Attacks Lack o f Kazakh 
Sovereignity, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1, The USSR, Second Series, 18.01.91.
105 ''Sorrow Line” - this was the name of the line of Russian fortresses from Kurgan to Petropavlovsk, which 
separated Russian territory from the Steppe.
106 Possibility of Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Kazakhstan Viewed, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1, The 
USSR, Second Series, 29.09.90.
107 Kazakh Writer Appeals to Gorbachev over Cossack Territorial Claims, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
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108 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: 
RISI, 1995, pp. 208-209.
109 Abdirov, M., Abdirova B., Kazachestvo v kontekste sovremennykh kazakhstansko-rossiyskikh otnosheniy // 
Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 2(3), 1995, p. 58.
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Kazakhstcmskaya pravda.110 In September 1990 Kazakh nationalist organisations 
held a massive rally in Alma-Ata condemning Russian separatists. Growth of 
separatist attitudes among ethnic Russians did in fact become a major problem for 
Nazarbayev’s leadership. At a press conference on 24 September 1990 CPK 
Central Committee Second Secretary Anufriyev said “separatist tendencies” caused 
“particular alarm”.* 111
The first serious confrontation between Cossacks and Kazakhs took place 
on 14-15 September 1991 in Uralsk, where “Vozrozhdeniye” arranged festivities 
to celebrate 400 years of the Ural Cossack Force, attended by the Ataman of the 
Union of Cossacks of Russia A.Martinov, one of his deputies V.Naumov, and 
Cossack representatives from the Don, Kuban, North Caucasus, Southern Urals 
and Siberia. During the celebrations the tricolour flag of the Russian Empire was 
unfurled. At the same time members of Azat, Zheltoksan and Nevada- 
Semipalatinsk movements came to Uralsk from Alma-Ata, Shymkent, Aktyubinsk 
and a number of other towns in Kazakhstan. The situation had the potential to 
develop into serious inter-ethnic conflict, bui the law enforcement agencies 
managed to confine it to a few minor clashes.112
The events in Uralsk prompted Nazarbayev to protest to Yeltsin that 
“provocative actions, staged by Cossacks on 15 September this year on the 
territory of Kazakhstan under the Russian flag were perceived by people and public 
movements of the republic as a political act demonstrating open disregard for the 
state sovereignty of Kazakhstan”, and to stress that the events created a serious 
threat “to civic accord and socio-political stability in the republic”. Nazarbayev 
also said that if the Russian leadership had given a timely assessment of the 
seriousness of the problems connected with the Cossack movement’s unfounded 
claims, which ran contrary to previous agreements, the Kazakh leaders would not 
have had to face such unconsidered actions.113 The Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet 
Presidium described the Uralsk celebrations as an “attempt to artificially import 
inter-ethnic conflicts”. 114 There was no public response from Yeltsin.
The growth of ethnic nationalism did not leave the Russian Federation 
untouched. The reasons for this were basically the same as in other Union 
republics, though the process had some specific features. Ethnic nationalism was a 
concept relatively new to Russians, because the Russian elite traditionally 
perceived the country as a multi-ethnic state, first as an empire and later the USSR,
110 Carlson, Ch., Kazakhs Refute Russian Territorial Claims // Radio Liberty, Report on the USSR, Vol.2, No.32,
August 10, 1990, pp. 18-19.
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// Kazakhstan i nrirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 2(3), 1995, p. 57; Krrrtov, A., Politicheskie partii i dvizlreniya 
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though Russians, not surprisingly, ascribed the role of leading nation to themselves. 
But Russian ethnic nationalism meant something other than recognition of the 
leading role of Russians in a multinational community. Its primary goal was 
national self-identification of ethnic Russians within the Soviet Union. The first 
public organisation to openly proclaim its adherence to the above ideology was the 
national-patriotic movement "Pamyat". This organisation was formed within the 
All-Russian Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments in the 
mid-1970's, for the purpose of renovating and restoring old buildings of historical 
or cultural value, primarily churches. Soon, however, "Pamyat" found itself 
involved in politics.
In late May 1987 "Pamyat" conducted its first rally at the Manezh square in 
the centre of Moscow. The demonstrators carried banners saying "Save Our 
Monuments", and demanded official registration of their organisation. Surprisingly, 
representatives of "Pamyat" were received by Yeltsin, then First Secretary of the 
Moscow City Party Committee and a Candidate (non-voting) Member of the 
Politburo. By the standards of those days this was an unprecedented and 
courageous move on Yeltsin's part. According to reports Yeltsin and the "Pamyat" 
deputation had a heated discussion that lasted for two hours. Yeltsin allegedly 
agreed with the members of the deputation on a number of issues, while 
disagreeing on others,115 but unfortunately, the reports do not specify the issues on 
which they agreed or disagreed. However, it seems likely that the meeting, 
Yeltsin's first encounter with a political process outside the official Party 
bureaucracy, influenced the evolution of his political views.
In a manifesto of 12 January 1989 "Pamyat" unveiled its political program, 
which among other things demanded that the Russian people "have rights equal to 
those of other peoples in our country". The manifesto called for establishment of 
Russia’s own Academy of Sciences, Conservatory of Music, Institute for Russian 
History, Center for Russian Culture, Russian Theatre, Russian Film Industry, 
publication of Russian Encyclopedia, and demanded introduction of "proportional 
national representation in the governing apparatus, and also in art, science, and 
education". The manifesto did not call for dissolution of the Soviet Union, but 
argued for providing all Union republics with "true autonomy", putting special 
emphasis on "economic autonomy".116 This, obviously, implied economic 
autonomy for Russia, virtually a call for economic separation.
The idea of Russia's political separation from the USSR, though 
hypothetical, was soon also in the air, openly voiced by a prominent Russian 
writer, Valentin Rasputin, at the Congress of People's Deputies in June 1989.117 
His high public profile immediately gave the idea a touch of political respectability. 
In December 1989 twelve public organisations sharing the concept of Russian
115 Yeltsin's Meeting with Memory Association Example of "Glasnost", BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 
1, Tire USSR, Second Series, 26.05.87.
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ethnic nationalism formed the Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Movements to 
contest the RSFSR Supreme Soviet elections scheduled for 4 March 1990.118 The 
Bloc’s program included such tasks as creating a Russian Communist Party; 
providing for Russia’s equal and proportional representation in the Union’s 
administrative bodies; achieving greater autonomy from the USSR government; 
giving Russia hill control over its natural resources; eliminating economic subsidies 
to other republics; and in case of the USSR’s disintegration, Russia’s taking 
control of territory populated by ethnic Russians in other republics.119
In 1990 the concept of Russian ethnic nationalism received a powerful new 
boost from the well-known emigre writer, Alexander Solzhenitsyn. His pamphlet 
"Rebuilding Russia" was published in September by two Moscow central 
newspapers with a total circulation of 25 million copies. Solzhenitsyn argued for 
Russia to secede from the USSR and form a common statehood with the other two 
Slavic republics, Ukraine and Belorussia. With regard to Kazakhstan Solzhenitsyn 
offered two options, total annexation by Russia or partition into an independent 
Kazakh south and a Russian north incorporated into the Russian state.120 
Solzhenitsyn’s ideas, representing a conservative trend in Russian ethnic 
nationalism, could not fail to influence wide sectors of Russian public opinion, and 
even received qualified support from liberal politicians in Yeltsin's entourage, with 
positive reactions voiced by Y.Karyakin, G. Yakunin, G.Starovoitova and others. 
Yeltsin himself embraced Solzhenitsyn's vision of Russia's future, and was so 
impressed by the article that he ordered it photocopied and distributed to all 
members o f the Russian parliament. The article, he asserted, contained "a lot of 
interesting thoughts". In November 1990, Yeltsin told the RSFSR Supreme Soviet 
that he was "intrigued by the idea of a union o f the three Slavic republics" - a 
central point in Solzhenitsyn's program.121
The difference between conservative and liberal Russian ethnic nationalists 
was that liberals had no interest in entities such as a Slavic Union, or in unification 
with Russian communities in other republics. They were prepared to see the new 
Russia as simply the Russian Federation detached from the union. Nor did they 
share the goal of preserving Russian cultural uniqueness. On the contrary, their 
major aim was prompt implementation of Western-style political and economic 
reforms, and they saw the rest of the Soviet Union as ballast, which only hampered 
progressive development of the Russian state, and should be dumped as soon as 
possible. But liberals obviously saw that they could use conservative Russian 
nationalists to attack Gorbachev and the Union government.
118 It included the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, the Unity 
Association of Lovers of Russian Literature and Art, tire All-Russian Culture Fund, tire Russian Section of the 
International Foundation for Slavic Literatures and Slavic Cultures, the Fund to Restore the Church of Christ the 
Saviour, the Association of Russian Artists, tire Public Committee to Save tire Volga and some others.
119 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 23.07.91.
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At that time real opposition to ethnic nationalists could come from only one 
ideology, based on the strong Russian imperial tradition, which can be identified as 
Russian neo-Eurasianism. As a philosophical school Eurasianism emerged in the 
1920’s in the left wing of the Russian postrevolutionary emigration.122 Eurasianists 
perceived the USSR as a continuation of the empire, and regarded ethnic 
nationalism, including Russian, as extremely dangerous to the future integrity of 
the common state. As an alternative they advocated a concept of “common 
Eurasian nationalism”.123 The main theoretician of Russian neo-Eurasianism was a 
popular novelist A.Prokhanov.124 Another prominent ideologist o f Russian neo- 
Eurasianism was Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, now Chairman of the Liberal Democratic 
Party of the Russia (LDPR).125 The first Neo-Eurasianist organisation, the United 
Council of Russia, was launched in mid-September 1989, with the objective of 
preserving the USSR.126 Neo-Eurasianism was clearly present in the activities of 
the "Soyuz" (Union) faction in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Communist Party 
of the Russian Federation, established in mid-1990, also supported ideas of neo- 
Eurasianism, though its leaders’ close links to Gorbachev deprived them of 
political credibility.
The Kazakh elite closely watched the political debate in Russia on relations 
with Kazakhstan, and could not fail to be concerned at the proposals to partition it 
voiced by Russian ethnic nationalists. In September 1990 at a rally in the centre of 
Alma-Ata Solzhenitsyn's publication was vehemently condemned.127 A series of 
articles attacking him appeared simultaneously in the Kazakhstan and Moscow 
press.128 However, the Kazakh elite had no liking for Russian neo-Eurasianism 
either, since it envisaged preservation of the USSR as a single state and Moscow’s 
firm control over the republics.
On 20 September 1989 a long-awaited plenum on nationality affairs was 
finally held. It adopted a CPSU platform on nationality policy.129 At the plenum
122 Among most prominent Eurasianists one can name geographer and economist P.N.Savitsky, philosopher and 
historian L.P.Karsavin, ethnologist and linguist N.S.Trubetskoy, historian G.V.Vernadsky, art researcher 
P.P.Suvchinskiy, religious philosophers G.V.Florovskiy and V.N.Iliin, literary researcher D.P.Svyatopolk-Mirskiy, 
law scientist N.N.Alekseev, economist Y.D.Sadovskiy. The group manifested itself for tire first time by publication 
of a collection of articles "Exodus to the East", which appeared in Sofia (Bulgaria) in 1921.
123 Trubetskoy, N., Obscheevraziyskiy natsionalism // Etnopoliticheskiv Vestnik, No.4, 1995, pp. 218-221.
124 Prokhanov, A., Tragediya tsentralisma // Literatumaya Rossiya, No 1, 1990.
125 The party was created on 31 March 1990 and its program spoke for “preserving tlie unity and the territorial 
integrity of the great power". It recommended to return to it tire historical name of Russia. It also proclaimed that 
tire RSFSR should become a unitary state and tire union republics should join it in a “union entity... on the basis of 
federation or confederation (that is with lesser or larger amount of powers)". [Liberalno-Denrokraticheskaya Partiya 
Sovetskogo Soyuza, Dokunrenty i nraterialy, Moscow [No publisher], 1991, pp. 39-41],
126 Members of the association included United Workers' Fronts of Moscow and Leningrad, the Union of Patriotic 
Organisations of the Urals and Siberia, Internationalist Fronts from Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova. 
[Sovetskaya Rossia, 14.09.89],
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128 See, for example: Nupreisov, A., Svoya i chuzlraya bob // Izvestiya, 31.09.90.
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Nazarbayev revealed his political objective of achieving maximum independence 
from Moscow. He described the Soviet Union in its present form as not a 
federation but a unitary state. To turn it into a real federation the republics' rights 
must be expanded, especially in ownership and administration of land, minerals and 
other resources. He advocated transferring ownership of basic industries to from 
Union to republican ministries, and argued strongly for granting republics the right 
to enter into international economic agreements. On the other hand he advocated 
that Moscow retain ownership of defence industries and means of 
communication.130
In his speech at the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies in 
December 1989 Nazarbayev emphasised that "republics need complete economic 
independence in the framework of a federation and right of ownership of their 
territory, and they need guaranteed freedom in relations with the Centre, ministries 
and foreign partners..."131 Thus Nazarbayev’s initial concept as declared was a 
political and military union with full economic independence for the republics, 
including in external economic relations. In this he was not original, but simply 
followed the Baltic nationalist leaders, who had been the first to advance the 
concept of “economic sovereignty”. Though at that stage Nazarbayev still 
supported preservation of the Soviet Union, and did not advocate full political 
independence for the republics, it is quite possible that he already had in mind the 
goal of full independence. He wrote in his memoirs: “From the beginning of 1990 I 
started to think that Kazakhstan would have to get out of the post-perestroika 
impasse independently. Already nobody believed in the power of the Centre”.132
Nazarbayev saw a real chance for Kazakhstan’s full independence in mid- 
1990, after the newly-elected RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration of 
sovereignty. The declaration among other things proclaimed that the RSFSR 
“recognises and respects the sovereign rights of the union republics and the 
USSR”.133 According to Nazarbayev, from the “formal” point of view, the Russian 
declaration of sovereignty meant “inability of the USSR to exist further in its 
previous form”.134 Kazakhstan’s own declaration soon followed, the Republic’s 
Supreme Soviet adopting it on 25 October 1990. Much of it repeated provisions 
contained in the Russian declaration. Kazakhstan proclaimed itself a “sovereign 
state which voluntarily associates with other republics in a Union of Sovereign 
Republics, and builds relations with them on a treaty basis”. It said that “citizens of 
the republic of all nationalities constitute the people of Kazakhstan, and they are 
the sole exponent of sovereignty and the source of state power in the Kazakh 
SSR”. The declaration established the supremacy of the constitution and
130 Pravda, 21.09.89.
131 Izvestiya, 15.12.89.
132 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, Almaty: ''Oner", 1996, p. 86.
133 Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR Adopted by tire First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, 
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Kazakhstan’s laws on its territory “except for matters which it voluntarily delegates 
to the Union”. Kazakhstan reserved the right to freely secede from the Union.135
There were, however, substantial distinctions between the Russian and 
Kazakh declarations, which reflected different policies with regard to the future of 
the USSR and the individual development of these two republics. While the 
Russian declaration claimed the right to have RSFSR “plenipotentiary 
representation in other Union republics and foreign countries”, Kazakhstan’s went 
much further, proclaiming its right “to act as an independent subject of 
international relations, determine foreign policy in its own interests, exchange 
diplomatic and consular missions, and participate in the activity of international 
organisations”. It also claimed the right to have its own internal troops, bodies of 
state security and internal affairs, and a national bank, not subordinate to Moscow. 
Thus Kazakhstan’s concept of sovereignty was much broader than Russia’s.
The Kazakh declaration also differed from the Russian on the issue of 
ethnic relations. In several places it emphasised the special role of the Kazakh 
nation. Thus the preamble mentioned “responsibility for the fate of the Kazakh 
nation”. Section 2 specified the necessity for “revival and development of the 
distinctive culture, traditions, and language and strengthening of the national 
dignity of the Kazakh nation”. The Russian declaration contained no mention of 
the Russian nation, and used the term “citizens o f the RSFSR”.
Besides, the Kazakh declaration contained some specific provisions absent 
from the Russian one. It said, for example, that Kazakhstan “regulates migration 
within the republic and between the republic and other republics” . It also warned of 
legal prosecution of any who made public appeals for violation of the republic’s 
territorial integrity and “inciting national discord”. The latter provision was clearly 
directed against those Russian organisations and individuals who advocated joining 
Russian-populated northern Kazakhstan to the RSFSR. The Kazakh declaration 
contained obvious nationalist overtones, despite several references to the 
multinational nature of Kazakhstan as a state. Implementation of all of its 
provisions would mean that the republic de facto became an independent state.
With the declaration adopted, Kazakhstan’s government proceeded to 
consolidate the republic’s sovereignty. In late October it introduced customs 
controls, including on trade with other republics of the USSR, to prevent export of 
all sorts of goods.136 In January 1991 it made its first claims on the Baykonur 
cosmodrome. On 14 January, during his visit to Baykonur, Nazarbayev said that 
“the cosmodrome’s scientific and technical potential will work directly towards 
resolving some of Kazakhstan’s problems, such as space communications, space 
television, study of natural resources, weather monitoring” . In early February he 
received in Alma-Ata representatives of the Defence Ministry and other ministries 
and departments, scientific institutions and enterprises connected with space
135 Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Kazakh SSR, 25 October 1990 // Perestroika in the Soviet Republics, 
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activities, and emphasised to them that Union ministries and departments should 
pay more attention to the social sphere. Leaders of space programs and the 
government of Kazakhstan signed a number of documents which envisaged setting 
up a warning system for contingencies such as earthquakes, mudslides, and other 
natural calamities. The space research institute of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences 
was to become a centre for space studies, scientists could take a more active part 
in the solution of ecological problems, earth studies and prospecting for natural 
resources from space.137
On 9 April 1991 the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a 
resolution transferring oil and gas deposits in Kazakhstan to the republic’s 
jurisdiction, and instructing the Committee for Administering State Property to 
conclude agreements to that effect with the USSR Ministry of the Oil and Gas 
Industry.138 The decision was taken just before the start of drilling operations in the 
Tengiz oilfield, an enterprise expected to be a joint venture between Kazakhstan 
and the US Chevron Corporation, and eventually to yield 30-35 million tons of oil 
a year plus natural gas. 139 On 25 March Nazarbayev met heads of enterprises 
subordinate to all-Union ministries to discuss how they fitted into Kazakhstan's 
economic reform program, particularly how powers should be redefined and 
relations changed between Moscow, Alma-Ata and the enterprises themselves.140
In early May 1991 Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet prepared a draft 
citizenship law, which contemplated granting citizenship only to those who had 
lived in the republic for at least 10 years and had a command of the state 
language.141 Soon after that the Kazakh authorities began repatriating Kazakhs 
from Mongolia, the first group of 170 arriving in July 1991.142
Besides such straightforward measures, Nazarbayev began a devious game 
aimed at creating a legal basis for inter-republican relations by-passing the USSR 
Government. He initiated a process of concluding multiple inter-republic 
agreements which undermined the power of the Union’s centre. The first such 
agreement was concluded less than a fortnight after the RSFSR declared its 
sovereignty. On 23 June 1990 Nazarbayev invited the leaders of Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to Alma-Ata, where they signed an 
Agreement on Economic, Scientific-Technological and Cultural Cooperation 
covering the period up to 1996. Its preamble stated the principle of “state and 
economic sovereignty of republics”, and proclaimed as a major objective 
"coordination of actions in attaining economic self-sufficiency of the republics, 
realisation of effective economic strategy and tactics with respect for mutual 
interests, and acceleration of social progress of the multinational population of the 
republics”. The agreement envisaged a permanent Coordinating Council of 
representatives of each republic’s State Planning Committee, to meet not less than
137 Kazakhstan Signs Space Programme Agreement, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, The USSR, 13.02.91.
138 Kazakh Resolution on Oil and Gas Deposits, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, The USSR, 15.04.91.
139 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.83, 30.04.91.
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twice a year, in each capital in rotation, but with its secretariat permanently based 
in Alma-Ata. It was “to guarantee the coordination of general economic, scientific- 
technological, and cultural-political directions, and fulfilment of the conditions of 
this Agreement”.143
It was typical of Nazarbayev’s political style that he described the meeting 
as an “event to strengthen our Union, our Federation as a whole”,144 whereas in 
reality both the meeting and the agreement served the opposite purpose of 
involving the other Central Asian leaders in a process of fragmenting the union, 
skilfully capitalising on their natural anxiety about the Russian declaration of 
sovereignty’s potential consequences for Central Asia. In a way it was a collective 
reply to Yeltsin, but in practice had a more far-reaching ulterior motive - to 
undermine the central government’s power by establishing alternative mechanisms 
for political and economic management of inter-republican relations.
Later Nazarbayev made similar deals with other republics, all accompanied 
by vocal declarations that they were being concluded for the Union’s sake, to lay 
the foundations for the new Union treaty. In a speech on 17 August 1991 
Nazarbayev actually took credit for Kazakhstan’s being the first to conclude 
agreements establishing “horizontal ties” with the other republics of Central Asia. 
“At that, frankly speaking, crucial point, a lot depended on the other republics 
understanding our aims. And we are grateful to Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia for 
not only supporting us, but also agreeing to conclude similar treaties with us”, he 
said.145
On 5 October 1990 Kazakhstan and Belorussia signed an agreement on 
economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation. It emphasised that direct 
ties could become a reliable base for drafting a new Union treaty, and established a 
coordinating council to regulate business contacts.146 In late November 1990 
Kazakhstan signed an agreement with Ukraine on economic and cultural 
cooperation, including establishing a permanent coordinating council for business 
cooperation, consisting of representatives of economic and management bodies, 
and completing the drafting of treaties on various issues, including diplomatic and 
foreign relations, within two months.147
On 21 November 1990 in Moscow Yeltsin and Nazarbayev signed a Treaty 
between the Kazakh SSR and RSFSR, which was more comprehensive than the 
previous inter-republican agreements. It proclaimed policies of equality, non­
interference in internal affairs, denunciation of pressure, coercion and blackmail in 
mutual relations, and guarantees of the rights and freedoms of Russians in 
Kazakhstan and Kazakhs in Russia. They also signed an economic agreement
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containing obligations on mutual supplies, identifying strategic directions for 
moving towards a market economy, and for cooperation in television, other means 
of communication, including via space, and transportation, including 
transcontinental. At the joint press conference after the signing, Yeltsin made an 
important statement designed to allay Nazarbayev’s fears about future Russian 
policy towards Kazakhstan, and to draw him to his side in his struggle with 
Gorbachev. Yeltsin said that Russia had once and for all abandoned the policy of 
supremacy, or of putting pressure on the republics, in particular on Kazakhstan.148 
But later events showed that Nazarbayev had no intention of taking sides; he 
played for one side only, his own.
The treaty with Russia set an important precedent, and more such treaties 
soon followed. On 18 February 1991 Nazarbayev and President Akayev of 
Kyrgyzstan signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Nazarbayev told a news 
conference that it opened up “vast opportunities for the republics to develop 
cooperation by recognising their sovereignty” .149 On 20 February 1991 
Nazarbayev and Kravchuk concluded a bilateral treaty between Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine, which provided for mutual recognition o f sovereignty of the republics, 
respect for their territorial integrity, and equal rights for all irrespective of 
nationality, religion or other differences. It was again stressed that such agreements 
would become a real basis for drafting the new Union treaty.150
In addition to undermining the USSR government’s power through bilateral 
agreements with other republics, Nazarbayev made similar attempts in the sphere 
of international relations. In 1990-1991 he toured the United States, Canada, 
South Korea and China, seeking to establish independent economic relations with 
them. But in that domain his efforts were less successful; he failed to induce any 
foreign state to by-pass Moscow and establish direct relations with Kazakhstan.
A major element in Nazarbayev’s political tactics in that period was 
exploitation of the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev. This became evident at 
the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990, at which Nazarbayev confirmed his stand in 
favour of the Union. "Our position, which the Communists and the majority of 
toilers in Kazakhstan share, is for a renewed strong Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and a unified CPSU", he said.151 But another passage contained a 
warning to Gorbachev: "How can Kazakhstan be helped, if 90% of its industry is 
under Moscow's industrial control?... Our repeated proposals and demands 
concerning economic and foreign trade independence for enterprises remain a 
voice in the wilderness", and the speech ended with a clear overture to Yeltsin: 
"We are sincerely happy at the goodwill shown by the new leadership of the 
Russian Federation, which is also striving to strengthen horizontal inter-republic
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ties. We believe that agreements of this sort will create the foundation for a new 
Union Treaty".152
Thus Nazarbayev used the Yeltsin factor to put pressure on the USSR 
government, to demand more concessions in the matter of putting Kazakhstan’s 
economy under Alma-Ata’s jurisdiction. If these demands were not met, 
Kazakhstan would establish direct economic ties with the RSFSR. Such ties were 
in fact established when Nazarbayev saw that his warning had fallen on deaf ears. 
From November 1990 Nazarbayev steadily moved towards a coalition with Yeltsin 
against Gorbachev. The peak of this was reached in January 1991.
Early in 1991 Gorbachev, feeling political power slipping from his hands, 
took a series of steps to reverse the situation, in what the media later called the 
"conservative offensive". The use of military force in Vilnius on 12 January sent an 
unpleasant message to national leaders in other republics. On 14 January, after 
returning from his tour of the Baltic states, Yeltsin threatened Gorbachev with the 
possibility of a comprehensive quadripartite treaty between Russia, Ukraine, 
Belorussia and Kazakhstan without waiting for the Union treaty.153 On 16 January 
Gorbachev made a countermove, decreeing the holding of a referendum on the 
future of the USSR on 17 March. Gorbachev calculated correctly that most of the 
Soviet population would support maintaining the Union’s integrity, and this would 
legitimise his efforts to keep it intact. This prospect was fraught with obvious 
dangers for the republican national elites, whose long-awaited goal of 
independence could become unattainable.
This worried Nazarbayev. On 4 February 1991 he participated in a separate 
meeting with the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia, held behind 
Gorbachev’s back. They discussed accelerating conclusion of the new Union treaty 
and signed an agreement on direct relations, bypassing the central government. As 
later revealed by Shushkevich, former Chairman of the Belorussian Supreme 
Soviet, it was in February that they drafted the treaty which became the basis of the 
Belovezhskaya agreement.154 Commenting on the results of the meeting, 
Nazarbayev said “the central government itself directed us towards developing 
horizontal links; we concluded an economic treaty, and we have a political 
declaration between these republics”. Nazarbayev explained the meeting by the 
need to create a common front of the republics against the USSR government. 
“...When it is a question of preserving, so to speak, of winning, or, perhaps 
winning back, the declaration adopted by the republics’ Supreme Soviets on the 
sovereignty of the republics, we have to fight together”.155 Thus Nazarbayev’s 
position was no different from that of the other three republican leaders, who
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would later initiate the Belovezhskaya Pushcha accords which dissolved the Soviet 
Union.
On 11 February 1991, at an extraordinary session of Kazakhstan’s Supreme 
Soviet, Nazarbayev strongly advocated speeding up negotiation of the new Union 
treaty, on the grounds that the “exacerbated political situation” in the USSR made 
it impossible to wait until all the republics had determined their attitude to it. The 
Supreme Soviet therefore passed a resolution that: “A dialogue must be started 
urgently with those who advocate preservation of the country’s unity, leaving the 
remaining republics the right to join it whenever they have made their final 
choice”.156 Nazarbayev’s formula was not as simple as it appeared. He wanted to 
keep Gorbachev involved as deeply as possible in the new treaty negotiations, in 
order to prevent his going over completely to the side of the hardliners in the 
Soviet leadership, who advocated introducing a Union-wide state of emergency 
and crushing separatist tendencies by force.
The last part of Nazarbayev’s formula cited above actually facilitated the 
Baltic republics’ quest for independence. While formally speaking for preserving 
the USSR’s integrity, he in fact proposed permitting all those who did not want to 
be part of the new Union to opt out of the negotiating process. With all the 
republics and the Kremlin already considering the existing union inadequate, this 
call was tantamount to allowing secession. If the USSR government had done as 
he suggested, it would have legitimised those republics’ independence, and 
facilitated further moves in the same direction by Kazakhstan. Thus Nazarbayev 
was actually furthering the USSR’s disintegration, while verbally stating his 
allegiance to its preservation.
Soon, however, Nazarbayev made a sudden turn, from opposing 
Gorbachev to defending him against Yeltsin. This was prompted by Yeltsin’s 
speech on Russian TV on 19 February 1991, in which he demanded Gorbachev 
resign and hand over all political power to the Federation Council. On the next 
day, at a joint press conference with Ukrainian leader Kravchuk in Alma-Ata, 
Nazarbayev described Yeltsin’s proposition as “simply unacceptable”. “...There 
will not be a leader of the state, on the whole there will be no centre. What he is 
proposing is that all republics again become part of the Great Russian Empire. This 
is also unacceptable for the republics... what he said was not constructive and this 
proposal cannot be supported in Kazakhstan”. 157
Nazarbayev definitely feared Yeltsin, and wanted to retain Gorbachev as a 
counterbalance to him. When asked in an interview which of the two he preferred, 
Nazarbayev said: "An important quality in every politician is predictability of his 
actions. I believe that M S.Gorbachev has this quality. Therefore I am very much 
afraid of drastic changes in the top echelon of power, which today could lead to
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loss of even the rather small democratic gains that perestroika has given us".158 
Nazarbayev's implied criticism of Yeltsin as unpredictable showed that he was 
unsure what Yeltsin would do once all restraints on his power were removed. In 
this Nazarbayev took account of Yeltsin’s unconcealed fascination with 
Solzhenitsyn’s concept of rearranging Russia, including annexing much or all of 
Kazakhstan to the Russian state.
Nazarbayev’s support for Gorbachev was only a tactical move, and soon he 
was again opposing him. Kazakhstan was the only republic in the USSR to change 
the wording of the referendum question on its future. In the question: “Do you 
consider it necessary to preserve the USSR as a union of equal sovereign 
republics?” the word “republics” was replaced by “states”.159 According to 
Nazarbayev, this change was made to bring it into line with the formulation 
contained in Kazakhstan’s declaration of sovereignty.160 The tactic he applied was 
again very ingenious. He could not refuse to hold the referendum, as did some 
other republics, because a number of the Russian-populated regions would hold it 
anyway, and this could lead to a de facto split of Kazakhstan. But the change in the 
wording could achieve the same goal, by permitting him to claim in future 
negotiations with Moscow that the voters had supported his concept of a much 
looser Union.
Gorbachev obviously understood what lay behind Nazarbayev’s move and 
tried to apply pressure. Nazarbayev says that he received daily telephone calls from 
Gorbachev or his aides, demanding that the union question be put first.161 And 
Nazarbayev managed to get away with his manoeuvre, although the changing of 
the wording caused resentment in some Russian-populated areas, for example Ust- 
Kamenogorsk and Uralsk, where the local authorities insisted that the USSR 
Supreme Soviet’s wording be retained.162 But in the overwhelming majority of 
Kazakhstan’s provinces it was Nazarbayev’s question that was put to the vote.
The results of the referendum in Kazakhstan were significant. 88.2% of the 
electorate voted, and 94.1% of them voted "Yes", the fourth highest among the 
Union republics. The USSR average was 80% voting and 76.4% of those voting 
"Yes", in Russia 75.4% and 71.3% respectively.163 Despite the controversy 
surrounding Kazakhstan's position on the referendum, Nazarbayev artfully used it 
to his own benefit. Firstly, over Moscow's objections he pushed through wording 
that suited him, and left him a wide field for manoeuvre vis-a-vis Gorbachev. 
Secondly, he did so without antagonising Gorbachev to the point of enmity.
The referendum results strengthened Gorbachev’s position vis-a-vis the 
national elites and allowed him to press for preservation of the Union. On 23 April
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1991 Gorbachev met the leaders of the nine republics that had participated in the 
referendum. The meeting adopted a joint statement which inter alia provided for 
speedy conclusion of a new Union Treaty “taking into account the results of the 
all-Union referendum". Gorbachev made substantial concessions, agreeing to 
recognise Union Republics as "sovereign states", promising "fundamental 
enhancement" of their powers, and committing himself to early elections after 
signing a new Union Treaty.164 During negotiations for the new draft Union Treaty 
Gorbachev tried to enlist Nazarbayev as an ally against Yeltsin. He clearly failed to 
grasp the essence of Nazarbayev’s policy, and fell for his multiple declarations in 
favour of the new Union Treaty.
On 28 May Gorbachev went to Kazakhstan, on a public relations exercise 
designed to boost his political standing in the final stages of negotiation of the new 
Union treaty. Nazarbayev used Gorbachev’s visit to maximum benefit for himself. 
He reiterated Kazakhstan’s commitment to the “renewed Union”, and extracted 
important new concessions from the USSR government. He lobbied Gorbachev to 
transfer industrial enterprises located in Kazakhstan but run by USSR ministries to 
the republic’s jurisdiction. At a meeting with Gorbachev and members of 
Kazakhstan’s political and industrial establishment on 30 May 1991, Nazarbayev 
voiced assurances that when the enterprises were transferred, the republic’s 
leadership “would display maximum balance and circumspection to maintain the 
coordination and management of production in the country as a whole”.165 To 
please Nazarbayev, Gorbachev gave way.
On 14-15 June 1991, at a meeting between Nazarbayev and M.Shadov, 
USSR Minister of the Coal Industry, O. Soskovets, USSR Minister of Metallurgy 
and V.Shimko, USSR Minister of Radio Industry, it was agreed to transfer these 
enterprises to Kazakhstan’s jurisdiction.166 This was an important victory for 
Nazarbayev. Neither he nor anybody else at that time could predict that the USSR 
would disintegrate before the end of the year, and assuming control of the major 
industrial enterprises in Kazakhstan was a breakthrough towards full economic 
sovereignty.
The ceremony for signing the Union Treaty was set for 20 August, and the 
first republics to do so would be Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.167 But before 
it, on 16-17 August, an important meeting between Yeltsin and Nazarbayev took 
place in Alma-Ata. Formally it was devoted to exchanging instruments of 
ratification of the bilateral treaty signed a year before, but its political purpose was 
to project both republics’ self-proclaimed image as sovereign states on the eve of 
signing the new Union treaty. But Nazarbayev used the occasion to extract major 
concessions from Yeltsin on the territorial issue. Besides signing a protocol on 
ratification, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev adopted a joint declaration “On Guarantees of
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Stability of the Union of Sovereign States”. It said that “preservation of the 
territorial integrity of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation is the most important 
guarantee for preventing disintegration of the country and its component states”. 
The declaration especially emphasised that in making the new Union, Russia was 
acting as a founding state “together with republics within the RSFSR”.168
Nazarbayev chose the right moment for extracting unequivocal obligations 
towards Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity. At that moment Yeltsin himself was 
faced with growing separatism inside the RSFSR. Following its declaration of 
sovereignty, autonomous entities within it were one after another proclaiming their 
sovereignty too, encouraged by Gorbachev, who was trying to undermine Yeltsin’s 
grip on power within the RSFSR and play the autonomous republics against 
Yeltsin, just as Yeltsin had played the Union republics against him. Some Russian 
autonomies had even suggested signing the Union treaty independently from 
Russia, thereby effectively assigning themselves the status of Union republics, and 
Yeltsin wanted to prevent this by all possible means. In Yeltsin’s words, 
Nazarbayev “firmly upheld” the position that neither Tatarstan, nor any other 
Autonomous Republic, should be a party to the Union treaty.169
For the first time Yeltsin publicly condemned Russian separatism in 
Kazakhstan, saying that revival of the Cossack movement “must not be allowed to 
grow into some sort of territorial claims”, and that “There can be no question of 
our tolerating the seizing of any territory of Kazakhstan in favour of Russia”.170 
Nazarbayev also drew Yeltsin into signing a declaration “On Common Economic 
Space”, which invited all republics of the Soviet Union to meet to discuss 
formation of a “common market space”, and principles of creation of an “inter­
republican economic committee”.171 The declaration represented Nazarbayev’s line 
of establishing maximum direct ties between republics, by-passing the Union 
government, and committed the RSFSR leadership to further actions to undermine 
the integrity of the Union after the signing of the new Union treaty, even though 
Yeltsin was still committed to preservation of the Union, in a form less 
burdensome for Russia. The new union treaty obviously suited him. But the 
proposed declaration showed that it did not suit Nazarbayev.
On 19 August 1991 the USSR’s gradual political evolution was interrupted 
by an abortive coup d'etat initiated by Gorbachev’s associates who opposed the 
new Union Treaty, and wanted to preserve the USSR in its previous form as a 
strong federation. The coup’s failure led to the central government’s collapse, and
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Nazarbayev was among those republican leaders who saw in this a good chance to 
opt for full independence. Gorbachev had lost real power, and could do little to 
stop them. On 24 August the Ukrainian and on 25 August the Belorussian 
Supreme Soviets declared independence. Nazarbayev refrained from doing so, but 
at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 26 August 1991 stated that “the renewed 
Union can no longer be a federation” and a new “confederative treaty” should be 
concluded, adding that the new Union should have neither Union government nor 
Union parliament. He also said that the treaty must be signed not only by Union 
Republics, but also by Autonomous Republics, which “have declared, and will 
want to declare themselves sovereign”, advocated giving those that decided to 
leave the Union the opportunity to do so, and called “for immediate solution to the 
question of giving full freedom to the Baltic republics, Moldavia and Georgia, and 
all who expressed their aspiration for independence and autonomy”.172
This was a program for dismantling the Union, which at that moment 
contradicted the positions of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. On the previous day 
Yeltsin had stated that the new Union must be a federation, and Gorbachev 
proposed at the session to sign the Union treaty and create central bodies to 
administer the Union until a new Constitution took effect.173 Moreover, 
Nazarbayev had clearly backtracked on his promise to Yeltsin, made only nine days 
before, not to support independence for Autonomous Republics, clearly aiming to 
undercut the unprecedented power Yeltsin had acquired after the coup, and damp 
down his possible imperial ambitions.
Not surprisingly, the Russian government statement opposing uncontrolled 
disintegration of the Union state was not well received by Nazarbayev. The 
statement was published on 27 August in Rossiyskayci gazeta, signed by Yeltsin’s 
press secretary Voshchanov, and implied territorial claims to Kazakhstan.174 On 29 
August Nazarbayev sent a telegram to Yeltsin, expressing concern that Russia had 
not yet clearly repudiated territorial claims on Kazakhstan’s borders, and saying 
that public protest, gathering force in Kazakhstan, could have unforeseeable 
consequences. He requested dispatch of an official representative of the RSFSR to 
Alma-Ata to sign an “appropriate communique”.175 On the same day Dzhanibekov, 
a USSR Supreme Soviet deputy from Kazakhstan, also criticised the statement.176 
A Russian delegation headed by Vice-President Rutskoy arrived in Alma-Ata on 29 
August, and was met by angry demonstrators from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk
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movement.177 Despite this cold reception, the negotiations between Rutskoy and 
Nazarbayev were quite fruitful. They resulted in a joint communique, which 
provided for joint measures “to prevent uncontrolled disintegration of the Union 
state”, confirmed mutual obligations “on issues o f human rights and territorial 
integrity of the sides”, and also contained a provision declaring “unlawful” actions 
by “public associations and movements, directed at violating inter-ethnic accord”. 
These were the obligations Nazarbayev had wanted Russia to confirm.
On the other hand Nazarbayev had to agree to certain demands made by 
the Russian delegation. One provision of the communique stipulated that during 
the transitional period “temporary inter-governmental structures of administration” 
must be established, while another called for speedy formation of a “system of 
collective security”, stipulated that decisions on military and strategic questions, 
space research and communications be taken only on the basis of “inter­
governmental consultations and coordination”, and provided for units of the USSR 
armed forces stationed in republics to have “dual subordination” to prevent their 
use for unconstitutional purposes. Another important undertaking was that both 
sides confirmed their acceptance of the former USSR’s international obligations. 
This was to put Kazakhstan’s future actions in international relations into a legal 
framework, which as later events showed played a very essential role.178
Thus Yeltsin’s political demarche played its part. The joint statement by 
the President of the USSR and leaders of 10 Union Republics, prepared on the eve 
of an extraordinary Congress of People’s Deputies (2-5 September 1991), repeated 
the major provisions of the Russian-Kazakh declaration. Announced at the 
Congress by Nazarbayev, the statement provided for: concluding a collective 
security treaty for the purposes of maintaining joint armed forces and a single 
military-strategic space; making a declaration guaranteeing citizens’ rights and 
freedoms; conducting basic reforms in the army, KGB, Ministry o f Interior, and 
USSR Procurator’s Office; and taking the republics’ sovereignty into account. The 
republics undertook to observe the USSR’s international obligations, including in 
arms control and foreign economic relations.
At the same time the statement reflected a total lack of prospects for the 
Union state. It said that all republics which so wished so could “prepare and sign” 
a Union Treaty, and each republic could “independently determine the form of its 
participation in the Union”. In practice this was tantamount to Gorbachev’s 
consent to dissolution of the USSR, because it allowed republics either not to join 
at all or to join but undertake only insignificant obligations. Moreover, the 
statement effectively abolished the central Union government, proposing to replace 
it with an Inter-Republican Economic Committee on a parity principle to 
coordinate only economic management. The Congress itself was to disband and be
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replaced by a State Council, comprising Gorbachev and the Republics’ Presidents 
as the supreme authority in the reformed USSR. Nazarbayev also inserted his 
proposal for an inter-republican economic treaty, to be joined by all republics, 
whatever their proclaimed status. The statement also asked the Congress to 
support the republics for membership of the UN and recognition as subjects of 
international law.179 Thus the program contained in the statement was one of 
gradual abolition of the Union state, and its replacement by a sort of international 
organisation with functions resembling those of a combined NATO and European 
Union.
After the Congress Nazarbayev continued his policy of consolidating 
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. On 13 September 1991 he issued a decree on 
conscription for military service giving Kazakhstan’s military Commissariat the 
status of a republican body, thus putting it under the control of Kazakhstan’s 
leadership, and also providing that from autumn 1991 Kazakhstan’s Interior 
Ministry forces would be manned “by citizens called up for actual military service 
from the territory of the republic”. This was to guarantee that Moscow could not 
use them in any internal conflict in Kazakhstan without his consent. The decree 
also prohibited sending conscripts to military construction detachments and 
Interior Forces units outside Kazakhstan.180 In October Nazarbayev explained that 
the Interior Forces would constitute the backbone of the future National Guard, to 
be “an important link in strengthening the republic’s security”, a necessity caused 
“by the tragic events of last August”.181 Thus Nazarbayev needed a National Guard 
to counter any possible new acts of force initiated by Moscow.
At the beginning of September Nazarbayev took a number of decisions to 
assume full control of the economy. He issued decrees transferring Union- 
subordinated enterprises and organisations in Kazakhstan to the republic’s 
jurisdiction, providing for independent foreign trade, and creating Kazakhstan’s 
own reserves o f precious metals and diamonds.182 Supreme Soviet Chairman 
Asanbayev said in an interview that it would be wrong for the “centre” to control 
all gold and hard currency reserves, that central reserves should be created from 
contributions by the Union’s member-states, and not consist of all the gold 
extracted in the republics, and added that the republics themselves must control the 
credit resources formed on their territory.183 On instructions from Nazarbayev 
Kazakhstan set up customs posts on the border with Russia’s Chelyabinsk 
province, to stem the outflow of food and consumer goods.184.
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In an interview with Hokkaido Shim bun, published by Kazakhstanskaya 
pravda on 2 October 1991, Nazarbayev explained that he saw the new union “as a 
community of sovereign states united in resolving similar economic, political, social 
and other problems... with each republic deciding for itself how it is to join and the 
conditions for its membership of the new organisation”. Use of such terms as 
“community” and “association” was not accidental. They meant that by then 
Nazarbayev had made a firm choice for dissolution of the single Union state, and 
its replacement by an organisation similar to the European Community. 
Nazarbayev also indicated that relations between Kazakhstan and Russia would be 
based on the treaty signed between them, thus denying central government any 
future role in regulating them.185
In October Nazarbayev made an attempt to put the Soviet military 
infrastructure in Kazakhstan under his control. In a speech on Republic Day, he 
revealed his plan “to build our relations with the troops stationed on the territory 
of Kazakhstan on a very strict legal basis, with the requirement that they be jointly 
subordinate to the republic’s President”.186 To this end he issued a decree on 25 
October establishing the State Defence Committee of Kazakhstan, and specifying 
that it was to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, defence and other 
vitally important interests of Kazakhstan.187 Lieutenant-General 
S.Nurmagambetov, appointed as its Chairman, said in an interview that a sovereign 
state such as Kazakhstan must have all the attributes of statehood, including those 
concerned with defence, and that Kazakhstan was not about to set up its own 
armed forces, but that the State Defence Committee would cover all the republic’s 
military infrastructure and take all forces in Kazakhstan under its control.188
At a meeting with voters in mid-November 1991 Nazarbayev said that Civil 
Defence troops and military commissariats, with all their property and weapons, 
would come under the control of the republic’s State Defence Committee. A 
“certain contingent of troops” subordinate to the central authorities in Moscow 
would remain in Kazakhstan, but their number would be determined by a special 
treaty with the Union centre.189
Also in November Kazakhstan declared its intention to take control of 
Baykonur cosmodrome. This was announced on 7 November by a spokesman for 
the Kazakhstan Space Research Agency, who said that Baykonur would become a 
joint-stock company called International Spaceport, which would compete with 
US, European and Chinese aerospace firms to launch commercial payloads with 
Soviet rockets.190
On 30 September, on Nazarbayev’s initiative, a conference of leaders of 
twelve union republics had been held in Alma-Ata. Formally it was devoted to
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preparing the text of an economic treaty, but Nazarbayev later gave a more explicit 
explanation of his decision to arrange it. He said that members of the State Council 
had begun to display dissatisfaction that Gorbachev presided at the Council’s 
meetings, and “proposals began to be heard to assemble without the President of 
the USSR and, if required, to elect a Chairman of the State Council”. This was not, 
of course, the result of mere dislike of Gorbachev. His presiding over the meetings 
was a manifestation, though a token one, that a single Union state still existed. 
Nazarbayev decided to further undermine the authority of the Union centre by 
inviting all State Council members except Gorbachev to meet in Alma-Ata, 191, so 
as to show that Gorbachev’s authority was null and void.
The Alma-Ata conference coincided with a major shift in the RSFSR 
leadership’s position on the Union treaty. A group of influential politicians and 
advisers in Yeltsin’s entourage, aware of what was happening in other republics, 
concluded that preservation of the Union was no longer possible. They prepared a 
confidential report “Russia’s Strategy in the Transitional Period”, and presented it 
to Yeltsin while he was on vacation in Sochi. The report indicated that the other 
republics’ interest in the union treaty was purely tactical, because during the period 
of transition they needed to preserve the existing system of flows of material and 
financial resources, and this was advantageous to them but disadvantageous to 
Russia, because “Having established control over the property on their territories, 
they are trying through Union bodies to redistribute Russian property and 
resources for their benefit” . This would, the report alleged, enable the republics to 
reconstruct their economies at Russia’s expense, while Russia’s own chances for 
economic revival would decrease. After that the republics could easily secede, 
leaving Russia in the cold. The report recommended that Russia “refrain from 
entering into long-term, firm and comprehensive economic unions”, “be 
uninterested in creation of permanent super-republican bodies of economic 
administration”, “categorically object to introduction of tax payments to the Union 
budget”, and “have its own customs service”.192
This was why many influential Russian politicians fiercely objected to the 
conclusion of the economic treaty in Alma-Ata. Though the Russian delegation 
there pledged to sign the treaty not later than 15 October 1991193, their promise 
was strongly criticised by several members of the Russian government. According 
to press reports the RSFSR government in effect disavowed Deputy Premier 
E.Saburov's signature, and he and State Secretary Burbulis flew to Sochi to see 
Yeltsin, who would have the final say on the matter.194 Gorbachev, on the other 
hand, was keen to preserve any super-republican structures which allowed him to 
maintain the semblance of a Union state. He was quick to intervene in the dispute, 
and announced that the State Council would be convened on 11 October to discuss
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conclusion of a Union Treaty and creation o f an economic community in the 
USSR. This was meant to put pressure on Yeltsin to comply with the economic 
treaty signed in Alma-Ata.195 At the State Council meeting Yeltsin reluctantly 
agreed to sign the economic treaty, provided that all 17 supplementary documents 
envisaged by it were ready, and that financing of economic bodies not provided for 
in the treaty was stopped.196
The treaty was finally signed on 18 October. But it soon became clear that 
this was only a political manoeuvre on Yeltsin’s part, and that he had no intention 
of observing the treaty. This fully revealed itself on 28 October, when in a speech 
to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies Yeltsin proposed radical economic 
reform, including price liberalisation, privatisation, land reform, tightening of credit 
policy, and possible introduction of a new currency.197 These proposals were made 
without consulting the other republics, and without regard to Russia’s obligations 
under the economic treaty.
Now it was mainly Yeltsin’s position that deadlocked the negotiations for a 
new Union Treaty. Very little progress was achieved at the State Council meetings 
on 4 and 14 November with Yeltsin insisting that the term “Union State” be 
replaced by “Union of States”. At the State Council meeting on 25 November 
Yeltsin refused to initial the draft Union Treaty until its examination by the Russian 
parliament. This was a delaying tactic. Gorbachev still thought the treaty could be 
signed in late December, and scheduled a meeting with Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, 
Kravchuk and Shushkevich for 9 December, to find a way out of the deadlock. But 
everybody else was waiting for the results o f the referendum in Ukraine.
On 1 December Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly for independence. This 
opened the way to implement the plan to dissolve the USSR. Yeltsin telephoned 
Nazarbayev to say that he would go to Belorussia to consult with Kravchuk and 
Shushkevich on presenting a joint position on the Union treaty to Gorbachev. 
Yeltsin did not invite Nazarbayev to the meeting. However, when Nazarbayev 
arrived at Moscow airport late on 8 December, he was met by Yeltsin’s 
representative. He connected Nazarbayev by telephone to Yeltsin, who invited him 
to Belorussia to sign “important documents” already agreed by the three leaders. 
Nazarbayev, clearly offended by such treatment, refused, saying he was not 
prepared to sign important documents without “consultations and advice”.198 At a 
press conference the next day he said: "Such questions should be resolved in a 
coordinated way, not without consulting other republics. They did not even know 
about them. I can only regret that it happened this way...".199 Gorbachev asserted 
in his memoirs that Nazarbayev consulted him before deciding not to go.200
The decisions taken by the leaders of the three Slavic republics at 
Belovezhskaya Pushcha proclaimed formation of a new political entity - the
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and declared that the USSR "as a 
subject of international law and geopolitical reality ceases its existence".201 The 
CIS was formed not as a state, nor even a confederation, but as an international 
organisation. It provided no post of President of the Commonwealth, and that 
meant the end of Gorbachev’s political career.
The fact that Nazarbayev took offence at the lack of consultation with him 
did not mean that he objected to the substance of the Belovezhskaya accords. As 
soon as the Supreme Soviets of Belorussia, Ukraine and Russia ratified the Minsk 
agreement, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet proclaimed independence on 16 
December, a very symbolic date, as it was the fifth anniversary of the Alma-Ata 
riots. Nazarbayev also played a central role in organising on 21 December in Alma- 
Ata a conference of eleven Union Republics, which endorsed the Belovezhskaya 
accords and signed a number of documents effectively abolishing the common 
union state. On 25 December 1991 Gorbachev relinquished the Presidency. The 
Soviet Union ceased to exist, and Kazakhstan emerged as a new independent state.
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CHAPTER 2
THE PROBLEM OF ETHNIC RUSSIANS IN KAZAKHSTAN
Russian official policy towards Kazakhstan developed in the framework of 
Moscow's broader strategy in relation to the post-Soviet states. It was a long and 
painful process of adjustment of abstract ideological perceptions, dogmas and 
prejudices to the harsh political realities of the Eurasian continent. The most 
difficult problem for Russian diplomacy was the status of Russian minorities in 
other CIS states. After the dissolution of the USSR national leaders in some of the 
republics introduced policies which discriminated against ethnic Russians. The anti- 
Yeltsin opposition artfully capitalised on events, holding him responsible for the 
collapse of the USSR, which, they alleged, not only failed to bring about a Russian 
national revival but led to humiliation and suffering of 25 million ethnic Russians 
who suddenly found themselves outside the borders of their national homeland. 
The government had to act. In late February 1992 Russian Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev stated in an interview that while Russia respected the sovereignty of the 
CIS states, it would strictly defend its own interests, including "the protection of 
the Russian and Russian-speaking population in other CIS states".1
Kazakhstan had one of the largest Russian minorities in the post-Soviet 
space, and its treatment by the authorities, naturally, became one of primary 
concern for the Russian leadership. The situation there was not as bad as in some 
other post-Soviet states (Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Tajikistan), but nevertheless 
gave grounds for anxiety. In the very first months after independence Russia tried 
to draw Kazakhstan into an agreement specifying obligations with regard to its 
Russian minority. At a meeting in Uralsk on 23 March 1992, the Russian and 
Kazakh delegations agreed to develop a comprehensive bilateral treaty, which 
among other things, would address the problem of rights and freedoms of ethnic 
Russians in Kazakhstan.
This treaty, "On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance", was 
signed on 25 May 1992 in Moscow by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev.2 It seemed to 
reaffirm the basic principle on which Yeltsin and Nazarbayev had made their 
alliance. Moscow recognised the inviolability of Kazakhstan's borders, and Almaty 
undertook to observe the rights of ethnic Russians. It was particularly important 
for Kazakhstan that its territorial integrity was recognised not within the 
framework of the USSR or CIS as in previous Russian-Kazakh agreements, but 
unconditionally.
The largest set of provisions in the treaty addressed some of Moscow's 
concerns with regard to ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Article 11 stipulated that
1 RFE/RL Daily Report No.40, 27.02.92.
2 Dogovor o druzhbe, sotnidnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoshchi mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy 
Federatsiey // Kazaklistansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya 1991 -1995 gody, Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: 
Posol stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 87-98.
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the parties would guarantee equal rights and freedoms to citizens and non-citizens, 
regardless of their ethnic origin. Citizens of Russia and Kazakhstan living in each 
other's territory were guaranteed "civil, political, social, economic and cultural 
rights and freedoms in accordance with commonly recognised international norms 
on human rights, taking account of the Parties' legislation as well". It also gave 
persons living in Russia or Kazakhstan the right to chose citizenship of the other 
country.
Article 12 said that the parties could "defend the rights of their citizens, 
living on the territory of the other Party, give them protection and support" in 
accordance with norms of international law. The problem here was that the 
majority of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan were not de jure Russian citizens, and 
were not formally covered by this provision. Their rights were mentioned in Article 
14, which had broader application. It stipulated that the contracting parties would 
"ensure the development and protection of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
uniqueness of national minorities on its territory and create conditions for 
encouraging this uniqueness". The following guarantees were envisaged for 
national minorities:
1. The right to "freely express, maintain and develop their ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious uniqueness, support and develop their culture in all its 
aspects, without being subjected to any attempts of assimilation against their will".
2. The right to "fully and effectively exercise their human rights and basic 
freedoms and use them without any discrimination and under conditions of full 
equality before the law".
3. The right "for participation in state affairs, effective and adequate to their 
needs, related to protection and encouragement of uniqueness of such minorities".
Article 27 stipulated that the parties "would encourage comprehensive 
development of languages and cultures of all nationalities" including teaching of 
national languages in schools. This provision was meant to ensure that the Russian 
language maintained a high profile in Kazakhstan. In Article 28 both countries 
undertook "to guarantee the regime of free activity of mass media within the 
framework of their legislation". Russia insisted on this provision, obviously in an 
attempt to secure the right for Russian organisations in Kazakhstan to express their 
views without hindrance.
Article 10 also said that the parties would “prohibit and suppress in 
accordance with their legislation" separatist organisations and those inflaming 
inter-ethnic tensions. Thus Russia virtually conceded to the Kazakh authorities the 
right to suppress the various Russian organisations and individual activists who 
were demanding incorporation of parts of Kazakhstan into Russia. Secondly, 
Russia implicitly undertook to ban similar activities in its own territory. This was 
compensated by the pledge in Article 15 that the parties would prevent and 
suppress persons or groups inciting violence against people of other nationalities. 
Russia insisted on this provision because of tragic experiences in some other post- 
Soviet states, where Russian minorities had become victims of violence by radical 
nationalist groups. There were several such organisations in Kazakhstan.
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But in general the balance of the treaty was more favourable to the Kazakh 
side. The references to national legislation substantially undermined all the 
provisions guaranteeing the rights of the Russian minority, because the Kazakh 
authorities could Enact such laws as they saw fit. The only place where reference 
to national legislation benefited Russia was Article 10, which allowed Moscow to 
refrain from suppressing Cossack organisations on Russian territory which were 
demanding annexation of Russian-populated areas of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, 
Articles 11 and 12 in combination still left Russia some valid grounds for criticising 
Kazakh policies on human rights and demanding fulfilment of the treaty.
Theoretically Article 11 benefited those Russians in Kazakhstan who 
preferred to receive Russian citizenship. But in practice this meant that in 
Kazakhstan they would become foreigners, and lose privileges associated with 
citizenship, for example, access to posts in the Public Service. Thus this provision 
did little to improve the position of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, and could help 
only those set on migration to Russia, a process the Kazakh authorities were only 
too happy to encourage.
The guarantees in Article 14 were inadequate, primarily because they 
limited participation by ethnic minorities in state affairs to purely cultural matters. 
This showed that Russian diplomacy had failed to consolidate in the text of the 
treaty the right of ethnic Russians to be adequately represented in government and 
administrative structures at all levels. But Russian did managed to have included in 
Article 14 an obligation for the parties to conclude a special agreement on 
cooperation in ensuring national minorities' rights. It was probably in this future 
agreement that Moscow hoped to cover in more detail all questions related to the 
position of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. But events showed that Kazakhstan was 
in no hurry to conclude such an agreement.
In all, the concessions made by Russia in the text of the treaty were more 
substantial than those made by Kazakhstan. While receiving unambiguous 
guarantees of its territorial integrity, Almaty managed to avoid any firm 
commitments to the Russian minority on its territory. But Moscow, obviously 
impressed by Nazarbayev’s numerous declarations in favour of inter-ethnic peace 
and accord, accepted his conditions. For example, he had strongly criticised 
mistakes in “nationality policy” committed in other multi-ethnic republics.3 In his 
program, “A Strategy for Kazakhstan’s Emergence and Development as a 
Sovereign State”, published on 16 May 1992, Nazarbayev pledged to make inter­
ethnic consensus a fundamental tenet of domestic policy.4 But the leaders of the 
Russian community in Kazakhstan, more aware of the real situation in the republic, 
did not receive the treaty well. Kachalin, Ataman of the Ural Cossack force, 
alleged at the hearings in the Russian State Duma in April 1995 that Yeltsin had 
fallen for Nazarbayev's assurances and signed the Kazakh version of the treaty,
3 Nazarbayev on the CIS, Kazakhstan, the Future, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 14.05.92.
4 Nazarbayev's Strategy for Kazakhstan's Future, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 21.05.92
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which made no provision for dual citizenship or for two state languages, Kazakh 
and Russian.5
Soon after conclusion of the treaty it became clear that contrary to official 
declarations defining Kazakhstan as a multi-ethnic state, the Kazakh authorities had 
embarked on developing an ethnically based statehood. On 2 June 1992 
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet approved the first reading of a new constitution, 
drafted by a commission chaired by Nazarbayev,6 some provisions of which caused 
anxiety among the Russian-speaking population. Its preamble proclaimed the 
“inviolability of Kazakh statehood”, and defined Kazakhstan as a state of the “self- 
determined Kazakh nation”. A meeting of the constitutional commission held on 28 
October 1992 under Nazarbayev’s chairmanship rejected proposals for a federative 
structure and state bilingualism.7 Proposals to proclaim Kazakhstan a state of all its 
multinational people, give Russian the status of second state language, and 
introduce private ownership of land, put forward more than once by Russian 
deputies in the Supreme Soviet, were always blocked by the Kazakh majority.8 
Despite fierce opposition by the Russian minority in the Supreme Soviet, the new 
constitution was formally adopted on 28 January 1993.
An analytical report on the constitutions of the Central Asian states, 
prepared in the Russian State Duma in 1995, defined independent Kazakhstan’s 
first constitution as “ethnocratic”, ie based on the principle of priority of the titular 
nationality - Kazakhs.9 Concerns over formulas in Kazakhstan’s constitution were 
voiced not only by the Russian community in Kazakhstan, but by Russian officials 
in Moscow. For example, at the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations in 
April 1995 A.Mikitayev, Head of the Directorate for Citizenship Questions in the 
presidential administration, expressed disapproval of the provision defining 
Kazakhstan as a state of the “self-determined Kazakh nation” and said it would be 
better formulated differently.10
The principle of priority of the Kazakh nation was also contained in the 
Law on Immigration adopted in June 1992. It stipulated that “indigenous people” 
could return to their historic homeland without hindrance.11 By its emphasis on 
“indigenous people”, Kazakhs, the law explicitly excluded people of other 
nationalities, for example, Russian Cossacks, many of whom had fled to China
5 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 136.
6 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 105, 03.06.92.
7 Nazarbayev Finalizes Last Revisions to New Draft Constitution, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
31.10.92. ’
8 Yazkova, A., Lafitskiy, V., Analiz konstitutsiy sredneaziatskogo regiona i praktika mezhnatsionaFnykh 
otnosheniy v Respublike Kazakhstan (analiticheskaya razrabotka), Moscow [No publisher] 1995, p. 1(b).
9 Ibid., p. 3.
10 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh", Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 33.
11 Immigration Law Published, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 28.08.92.
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after the civil war. Moreover, subsequent implementation of the law showed that it 
hardly considered other ethnic groups, for example, Uigurs, Kalmyks and Dungans, 
who could contend with Kazakhs for “indigenous” status.
Not surprisingly the law was criticised by the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, but to no avail. Its principles were incorporated in the new constitution, 
which virtually divided Kazakhstan’s citizens into two groups - Kazakhs and non- 
Kazakhs. Article 4 on the one hand prohibited citizens of Kazakhstan from holding 
citizenship of another country “except in cases envisaged by this constitution and 
international treaties o f the Republic of Kazakhstan”, but on the other stipulated 
that “Kazakhs living in other states are entitled to hold citizenship of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan together with citizenship of other states” . The report of the Duma’s 
research service on Central Asian constitutions said that this provision violated the 
fundamental principle of equality of citizens’ rights.12
But for the Kazakh leadership ethnically based demographic and migration 
policies were important elements in attaining the goal of creating a Kazakh national 
state. In an interview to Kazakh TV in connection with the first anniversary of 
independence, Nazarbayev said “Kazakhs are coming back to Kazakhstan from 
various different countries, from Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Karakalpakstan... All of them are settling down. There are also people leaving 
Kazakhstan... If we manage to stand on our feet and keep going for 15-20 years 
the demographic situation will be changed”.13 M.Tatimov, a senior expert in the 
Information and Analytical Centre of Kazakhstan’s presidential administration 
openly called for an “effective demographic policy”, a major component of which 
should be “directing flows of new settlers from the desiccating Aral basin, as well 
as migrants from foreign countries, into central and northern regions on the border 
of Kazakhstan”.14 Kazakhs from Mongolia were indeed sent to north Kazakhstan. 
Official data indicated that by November 1992 some 30,000 Kazakhs had left 
Mongolia for Kazakhstan,15 and another source indicated that in 1991-1992 they 
totalled 41,000.16 Thus the primary objective of Kazakhstan’s migration and 
demographic policy was to achieve a decisive shift in the ethnic balance in favour 
of Kazakhs.17
In line with this policy was the decision to move Kazakhstan’s capital from 
Almaty to Akmola, proposed by Nazarbayev in June 1994, and formally adopted 
by the parliament on 6 July 1994. The Kazakh authorities gave numerous 
justifications for this decision - overpopulation of Almaty, its location in a
12 Yazkova, A., Lafitskiy, V., Analiz konstitutsiy sredneaziatskogo regiona i praktika mezhnatsional’nykh 
otnosheniy v Respublike Kazakhstan (analiticheskaya razrabotka), Moscow [No publisher] 1995, pp. 9-10.
13 Nazarbayev on Kazakh TV: Talks about Economy, Religion, Nationality Mix, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 18.12.92.
14 Tatimov, M., Vliyanie demograficheskikh protsessov na vnutripoliticheskuyu stabiTnost’ Respubliki Kazakhstan 
// Politika (Almaty), N o.5, 1995, p. 22.
15 Izvestiya, 11.11.92.
16 Bakaev, L., Mezhetnicheskie otnosheniya v Kazakhstane // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: ekonomika, politika, 
bezopasnost’, No.2, 1995, p. 7.
17 One official at the Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the author of this thesis that tire Kazakh objective 
was to increase Kazakh numbers to as many as 30 million.
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seismically active zone, its proximity to the Chinese border and to politically 
unstable Tajikistan.18 But the Russian community in Kazakhstan and many experts 
in Moscow unambiguously perceived it as an attempt to exercise stricter control 
over the Russian-populated northern regions, and to stimulate an influx of Kazakhs 
to change the demographic balance there.
Certain elements of the policy of nation-state building acquired clear anti- 
Russian overtones. One was a massive campaign to rename Russian settlements 
into Kazakh. In September 1992 the Supreme Soviet Presidium resolved to rename 
29 Russian settlements in six provinces,19 and shortly afterwards renamed 
Dzhambeytinskiy district in West Kazakhstan province Syrymsky district, in 
honour of Syrym Datov, widely portrayed in Kazakhstan as a fighter for 
independence against Russian rule.20 In the same province, one other city and three 
villages were also renamed.21 Large cities such as Shevchenko, Ust-Kamenogorsk 
and Semipalatinsk were renamed Aktau, Oskemen, Semey.22 In the new 
constitution the name of the capital, Alma-Ata, was changed to Almaty, according 
to Nazarbayev’s secretariat to bring the spelling into line with “the norms of the 
Kazakh language”.23 The renaming campaign acquired very large dimensions. The 
Russian Federal Migration Service (RFMS), in a report to the State Duma, noted 
with concern that in Kazakhstan “Russian settlements are methodically being 
renamed”.24
The second element of de-russification was language policy. In 
Nazarbayev’s perception Moscow exercised control over the periphery through 
“cultural integration”, of which “language policy” was a tool.25 Consequently in 
building a nation-state independent from Moscow, the role of Russian culture and 
language in Kazakhstan’s public life must be diminished. Kazakhstan’s first post- 
Soviet constitution (Part 8 of the Fundamentals of the Constitutional System) 
defined the Kazakh language as the only state language, and assigned Russian the 
status of “language of inter-ethnic communication”. The situation in pre-
18 Izvestiya, 11.06.94; Segodnya, 07.06.97.
19 In East-Kazakhstan province Dirizhabl became Kyzylsu, Kirovo - Zhanalyk, Andreyevka - Zhanatileu, 
Komsomol - Zhetyaral, Priozemyy - Tugyl, Pokrovka - Manyrak, Sergeyevka- Kaynar, Budenovka - Toskayyn, 
Vysokogorka - Karabulak, Maralikha - Maraldy, Pugachevo - Ushbulak, Platovo - Sarytau, Zelenoye - Algabas, 
Kalinino - Yegindybulak, Tochka - Bayash, Utepova Skalistoye - Izgutty Aytykova; in Kustanay province Aktobe 
became Maylin; in Mangistau province Kuybyshevo became Zhyngyldy; in Semipalatinsk province Yemazar 
became Zhantikey, Igorevka - Sulusary, Saratovka - Koytas, Filippovka - Shymyldyk, Ilyinka - Birlikshil; in Taldy- 
Kurgan province Andreyevka became Kabanbay, Saratovka - Kyzylkayyn, Glinovka - Ushbulak, Tridtsat’ Let 
Kazakhskov SSR - Nadirizbek; in Akmola province Budennoye became Khadzhimukana; in South Kazakhstan 
province Galkino became Zertas [Places Renamed in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
19.09.92],
20 Rayon in West Kazakhstan Renamed after Kazakh National Hero, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
02.10.92.
21 Megapohs-Express, 05.05.93.
22 Kuzmin, N., Nochnyye besedy // Molodaya Gvardiya, No.2, 1997, p. 339.
23 Supreme Kengez Votes to Change Spelling of Alma-Ata, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 12.02.93.
24 Federal'naya Migratsiomiaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posoFstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 14.
25 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, Almaty: “Oner”, 1996, p. 39.
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independence Kazakhstan had been that Russian de facto was the main language in 
the state apparatus and the economy. The Kazakh language was used only by 
Kazakhs, and not in the workplace environment. 74.5% of Kazakhs were fluent in 
Russian, and another 8% could speak and read, but not write it. Thus only 17.5% 
of Kazakhs could not effectively communicate in Russian. But only 2.1% of 
Russians were fluent in Kazakh, and another 2.3% could speak and read, but not 
write it.26 So 95.6% of Russians could not communicate effectively in the Kazakh 
language.
In all, language policy was an effective way of sidelining Russians. In 
particular, introduction of Kazakh language requirements for certain positions in 
government, public service and some professions could effectively deny the 
overwhelming majority of Russians access to these posts.
It is noteworthy that the language provision of the constitution was 
adopted while Kazakhs were not even half the population, and Russian was 
actually the language of the majority. A sociological survey conducted by the 
Information and Analytical Centre of Kazakhstan’s parliament in July 1994 showed 
that 85.5% of all respondents were fluent in Russian. Even a significant proportion 
of Kazakhs regarded Russian as the main language. The same survey showed that 
only 71% of Kazakhs were fluent in the Kazakh language, and another 17.5% 
could speak and read, but not write it.27
The Russian population of Kazakhstan was, naturally, unimpressed by the 
decision to deny Russian the role of second state language. The problem of the 
status of Russian became a major irritant in inter-ethnic relations. It must be noted 
that the majority did in fact support the idea of making Russian the second state 
language. The July 1994 sociological survey mentioned above found that 48.7% of 
respondents positively favoured the proposition, and another 6.6% were more 
inclined to support than oppose it, while only 23.8% were firmly against it. 
However, among Kazakh respondents alone, 21.7% favoured granting Russian the 
status of second state language, but 47% opposed it.28
Russian authorities expressed dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan’s language 
policy. At the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations Mikitayev agreed 
that “state measures are probably needed, which would allow for active 
development of the Kazakh language...But this does not mean that one should 
discriminate against any other language or other culture”. Mikitayev stated that the 
issue “of the status o f the Russian language should be revisited”, and Kazakhstan’s 
government should make Russian a state language. He also warned that failure to 
solve this problem would continue to mar bilateral relations, and have a negative
26 Arsenov, M , Kalmykov, S., Sovremennaya yazikovaya situatsiya v Respublike Kazakhstan // Politika (Almaty), 
No. 1, 1995, p. 43.
27 Ibid., pp. 43-44.
28 Ibid., p. 48.
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effect on economic cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan. Mikitayev was 
supported by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov.29
Of very direct relevance to language policy were measures taken in the field 
of education. The RFMS' report to the Duma noted with concern that the number 
of Russian schools in Kazakhstan was decreasing, and in bilingual schools the 
number of hours taught in Russian was diminishing.30 The actual situation with 
Russian schools is shown in the following tables.
Table 2.1
Number of Kazakh and Russian language secondary schools 
in Kazakhstan (1989-1996)31
T ype of 
sch ool
1989-
1990
1990-
1991
1991-
1992
1992-
1993
1993-
1994
1994-
1995
1995-
1996
C h an ge
Kazakh 2 6 1 3 2 7 6 8 2 9 0 5 3081 3 3 7 9 338 7 3 3 6 4 +751
R u ssian 3 9 1 6 3641 3 4 3 3 3 0 4 9 2 8 4 0 2 5 7 7 2 4 8 4 -1 4 3 8
Mixed 1409 1647 1804 2 0 9 2 2 2 9 9 2 5 2 8 2 634 + 1 2 2 5
Other 84 86 89 89 92 9 8 91 +5
All sc h o o ls 8 022 8 1 4 2 8231 8311 8 6 1 0 8 5 9 0 8 5 7 3 +551
The decrease in the number of Russian schools was not compensated by the 
creation of so-called mixed schools, as the number of Russian schools dropped by 
207 more than the number of mixed schools increased. On the other hand, this 
number almost exactly equalled the difference between the increase in the total 
number of schools (551) and that of new Kazakh schools (751). Thus 37.6% of the 
growth in the number of Kazakh schools was provided by closure of Russian 
schools. The introduction of mixed schools also meant a decrease in the number of 
classes taught in Russian. Unfortunately the figures on the proportion of Russian 
and Kazakh classes in mixed schools is unavailable. But logic suggests that 
introduction of Kazakh classes in former Russian schools meant abolishing a 
corresponding number of Russian classes. This conclusion is substantiated by the 
data in the next table, which shows the decrease in the number of Russian classes.
29 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikli slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykli Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyaklv', Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, pp. 10,28.
30 Federal'naya Migratsionnaya sluzhba Rossii, O rabote migratsioimoy sluzhby posol’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 14.
31 Source: EtnokuFtumoe obrazovanie v Kazakhstane: tsifry i faktyi // MysF (Almaty), No.9, 1996, p. 67. [The 
publication is based on data provided by Kazakhstan's Statistical Committee, Ministries of Culture and Education, 
National Agency of Press and Mass Media],
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Table 2.2
Distribution of pupils in secondary schools as per language of study 
in thousands and as percentage of the total (1991-1996)32
L anguage 1991-1992 199 2 -1 9 9 3 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4 199 4 -1 9 9 5 1995-1996
Kazakh 1063.6 34.1 1153 .9 3 7 .2 1232 .7 3 9 .9 1302 .6 4 2 .7 13 5 8 .5 4 4 .7
R ussian 1975 .3 6 3 .3 1865 .2 60.1 1772 .0 5 7 .4 165 5 .5 5 4 .3 1584 .9 5 2 .2
Other 79.01 2 .6 8 1 .5 2 .7 8 1 .1 3 2 .7 8 8 .7 3 9 1 .2 3.1
On the other hand, the table demonstrates that despite vigorous efforts by the 
government to expand the system of Kazakh language education, the number of 
pupils attending Russian classes still exceeded those attending Kazakh classes. In 
1995/96 the number of Kazakh schoolchildren attending Russian classes was 
327,800.33
In higher education the government also embarked on a policy of gradual 
transfer of more university courses into the Kazakh language. However in this field 
the measures were less drastic than in the secondary schools, because transferring 
tertiary education into Kazakh was much more complex, demanding and costly. In 
1992-1996 the proportion of university students attending courses taught in 
Kazakh increased from 22.1% to 30,9%.34 This, however, did not cause ethnic 
Russians particular anxiety, as enough courses were taught in Russian to satisfy 
demand. But Russians were concerned that ethnic Kazakhs received privileged 
access to higher education.
Research commissioned by the Kazakhstan government showed that in 
1993 more Kazakhs than Russians enrolled as first year students. In Kazakhstan’s 
National University in Almaty this difference acquired striking proportions. 
Kazakhs were 79.5% of those admitted, Russians only 14.6%. B.Abdigaliev 
explained this phenomenon by the fact that there are more Kazakhs than Russians 
under the age of 30. He claimed that 79.4% of applicants to the National 
University were ethnic Kazakhs, and only 13.4% ethnic Russians.35 But it is hardly 
likely that there are almost six times as many Kazakhs under 30 as there are 
Russians, especially in Almaty, where Russians are 59% of the population, and 
Kazakhs only 22%.36 The situation was similar in other Russian-majority regions. 
For example, in Karaganda in 1994 Kazakhs were only 18-20% of the population,
32 Source: Etnokul'tumoe obrazovame v Kazaklistane: tsifry i faktyi // Mysl' (Almaty), No.9, 1996, pp. 67-68.
33 Etnokul'tumoe obrazovanie v Kazaklistane: tsifri i facti // Misl (Almaty), No.9, 1996, p. 68.
34 The total number of university students in Kazakhstan was 280,700 in 1992/93 and 260,000 in 1995/96. 
[EtnokuEtunioe obrazovanie v Kazaklistane: tsifri i facti // Misl (Almaty), No.9, 1996, pp. 71-72].
35 Abdigaliev, B., Russkie v Kazaklistane: problemy, mify i realnost’ // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, 
No. 1(2), 1995, pp. 74-75.
36 Harris, Ch., Novie russkie menshinstva: statisticheskoe obozrenie // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: ekonomika, 
politika, bezopasnost', No.2, 1995, p. 44.
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but 85% of the students in tertiary education.37 In Akmola province Kazakhs were 
21.7% of the population, 30% of secondary school students, but 51% of students 
in tertiary education.38 A privileged position in higher education would enable 
Kazakhs to compete successfully against Russians for the more prestigious and 
better-paid jobs, and in the long run ensure the emergence of a predominantly 
Kazakh political and business elite. On the other hand, creation of disadvantageous 
conditions for Russians would compel many of them to seek educational 
opportunities for themselves or their children outside Kazakhstan, and thus 
indirectly encourage them to emigrate.
The second major element of the de-russification program was the policy 
on privatisation of state property. Historically Kazakhstan’s major industries had 
been staffed and managed by ethnic Russians. This was explained firstly by the 
need for highly qualified managers, engineers and workers, and, secondly, by 
Kazakh preference for agricultural over industrial employment. Hence most 
qualified personnel for industry came from Russia, so that at independence 79% of 
Kazakhstan’s industrial employees were Russians.39 After the collapse of the 
USSR, Kazakhstan’s Russians remained in control of Kazakhstan’s industry. A 
sociological survey of industrial enterprises in Almaty in 1994 showed that 
Russians substantially outnumbered Kazakhs at all levels of management. Thus 
among engineers and officers Russians were 67%, Kazakhs - 14.3%, among 
leading specialists 68.1% and 15.1% respectively, at the level of directors - 59.5% 
and 18%. Even among manual workers, 58.8% were Russians and only 21.3% 
Kazakhs.40
In May 1992, just before conclusion of the Russian-Kazakh treaty “On 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance” Nazarbayev issued a decree 
which was meant to create the impression that ethnic Russians would receive fair 
treatment in privatisation. The decree envisaged privatisation taking place at the 
request of the labour force, which would be automatically entitled to 25% of all 
shares, and senior executives would also be entitled to a certain number of 
shares.41
It soon became clear that the goal pursued by the Kazakh elite was to 
deprive ethnic Russians of economic power, and re-distribute national wealth in 
favour of Kazakhs. As L.Sharonov, entrepreneur and commercial director of the 
21st Century Fund in Almaty put it, Russian and Slavic entrepreneurs were driven 
into a corner, and “Joint-stock companies created on the basis of state enterprises,
37 Megapolis-Express, 02.02.94.
38 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsn, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
39 Harris, Ch., Novie russkie menshinstva: statisticheskoe obozrenie // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: ekonomika, 
politika, bezopasnost’, No.2, 1995, p. 53.
40 Abdigaliev, B., Russkie v Kazakhstane: problemy, mify i realnost’ // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, 
No. 1(2), 1995, p. 76.
41 Privatisation Decree Leaves State with Controlling Role, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 14.05.92.
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total control by state bureaucrats, who are mainly people of Kazakh nationality or 
puppets, the dictatorship of the National State Bank in the credit-and-finance 
sphere - all this signifies that what is actually occurring is a takeover of the 
republic’s economy by a single nationality”.42
In the opinion of A.Dixon, who made a thorough study of Nazarbayev’s 
economic policy, privatisation in Kazakhstan acquired A definite ethnic bias 
favouring Kazakhs. He also gave examples of such unfair privatisation.43 This 
opinion is shared by Russian experts. According to the Duma report on the Central 
Asian constitutions, privatisation in Kazakhstan was driven “by attempts by ruling 
groups and clans of the titular nationality to gain leading positions in the 
distribution of ‘public’ property..., and correspondingly take the main levers of 
power into their hands...In this situation logic leads them along the path of 
sidelining major competitors, who are thought to be and really are the heads of the 
largest industrial enterprises and technical experts, incomers from Russia” .44 As an 
example of unfair privatisation practices Russian observers referred to the principle 
of distribution of privatisation coupons in Kazakhstan. Each urban resident 
received 100 coupons, those in rural areas 120. Since Russians predominate in 
urban and Kazakhs in rural areas, the distribution of coupons favoured Kazakhs 
over Russians.45
When in April 1993 Kazakhstan launched a national privatisation program 
for 1993-1995, the authorities could not simply exclude industrial management and 
labour, predominantly ethnic Russians, from the process. To do so would have 
caused serious discontent among ethnic Russians, and probably provoked massive 
industrial action which could have led to industrial collapse, because there were not 
enough qualified Kazakhs to replace the Russians. Almaty also had to take account 
of likely international repercussions. Hence the program contained important 
limitations on privatisation. It was to be conducted on state initiative, and under 
state control. Besides, in the privatisation of the largest and usually most lucrative 
companies, involved in mining non-ferrous, precious and rare metals or developing 
oil and gas fields, the government reserved around 70% of shares for itself, thus 
effectively retaining control, preventing management or labour conducting 
privatisation to suit their interests, and leaving the decisive word to government 
bureaucrats, mostly Kazakhs.46
While retaining control of such enterprises, the government started to make 
them available for contract management by foreign companies with a right to 
further privatisation. Decisions on such contracts were taken by Kazakh authorities 
at various levels, and the employees of the enterprises had no leverage on them.
42 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 05.06.93.
43 See: Dixon, A., Kazakhstan: Political Reform and Economic Development, London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1994.
44 Yazkova, A., Lafitskiy, V., Analiz konstitutsiy sredneaziatskogo regiona i praktika mezhnatsional'nykh 
otnosheniy v Respublike Kazakhstan (analiticheskaya razrabotka), Moscow [No publisher] 1995, p. 12.
45 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, p. 32.
46 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
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The contracts were concluded without due consideration to the efficiency of 
foreign companies, their business reputation, or their ability to operate in the 
specific conditions of Kazakhstan.
According to Nazarbayev, in 1997 200,000 workers were employed at 
enterprises handed over to foreign management or privatised by foreigners.47 This 
is a large proportion of industrial workers for a country like Kazakhstan. But the 
privatisation did not bring any noticeable improvements in Kazakhstan’s economic 
performance, even in the industries where the majority of enterprises were handed 
to foreign management.48 Moreover, some foreign companies which had taken 
over Kazakhstan’s enterprises went bankrupt, ceased operations and retrenched 
workers. Others applied the devious practice of non-payment of wages. This 
caused protest actions from workers, which acquired different forms, with the most 
desperate marching on and staging demonstrations in Almaty. The revenue 
received from privatisation was also less than impressive. The Russian weekly 
Zcn’tra in April 1997 wrote, citing expert opinion, that Nazarbayev’s government 
sold to foreigners or handed over to foreign management 98% of the republic’s 
industry for “a ludicrously small sum, not exceeding three billion dollars”.49
All this causes serious doubts that the major goal of passing over 
Kazakhstan’s major industries into foreign hands was motivated by purely 
economic considerations. It seems that the main reason was political. The tactic 
was ingenious, because it enabled two major goals to be achieved simultaneously. 
Firstly, it deprived ethnic Russian managements of most levers of economic power, 
and transferred it to foreign companies almost totally dependent on the goodwill of 
the Kazakh leadership, which thus achieved at least indirect control over the 
enterprises. Secondly, ethnic Russians were sidelined from privatisation, and 
deprived of property they could legitimately claim. Most of the earnings from the 
sales were redistributed in favour of ethnic Kazakhs, and moreover Kazakh 
bureaucrats who supervised the transfers naturally got their fair share of bribes. 
This also explains why companies from Russia were sidelined from the 
privatisation, despite having some natural advantages such as first hand experience 
with technological processes at Kazakhstan’s enterprises and knowledge of 
Kazakhstan’s business practices. If the enterprises went under Russian control it 
would mean not diminishing but increasing Russian influence in Kazakhstan, and 
naturally increasing the influence of Russian diaspora in the republic. That was 
precisely the outcome that Nazarbayev wanted to avoid.
According to A.Tuleyev, Russia’s Minister for Cooperation with CIS 
States, 90% of Kazakhstan's industry was handed over “to many third countries 
apart from Russia". He also complained that Kazakhstan “is intentionally avoiding 
solution of questions dealing with establishment of joint enterprises with Russia, or
47 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.05.97.
48 For example, in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy production continuously fell in 1993-1994. In 1995 it 
managed to regain some ground, but still fell far short of the level o f production in the last years of tire USSR. [See: 
Kazakhstan: Transition of the State, A World Bank Country Study, Washington: World Bank, 1997, p. 226],
49 Boroday, A., Ray Nazarbayeva // Zavtra, No. 13(174), 1997.
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financial and industrial groups, is dragging its heels over the adoption of 
regulations on their forming, while opening unlimited opportunities for penetration 
of the country's economy by Western capital” . As an example, he pointed to the 
sale o f the controlling share of the republic's chrome industry to Japan Chrome 
Corporation,50 which he said, was done without prior consultations with the CIS 
member states. "Now metal producers of Russia and other states have to buy 
chrome at a higher price, which has badly hit the economics of the entire metal 
making industry," he said. He added that a similar situation had arisen with 
Kazakhstan's sale to foreign firms of semifinished titanium, with the result that 
dozens of production units came to a standstill in Russia and other CIS states.51
An absolutely different approach was chosen by the Kazakh leadership in 
relation to privatisation of land. It was decided not to privatise it at all. What lay 
behind this decision was realisation that land privatisation would benefit mostly 
Russian farmers engaged in sedentary agriculture, and do very little for, or even 
harm, the interests of Kazakhs engaged in animal grazing. In northern Kazakhstan 
most agricultural land was worked by Russians, and its privatisation would give 
Russians control of large areas. This would on the one hand give Russian 
agricultural producers substantial economic autonomy, and on the other would 
create difficulties for further resettlement of ethnic Kazakhs in northern regions. 
Hence the first post-Soviet constitution of Kazakhstan defined land as “the 
exclusive property of the state”.52
On 19 April 1994 Nazarbayev issued a decree on land ownership, which 
granted citizens the right to lifetime, inheritable possession of plots of land, and 
instructed local authorities to sell the right to possess, use or lease land to 
individuals or legal entities. But only right of use was involved; the land remained 
state property and could easily be repossessed. 53 Naturally this conferred little 
security on any land users, especially non-Kazakhs, who could expect in an 
ethnically based state to be the first victims of government arbitrariness. Thus the 
problem of private land ownership remained a major issue in which Russian and 
Kazakh interests clashed.
The most important element of de-russification was the ousting of ethnic 
Russians from positions of influence in the government, representative bodies and 
public service. The percentage of Kazakhs in the top echelons of power in 
Kazakhstan (heads and their deputies of ministries, departments and province 
administrations) continuously increased, while that of non-Kazakhs decreased. 
Non-Kazakhs held 50% of such posts in 1985, 49.7% in 1988, 41.5% in 1992, and
50 Japanese Embassy in Almaty officially announced in summer 1997 that there was no company with such a name 
ever registered anywhere in Japan. [Information is provided by Merhat Sharipzhan from RFE/RL Kazakh 
Broadcasting Service on 04.02.98],
51 Russian Minister Responds to President Nazarbayev's Remarks, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
22.05.97.
52 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, p. 31.
53 Izvestiya, 13.04.94.
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only 25% in 1994. 54 The Russian Federal Migration Service’s 1995 report to the 
Duma pointed with concern to the continuation of “purposeful ousting of persons 
of non-Kazakh nationality from leading posts”. 55
Information on the first half of 1994 indicated that there were no non- 
Kazakhs among the five state advisers. Six o f the seven Deputy Prime Ministers 
were Kazakhs. In the President’s offices only one senior official in seven was a 
non-Kazakh. In certain ministries at the level of minister and deputy minister the 
ratios were: Ministry of Education 1:6, Finance 3:5, Transportation 2:4, Press and 
Public Information 1:4, Economics 1:7, Justice 1:4, the National Security 
Committee 1:6, Committee for State Television and Radio 0 :5 .56
Konstantin Zatulin, Chairman of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and 
Ties with Compatriots, noted in his report on his visit to Kazakhstan in March 
1994 that Russians “continue being ousted from the sphere of political and 
ideological leadership” and “are poorly represented in new entrepreneurial 
circles...In Kazakhstan we encounter a deliberate, well-thought out policy of the 
ruling Kazakh elite, concerned to keep the Russian population as a labouring estate 
(workers, engineers, specialists) and worried by the prospect of political self- 
determination of Russians as citizens of Kazakhstan” .57
Meanwhile a similar process was occurring at province level, including in 
northern Kazakhstan. In November 1993 leaders of the Russian community in 
North Kazakhstan province complained in an interview that the province’s entire 
leadership was being replaced by Kazakhs.58 In 1994 Kazakhs in senior posts in the 
Akmola province administration rose from 42.5% to 51.5%.59 In the same year, in 
Kokchetau province administration, 5 out of 7 departmental heads, 12 of 15 heads 
of directorates, 8 of 10 committee chairmen, 18 of 19 province procurators, and all 
the city judges, were Kazakhs.60 At the highest levels ( head of administration to 
chief of staff) in provincial administrations the ratios of non-Kazakhs to Kazakhs 
were: Karaganda 2:6, Pavlodar 3:6, Turgay 3:6, Almaty (province) 2:7, and 
Almaty (city) 2:9,61 although Russians substantially outnumbered Kazakhs in all 
these provinces. At the 1995 Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations 
Mikitayev said he considered it “unreasonable” when in northern provinces of
54 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
55 FederaFnaya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posoFstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 14.
56 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 02.04.94.
57 Zatulin, K., Otchet ob itogakh poezdki gruppy deputatov Federal’nogo Sobraniya, nablyudavshikh za vyborami v 
Verkhovniv Sovet Respubliki Kazakhstan, Doc. No.316/333, Moscow [No publisher] 01.04.94, p. 4.
58 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27.11.93.
59 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
60 Megapolis-Express, 02.02.94.
61 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 02.04.94.
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Kazakhstan “leaders of territories are replaced on ethnic grounds and there remain 
even fewer Russians” . 62
A special case was Kazakhstan’s representative bodies, especially the 
Supreme Soviet, formed by popular election. The Kazakh leadership could not 
prevent Russians from electing Russians to the Supreme Soviet, and this could 
theoretically give ethnic Russians and other non-Kazakhs a chance to take control 
of at least one branch of state power. The first post-Soviet parliamentary elections 
were scheduled for 7 March 1994, and the most widespread prognosis was that 
there would be a “Russian parliament”, on the grounds that the Russian-speaking 
population made up the greater part of the electorate in Kazakhstan. That 
conclusion63 was, of course, based on the assumption that the elections would be 
free and fair.
But the Nazarbayev government did its best to prevent such an outcome. 
Gross violations of democratic electoral norms became obvious at the early stages 
of preparations for the elections, most seriously in setting the boundaries of 
electoral districts. As a result the numbers of voters per district differed 
substantially, from 16,000 to 106,000 according to Mansurov, Kazakhstan’s 
Ambassador to Moscow.64 The 176 winning candidates comprised 103 Kazakhs 
(58%), 49 Russians, 10 Ukrainians and 14 of other nationalities. 65 Thus Kazakhs 
had a clear parliamentary majority, well above their proportion of the population.
The unfairness and undemocratic nature of the elections was pointed out by 
international observers, including a CSCE delegation.66 Zatulin welcomed the 
CSCE observers’ conclusions, and warned that after the elections Kazakhstan 
“entered a very risky stage of the development of the political situation” 67 In 
RFMS’ assessment, the elections “not only consolidated the Kazakh nation’s 
dominant position in the multi-ethnic state, but also deepened the division between 
the ‘indigenous’ and ‘non-indigenous’ population”. Their dominance in the 
parliament “allowed the Kazakh majority practically to block adoption by the 
Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet of decisions vitally important to the non-indigenous 
population, capable of stabilising the situation in the Republic”.68
Overall the de-russification policy was not an expression of a simple 
sentimental desire to restore historical justice as seen by the Kazakh leadership, and 
revive national customs and culture. On the agenda were clear and specific issues
62 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federarnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 38.
63 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 02.04.94.
64 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestveimikami "O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh", Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 64.
65 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15.03.94.
66 Segodnya, 11.03.94.
67 Zatulin, K., Otchet ob itogakh poezdki gruppy deputatov Federal'nogo Sobraniya, nablyudavshikh za vyborami v 
Verkhovniy Sovet Respubliki Kazakhstan, Doc. No.316/333, Moscow [No publisher] 01.04.94, pp. 1-3.
68 Federal'naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 2.
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of political and economic power. Kazakhstan had a Russian community almost 
numerically equal to the Kazakhs, generally better educated and qualified, 
especially for industrial posts, and strategically positioned in control of 
Kazakhstan’s most important economic sectors. The only advantage Kazakhs had 
over Russians was control of state power, and they wanted to retain and exploit 
this advantage. Hence de-russification was aimed at achieving greater 
consolidation of political and economic power in Kazakh hands, an objective 
hardly achievable democratically, since the non-Kazakh population notably 
exceeded that of Kazakhs.
At first sight de-russification was in striking contrast to Nazarbayev’s 
declared aim of maintaining inter-ethnic accord. But in reality there was no 
contradiction. Analysis of the political program of the pro-Nazarbayev Union of 
People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (UPUK),69 formed on 6 February 1993, gives a clear 
indication of his strategy. References to national equality concerned exclusively the 
cultural rights of ethnic minorities, and avoided the issue of their role in political 
life, state institutions and government. In respect of politics the program had a 
definite nationalist inclination. It said that UPUK supported “state self- 
determination of the Kazakh nation and its further endowment with real 
substance”. However, the program, obviously with reference to other Kazakh 
nationalist parties, criticised “radical nationalist” tendencies in defending Kazakh 
national interests. It condemned “radical and rapid change of the balance of 
interests in favour of its own nation”, as “fraught with conflicts...Ethnic and social 
conflicts can put a brake on the development of all nations”. As an alternative the 
program put forward a concept of “evolutionary development with equality of all 
nationalities and ethnic groups, and reaching concord”, but only while recognising 
that “in a number of issues the Kazakh nation, given the fact that Kazakhstan is the 
only statehood for Kazakhs, has priority”.70
Thus the policy advocated by the UPUK program was an evolutionary, 
gradual transformation of Kazakhstan into a Kazakh national state. This policy did 
not differ in substance from those of other ethnic nationalists in the post-Soviet, 
post-Socialist space. However, it differed in form, taking account of Kazakhstan’s 
specific demographic and geographical conditions. Nazarbayev had to act much 
more subtly and ingeniously than his counterparts in other republics, anticipating 
that radical actions could lead to armed conflict with the Russian population, and 
to Kazakhstan’s being split into two parts - north and south - along ethnic lines. 
The following table shows that such a scenario was quite plausible, given the 
geographical distribution of the Russian population.
69 Most of the provisions of tire program were later incorporated into Nazarbayev's brochure “Ideological 
Consolidation of the Society as a Condition of Progress of Kazakhstan". (See: Nazarbayev, N., Ideynaya 
konsolidatsiya obschestva - kak uslovie progressa Kazakhstana, Almaty: "Kazakhstan - XXI vek", 1993).
70 Programma Soyuza Narodnoe Edinstvo Kazakhstana // Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennie 
ob iedineniya Kazakhstana na sovrenrennom etape razvitiya, Almaty: KISI, 1994, pp. 208-211.
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Table 2.3
Regions of Kazakhstan with Russian Majority or Plurality71
Province R u ssian s Ukrainians B elorussians K azakhs O thers Population
(thousands)
Akmola 46.3% 8.5% 2.7% 21.7% 20.8% 8 4 5 .8
K ostanay 47% 15.8% - 17.4% 19.8% 1054.9
Kokchetau 36.5% 8.4% 2.6% 28.9% 23.6% 6 5 4 .9
Karaganda 52.7% 7.9% 2.3% 20.7% 16.4% 1265,6
Pavlodar 44.5% 9.2% - 31.9% 14.4% 9 4 2 .2
North-Kazakhstan 62% - - - - 6 0 1 .0
East-K azakhstan 65.9% - - 27.2% 6.9% 9 3 7 .3
W est-K azakhstan72 36.3% - - 54.1% 9.6% 6 6 8 .4
Nazarbayev wanted to keep the whole of Kazakhstan for Kazakhs, but understood 
that the goal of A Kazakh national state within the existing borders could be 
achieved only by gradual, evolutionary means, waiting until the ethnic balance 
changed decisively in Kazakh favour. Eruption into a violent ethnic conflict, as in 
Yugoslavia or Moldova, would be disastrous above all for the Kazakhs themselves.
Initially it seemed that de-russification was achieving its goal. It led to 
increased Russian emigration from Kazakhstan, though accurate figures on 
emigration, its ethnic, occupational and age composition, geographical distribution 
among provinces of Kazakhstan and other related details are difficult to establish. 
In April 1.993 the Kazakh authorities issued a directive classifying the data on 
emigration,73 and some figures were released from time to time, but they were not 
systematic, detailed or verifiable, and were sometimes mutually contradictory. 
Figures provided by Russia were not accurate either, sometimes bordering on 
estimates, though for a different reason, namely that not all emigrants from 
Kazakhstan officially registered as refugees or forced migrants. Many simply 
moved to relatives, friends or prearranged employment, and some Russians or 
Russian-speakers emigrated not to Russia but to Ukraine, Belarus or countries 
outside the CIS, though apart from ethnic Germans, the overwhelming majority 
emigrated to Russia.
Nevertheless, combining incomplete data from the various sources can give 
a rough picture of the emigration process. Thus the excess of emigrants from over 
immigrants to Kazakhstan increased from 67,000 in 1991 to 96,000 in 1992, a
71 Sources: Ayaganov, B., Kuandikov, A., Bavmagambetov, S., Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Kazakhstane: 
regional'nyy opyt, // Politika (Almaty), No.l, 1995, pp. 39-42; Karta Kazakhstana, Almaty: PKO “Kartografiya", 
1996; Harris, Ch., Novyye msskie menshinstva: statisticheskoe obozrenie // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: 
ekonomika, politika, bezopasnosC, No.2, 1995, p. 40.
72 In this province tlire is a distinct geogrphical split between the north and the south. Russian population settled 
compactly in the north prevails in the provincial centre Uralsk and adjacent districts - Zelenovskiy, Pnuralmy, 
Terektinskiy and Burlinskiy, as well tire town of Aksay.
73 "Russia" TV Says Russians Still Emigrating From Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
03.01.94; Megapolis-Express, 02.02.94.
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43.3% rise.74 According to Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to Moscow, Mansurov,
142.000 Russians emigrated from Kazakhstan to Russia in 1992, 145,000 in 1993, 
and 255,000 in 1994. In the same period 115,000 Russians immigrated to 
Kazakhstan.75 Data provided by the Russian Federal Migration Service indicate 
total emigration from Kazakhstan of 369,000 in 1992, and 333,000 in 1993.76 
According to Kazakhstan’s State Statistical Committee, in 1994 the republic lost
410.000 through emigration, 266,637 (65%) of them Russians.77
Kazakh stem skaya pra\>da recently published statistics on migration. In 
1992-1996 Kazakhstan lost 730,000 through emigration. 344,112 emigrated to 
Russia in 1994, 187,390 in 1995, and 138,693 in 1996, while immigration in the 
same three years was 42,426, 46,860 and 31,888 respectively.78 These figures 
appear to include all migrants, not only Russians, and relate only to emigration to 
Russia. They contradict Nazarbayev’s own May 1997 statement that since 
independence a total of 2.3 million had emigrated from Kazakhstan, while 670,000 
had immigrated,79 giving a net negative migration balance of 1.63 million, not the
730.000 cited by Kazakhstanskaya pra\’da. However, the latter figure may 
represent only ethnic Russians who emigrated from Kazakhstan to Russia.
Despite the incompleteness of the data, it can be concluded that emigration 
from Kazakhstan was massive, Russians were a majority among emigrants, and 
immigration to Kazakhstan in the same period was small by comparison. The peak 
of emigration was reached in 1994, and it then began gradually to subside, clearly 
because those most anxious and able to leave had already gone. Nevertheless, 
Kazakhstan’s negative migration balance still substantially exceeds that of the 
USSR’s last years.
At the 1995 Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations Zatulin noted 
with concern that the flow of migrants from Kazakhstan was constantly increasing, 
and was capable of “sweeping away all positive results of any economic growth 
and any economic reforms in Russian Federation” .80 Kazakh officials did not deny 
the massive scale of emigration. At the same hearings Kazakhstan’s Ambassador 
Mansurov admitted that migration from Kazakhstan was “acquiring a massive 
character” and that Kazakhstan’s leadership was “concerned about this problem”.81
74 Khroustalev , M., TsentraFnaya Aziya vo vneshney politike Rossii, Moscow: MGIMO, 1994, p. 34.
75 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma Federarnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 54.
76 FederaFnaya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 3-4.
77 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
78 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 07.11.97.
79 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.05.97.
80 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykli Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazaklistanskikli otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 4.
81 Ibid., p. 54.
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The RFMS report to the Duma contained this conclusion: “There are probably no 
possibilities for satisfactory solution of inter-ethnic problems, if the Republic of 
Kazakhstan proceeds along the path of further consolidation of sovereignty. Each 
step in this direction will painfully affect the mass of the Russian-speaking 
population, pushing it to an inevitable exodus...” .82
While not denying the scale of emigration, Nazarbayev’s government tried 
to find acceptable explanations for it, not always mutually consistent. On one 
occasion Nazarbayev in fact admitted that it was caused by errors in nationality 
policy. In his message to Kazakhstan’s parliament on 9 June 1994 he included 
mistakes in language policy and in determining the status of state language among 
the reasons for the emigration, and declared it “necessary to adopt a new law on 
languages without delay, and eliminate any discrimination against the Russian 
language, which Kazakhs and other peoples need for their development just as 
much as the Russian-speaking population does” . He also mentioned “bias in 
personnel policy” and “imbalance in admissions of applicants to higher and 
specialised secondary educational institutions” as negative factors stimulating 
emigration, and said the time had come to call attention to manifestations of 
everyday nationalism.83
But nine months later the tune changed. At the first session of the Assembly 
of Peoples of Kazakhstan on 24 March 1995 Nazarbayev stated that “it would be 
naive to seek reasons for emigration in non-existent discrimination on ethnic 
grounds".84 Most Kazakh experts concentrated on proving that primarily economic 
reasons stimulated Russian emigration. At the Duma hearings on Russian- 
Kazakhstan relations Mansurov produced results of a sociological survey, 
conducted by Kazakhstan’s State Statistical Committee among 6,000 emigrants 
(Table 2.4).85 Obviously respondents were allowed to name more than one reason, 
because Mansurov’s percentages add up to more than 100%. Table 2.5 represents 
the results of a sociological survey conducted by the Information and Analytical 
Centre of Kazakhstan’s parliament in July 1994.86 This survey was of all ethnic 
groups, including Kazakhs, and this diluted the specific reasons for Russian 
emigration.
82 Federal'naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 10-11.
83 Izvestiya, 15.06.94.
84 Nazarbayev, N., Za mir i soglasie v nashem obshchem dome, Doklad na pervoy sessii Assamblei narodov 
Kazaklistana // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 1(2), 1995, pp. 8, 16.
85 Gosudarstvennaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazaklistanskikh otnosheniyaklr, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 56.
86 Arsenov, M., Kalmykov, S., Sovremennava yazikovaya situatsiva v Respublike Kazakhstan // Politika (Almaty), 
No. 1, 1995, p. 49.
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Table 2.4
Reason for emigration % respondents
Dissatisfied with high prices 46%
Dissatisfied with low wages 24.6%
Food and consumer goods shortages 19%
Lack of prospects in work 16%
Having problems finding work 12%
Poor housing conditions 11%
Table 2.5
Reason for emigration % respondents
Inability of authorities to ensure “normal life in fu ture” 14.6%
Higher living standards in country o f intended migration 14%
W ant to reunite with their families 11%
W orsening inter-ethnic relations 7%
Language problem 5.5%
Discrim ination on ethnic grounds 3%
Undecided, and other reasons 44.9%
Table 2.6
Reason for emigration % of respondents
Unstable economic situation 15.5%
W orsening inter-ethnic relations 13.4%
Adoption of legislation violating human rights 6.0%
Threat of unemployment 5.6%
Rise in prices 4.7%
Discrimination against national minorities 3.1%
Inability to solve the problem of accommodation 2.6%
Difficulties of adaptation to new life 2.6%
Inability to continue education 1.6%
Danger of becoming a victim of physical violence 0.6%
Other 4.7%
Undecided 3.3%
Did not answer 36.3%
Number of respondents 1118
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Data provided by pro-Russian organisations presented a different picture. A 
survey conducted by the Sociological Centre of Ust-Kamenogorsk city 
administration in late 1994 showed that 39.8% of people emigrated because of 
ethnic and language discrimination, and 36.3% because of economic problems,87 
thus rating both economic problems and discrimination high, but with 
discrimination slightly more important. This is supported by data from independent 
research. For example, a survey performed in December 1994 by a group of 
American experts (Table 2.6) identified the following motives for Russian 
emigration from Kazakhstan.88
The survey demonstrated that those emigrating for economic reasons and 
those affected by the unfavourable inter-ethnic situation were almost equal in 
numbers, 27.8% and 27.3% respectively. This confirms that nationality policy in 
Kazakhstan served as a very direct stimulus to Russian emigration, and played no 
lesser role than the worsening economic situation. Besides, the very methodology 
of separating economic and inter-ethnic reasons seems faulty. In practice they are 
closely interrelated. If a person’s ethnic background causes him to lose out to the 
titular nationality in the privatisation process, the search for well-paid employment, 
or prospects of good tertiary education for his children, he will naturally see 
economic prospects as grim, and choose to emigrate even if not currently 
experiencing any direct ethnic discrimination.
Figures on the ethnic composition of the migration balance in Kazakhstan 
tend to support this conclusion. In 1993 total emigration from Kazakhstan 
exceeded total immigration by 222,00089, but ethnic Kazakh immigration exceeded 
emigration by 23,50090. Even in 1994, the year of highest net emigration from 
Kazakhstan, Kazakh immigrants exceeded Kazakh emigrants by 2,406.91 The trend 
continued in later years. In the first nine months of 1996 Kazakh immigrants 
(12,227) exceeded Kazakh emigrants (7,173) by 5,074, though in the same period 
of 1997 Kazakh emigrants (9,113) slightly exceeded immigrants (8,586).92 In 
practice since independence more Kazakhs immigrated to Kazakhstan, than 
emigrated from there. If migration flows to and from Kazakhstan were determined 
exclusively by economic reasons, one would not expect to find more Kazakhs
87 Gosudarstveimaya Duma Federarnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svvazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
88 Tire survey took place in 8 cities - Almaty, Atirau, Balikshi, Mamlutk, Petropavlovsk, Talgar, Turkestan, 
Shymkent, and involved 1061 Kazakh and 1118 Russian respondents. It was financed by US Science Foundation, 
Carnegie Corporation and MacArthur Foundation. [Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisinrogo razvitiya / Pod 
obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 1995, pp. 275, 291-292],
89 Federal'naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posoFstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 3-4.
90 Galiev, A., Etnodenrograficheskie i etnonrigratsiomryye protsessy v Kazakhstane // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: 
ekononrika, politika, bezopasnosf, No.2, 1995, p. 61.
91 Gosudarstveimaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Spravka o polozhenii v Kazakhstane, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1995.
92 Tire information was provided by Merhat Sharipzlran from RFE/RL Kazakh Broadcasting Service with reference 
to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Bureau in Aknrola and Kazakh State Agency on Statistics.
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going to Kazakhstan than leaving. If the economic situation had a relatively 
stronger negative impact on Russians and other non-Kazakhs there must have been 
reasons for it.
Although massive, Russian emigration affected primarily only one group 
within the Russian population of Kazakhstan, namely Russians born in Russia, who 
migrated to Kazakhstan for various, mostly professional/career, reasons. They have 
high average educational and qualification levels and live in cities, in many of which 
they are the majority of the population. This group is most disposed to emigration, 
because it has the fewest local ties, and the highest proportion of qualifications 
marketable elsewhere. There is, however, a second group, larger that the first 
(66.6% of all Russians in Kazakhstan), consisting of Russians whose ancestors 
have lived in Kazakhstan for two-three generations. They live mostly in rural areas, 
and in the north-west, north and north-east regions, and are far less likely to 
emigrate than members of the first group; although two-thirds of Kazakhstan’s 
Russian population, they are only one-third of Russian emigrants from there.93 The 
sociological survey by the Information and Analytical Centre of Kazakhstan’s 
Parliament showed that intending migrants formed 23% of urban but only 7% of 
rural populations.94 Most conspicuous within the second group are Cossacks. 
Migration among them is negligible, and mostly of young men going to serve in the 
Russian armed forces.95
Another important conclusion that can be drawn from the various surveys 
is that most Russians intend to stay in Kazakhstan. The July 1994 sociological 
survey mentioned above established that throughout Kazakhstan only 25% of 
Russians contemplate emigration.96 The survey performed by the group of 
American researchers in December 1994 established that only 20.8% of Russians 
see their future in emigration, while 36% of Russians indicated definite intent to 
stay in Kazakhstan and fight to preserve the Russian language and culture. Another 
4.5% declared their intention to organise themselves politically for secession of the 
Russian-populated lands from Kazakhstan.97
Self-organisation of the second group of the Russian population started 
even before the disintegration of the USSR, and Kazakhstan’s policy of nation­
state building intensified the process, with the Cossacks taking the lead. Their
93 Federarnaya Migratsioimaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsiomioy sluzhby posol'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 15-16; Rybakovskiy, L., 
Migratsionnyy obmen naseleniem mezhdu TsentraFnoy Aziey i Rossiey // Rossiya i musulmanskiy mir, Bulleten' 
referativno-analiticheskoy informatsii, No. 12(42), Moscow: INION, 1995, p. 37.
94 Arsenov, M., Kalmykov, S., Sovremennaya yazikovaya situatsiya v Respublike Kazakhstan // Politika (Almaty), 
No. 1, 1995, p. 49.
95 Federal'naya Migratsioimaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsiomioy sluzhby posol’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 15-16.
96 Arsenov, M., Kalmykov, S., Sovremennaya yazikovaya situatsiya v Respublike Kazakhstan // Politika (Almaty), 
No. 1, 1995, p. 49.
97 Other respondents named different modes of behaviour or had difficulties in answering the question. 
[Kazakhstan: realii i perspektiw nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, p. 277],
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organisations started to emerge even before the collapse of the USSR, and were 
followed by other sections of the Russian community. On 24 September 1992 a 
founding conference of a new Russian organisation, the Republican Public Slavic 
Movement “Lad” (Concord) was held in Petropavlovsk. Lad’s statute defined its 
objectives as “preservation of the ethnic uniqueness, culture and languages of the 
Slavs, spiritual revival of the Slavic people of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
developing and strengthening of democracy, realisation and defence of political 
economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms, strengthening of peace and 
friendship, fraternal relations between peoples of our multinational republic”.98 On 
28 May 1993 Lad received official registration and a year later, according to its 
leader A.Dokuchaeva, had 25,000 members 99 Lad’s activities had a clear political 
direction, though formally it continued presenting itself as A purely cultural 
organisation, a tactic applied to overcome restrictions on political organisations of 
ethnic Russians.
In November 1992 another Russian community organisation, Russian 
Centre, was launched in Alma-Ata. It was based on the Russian Cultural Centre 
there and Slavic cultural societies in the 17 provinces. Its declared aims were to 
help the Slav population through the transition to the market economy, and ensure 
that Slavs stayed in Kazakhstan.100 It was headed by N. Sidorova. The importance 
of these two new' organisations, was that they were not directly linked to the 
Cossack movement, and served as points of consolidation for the non-Cossack 
Russian and general Slav community in Kazakhstan.
On 7 December 1992 Russian community organisations staged a 15,000- 
strong rally in Ust-Kamenogorsk, demanding that Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet 
and President restore the political and economic integrity o f peoples of the CIS 
countries. The resolution it adopted requested recognition o f Russian as the second 
state language, and of dual citizenship for residents in the republic, and that the 
East Kazakhstan provincial authorities be granted “right of self-government in the 
spheres of language, culture and exploitation o f natural resources”. They 
threatened to call “a general political strike and recall the deputies representing the 
province” if their demands were not met. I.Korbanev, a co-chairman of the Slavic 
Culture Society in East Kazakhstan province, warned that if the parliament refused 
to consider the demands, the society could raise the issue of forming a Trans-Irtysh 
republic101, an obvious analogy with the Transdnestria Republic in Moldova. When 
asked about the rally in an interview Nazarbayev dismissed it as of "secondary 
importance”, and warned that public actions by Russians in Kazakhstan could meet 
with a similar response by Kazakhs.102
98 Ustav Respublikanskogo Obshchestveimogo Slavyanskogo Dvizheniya “Lad" // Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie 
partii i obshchestvennyye ob’iedineniya Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape razvitiya, Almatv: KISI, 1994, pp. 
217-219.
99 Zaslavskaya, M., Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennyye ob’iedineniya Kazakhstana na sovremennom etape 
razvitiya, Almaty: KISI, 1994, p. 32.
100 Russian Organisation Launched in Alma-Ata, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 27.11.92.
101 Slavs in East Kazakhstan Threaten Secession, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 09.12.92.
102 Nazarbayev Answers Viewers' Questions on TV Phone-in, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 11.12.92.
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The implementation of de-russification in Kazakhstan did not go unnoticed 
in Moscow. Probably the first Russian expert to voice concern was A.Migranyan, 
one of Yeltsin’s political advisers. He argued that Kazakhstan’s declared support 
for closer integration with Russia was not a long-term strategy, but a tactic to gain 
time. The important point in his deliberation was that he concentrated not on the 
immediate negative economic effects of the large Russian immigration from 
Kazakhstan, but on future strategic relationships between the two countries.103 The 
immigration was disadvantageous for the Russian economy, but only temporarily. 
Russia was after all large enough to accommodate all Russians leaving Kazakhstan 
without overstraining itself, and Migranyan well understood that.
What would be Kazakhstan’s attitude towards Russia in a strategic 
perspective, would it remain friendly and allied, or make a geopolitical shift and 
join forces hostile to Russia, creating a serious danger to Russian national security? 
These were the questions that troubled Russian foreign policy analysts at the time. 
Moscow obviously saw the presence of a large Russian community in Kazakhstan, 
and its wide representation in government, public service and major industries as 
insurance of Kazakhstan’s loyalty in strategic perspective. The attitude to ethnic 
Russians in Kazakhstan became the main criterion by which the real and not 
declared intentions of Kazakh leadership were judged. Russia’s primary concern 
was, firstly, to encourage Russians not to leave Kazakhstan, and secondly, to force 
the Kazakh leaders to restore the role of ethnic Russian in state institutions.
On 30 November 1992 Yeltsin issued an executive order “On Questions of 
Protection of Rights and Interests of Russian Citizens beyond the Borders of the 
Russian Federation”, which had direct implications for Kazakhstan. Among other 
things the document instructed the Foreign Ministry to be more active in defending 
“Russian citizens and their interests” abroad, and also authorised the Foreign 
Ministry and State Committee on Economic Cooperation with CIS states “to 
consider questions of economic relations with republics of the former USSR, 
depending on their observance of human rights in accordance with universally 
accepted norms and principles of international law”.104 Thus Moscow established a 
direct linkage between treatment of ethnic Russians in other republics and Russia’s 
economic relations with these republics. Given Russia’s economic dominance in 
the post-Soviet space, this was tantamount to authorising the use of economic 
pressure against recalcitrant republics.
One method chosen by Moscow for exercising political pressure on 
Kazakhstan was providing political and diplomatic support for Russian community 
activists and organisations, especially in cases of persecution by the Kazakh 
authorities. The first such episode occurred on 12 April 1994, when Boris 
Suprunyuk, chief editor of the independent newspaper “Glas”, was arrested in 
Petropavlovsk. A massive media campaign in his defence was accompanied by
103 Megapolis-Express, 28.10.92.
104 Rasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o voprosakh zaschity prav i interesov rossiyskikh grazhdan za 
predelami Rossiyskoy Federatsii // Diplomaticeskiy Vestnik, No. 1-2, 1993, p. 8.
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rallies and threatening statements by Russian patriotic organisations directed at the 
Kazakh authorities.105
The Russian authorities also acted decisively. The Russian Embassy in 
Almaty sent diplomatic notes on 12 and 21 April requesting consular access to 
Suprunyuk, but Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry ignored them. Following the failure 
of the Embassy’s demarches, the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs and Ties with 
Compatriots issued a special statement which said that the Kazakh authorities’ 
actions “grossly violated” international human rights norms and the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The Committee expressed “deep 
concern that such practices with regard to Kazakhstan’s Russians may complicate 
bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Kazakhstan”, and appealed to the Kazakh authorities to take steps to settle the 
situation and “inform state bodies of the Russian Federation about their actions 
with regard to Russian Federation citizen Suprunyuk and other Kazakhstan 
Russians in custody”.106
At the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations, Deputy Foreign 
Minister Panov revealed that the Duma resolution had been arranged at the 
Russian Foreign Ministry’s request.107 This refutes the well-established 
misconception that there were some differences of principle between the Russian 
parliament and Yeltsin’s administration over protection of ethnic Russians in the 
post-Soviet states. This is further confirmed by another disclosure by Panov, that 
“a practice of communicating through confidential letters” had been established 
between Yeltsin and Nazarbayev, that when difficult questions arose, they wrote to 
each other, and “issues such as that of the Cossacks were touched on more than 
once in letters which Boris Nikolayevich sent to Nazarbayev”.108 So, while keeping 
silent publicly, Yeltsin expressed his concern to Nazarbayev through diplomatic 
channels. In the Suprunyuk case Mikitayev acted as Yeltsin’s personal envoy, and 
allegedly passed a personal message from Yeltsin to Nazarbayev.109 Suprunyuk 
was released by the end of May.
In similar later episodes, the Russian Government acted along the same 
lines. This was in the case when in late October 1994 F.Cherepanov, acting 
Ataman of the East Kazakhstan province Cossacks, was kidnapped in Ust- 
Kamenogorsk.110 The Russian Foreign Ministry registered dissatisfaction, and 
demanded the Kazakh side take all necessary steps to free Cherepanov.111 The
105 Leader of Russian Community Arrested in Northern Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
19.04.94.
106 Zayavlenie Komiteta Gosudarstvennoy Dumy po delam SNG i svyazyam s sootechestveimikami v svyazi s 
arestom grazhdanma Rossiyskoy Federatsii B.F.Suprunyuka 12 aprelya 1994 g. v g. Petropavlovske, Moscow [No 
publisher] 1994.
107 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogranuna parlamentskikh 
slushamy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestveimikami “O 
rossiysko-kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakli”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 12.
108 Ibid., p. 11.
109 Problems Remain in Russo-Kazakh Citizenship Accord, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 31.05.97.
110 Reuters News Service, 01.11.94.
111 Reuters News Service, 03.11.94.
80
arrest of Gunkin, Ataman of the Semirechye Cossacks, on 28 October 1995 
aroused a similar reaction. In a letter to Kazakhstan's National Security Committee, 
the Russian Ministry for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy said that the 
Russian public saw Gunkin's arrest as "an attempt to hold elections to the Kazakh 
parliament without considering the interests of Kazakhstan's Russian-speaking 
population".112 On 17 November the Duma adopted a resolution supporting 
Gunkin, and expressing concern at “the violation of rights and freedoms of both 
ethnic Russians and Russian citizens in Kazakhstan".113 When despite these 
protests Gunkin was jailed for three months, the Russian Foreign Ministry 
expressed its disappointment.114 Gunkin served his full three-month sentence, and 
after release was re-elected as Ataman.115
Russia also foresaw more active utilisation of Cossack organisations to put 
psychological pressure on the Kazakh authorities. In early August 1992 a meeting 
of Cossack atamans from all over Russia was held in Moscow. Rutskoy spoke 
there in favour of restoring Cossack units in the Russian armed forces, and 
announced that the Russian leadership had decided to draft a special program to do 
with Cossack Force and frontier guard units. Speaking about the position of ethnic 
Russians in the CIS states, he especially mentioned Kazakhstan. “Despite 
Nazarbayev’s rhetoric about internationalism, Kazakhstan’s cabinet is adopting 
decrees barring citizens from certain jobs if they do not speak the Kazakh 
language... We cannot just sit back and watch the growth of national chauvinism 
and discrimination against ethnic Russians in the former union republics. In such a 
situation we must assume a tough position and take measures to prevent such 
discrimination” .116 After the meeting Abdildin, Chairman of Kazakhstan's Supreme 
Soviet, registered his dissatisfaction, stating in a newspaper article that the Cossack 
atamans' claims to autonomy to protect the interests of the Russian population in 
Kazakhstan were a provocation, fraught with risk of conflicts.117
On 15 March 1993 Yeltsin signed a decree ordering reorganisation of 
Russian military structures in North Caucasus. The decree inter alia provided for 
organisation of Cossack units in the army, internal troops and security forces, and 
creation of special departments within the Defence, Interior and Security ministries 
to supervise such units. Local authorities in traditional Cossack regions were 
instructed to form Cossack “voluntary non-military structures” which, however, 
were to be used for “civil and territorial defence” as well as ensuring law and order
112 Russia Concerned over Arrest of Cossack Chieftain in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
16.11.95.
113 Duma Voices Concern over Human Rights in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 20.11.95.
114 Cossack Chief Sentenced to Three Months in Prison, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 23.11.95; Russia 
Expresses Regret at Court Sentence on Cossack Chief, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 23.11.95.
115 Opasnost" zaklvuchaetsya ne v vovne a v samoobmane, kotoryy opravdyvaet nereshitelnost’ rossiyskoy vlasti, // 
Shturm, No.3, 1996, p. 31.
116 Cossack Council of Atamans ends session in Moscow, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 17.08.92
117 Cossack Atamans' Claims to Autonomy in Kazakhstan are a "Provocation", BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 15.08.92.
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and protecting property.118 Almaty’s reaction to this decree was painful. A lengthy 
article in the Kazakh language weekly Orken (Horizon) said that Yeltsin's decision 
could hardly be regarded as a purely Russian domestic affair, and that it had a 
direct bearing on the situation in Kazakhstan.119
The Cossacks were definitely much more prepared for action than other 
sections of Kazakhstan’s Russian community. A public opinion survey among 
Russians found that only 17.7% were prepared to take up arms “to defend the 
interests of their people in inter-ethnic conflicts”, whereas 42.9% of Cossacks were 
so prepared.120 In some regions Cossacks have already created shadow structures 
for organisational deployment in crises. For example, in 1993 Cossacks in northern 
Kazakhstan divided their territory into 20 Cossack settlements, and formed illegal 
committees to govern them.121 According to Kazakh sources, unregistered 
Cossack associations exist in Akmola, East Kazakhstan, Kokchetau, North 
Kazakhstan and West Kazakhstan provinces.122
In March 1994 several villages in Taldy-Kurgan province became an area of 
sharp confrontation between Kazakhs and local Cossacks, with occasional clashes 
taking place, and a larger encounter averted only through police intervention. In 
April 1994 the Russian Justice Ministry registered the Siberian Cossack Force. 
Four of its 16 subdivisions were located in Kazakhstan.123 In November 1994 
Russian Cossacks started creating an Ural Cossack Force in Orenburg province 
with headquarters in the town of Tashla. The Force was to include Cossacks living 
in West-Kazakhstan.124
Not surprisingly, Cossacks in Kazakhstan became the primary target of 
attacks by the Kazakh authorities, preventing registration of Cossack 
organisations, and denying them the right to hold public meeting, rallies and 
demonstrations. Cossack activists were subjected to regular police harassment, 
detention and arrest. But the Kazakh authorities soon realised that the Cossack 
movement could not be contained by repression alone, and moved to a more 
flexible approach. The first signs of this appeared in March 1994, when State 
Counsellor to the President Suleymenov proposed convening a republican congress
118 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o reformirovanii voennykh Struktur pogranichnykh i vnutrennikh voysk 
na territorii Severo-Kavkazskogo regiona Rossiyskoy Federatsii i gosudarsvennoy podderzhke kazachestva, No. 341, 
Moscow [No publisher], 15.03.93.
119 Yeltsin Decree on Cossacks Sparks off More Debate on Attitudes to Russia, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 17.04.93.
120 Abdirov, M., Abdirova B., Kazachestvo v kontekste sovremennykh kazakhstansko-rossiyskikh otnosheniy // 
Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 2(3), 1995, p. 59.
121 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisnnogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: 
RISI, 1995, p. 209.
122 Ayaganov, B., Kuandikov, A., Baymagambetov, S., Etnopoliticheskava situatsiya v Kazakhstane: regional'nyy 
opyt, // Evraziyskoe Soobshchestvo, No.4-5, 1995, p. 7.
123 RFE/RL Report No.67, 08.04.94; Kazakhstan: realh i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey 
redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 1995, p. 210.
124 Ayaganov, B., Kuandikov, A., Baymagambetov, S., Etnopoliticheskaya situatsiya v Kazakhstane: regional’nyy 
opyt, // Evraziyskoe Soobshchestvo, No.4-5, 1995, p. 7; Abdirov, M., Abdirova B., Kazachestvo v kontekste 
sovremennykh kazakhstansko-rossiyskikh otnosheniy // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 2(3), 1995, p. 
59.
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in Almaty of all Cossack formations and communities, to discuss the official status 
of Kazakhstan's Cossacks.125 Historians M.Abdirov and B.Abdirova recommended 
drafting a program of "cultural revival" of the Cossacks, encouraging creation of 
Cossack "cultural funds", specific business activities (protection of fish resources, 
struggle against poaching etc), holding Cossack festivals, folklore celebrations, 
etc”.126 The authors advised a logical combination of this policy with harsh 
measures against recalcitrant Cossack organisations: a “carrot and stick” tactic. 
The core of the policy was to channel the Cossack movement into a direction 
innocuous for the Kazakh nation-state, by finding a base among Cossacks who 
would be satisfied with access to economic and cultural benefits and other 
incentives.
On 1 June 1994 the Kazakh authorities registered the Society for 
Assistance to the Semirechye Cossacks, which brought together Cossacks from the 
Almaty and Taldy-Kurgan provinces of eastern Kazakhstan. While registering it, 
Justice Ministry officials stressed that it should not be regarded as a military-style 
formation. However, State Counsellor Suleymenov said that it might be possible 
for Cossack troops to serve on the borders with China, Iran and the Caspian Sea, 
and that a Cossack platoon might be raised for Kazakhstan's Republican Guards, 
and suggested that the Kazakhstan Cossacks create a multi-ethnic movement 
similar to Cossack groups in Russia, which include Kalmyks and Osetians.127 The 
purpose of this manoeuvre was clearly to DILUTE the Cossack movement’s ethnic 
character and pro-Russian orientation. But following the kidnapping of 
Cherepanov, the society showed that it was in no-one’s pocket. On 19 November 
it staged a demonstration and rally in the centre of Almaty, after which it was 
suspended and some Cossack activists arrested.128
The most explosive situation pertaining to ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan 
emerged in November 1993, when Moscow left the rouble zone, and refused 
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states fresh deliveries of Russian currency. 
Russian-Kazakh relations hit their lowest point since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Tension was in the air, with rumours of possible anti-Russian violence in 
Central Asia. In this electrified atmosphere Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin, on 
behalf of the Russian government, issued a strong warning to Central Asian 
nationalists that Russia would find ways to defend ethnic Russians.129 Shokhin's
125 Kazakhstan's Cossacks to Meet to Discuss Status, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 29.03.94.
126 Abdirov, M., Abdirova B., Kazachestvo v kontekste sovremennykh kazakhstansko-rossiyskikli otnosheniy // 
Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 2(3), 1995, p. 62.
127 Cossack Group Given Official Status by Kazakh Authorities, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
12.07.94.
128 Kazakh Justice Minister Suspends Cossack Society, Rutskoy Alleges Discrimination, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 08.12.94.
129 On 16 November 1993 Shokhin's statement was published in the semi-official newspaper Irvestiya. It said: "hi 
the past few days, in connection with the problems of creating a new rouble zone, threats have been spread around 
m some former Soviet republics to the effect that Russia should again assume a considerable share of the expense 
of improving their financial situation, or else tilings will go especially badly for ethnic Russians who live in those 
republics. This kind of blackmail can hardly be serious, but such irresponsible statements cannot be ignored...
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Statement was echoed by other senior Russian officials, including Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev.130
The statements provoked angry reactions in Kazakhstan, and Nazarbayev 
did not hesitate in an interview to show his displeasure by drawing a parallel with 
Nazi Germany's march into Czechoslovakia’s German-speaking Sudetenland in 
1938. "When they talk about protecting people who are not citizens of Russia but 
of Kazakhstan I recall the times of Hitler, who started with “protecting” the 
Sudeten Germans”, he said.131 Yeltsin was worried enough to dispatch Kozyrev at 
once on a tour of Central Asia. He arrived in Almaty from Uzbekistan on 16 
November 1993, but Nazarbayev claimed to be unwell, and refused to see him. 
Instead Kozyrev, conspicuously accompanied by First Deputy Defence Minister 
General B. Gromov, held talks with Foreign Minister Suleymenov, and was also 
received by Prime Minister Tereshchenko, to whom he handed a memorandum on 
the situation of Russians in Kazakhstan listing the issues that caused concern: 
language policy, problems of Cossacks, personnel policy, the situation in education 
and culture, and the status of Russian military personnel.132 After the meeting 
Kozyrev told journalists Russia’s position in favour of dual citizenship remained 
unchanged.133
The last thing the Russian government needed at that time was an inter­
ethnic war in Kazakhstan. Such a war would have placed Russia in a very difficult 
international situation. Internal political pressures would have made it impossible 
not to intervene on behalf of the Russian community, but such intervention would 
have inevitably caused international outrage and plunged Russia into political and 
economic isolation. Even if the intervention succeeded, the geopolitical advantages 
for Russia would be most dubious. Annexation of northern Kazakhstan would 
leave southern Kazakhstan under the control o f anti-Russian forces, gravitating 
towards Islamic fundamentalism, and creating a permanent security threat to 
Russia’s southern borders.
Hence simultaneously with strongly-worded statements targeting the 
Kazakh and other Central Asian elites, Moscow did its best to diminish tension. 
During his visit to Kazakhstan in December 1993 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, at 
a joint press conference with Tereshchenko on 25 December, said he had discussed 
the problem of the Russian population with Nazarbayev. He also stressed that 
leaders of certain Russian political parties had “made irresponsible remarks, 
concerning especially the Russian community in Kazakhstan, and not only in 
Kazakhstan”, and continued “this I do not want, and it cannot be identified as 
government policy, or the policy of the President.. Russia does not want to foment
Russia has sufficient means of responding to bullying methods of "people's diplomacy" to make the "architects" of 
this policy regret it. And there is no need to harp on the old ideological theme of "imperialist practices" - Russia can 
and will defend its current interests". [Izvestiya, 16.11.93],
130 Izvestiya, 16.11.93.
131 Reuters News Service, 26.11.93.
132 Megapolis-Express, 02.02.94.
133 Russian Foreign Minister Visits, Discusses Cooperation And Tajikistan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 19.11.93.
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inter-ethnic tensions, especially by using the Russian-speaking community... I want 
to use this opportunity to address the Russian-speaking community of Kazakhstan. 
Don't listen to irresponsible declarations”.134 According to the Russian Federal 
Migration Service, in 1994 Russia’s embassy in Kazakhstan concentrated its efforts 
“primarily on mitigating the inter-ethnic situation in the country, calming the 
Russian population and reducing its exodus from Kazakhstan”.135
Nazarbayev also took steps to diminish tensions. In early January 1994 he 
announced that he had passed to Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin a draft treaty on basic 
principles relating to Kazakh and Russian Federation citizenship, in which the 
contracting parties pledged to adopt without delay legislation establishing a 
simplified procedure for acquisition of citizenship by Kazakhs and Russians, under 
which applications must be considered within six months of submission. In 
addition, the signatories would pledge to enact legislation permitting their citizens 
to serve in each others’ armed forces under contract. However, Nazarbayev 
indicated that he was not at that point prepared to make any concessions on 
language matters.136
The primary purpose of Nazarbayev’s announcement was domestic policy 
considerations. With parliamentary elections imminent (scheduled for 7 March 
1994), the ethnic divide in Kazakhstan had become only too obvious. The major 
differences between the parties and organisations representing the Russian and 
Kazakh communities remained unchanged - language, citizenship and fair 
representation in government structures. With his proposal on citizenship 
Nazarbayev clearly wanted to play up a little to the concerns of ethnic Russians, 
not to antagonise them more before the elections, and probably to secure some of 
their votes for his party’s candidates, who would appear moderate compared to the 
radical Kazakh nationalists. For the Russian community, Kazakhstan’s first post- 
Soviet elections were a chance to shift the balance of power in the republic’s 
leadership somewhat in their favour. But as was shown above, they failed, due to 
undemocratic electoral practices.
Zatulin headed the Russian parliamentary delegation which visited Almaty 
on 6-9 March to observe the elections. His report, addressed to Duma Speaker 
Rybkin, contained the following conclusions and recommendations.
1. “Results of the visit allow for an unpleasant conclusion about the state of 
the Russian community, Russian ethnic and cultural societies and organisations. At 
present internationalist interests in Kazakhstan are much better expressed by 
Kazakh public and political figures and academics of democratic orientation 
(O.Suleimenov, N.Masanov), and not by the leaders of the Russian community, 
who are little known beyond their own circle... National leaders of the Russian
134 Russian Premier Calls on Ethnic Russians Not to Heed Provocation, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
30.12.93.
135 Federal naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
v Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 6.
136 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 06.01.94.
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population in Kazakhstan do not exist, though there are undoubtedly grounds for 
raising them”.
2. “Unfortunately, Russia has not yet demonstrated a well-conceived policy 
which would allow it to exercise far-reaching influence on the situation inside 
Kazakhstan. We think that part of the responsibility for this must be attributed to 
officials of the Government of the Russian Federation, none of whom has yet once 
met representatives of the Russian population of Kazakhstan”. The report gave as 
an example Russian Minister for Culture Sidorov, who ignored Russian community 
organisations when opening the “Days of Russian Culture” in Almaty.
3. “Not trying to disavow altogether the results o f the elections to 
Kazakhstan’s parliament, in future we should concentrate on stressing its 
temporary, transitional nature”.
4. “At inter-state level the questions of dual citizenship and status of the 
Russian language as second state language must be kept open. Negotiations that 
have taken place indicate that among the leaders of Kazakhstan there is not fall 
confidence that they did not overshoot the mark, at least on the Russian language 
issue. However, without coordinated pressure from inside and outside Kazakhstan, 
no decision putting the Russian language on an equal footing with Kazakh can be 
taken, because Russian deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan are, as a rule, filtered through representatives of the local population, 
whose political task is formulated by the republic’s leadership Meanwhile, without 
demonstrating will to resist on the issue of language (or dual citizenship), further 
degradation of Russians in Kazakhstan’s political life will continue” .
5. “Under the emerging trend for ousting Russian and the all-democratic 
opposition closely connected to it, the possibility of build-up of an explosive 
political potential in Kazakhstan’s northern provinces cannot be excluded. It seems 
to us that a request to allow Kazakhstan’s northern provinces to establish direct 
economic links with the adjacent regions of Russia is exceptionally important, and 
can be justified before the Kazakh side itself. Maintaining and strengthening mutual 
economic integration of these provinces is the best guarantee of loyalty of 
Kazakhstan and its ruling circles, who have an interest in territorial integrity”.
6. “We should take measures, including demonstrative ones, of support for 
Russian-speaking ethnic and cultural organisations and Cossacks in Kazakhstan. 
There is no other way to develop their capabilities, other than doing what we can 
to render them assistance. We regard the position of the Russian Embassy in 
Kazakhstan as absolutely correct in this respect. The Kazakhstan leadership’s 
initial negative reaction needs to be outlived and overcome. They are politically 
and economically incapable of developing a real confrontation with declared 
Russian interests”.
7. “Russia’s indubitable objective in relation to Kazakhstan is its further 
integration, closer union with Russia in comparison to the CIS... And if Russia 
today is not yet fully prepared for integration with Kazakhstan, everything
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necessary should be done not to exclude such a development in the foreseeable 
future”. 137
Zatulin’s report contained what can be described as a Russian centrist view 
on future strategy towards Kazakhstan. His conclusions and recommendations 
found reflection in subsequent Russian policy, which was directed not at 
partitioning Kazakhstan on ethnic lines and incorporating its ‘northern territories’ 
into the Russian state, but gradually and gently drawing the whole of Kazakhstan 
into a closer relationship with Russia, with a long-term prospect of incorporating 
it into a new form of union or confederation. For this purpose both external and 
internal pressure on the Kazakh authorities would be exercised, envisaging in the 
longer run the removal of Nazarbayev’s nationalist regime. Kazakhstan’s Russian 
community and democratic, internationalist movements and parties among 
Kazakhs would be used to exert such pressure from within. In line with this 
strategy would be a course of strengthening Russian organisations in Kazakhstan 
and facilitating their acquiring a larger share of political power.138
Widespread criticism of Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections, from both 
within and without, coupled with the new strains in inter-ethnic relations which 
the elections had introduced into the republic’s political life, weakened 
Nazarbayev politically. This probably explains his desire to achieve some 
compromises with Russia. In late March 1994 he went to Moscow with a package 
of proposals to smooth the negative political attitudes to his regime that were 
developing in the Russian government and Russian public opinion. They included 
a number of military and strategic matters important to the Russian defence 
establishment, and a proposal to create a Eurasian Union of states to replace CIS, 
intended to appeal broadly to the Russian public in both Russia and Kazakhstan. 
However, he managed to avoid any concessions of principle on the rights of 
ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, a question of primary importance for his strategy 
of building a Kazakh nation-state. The only document on this issue which 
Nazarbayev and Yeltsin signed was the Memorandum on Basic Principles of 
Resolving Issues Related to Citizenship and Legal Status of Citizens of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan, Permanently Residing in the Russian Federation, and 
Citizens of the Russian Federation, Permanently Residing in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, of 28 March 1994.
The memorandum acknowledged the importance of soonest possible 
settlement of questions related to “citizenship and legal status of citizens of one 
state... on the territory of the other”. Both parties agreed to resolve these questions 
through a simplified procedure for granting citizenship; ensuring equality of rights 
of permanent residents with local citizens, with some agreed exemptions; 
guaranteeing each other’s permanent residents the right to own, use and dispose of
137 Zatulin, K., Otchet ob itogakh poezdki gruppy deputatov Federal’nogo Sobraniya, nablyudavshikh za vyborami v 
Verkhovniy Sovet Respubliki Kazakhstan, Doc. N o.316/333, Moscow [No publisher] 01.04.94, pp. 1-3.
138 Some liberal Duma members expressed concern about such kind of policies. For example, A.Arbatov condemned 
what he called “Monroe Doctrine” approach, stressing that Russia should not seek special role in the CIS. “...It is one 
thing to protect “near abroad” and another is to long for domination”, he said. [Mirovaya ekonomika i 
mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya, No.7,1994, p. 12]
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their property in accordance with the legislation of the state of residence; to give 
citizens of one state the right to serve under contract in the other’s armed forces; 
guaranteeing visa-free travel to each others’ territory; maximum simplification of 
customs procedures for citizens travelling between the two countries.139 Though 
these provisions addressed practical issues very important for Russia, they were 
still only a declaration of intent, and not a very precise one. The memorandum did 
not reflect the major Russian interest, dual citizenship, but neither did it exclude it 
from the agenda for further negotiations. It instructed the foreign ministries of both 
states to produce a draft agreement on the subject within a month.
In May 1994 Almaty was visited by a Russian delegation led by Mikitayev. 
Its main purpose was to discuss citizenship issues. The talks once again failed to 
resolve Russian-Kazakhstan contradictions. Almaty still did not accept dual 
citizenship, while Moscow tried to keep it on the agenda.140 However, after 
returning to Moscow Mikitayev was optimistic. He said that an agreement 
regulating citizenship could be signed by Yeltsin and Nazarbayev as early as in- 
June or July 1994, and that Russia was still hoping to persuade Kazakhstan to 
agree to dual citizenship.141
Behind Russian insistence on Kazakhstan’s acceptance of the principle of 
“dual citizenship” was a far-reaching political agenda, reflecting primarily strategic 
considerations, not human rights. Mikitayev was probably sincere in telling the 
Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations that “dual citizenship is a bridge 
of friendship..., a confirmation that both states intend in future to live in friendship 
and fraternity”.142 Indeed, Kazakhstan’s acceptance of the dual citizenship principle 
would be an insurance that the republic would stay strategically bound to Moscow, 
because almost half of its citizens would simultaneously be Russian citizens. 
Besides, the issue of protecting Russian citizens in Kazakhstan could serve as a 
justification for Moscow applying economic and political or even military pressure 
against Kazakhstan. Considering Russia’s and the Soviet Union’s past records on 
human rights, it would be much easier for Moscow to justify any such action not in 
terms of defending human rights, which would lack credibility, but in terms of 
protecting its citizens. On the other hand, Almaty’s awareness of a possibility of a 
Russian action in defence of its citizens would definitely deter Kazakhstan from 
any steps in international relations which could endanger vital Russian interests.
139 Memorandum ob osnovnykh printsipakh resheniya voprosov, svyazannykh s grazlidanstvom i pravovym 
statusom grazhdan Respubliki Kazakhstan, postovaimo prozhivaiuschikh na territorii Rossiyskoy Federatsii, I 
grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii, postoyanno prozhivaiuschikh na territorii Respubliki Kazakhstan // Kazakhstansko- 
Rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: PosoFstvo Respubliki 
Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 160-161.
140 Problems Remain in Russo-Kazakh Citizenship Accord, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 31.05.97.
141 Problems Remain in Russo-Kazakh Citizenship Accord, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 31.05.97; 
Russia to Persuade Kazakhstan to Sign Dual Citizenship Agreement, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
02.06.94.
142 Gosudarstvennaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogranuna parlamentskikh 
slushaniy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O 
rossiysko-kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakli',) Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 41.
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The practical advantages dual citizenship could give to ethnic Russians 
living in Kazakhstan were mostly psychological. The present generation of ex- 
Soviets spent most of their lives under a regime which severely restricted the right 
to leave or enter the country. For ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, dual citizenship 
does at least offer some chance that if Russia at some future date reimposes tight 
restrictions, and conditions in Kazakhstan become bad enough to make them want 
to leave, Russia will let them in. Some Russians, especially in southern Kazakhstan, 
may derive psychological comfort from awareness that Russian citizenship may 
entitle them to Russia’s protection in case o f inter-ethnic violence, which cannot be 
excluded, given such precedents as the civil war in Tajikistan and continuing 
instability on the Tajik-Afghan border.
Moscow’s reasons for wanting dual citizenship were Almaty’s reasons for 
rejecting it. Kazakhstan’s experts produced a whole series of arguments against it. 
The main one was that it could affect the evolution of the young independent state, 
bringing “divided loyalties” into its life.143 Another argument was that dual 
citizenship would place ethnic Russians in a privileged position compared to 
Kazakhs, and that would violate the basic constitutional principle of national 
equality. The argumentation also referred to technical difficulties arising from 
differences in national laws if applied to people with dual citizenship.144 As often in 
diplomacy, these arguments concealed the basic issue: the Kazakh leadership saw 
dual citizenship as a major threat to the policy of nation-state building. Firstly, it 
would discourage Russian emigration. Secondly, it would augment Moscow’s 
capabilities for interference in Kazakhstan’s internal affairs. Thirdly, having 30- 
40% of foreign citizens would undermine the very basis of the nation-state.
The Kazakh authorities could not, o f course, prevent ethnic Russians in 
Kazakhstan applying for Russian citizenship. But to do so would mean losing 
citizenship of Kazakhstan, and with it many of the social, economic and political 
rights enjoyed by citizens. This was highly discouraging, so applications for 
Russian citizenship came only from those who had already decided to emigrate, 
and were therefore of no further use for Russian strategy towards Kazakhstan. 
According to the Russian embassy in Almaty, in 1993 5,400 acquired Russian 
citizenship through it, but in 1994 the figure jumped to 53,000. Even this was few, 
given the size of the Russian community in Kazakhstan. Moreover, most of those 
who took Russian citizenship obviously emigrated, because the number of Russian 
citizens officially registered with the embassy as permanent residents remained very 
low, at 6,516.145
Given Moscow’s and Almaty’s diametrically opposite positions on dual 
citizenship, the negotiations on the issue went on for much longer than predicted 
by Mikitayev. The settlement took the form of two documents, A treaty and an
143 RFE/RL Report No.224, 29.11.94.
144 Kotov, A., Edinoe grazhdanstvo - konstitutsioimaya osnova ravnopraviya v Respublike Kazakhstan // Politika 
(Almaty), No.3, 1995, pp. 21-23.
145 Federal'naya Migratsioimaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
v Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 7.
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agreement, both signed on 20 January 1995 during Nazarbayev’s visit to 
Moscow.146 The treaty introduced a status of permanent resident for citizens of 
one country on the territory of the other. Permanent residents were entitled to the 
same rights as citizens, with some exceptions (Article 4). they could not vote or be 
elected to highest state positions or representational bodies; participate in universal 
voting; occupy positions in the diplomatic service, security bodies, or internal 
affairs bodies; in the central bodies of executive authority, as judges, or as 
procurators or as heads or deputy heads of regional, district, city, rural and 
settlement administrations.147
The treaty allowed permanent residents “to occupy positions as heads and 
deputy heads of structural subdivisions of regional, district, city, rural and 
settlement administrations, as well as of departments, directorates, committees and 
other organisations within the system of local bodies of executive authority”, and 
“to possess, use, and dispose of property” belonging to them. Acquisition of new 
property by permanent residents was to be regulated by legislation of the party of 
residence. Permanent residents could “participate in privatisation of state property 
of the party of residence on an equal basis with its citizens, in accordance with 
legislation in effect in the party of residence”(Article 6).
The agreement said that the parties would afford each other’s citizens 
arriving for permanent residence simplified procedure for acquisition of citizenship 
through registration.148 It also established a time frame of three months for 
registering acquisition of citizenship. The agreement guaranteed permanent 
residents born in the territory of the other party, or whose parents were or had 
permanently resided in the territory of the other party, to freely chose citizenship of 
Russia or Kazakhstan within one year after the agreement came into force.149 This 
provision covered a substantial number of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, but by no 
means all of them. The agreement implied, though it did not state directly, that
146 Officially they were called “Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the 
Legal Status of Russian Federation Citizens Residing Permanently on the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 
and Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan Residing Permanently on the Territory of Russian Federation” and 
“Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Simplifying tire Procedure for 
Obtaining Citizenship by Citizens of tire Russian Federation Arriving for Permanent Residence in Kazakhstan, and 
Citizens of tire Republic of Kazakhstan Arriving for Permanent Residence in the Russian Federation”.
147 Dogovor nrezlrdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey o pravovonr statuse grazlrdan Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, postoyamro prozlrivaiuschiklr na territorii Respubliki Kazakhstan, i grazlrdan Respubliki Kazakhstan, 
postoyanno prozlrivaiuschiklr na territorii Rossiyskoy Federatsii // Kazakhstansko-Rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991- 
1995 gody, Sbonrik dokunrentov i nraterialov, Moscow: Posol’stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
1995, pp. 216-221.
148 This applied in the following cases: “a) when the applicant was a citizen of the Kazakh SSR or RSFSR and 
simultaneously a USSR citizen in the past, resided in these territories as of 21st December 1991, and has been 
permanently residing there up to entry into force of this agreement; and/or b) when the applicant has close relatives 
who are citizens of the parties: husband (wife), parents (adoptive parents), children (including adopted children), 
sisters, brothers, grandfather or grandmother, permanently residing as citizens in the territory of the party of 
citizenship to be acquired”.
149 Soglashenie mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey ob uproshchennom poryadke 
priobreteniya grazhdanstva grazhdanami Rossiyskoy Federatsii, pribyvaiuschimi dlya postoyaimogo prozhivaniya v 
Respubliku Kazakhstan, i grazhdanami Respubliki Kazakhstan, pribyvaiuschimi dlya postoyaimogo prozhivaniya v 
Rossiyskuyu Federatsiu // Kazakhstansko-Rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i 
materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 221-224.
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acquisition of citizenship of one side entails relinquishing citizenship of the other. 
However, Russia managed to insert a provision which in principle would allow 
invalidation of this, at least by Russia.150
Overall, Russia failed to achieve its major goal - recognition by Kazakhstan 
of the principle of dual citizenship. This was a major setback for Moscow and 
victory for Nazarbayev. However, in combination the treaty and agreement 
contained a number of provisions which addressed essential interests of the Russian 
population. Both represented Russian attempts to create more favourable 
conditions for Russian citizens in Kazakhstan, without introducing the principle of 
dual citizenship. Moscow obviously hoped that improvement of the status of 
Russian citizens in Kazakhstan, codified in the agreements, would still encourage 
ethnic Russians to take up Russian citizenship but not emigrate. But even within 
the format of the agreement Russian diplomacy failed to achieve the maximum 
possible. Basically the regime stipulated in the agreements still discouraged ethnic 
Russians from accepting Russian citizenship without emigrating.
This was in fact admitted by the Russian executive bodies which took part 
in the negotiations. According to the RFMS, “documents on citizenship issues 
signed in Moscow on 20.01.95 do tackle the most pressing issues of ethnic 
Russians residing in Kazakhstan and their movements between the two states, but 
at present do not yet solve as such the problem of the Russian-speaking population 
of Kazakhstan”.151 In particular the RFMS pointed out that provisions on property 
ownership “extended to some degree” the administrative rights of Russians in 
Kazakhstan, “introduced more clarity” in their rights with regard to existing 
property, but “this document preserves the existing ban on Russian citizens 
acquiring property in Kazakhstan, putting them in this on the same level as other 
“foreigners”.152
The Russian community in Kazakhstan was also unimpressed with the 
substance of both documents. In the opinion of Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet 
Deputy Golovkov, “the treaty confirmed existing limitations on the rights of 
Russian citizens residing permanently in Kazakhstan, and the agreement 
encouraged ethnic Russians to leave”.153 On 2 February 1995 the leaders of 
Russian community organisations - Lad (A.Dokuchaeva), Russian Commune 
(Yu.Bunakov), Russian Centre (N. Sidorova), Semirechye Cossack Force 
(N.Gunkin), and Russian members of the Kazakhstan parliament, S.Vasilieva, 
V.Galenko, A.Melnik, and N.Fomich, signed an appeal to the Russian Duma, 
calling on it not to ratify the agreements and to “continue working on solving
150 Article 5 said that "if the domestic legislation of the parties establishes more advantageous conditions for 
acquisition of citizenship for a certain category of individuals, the domestic legislation of the parties is applied”. 
Thus if Russia wanted to waive the requirement for relinquishment of Kazakhstan citizenship, it could do so.
151 Federal'nava Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
v Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, p. 11.
152 Ibid., p. 17.
153 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh 
slushaniy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykli Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O 
rossiysko-kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, pp. 46.
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issues of dual citizenship". They claimed that the agreements “only create an 
illusion of solving the citizenship issue”. In conclusion they called on the Duma to 
unilaterally recognise the right to Russian citizenship for all Russians living in 
Kazakhstan in the same manner as Kazakhstan’s constitution recognised the right 
for all Kazakhs living abroad.154
Concern was also voiced by some politicians in Moscow. At the Duma 
hearings on Russian-Kazakhstan relations Zatulin expressed doubts about both 
documents as seeming directed “as if to contribute to possible larger migration 
from Kazakhstan to Russia...” . A.Dolgopolov, Chairman of a Subcommittee on 
Cossacks of the Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, 
stated that it was not clear to him whether the agreements were proof that the 
Kazakh side had made “a principled choice in favour of establishing close political, 
economic and military cooperation with Russia”, or whether it was an attempt 
“secure by formal concessions and declarative agreements an attitude of the 
Russian people and government which would permit continuance in practice of the 
strategic line of ousting the Russian-speaking population from Kazakhstan” .
These interpretations were rejected by Mikitayev, who said the agreements 
were designed to assist Russians in Kazakhstan to solve many acute problems,155 
and were a positive development because they “approximated” the rights of 
Russian citizens residing in Kazakhstan to those of citizens of Kazakhstan. 
Mikitayev called for speedy ratification of both agreements, and was supported by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Panov, who said they gave Russian citizens in Kazakhstan 
preferential status in comparison with other foreigners.156 However both officials 
made it clear that the issue of dual citizenship remained on the agenda.157 Despite 
the executive branch’s strong support, the Duma delayed ratification for more than 
two years. Only on 26 June 1997 did Russia and Kazakhstan exchange instruments 
of ratification.158
In 1995 Nazarbayev took a number of steps to consolidate his personal 
power. On 11 March he dissolved parliament, then called a referendum on 
extending his term of office until the year 2000.159 The purpose of his move was 
clear - to deprive the opposition of its only remaining source of influence on 
governmental policy, the parliament. This also meant that ethnic Russians might 
lose their only independent channel of political expression. Not surprisingly, 
Russian community organisations were swift to react. Lad, Russian Commune and
154 Obraschenie k predsedatelyu fraktsii Agramoy Partii Rossii M.I. Lapshinu, Gosudarstvennaya Duma 
Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 04.02.95, Moscow [no publisher] 1995.
155 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh 
slushaniy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O 
rossiysko-kazaklistanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, pp. 39-40, 125.
156 Ibid., pp. 9, 24.
157 Ibid., pp. 18-19,24-25,41.
158 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.06.97.
159 Nazarbayev's decision showed his particular dislike for contested elections. In the first presidential election in 
Kazakhstan on 1 December 1992 he was the only candidate.
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some other organisations issued statements demanding new, free and fair 
parliamentary elections as soon as possible.160 They received immediate support 
from the Russian Duma. On 13 March its Committee on CIS Affairs and Ties with 
Compatriots adopted a statement on “Political Crises in Kazakhstan”, which 
expressed the hope for a new "free and democratic elections”, and called for “more 
active participation in the legislative bodies by members of the Russian 
community”.161
However, the referendum, held on 29 April, was conducted in a manner 
reminiscent of Soviet times. According to official Kazakh data the turnout was 
91.3%, and 95.4% of those voting favoured extending Nazarbayev’s term of 
office. Numerous polls taken beforehand had indicated that the turnout would not 
exceed 70%, and that 17 to 26% of those voting would vote against 
Nazarbayev.162 If in March 1994 the authorities tried to win by unfair tactics, in 
1995 they saved themselves the trouble. The results were simply decreed from 
above. Subsequent events with the referendum on the new constitution and 
elections to the new parliament proved this beyond doubt.
The referendum on the new constitution was held on 30 August, and, like 
its predecessor, delivered Soviet-style official results, claiming a 90% turnout and 
89% approval of the new constitution. At a news conference in Almaty on 1 
September, opposition organisations said the results had been rigged, and turnout 
had been only 34%. International observers ignored the referendum163, and the US 
Representative to OSCE, Sam W. Brown Jr, said on 31 August that it was a 
"second step backward from democracy”. Interestingly, US criticisms of the 
referendum were generally similar to those made by the opposition Russian 
community organisations.164
160 See: Politicheskoye zayavlenie respublikanskogo obschestvennogo slavyanskogo dvizheiiiya “Lad” o rospuske 
Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Kazakhstan, Almaty [No publisher] 19.03.95; Russkaya Obschina protestuyet, 
Resolyutsiya obschego sobraniya, Almaty [No publisher] 20.03.95.
161 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federal’nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Komitet po delam Sodruzhestva 
Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami, Zayavlenie o politicheskom krizise v Kazakhstane, 
Doc. No.316/492, Moscow [No publisher] 13.03.95.
162 Segodnya, 04.05.95.
163 OMRI Daily Report No. 170, Part I, 31.08.95; Opposition Says Referendum Turnout 34%, Result Invalid, BBC 
Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 04.09.95.
164 The US statement said: “On August 1, the Kazakstani government published the "final version" of its new draft 
constitution, hi the view of democracy and human rights activists in Kazakhstan, the new constitution does not 
adequately protect civil and human rights... The U.S. and other countries urged Kazakstan to approach the OSCE's 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights to solicit technical assistance to bring the draft constitution 
more closely into line with democratic norms. The U.S. regrets that the government of Kazakstan pressed forward 
with the 30 August referendum, hi view of the predictable and frankly unbelievable Soviet-style results of the 29 
April referendum which extended President Nazarbayev's term in office, there is little reason to doubt that official 
results of the 30 August vote will show the draft constitution winning by a vast overwhelming and equally 
unbelievable margin. The term extension referendum was a step backward from democracy in Kazakstan. The U.S. 
regrets that the constitutional referendum is a second step backward from democracy. The U.S. expresses these 
concerns as a friend of Kazakstan. Democracy is essential to Kazakstan's long-term stability, unity, and prosperity. 
Kazakstan is a young, multi-ethnic state facing a range of challenges and only participatory government can give 
Kazakstani citizens the sense of common destiny essential to maintaining political cohesion during a painful 
political and economic transition. The U.S. government did not send observers to monitor the constitutional 
referendum on 30 August”. [US Disappointed in Constitutional Referendum in Kazakhstan, File ID: 
95083103.WWE, USIA Database, 31.08.95],
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The new constitution removed a number of the most obvious ethno-centric 
provisions, but still fell far short of Russian expectations. Though references to the 
ethnic nature of Kazakhstan’s statehood were abolished, the preamble to the 
constitution still said that the “people of Kazakhstan” were creating their statehood 
“on ancestral Kazakh lands”. This served to remind all non-Kazakhs that they were 
considered guests on Kazakh territory, though this was untrue of many non- 
Kazakh citizens. Article 10 denied citizenship o f any other country to Kazakhstan 
citizens without exception. This eliminated the privileged status Kazakhs had 
previously enjoyed with regard to dual citizenship, but also explicitly prevented any 
future agreements on dual citizenship between Russia and Kazakhstan.
Article 6 stipulated that land could be private property “on grounds, 
conditions and within limits, established by law”.165 Such law could not be a 
problem for the Kazakh leadership, because Nazarbayev had already decided to 
establish total control over the legislature, so that he could adopt and amend laws 
which as he wished. Article 7 reiterated the role of Kazakh as the only “state” 
language. Russian was upgraded to an “official” language,166 but still denied the 
equal status with Kazakh which was one of the Russian community organisations’ 
major demands.
But the main issue of concern was that the new constitution concentrated 
almost unlimited power in the President’s hands, in provisions which attracted the 
bulk of the Russian community organisations’ criticisms 167 Russians in Kazakhstan 
understood only too well, from experience of previous Soviet constitutions, that 
whatever improvements the new constitution might contain, in the absence of basic 
democratic guarantees its provisions would remain on paper, and serve only to 
camouflage continuation of ethno-centric policies. Excessive concentration of 
power in the President’s hands, and the lack of effective checks and balances to his 
authority, meant that the Russian community lost even the minor leverage on 
government policy which it previously had.
All throughout 1995 Nazarbayev justified establishment of authoritarian 
rule by the necessity to achieve inter-ethnic consolidation. This, however, soon 
proved only empty promises. A major consequence of the political transformation 
in 1995 was an even greater sidelining of ethnic Russians from politics and 
government. By late 1995 81.4% of posts at the level of ministers, heads of state 
committees, committees and departments were held by Kazakhs, and only 14% by 
Russians, compared to 64.2% and 21% respectively in 1994.168 During the 
elections to the new two-chamber parliament,169 held on 5 and 9 December 1995,
165 Konstitutsiva Respubliki Kazakhstan, Almaty: “Kazakhstan”, 1995, p. 6.
166 Ibid., p. 7.
167 Kazakh Protest Rally over New Draft Constitution, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 29.07.97.
168 Moskovskiy Komsomolets, 24.08.95.
169 Deputies to the upper house, the Senate, were to be elected by province electoral colleges made up of all 
members of representative bodies of each province. Two senators were to be elected from each province, cities 
under republic's jurisdiction and the capital. Seven senators were to be appointed by tire president. This brought the
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candidates for the Senate were nominated directly from Almaty. As a result 28 
were unopposed, and 26 of the 38 elected (68%) were Kazakhs.170 In the elections 
to the Majilis, the government did its best to eliminate opposition candidates, 
sometimes employing overtly oppressive measures.171 As a result 53 (79%) of the 
67 Majilis seats went to pro-government candidates.172 Data on the ethnic 
composition of the Majilis are not available, but officially selected deputies, 
whatever their ethnicity, obediently followed Nazarbayev’s political line.
In an interview with Moscow's NTV television on 22 October 1997, 
Nazarbayev disclosed that Kazakhs were 70% of government members and 
provincial governors,173 substantially more than the percentage of Kazakhs in the 
population. Besides, this remark referred only to a very narrow circle of top 
officials, and did not include other senior positions in the state apparatus such as 
deputy ministers, deputy province governors, mayors of large cities, or the 
presidential administration. In the latter, for example, by January 1997 Kazakhs 
held 75% of the leading positions.174 Nazarbayev produced no figures for the 
ethnic composition of the most important government departments such as the 
Foreign, Defence and Interior Ministries and the National Security Committee, nor 
did he evince any desire to conduct new parliamentary elections which would 
adequately reflect Kazakhstan’s ethnic balance.
On 22 December 1995 Nazarbayev issued a decree “On Land”, which had 
the force of law. It established that all land in Kazakhstan remained state property, 
except for plots adjacent to or allocated for construction of residential buildings, 
installations and their compounds, for gardening or vegetable growing or 
production, or any other facilities specific to the land. The edict barred private 
ownership of agricultural land or peasants’ private plots. Peasants would receive 
“the right to permanent land use”, but the land remained state property. This meant 
rejection of farmers’ demands for private ownership of agricultural land, 
particularly widespread among Russians, and especially among Cossacks, who 
were trying to resurrect the ‘stanitsa’ with its specific form of private property in 
land.
Formally the “buy-out” procedure established by the edict for alienation of 
privately owned land “for state needs” looked like corresponding to international 
norms with the final decision on disagreements between the government and a 
landowner left to the courts. But under Kazakhstan’s realities, where courts are 
government instruments without the relative independence they have in democratic
total number of senators to 47. To the lower chamber, the Majilis, 67 deputies were to be elected on the basis of 
direct voting in electoral districts.
170 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 08.12.95.
171 The most outrageous episode involved Ataman Gunkin, who was abducted by police officers at the headquarters 
of an election precinct, where he came to register [Nezavisimaya gazeta, 03.11.95].
172 Calculation is made on the basis of statistics, provided in: Mashanov, M.S., SravniteTnyy analiz partiynogo 
aspekta parlamentskikli vyborov 1994 i 1995 godov, Almaty: IRK, 1996, pp. 14-15.
173 President Nazarbayev Denies Breach of Ethnic Russians' Rights, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
28.10.97
174 Struktura administratsii Presidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan i perechen’ dolzhnostnykh lits, obespechivayuschikh 
ego devatelnosC // Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 10.01.97, p. 1.
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countries, this provision could in no way hamper government arbitrariness, and no 
land owner could be sure that he would be fairly compensated (if at all) for his 
property.
Moreover, the edict contained clear discriminatory provisions against ethnic 
Russians, by stipulating that private land plots "may not be in private ownership by 
foreign citizens” (Article 33). This meant that any ethnic Russian who chose 
Russian citizenship would lose the right to own any land he held. Moreover, 
Article 40 stipulated that “right to permanent use o f land may not be granted to 
foreign land users”, so Russian citizens in Kazakhstan would have only the right of 
temporary land use, for which, under Article 8, they would be obliged to pay “to 
the extent to which that right was not previously purchased”. Since in Soviet times 
land plots were allocated free of charge, this would necessitate paying the full 
market value. In all the land decree created strong material disincentives for ethnic 
Russians to take up Russian citizenship.
The Kazakh authorities continued persecution of Russian community 
activists, adding new fuel to the existing tensions in bilateral relations with Russia. 
On 20 August 1996 Nina Sidorova, head of the Russian Centre in Almaty, was 
arrested on charges of insulting judges and guards during Gunkin’s trial. Again a 
Russian reaction followed. On 16 September a protest demonstration was held 
outside the Kazakh Embassy in Moscow.175 On 18 September 1996 the Duma 
Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots issued a statement 
expressing concern about "the continuing persecution of the Russian population in 
Kazakhstan", and calling on the Kazakh authorities to "cease persecution and 
harassment of the Russian population, Cossacks in particular".176 Sidorova was 
convicted of contempt of court and injuring an official of the Procurator’s Office, 
and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, but the sentence was immediately 
suspended under an amnesty to mark the anniversary of Kazakhstan's 
constitution.177 In May 1997 Petr Kolomets, Deputy Ataman of the Semirechye 
Cossack Force, was arrested in Almaty. Russian Cossacks held protest rallies 
demanding Kolomets’ release in Moscow, Kurgan and some other Russian cities, 
for example a small demonstration in June 1997 outside Kazakhstan’s Embassy in 
Moscow.178
The policy of administratively restricting use of the Russian language also 
remained unchanged. On 4 November 1996 Nazarbayev endorsed the “Concept of 
Language Policy of the Republic of Kazakhstan”, which advocated altering the 
“hierarchy of languages” and giving priority to development of the Kazakh 
language. It did not envisage a wide sphere of long-term use of Russian, and 
contained provisions that could be interpreted as establishing administrative
175 Protest in Moscow about Treatment of Kazakhstan's Russian Population, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 18.09.96.
176 Russian MPs Concerned about Treatment of Russians in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
23.09.96.
177 Ethnic Russian Activist Found Guilty, but Sentence Lifted, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 23.12.96.
178 Zavtra, 27.05.97, 30.06.97, 22.07.97.
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barriers to employment in certain non-public service professions by requiring 
knowledge o f the Kazakh language.179 Nazarbayev’s endorsement prompted 
criticism by the Russian government. Minister for Cooperation with CIS States 
Tuleyev sent a note to Nazarbayev and the speakers of both houses of the Kazakh 
parliament, saying that the concept “limits the already curtailed rights of the 
Russian-speaking part of the population”, and calling for revision of some of its 
provisions, on the grounds that they contradicted the principles of the Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.180
Despite this, on 18 June 1997 Kazakhstan’s parliament passed a law “On 
Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan”, which was based on the concept, and 
confirmed the Kazakh language as the only state language. Russian was to be 
officially used “equally with Kazakh” in state and local administration. But the 
notion o f “equality” was undermined by Article 23 of the law, which established a 
special state program “for priority of the state language and stage-by-stage transfer 
of administrative work into the Kazakh language”, and by Article 9, under which 
Kazakh was to be the main language of state legislation and other acts of state 
bodies. Kazakhstan’s diplomatic missions were to function in Kazakh, and “in 
other languages when necessary”, official diplomatic receptions to be conducted in 
Kazakh, and bilateral treaties to be written in the “state languages” of the 
contracting parties.
A peculiarity of the law was that it went beyond the sphere of official 
relations into that of private communication. It said that Kazakh was to be used in 
non-governmental organisations, though other languages could also be used “in 
case of necessity” (Article 8), that internal documentation in state and private 
organisations must be in both Kazakh and Russian (Article 10), as must all 
contracts between individuals or companies (Article 15). Thus private deals 
between two or more Russians, or between companies in Russian-populated areas, 
would have to be in both languages, requiring a complicated bureaucratic process 
of certified translation into Kazakh, and companies in Russian-populated areas 
would have to employ Kazakh interpreters and translators, which would create 
extra difficulties in their work.
The law also prescribed that Kazakh-language TV and radio broadcasts 
should not be less than half of all broadcast time. Formally, this provision 
corresponded with established international practice that individual TV and radio 
stations could be assigned quotas for broadcasts in specific languages. But 
Kazakhstan’s law applied this practice in an excessive way covering all TV and 
radio stations, both government and private, for the purpose of making life difficult 
for Russian-language electronic mass media, particularly in the Russian-majority 
provinces.
Another unprecedented requirement was that “cultural events” should be 
conducted in Kazakh and “when necessary in other languages”, but without
179 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 06.11.96.
180 Russia Wams against Change in Kazkakhstan's Language Policy, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
23.1 1.96.
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defining how “necessity” would be determined, thereby leaving the final decision to 
bureaucratic arbitrariness. Due to strong opposition from the non-Kazakh 
population, the law did not go as far as establishing a list of professions where 
knowledge of Kazakh would be obligatory, but it foreshadowed future adoption of 
such legislation.181 Not surprisingly, the law was harshly criticised by members of 
the Society of Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan at a press conference on 21 August 
1997.182
The intensification of the ethno-centric policy can be explained by the fact 
that the Kazakh leadership’s hopes for early resolution of the inter-ethnic situation 
in the Kazakhs’ favour did not materialise. The main failure was in the economic 
sphere, where expectations of an early economic revival proved unfounded.183 In 
addressing the nation in October 1997 Nazarbayev admitted that over the past 
eight years Kazakhstan’s economic output had shrunk “more than twice”, and the 
“standard of living of the majority of citizens deteriorated”.184
Despite various administrative limitations imposed by the Kazakh 
authorities, Russian remains Kazakhstan’s de facto first language. This was 
conceded by S. Orazalinov, Director of the Department for Coordinating Language 
Policy in Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education and Culture, at a representative 
conference in Almaty in July 1997. He admitted that the Kazakh language had not 
yet acquired “worthy positions in education, science and public administration”, 
and was used only "among the indigenous population", and predominantly "in the 
non-work environment”. He said that many Kazakh language study courses 
established several years before, had disappeared, and complained that while 3-5 
years before enrolments to Kazakh-language secondary schools had increased, now 
a reverse process was under way. He went on to say that newspapers, journals and 
books in Kazakh, “which already have low circulation”, failed to sell, since there 
was no demand for them. Not all TV and radio channels, especially commercial 
ones, used Kazakh in their broadcasts, and in many ministries and departments the 
requirement to conduct business in both Kazakh and Russian was being ignored, 
and only Russian used.185
The Kazakh leadership failed to achieve a decisive shift in the demographic 
balance in favour of Kazakhs. Nazarbayev’s policies indeed led to a dramatic fall in 
the Russian population from 40.8% in 1990 to 36.4% in 1994 and 29% in 1997.186 
In 1997 emigration continued, and even increased compared to 1996. In the first 
nine months of 1997 230,786 emigrated from Kazakhstan, 57.5% of them ethnic
181 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan o Yazikakh v Respublike Kazakhstan // Kazakhstanskava pravda, 15.07.97, p. 2.
182 RFE/RL Newsline Vol. 1, No. 101, Part I, 22.08.97.
183 Tables A.6 and A.7 (Appendixes 7 and 8) contain some economic indicators of Kazakhstan’s agricultural and 
industrial development in 1985-1995.
184 Nazarbayev, N., Kazakhstan - 2030: protsvetanie, bezopasnost’ i uluchshenie blagosostoyaniya kazaklistantsev, 
Poslanie Presidenta strany narodu Kazakhstana // Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.10.97, p. 8.
185 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.07.97.
186 Russia, No. 19, 1994, p. 4; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.05.97.
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Russians.187 However in combination with other Slavs and non-Kazakhs who 
perceive themselves as Russian-speakers they are still about half of the population.
At the same time, the post-independence years registered a rapid decrease 
in the ethnic Kazakh birth rate. One factor that may have contributed was the 
difficult economic situation. M.Tatimov, a senior expert in the Information and 
Analytical Centre of the presidential administration, noted with concern that the 
Kazakh birth rate was falling “even faster than in the years of destruction, famine 
and war (the 1920s, 30s and 40s)” .188 In his address to the nation in October 1997 
Nazarbayev pointed to a real danger of “demographic depopulation” in 
Kazakhstan, noting that for the first time in the past 50 years “our population has 
begun to shrink”. He called for “immediate termination of this trend”, and 
identified demographic and migration policy as “a leading priority of national 
security”.189
Besides, Russian emigration from Kazakhstan had a certain specific 
character, which contributed to accentuating the inter-ethnic divide. It affected 
primarily the southern, Kazakh-populated provinces. According to A.Galiev, Head 
of the Chair at the Interior Ministry Higher School in Almaty, the extent of 
emigration from northern and southern provinces varied substantially. The largest 
emigration took place from seven provinces - Mangistau, Kzyl-Orda, Atirau, 
Zhambul, South-Kazakhstan and Taldy-Kurgan. The lowest migration was from 
North-Kazakhstan, West-Kazakhstan, Kostanay, Kokchetau, East-Kazakhstan, 
Akmola, Aktyubinsk and Pavlodar provinces.190 The second group comprised 
mostly provinces with a Russian-majority population, and the trend indicated that 
Russians there were not particularly keen to emigrate. The prospect of re­
colonisation of the northern provinces by Kazakhs, given their poor demographic 
situation, does not look very promising, at least in the short term.
In the RFMS assessment, exacerbation of the problem of the “northern 
territories” can be expected. “The predominantly Russian-speaking population 
there can choose secession from Kazakhstan instead of a massive exodus,, and this 
could cause serious complications in Russian-Kazakhstan inter-state relations”.191 
Another disturbing fact is a finding of a sociological survey that secessionist 
attitudes are much stronger among younger-generation ethnic Russians. According 
to N.Baytenova, a political scientist from the Kazakh National University, 
separatist attitudes among Russians are more characteristic of those under 35 years
187 The information was provided by Merhat Sharipzhan from RFE/RL Kazakh Broadcasting Service with 
reference to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's Bureau in Akmola and Kazakh State Agency on Statistics.
188 Tatimov, M., Vliyanie demograficheskikh protsessov na vnutripoliticheskuyu stabilnost' Respubliki Kazakhstan 
// Politika (Almaty), No. 5, 1995, p. 22.
189 Nazarbayev, N., Kazakhstan - 2030: protsvetanie, bezopasnost' i uluchshenie blagosostoyaniya kazakhstantsev, 
Poslanie Presidenta strany narodu Kazakhstana // Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.10.97, pp. 8, 14-15.
190 Galiev, A., Etnodemograficheskie i etnomigratsionnyye protsessi v Kazakhstane // Evraziyskoye soobshchestvo: 
ekonomika, politika, bezopasnost', No.2, 1995, p. 61.
191 Federal'naya Migratsionnaya Sluzhba Rossii, O rabote Migratsionnoy sluzhby posol'stva Rossiyskoy Federatsn 
v Respublike Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Doc. No.722, Moscow [No publisher] 13.04.95, pp. 10-11.
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of age, while the over-50s are indifferent or against secession. 192 This suggests 
that as time goes by, Russian secessionist potential in Kazakhstan is likely to 
increase.
The policy directed at neutralising the Cossack movement also failed, and 
attempts to split the Cossack organisations had only very limited results. One 
example is the situation in Uralsk. According to Zci\>tra, Nazarbayev’s secret 
services managed to neutralise the former leadership of the Ural Cossacks, and put 
their “agents” into leading positions in major Cossack organisations, which then 
proclaimed that the Cossack movement’s main objective must be solution of 
economic problems. The newspaper identified as “agents” leaders of the Ural 
Cossacks such as Bukin and Solodilov, who secured the support of the majority of 
Cossacks through promises of hinds, allegedly opened for them in Almaty.193 
Those Cossacks who opposed Bukin and Solodilov were grouped around A 
Kachalin, the pro-Moscow Ataman of the Ural Cossack Force.
The other example is the Union of Cossacks of Semirechye (to be 
differentiated from the Semirechye Cossack Force), supported by official Almaty 
and headed by Ovsyannikov. He promoted the idea that Cossacks should be loyal 
to Nazarbayev, since they always served sovereign Kazakhstan. His union, which 
initially had a following of only 50, began a contest with Gunkin’s organisation for 
influence over the Semirechye Cossacks. In July 1997 Ovsyannikov’s deputy, 
Shikhotov, published an article in Kazakhstanskaya prct\>da bitterly attacking 
Gunkin, and saying that he “should not be associated with the Semirechye 
Cossacks.” 194 Gunkin in his turn claimed that he had evidence proving that 
Ovsyannikov had always been an officer of Kazakhstan’s Interior Ministry, and had 
deliberately tried to hinder development of the Cossack movement.195 Despite 
these episodes, most Cossack organisations in Kazakhstan maintained their 
independence, and remained opposed to the regime.
The First Division of the Siberian Cossack Force decided to hold its 
Assembly in Kokchetau on 2 May 1997. This was clearly a provocative move, 
specifically scheduled for the May holidays and celebrations. The main issue on the 
agenda was “determination of the status of the lands of the Siberian Cossack Force 
located at present on the territory of Kazakhstan”. It was expected that Cossacks 
from other areas of Kazakhstan and from Russia would attend. The organisers 
planned to use the Assembly to proclaim creation of a South Siberian Republic, 
which would include Kokchetau, Pavlodar and North-Kazakhstan provinces. The 
Kazakh authorities knew of the planned action and prepared for it well in advance. 
The Assembly was, naturally, banned, some Cossack activists were summoned to 
the local police and Committee of National Security (CNS), extra police and
192 Baytenova, N., Mezhetnicheskaya integratsiya v Kazaklistane: sostoyanie i perspektivy // Politika (Almaty), 
No.3, 1995, p. 29.
193 Boroday, A., Ray Nazarbaeyva // Zavtra, No.l 1, 1997.
194 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 05.07.97.
195 Opasnost' zaklyuchaetsya ne v voyne a v samoobmane, kotoryy opravdyvaet nereshitelnost" rossiyskoy vlasti // 
Shturm, No.3, 1996, pp. 33-34.
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troops were deployed in Kokchetau, and reinforced units patrolled the streets 
during the May holidays. Russian representatives arriving for the Assembly were 
intercepted at the railway station and forcibly turned back. Ten of them were 
arrested by the local police. When groups o f Cossacks gathered in the centre of the 
city on 2 May, they were surrounded by Interior Ministry troops and driven out of 
the city. They managed to hold their meeting in the outskirts, but it obviously failed 
to produce any strong political effect.196 Nevertheless the action served to show 
that the Cossack movement was still alive, and prepared to defy the authorities.
The Russian leadership was disappointed by its inability to induce 
Nazarbayev to change his political course. On 23 November 1996, during a 
meeting with Nazarbayev, Yeltsin proposed drawing up a new, broader agreement 
on the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. According to presidential 
spokesman Yastrzhembskiy: "Yeltsin suggested to Nazarbayev that a joint 
document be drafted on the status o f the Russian-speaking population in 
Kazakhstan, defining personal guarantees and the status of the Russian language 
there... Such a document will put an end to speculation and discrimination in this 
field”.197 Yeltsin’s proposal indicated that he saw the weaknesses of the previous 
agreements with Kazakhstan, and wanted to improve the situation. But 
Nazarbayev showed no inclination to negotiate a new treaty.
In January 1997, as a clear signal of dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan’s 
attitude, Moscow decided to deploy Cossack units along the Russia-Kazakhstan 
border. Their functions included checking documents and inspecting baggage of 
persons entering Russia from Kazakhstan. To manage these units Russia's Federal 
Border Guards Service (RFBGS) established a new Border Watch Directorate.198 
This was a basic policy reversal, because previously Russia had made rather firm 
commitments to the principle of open borders with Kazakhstan. RFBGS naturally 
tried to downplay the event, describing it as “an experiment” to combat drug 
trafficking and smuggling, and involving unarmed volunteers.199 The “experiment” 
embraced at least four large Russian provinces - Saratov, Orenburg, Chelyabinsk 
and Omsk - and was to be extended to the whole 7,500 km length of the joint 
border after the trial period ended in June.200 Moreover, by late March 1997 it was 
already known that the “volunteers” were in fact light-armed units.201
Russia’s move evoked an angry reaction in Almaty. On 25 March 1997 
B.Sarsekov, Secretary of Kazakhstan's Security Council, criticised the decision, 
pointing out that it was at odds with the open borders agreement with Russia. "In 
some Russian regions along the Kazakh border, the Russian Federation has set up
196 Zavtra, 22.04.97, 05.05.97.
197 Yeltsin Proposes Accord on Ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 27.11.96.
198 Reuters News Service, 16.04.97.
199 Reuters News Service, 16.04.97.
200 Russia Denies Breaking Accords with Kazakhstan over Border Guards, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 28.03.97.
201 Cossacks Reject Protests at Their Role on Kazakh-Russian Border, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
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Cossack posts. These Cossacks received uniforms and weapons. These Cossacks 
are a prototype border guard force," he told a news conference in Almaty.202 On 
16 April this was followed by a formal statement by the Kazakhstan Foreign 
Ministry press-service, which expressed regret at the Russian move. The statement 
said that “serious concern has been provoked by an experiment by Russia's Federal 
Border Guards Service to place non-regular units manned by Cossacks to guard 
the border". The statement claimed that this was a "serious breach" of existing 
bilateral accords on the regime of the common border, and drew particular 
attention to the Cossack involvement.203
On 16 May Nazarbayev addressed a group of Russian journalists in Almaty, 
and blamed Russia for what he described as the loss of trust in the CIS among its 
members.204 He devoted a substantial part of his statement to Cossacks, saying that 
he was alarmed that Cossack units had been deployed to guard the Russian-Kazakh 
border and that he had sent a special memorandum on this issue to Yeltsin, but still 
had received no reply. In a veiled warning, Nazarbayev said that in Kazakhstan 
“under the sultans and khans there were Sardars, military formations similar to 
Cossacks under the Tsars”, and that pressure was mounting on him to recreate 
such formations and deploy them in all provinces of Kazakhstan.205
Tuleyev himself a Kazakh, reacted sharply to Nazarbayev’s comments, 
calling them “anti-Russian”. On 20 May 1997 he issued a statement, in which he 
stressed that Russia "will continue to condemn Kazakhstan's policy towards 
Russian and Russian-speaking citizens", criticised Kazakhstan's decision to reduce 
the quantity of Russian-language TV and radio broadcasts, and opposed the 
adoption of "a discriminatory language law, which infringes the interests of the 
Russian-speaking population".206 Now it was Almaty’s turn to feel offended. A 
diplomatic protest was sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry. Tuleyev revealed in 
an interview that Nazarbayev had personally asked Yeltsin to dismiss him.207 Nor 
did Nazarbayev stop at that. In an interview shown on Kazakh TV on 27 June 
1997, he warned that Kazakhs “should be ready to preserve the country's 
independence and integrity”, because many "ill-wishers" had emerged in Russia, 
and “have drawn up different programs, if not to go back to the Soviet Union, then 
to bring Kazakhstan back under Russia's wing ", programs which included as a last 
resort “stirring up ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan with the idea of separatism, 
and setting them against ethnic Kazakhs” .208
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206 Russian Minister Responds to President Nazarbayev's Remarks, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
22.05.97.
207 Tuleyev, A., SNG: blef ili integratsiya? Beseda s Aleksandrom Prokhanovym i Valentinom Chikinym // Zavtra, 
No.21, 1997.
208 Kazakh President Wams of Possible Threat from Russia, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 30.06.97.
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Simultaneously with verbal attacks against Russian policy, Almaty 
continued pressing Moscow to revoke the decision on Cossack-manned border 
posts. On 4 June 1997 at a meeting of the Council of CIS Border Troops 
commanders in Moscow, the Kazakh representative called the Cossack 
involvement an "experiment" which "caused certain tension ... in Kazakhstan" and 
urged Moscow to terminate it.209 But Moscow was in no hurry to accommodate 
the Kazakh demands, obviously finding the border patrols an effective instrument 
of diplomatic leverage over Kazakhstan on human rights issues. On 26 June 1997, 
while returning from New York, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Tokayev had a 
brief meeting with his Russian counterpart, Primakov, during a stopover in 
Moscow, and again raised the Cossack issue. Primakov replied that “the 
experiment” was temporary, and that the Russian Foreign Ministry “was 
recommending” that it be abandoned, but he gave no clear indication of when this 
might happen.210
Nazarbayev discussed the issue of border controls with Yeltsin on 6 
September 1997, while attending Moscow’s 850th anniversary celebrations. 
Yeltsin promised that Chernomyrdin and other high-ranking Russian officials 
would visit Kazakhstan and sign a number of bilateral agreements on that and other 
issues.211 On 29 September A.Nikolayev, Russian Federal Border Service Director, 
arrived in AJmaty and met Nazarbayev, obviously to discuss the Cossack border 
guards issue. After the meeting Nazarbayev told journalists that the two countries’ 
border guard services would prepare and sign an agreement on the regime and 
status of the Russian-Kazakh border, which would provide for “elementary 
security” along it. Nikolayev added that Kazakhstan had agreed on joint measures 
with Russia to reinforce its “outer” (non-CIS) borders.212 But Nikolayev’s visit did 
not solve the Cossack question. It is unlikely to be solved until a broader 
agreement providing for Russia’s increased role in Kazakhstan’s border protection 
is negotiated, a process likely to be prolonged. In fact, Russia may well prolong 
them by putting forward more and more conditions, and linking success of the 
negotiations to Kazakh concessions on the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.
This conclusion is substantiated by the results of Chernomyrdin’s visit to 
Kazakhstan on 4 October 1997. He and Nazarbayev agreed to form an inter­
governmental commission on cooperation between the two countries. Its main task 
is to prepare Yeltsin’s official visit to Kazakhstan, and negotiate a new basic treaty 
to replace the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, because as it 
was said, “time requires clarification of many notions which emerged five years 
ago, when the previous document was adopted” .213 The understanding was 
probably a development of Yeltsin’s 1996 proposal for a new agreement with 
Kazakhstan on the status of ethnic Russians. In any event, it means that Russia has
209 Kommersant-Daily, 06.06.97.
210 Kazaklistanskaya pravda, 28.06.97.
211 Kazaklistanskaya pravda, 09.09.97.
212 Kazaklistanskaya pravda, 02.10.97.
213 Kazaklistanskaya pravda, 07.10.97.
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managed to draw Kazakhstan into re-negotiating the previous basic agreement, 
which it saw as inadequately serving Russian interests, especially on the question of 
ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Consent to negotiate was itself a major Kazakh 
concession, but previous experience of negotiations between Russia and 
Kazakhstan suggests that they are hardly likely to proceed without major 
difficulties, or to have an outcome both early and successful. Moreover, the 
negotiation process itself is likely to have further adverse effects on bilateral 
relations, result in additional diplomatic complications, and not remove the major 
differences over the status of ethnic Russians. To overcome these differences, 
either Russia’s or Kazakhstan’s policies on matters of principle must change, but 
there are no signs that this is likely, at least in the foreseeable future.
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN AND KAZAKH APPROACHES TO CIS 
INTEGRATION
Relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet era were very 
much dependent on their interaction within the multilateral CIS framework. 
Kazakhstan’s attitude to the CIS was predetermined by its very large dependence 
on economic relations with other CIS states. According to expert assessments 
Kazakhstan in a fully isolated situation could manufacture only 27% of the 
products it was manufacturing in 1991, whereas the figure for Russia would be 
64.5%. Kazakhstan's economy could produce only 42% of the consumer goods 
sold there.1 Before independence Kazakhstan ran regular trade deficits with the 
rest of the USSR, which in 1990 reached 7 billion roubles.2 Besides, in Soviet 
times Kazakhstan's economy relied heavily on subsidies from the USSR central 
government, which, according to the Economist, covered 23% of its budget in 
1991.3 Thus Kazakhstan's immediate transition to economic self-reliance was not 
possible even in theory. In these circumstances Nazarbayev's diplomatic tactics 
were shaped by the need to maintain the system of CIS economic interrelationships 
to the extent possible, and utilise its benefits to restructure and modernise 
Kazakhstan's economy.
Kazakhstan’s great dependence on economic relations with other CIS 
republics was the reason why Nazarbayev, even before the collapse of the USSR, 
persistently insisted on preserving economic union, while at the same time actively 
pursuing the dismantling of the Union’s central political structures, which limited 
Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. From the very first days after dissolution of the USSR 
Nazarbayev stood firmly for economic integration within the CIS. At the CIS 
Heads of State meeting in Moscow on 16 January 1992 he suggested renouncing 
import restrictions and restrictive licensing of products intended for industrial and 
technical purposes, and repealing taxes on imports and exports in transit through 
CIS states. But these proposals were greeted unenthusiastically by some other CIS 
members, especially Ukraine, and even Yeltsin’s support failed to secure their 
acceptance.4
When the CIS summit in Minsk on 14 February 1992 ended without any 
major breakthroughs in the economic field, Nazarbayev did not conceal his 
frustration. In an interview immediately after the summit he criticised “paralysis of 
economic links, closure of trade borders by way of licences and quotas, economic 
disintegration”, and put forward a program of economic integration:
1 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, (Kazakhstan: 
realities and prospects of independent development, / under general editorship of E M Kozhokin) Moscow: RISI, 
1995 pp. 14, 138.
2 Kazakhstan-Rossiya: sostoyanie i perspektivy ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva / Ed. Tsentr Strategicheskikh 
Issledovaniy Respubliki Kazakhstan, Almaty: “Tulga”, 1993, p. 4.
3 Economist, Vol.325, No.7791, 1993, p. 81.
4 Izvestiva, 18.01.92.
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1 Setting up “a good and powerful coordinating centre..., perhaps an 
assembly like the European Parliament”.
2 Creation of a banking union for those within the rouble currency zone.
3. Coordination o f pricing policy for basic sectors of the economy, especially 
for power and fuel; examine coordination of monetary and credit procedures, 
investment procedures, “and so forth”.
4. Lifting all customs barriers
5. Harmonising legislation to create a normal environment for businessmen.5 
Explaining his position on CIS integration during his visit to Austria a few days 
later, Nazarbayev said that each CIS member should be politically independent and 
free, but the CIS should remain a single economic area like the European 
Community.6
The program he proposed was very pragmatic, and directed not so much at 
strategic objectives of CIS integration, but at meeting Kazakhstan’s immediate 
economic needs. The idea of creating a powerful coordinating centre “like the 
European Parliament” was illogical, because the European Parliament never was 
and still is not such a coordination centre. Thus, Nazarbayev proposed a largely 
symbolic supranational body that would be unable to limit Kazakhstan’s 
sovereignty in any way, nor impose guidelines which Kazakhstan was not prepared 
to follow. On the other hand, the proposals to create a banking union and 
coordinate monetary and credit procedures reflected Nazarbayev’s desire to have a 
say in decisions on rouble emission. After the collapse of the USSR the emission of 
roubles remained in Moscow’s hands, and it could supply other republics with cash 
at its own discretion. In the first quarter of 1992 the Russian Central Bank raised 
the percentage emission allocated to Russia from 66% in 1990-91 to 80%. It also 
refused to accept bills of exchange or cheques from other rouble zone states.7 
Nazarbayev obviously hoped that introduction of a coordinating structure such as a 
banking union would impose some restrictions on Moscow, and perhaps 
subordinate it to the combined will of the other CIS states.
Russia in its turn was extremely dissatisfied with the policies of central 
banks of other CIS states, including Kazakhstan. Finding themselves free of 
Moscow's control, they embarked on unrestrained non-cash emission of roubles. 
Russia was the only republic which printed roubles, but all central banks in the 
rouble zone could issue rouble credits. Local central banks lent to local commercial 
banks, commercial banks lent to local companies, and the companies used the 
money to buy imports, mostly from Russia itself. As a result, this mass of credit 
roubles ended up in Russian exporters’ bank accounts. Russia was immediately 
awash with devalued money, which was spurring enormous inflation and a massive 
outflow of goods and resources to other CIS countries. Russia countered by
5 Nazarbayev: Summit and Documents "Not Particularly Comforting”, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
18.02.92. ’
6 Nazarbayev Refuses to Enact Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
26.02.92. '
7 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.96, 20.05.92.
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introducing restrictions on exports of fuel and energy resources, and on some 
essential raw materials and manufactures. This limited Kazakhstan’s ability to buy 
the resources and goods it needed freely in Russia. Hence Nazarbayev’s proposal 
to lift all customs barriers.
Very painful for Kazakhstan was Moscow's decision to free fuel prices. 
These were much below world market prices, and the Soviet economy in general 
and Kazakhstan's in particular had become dependent on cheap energy and fuel. 
Freeing prices overnight could have a destabilising effect on Kazakhstan's 
economy, hence Nazarbayev’s proposal to coordinate pricing policy for basic 
sectors of the economy, especially power and fuel. Almaty pleaded with Moscow 
to postpone freeing of oil prices until mid-summer, when major agricultural work 
would be over, but Moscow agreed on only a one-month delay, until mid-May.8 
Kazakhstan then mobilised Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan and Ukraine 
to appeal jointly to Russia to delay the freeing of oil prices until October, when 
sowing and harvesting would be over.9
At the Central Asian states’ meeting in Bishkek on 22-23 April 1992, 
Russia was criticised for failing to consult its CIS partners on monetary policy such 
as price formation and meeting their increased needs for roubles.10 Following the 
meeting Nazarbayev announced that his "confidence in the stability of the 
Commonwealth had decreased of late", and said he was dissatisfied over progress 
in establishing joint cooperation bodies, putting the blame on Russia and Ukraine.* 11 
It was also at that time that reports of Kazakhstan's intention to introduce its own 
currency began to circulate in the media. In an article that appeared in several 
Kazakhstan newspapers on 17 May, Nazarbayev was quoted as saying that 
Kazakhstan might have to introduce its own currency "without waiting for 
economic stabilisation".12
These rumours were not without foundation. In early 1992 Nazarbayev 
signed a top secret decree on preparation to introduce Kazakhstan’s own currency. 
Nazarbayev himself approved the designs, the masters were kept in a safe in a 
British bank, and agreement was reached with a British company to print the 
money promptly when ordered.13 But Kazakhstan had as yet no intention of 
introducing its own currency. Staying in the rouble zone conferred some 
substantial advantages - ability to buy goods and services in Russia in excess of 
goods and services provided to Russia by Kazakhstan. The rouble zone was in fact 
a new form of Russian subsidy to other CIS members. While it existed, Nazarbayev 
wanted to take full advantage of it. But many in the Russian government started to 
voice objections, and insist that the zone be abolished. Only then did Nazarbayev 
order 20% of the Kazakh currency to be printed, “just in case” .
8 Gaydar Tells Viewers of Postponement of Oil Price Liberalisation, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
30.03.92.
9 Reuters News Service, 02.04.92.
10 Izvestiya, 25.04.92.
11 Reuters News Service, 23.04.92.
12 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.96, 20.05.92.
13 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, pp. 143-144.
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In Russia there were influential Eurasianist-orientated forces, who insisted 
that the rouble zone should be preserved, in the hope that it would facilitate 
integration within the CIS. Since Parliament controlled the Russian Central Bank, 
it could exercise strong leverage over Russian monetary policy. There were two 
solutions to the monetary problem: either firm Russian control of currency-issuing 
over all participants in the rouble zone, or introduction of national currencies by 
individual CIS countries. The Russian Central Bank tried to explore the option of 
maintaining the rouble zone without disadvantaging the Russian economy. An 
attempt to realise this alternative was made at the meeting of CIS central banks in 
Bishkek on 7-8 May, where it was agreed to create an Interbank Coordinating 
Council of the rouble zone states’ central banks, charged to coordinate monetary 
policies, agree limits on budget deficits, and set the level of currency emission each 
quarter.14 At the Tashkent summit on 15 May member-states agreed to settle a 
proportion of their debts to each other where possible, and introduced tougher 
penalties for non-payment. But the summit failed to agree on guidelines for the 
functioning of states in the rouble zone, or on introduction of national currencies.15 
On 21 May, at a conference in Tashkent, the CIS national banks consented to 
coordinate their efforts, exchange information, limit issuing of credits to republican 
governments and commercial banks, and shift gradually transition to a unified 
currency rate. Guidelines for monetary policy in the rouble zone were worked out, 
to be coordinated with member governments and endorsed at the next meeting of 
the Interbank Coordinating Council.16
None of these decisions produced substantial results. By 1 June 1992 the 
other CIS republics’ debts to Russia had reached 214.7 billion roubles, and were 
growing rapidly.17 On 21 June Yeltsin issued a decree on protection of Russia’s 
monetary system, which established account-settling on reciprocal goods deliveries 
between Russia and other countries in the rouble zone, ruling out any possibility of 
automatic crediting of deliveries.18 The new system provided that other CIS 
republics could make purchases in Russia only from special accounts at the Russian 
Central Bank. The system was designed to shield Russia from uncontrolled 
granting of credit, by creating a regime under which CIS countries could buy in 
Russia only with roubles earned from their own sales, or credits legally granted by 
the Russian Central Bank. The decision de facto split the rouble zone into sub­
zones with roubles of different values. Thus the rouble in Kazakhstan was no 
longer equivalent in value to the rouble in Russia. The arrangement drew a sharp 
reaction from the Central Banks of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, which 
demanded an extraordinary meeting of the Interbank Coordinating Council.19 But
14 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.96, 20.05.92.
15 Yeltsin Adviser on Finance Agreements Reached at Tashkent Meeting, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
18.05.92.
16 Bankers in Rouble Zone Agree on Need to Coordinate Emission and Credit, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 29.05.92.
17 Izvestiya, 09.07.92.
18 Yeltsin Decree to Maintain Russian Control of Rouble in Rouble Zone, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
23.06.92.
19 Izvestiya, 09.07.92.
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Moscow refused to comply. The first serious crack had appeared in the rouble 
zone.
In August 1992 Nazarbayev proposed a new package of initiatives on 
economic integration within the CIS, including:
1. Establishment of a CIS Economic Council;
2. Creation of a banking union of rouble zone states;
3. Making the rouble a supranational currency, allowing other republics a say 
on emission and credit issues;
4. Establishment of a CIS Economic Court;
5. Strengthening the defence alliance and making it functional;
6. Organising the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.20
The initiatives were very reminiscent of those he had advanced in February 
1992, and reflected a similar set of economic and political priorities. They were 
limited and pragmatically oriented toward helping Kazakhstan solve its most acute 
problem, that of economic survival in the post-Soviet era, while at the same time 
avoiding any real limitations on its sovereignty. On the other hand they imposed 
real limitations on Russia’s freedom of manoeuvre in economic policy, making it 
dependent on attitudes in Almaty, Tashkent or Kiev. As the largest country in the 
CIS, with economic potential far exceeding that of all the other members 
combined, Russia had no desire to become subordinate to decisions imposed by its 
smaller partners. No agreement other than acceptance of its own terms would be 
acceptable to Moscow, and Nazarbayev's proposals were no exception.
Not surprisingly, at the CIS summit in Bishkek on 9 October, Russia’s 
position on Nazarbayev’s initiatives was reserved. Yeltsin rejected the idea that 
other republics besides Russia should control rouble issuing and credits. When the 
question of an interstate bank was discussed, he rejected the proposal that each 
member have one vote.21 It was decided to refer the question to a working group. 
Russia's Economic Minister Nechaev noted after the summit that creation of a 
single currency-issuing bank would necessitate a single budget policy, but this 
would infringe the rights of parliaments, and they would never agree to it.22 
Russian officials said they saw the bank’s role as a clearing house for inter-state 
payments, rather than as a new rouble-zone central bank.23 The CIS Economic 
Council’s proposal was watered down and replaced by a "coordinating committee" 
with unspecified powers, and decision on it was postponed.
However, the summit took an important decision "On the Single Monetary 
System and Coordinated Credit and Currency Policies of States Which Retain the 
Rouble as Legal Tender". It was signed by nine CIS republics, including Russia and 
Kazakhstan, but not Ukraine, and declared the rouble the only legal tender in the 
signatories' territories. Limitations to rouble circulation were declared illegal, and
20 Valovoy, D., Kremlevskiy tupik l Nazarbayev, Moscow: "Molodaya Gvardiya”, 1993, pp. 168-169.
21 Megapolis-Express, 14.10.92.
22 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10.10.92.
23 Reuters News Service, 22.01.93.
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the parties authorised the Central Bank of Russia to control cash and credit 
issuance pending establishment of an Interstate Bank. Credit quotas were to be 
fixed by the Interbank Coordinating Council. Russia was responsible for providing 
the signatories’ Central Banks with adequate amounts of cash.24 At the same time 
Moscow gave its CIS partners two and a half months to determine their monetary 
and credit policy, and reserved the right to raise the question of making the rouble 
Russia’s currency only, unless this demand was met.25 For Nazarbayev this 
outcome was unpromising. The major objectives of his “integration” policy had not 
been achieved.
When on 14 December 1992 Chernomyrdin was elected Russian Prime 
Minister, Nazarbayev’s hopes of preserving the rouble zone were revived. In 
contrast to the young and liberal-minded Gaidar, Chernomyrdin was an 
experienced old-school Soviet bureaucrat, and also a personal acquaintance of 
Nazarbayev. On the day after Chernomyrdin’s election, Nazarbayev spoke in an 
interview on Ostankino TV Channel in favour of a smaller and tighter 
Commonwealth, comprising only the states which supported the rouble zone and 
joined the defence alliance.26
During Chernomyrdin’s visit to Alma-Ata on 19 December, Nazarbayev 
tried to exploit their personal relationship. He asked Chernomyrdin if Kazakhstan 
could count on staying in the rouble zone, and Chernomyrdin promised that 
Kazakhstan could “definitely stay in the rouble space” .27 Nazarbayev agreed to 
send an official delegation to Moscow to draft an accord on payments and 
deliveries of oil, non-ferrous metals and timber.28 Knowing Chernomyrdin’s 
background in the Russian oil and gas industry, Nazarbayev wanted to use his 
interest in Kazakhstan’s energy resources to facilitate agreements in other fields.
Both agreed to proceed with plans to create CIS banking and economic unions, 
whatever the results of the next Commonwealth summit.29
During the negotiations in Moscow on 24 December, Russia and 
Kazakhstan signed several documents; they included an agreement on cooperation 
in the power and energy industry; on procedure for debt settlement for 1992 and 
implementation o f inter-government credit; a protocol on the meeting between the 
leaderships of Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s national banks; a protocol on 
implementing accords in monetary and credit relations; an agreement on mutual 
deliveries of production and technical goods and cooperation between the two 
countries’ metallurgical industries in 1993.30 Soon afterwards, Chernomyrdin made 
another gesture of accommodation to Nazarbayev. On 9 January 1993 he arranged 
a representative meeting in Omsk between Russian and Kazakhstan governmental
24 Ekonomika i Zhizn’, 22.10.92.
25 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10.10.92.
26 Nazarbayev: CIS Leaders Should “Carry Out Divorce" at Minsk in Civilised Manner, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 21.12.92.
27 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, pp. 144-145.
28 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 244, 21.12.92
29 Reuters News Service, 19.12.92.
30 Kazaklistansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: PosoFstvo 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 47-48.
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delegations with participation by the heads of adjacent provinces of both countries.
The Kazakhstan delegation was led by Prime Minister Tereshchenko. The sides 
agreed to coordinate their actions in pricing, monetary, credit, fiscal and customs 
policy, and support for entrepreneurial activity. The Joint communique emphasised 
that “closeness of the two countries and long-term cooperation of their economies 
are a solid basis for strengthening integration processes and helping to overcome 
difficulties of the transitional period”.31 After the meeting Tereshchenko stressed 
the significance of “economic cooperation” and expressed the hope that customs 
barriers between the two countries would be lifted and the problem of mutual 
payments between enterprises solved.32
The importance of the Omsk meeting was that it preceded the CIS summit 
in Minsk, at which Nazarbayev hoped to have his integration program finally 
approved. In preparation for the summit, he tried to secure maximum political 
support. On 4 January 1993 he attended a summit of Central Asian leaders in 
Tashkent. Its declared purpose was inter-regional economic cooperation in Central 
Asia, but actually the emphasis was on economic cooperation within the entire 
CIS. Expressing his colleagues’ shared opinion, Nazarbayev stressed at a press 
conference that their support of the rouble zone would be conditional on the rouble 
being a supranational currency, on creation of a banking union consisting of 
executives of all the republics' central banks, each having one vote, and if a 
common investment policy were established. An alternative to CIS integration was 
also discussed, including setting up a separate Central Asian economic grouping. 
Nazarbayev said that given certain conditions, it was entirely possible to form a 
regional market, and went as far as hinting at the possibility of a military alliance of 
the Central Asian states. The Central Asian leaders believed such a grouping would 
reorient itself from the CIS toward the Asian world, initially Iran and Turkey, 
building routes through their territories for export of raw materials.33
The decisions taken at the summit had little practical meaning. The 
participants simply instructed their governments "to study questions involving 
pricing policy, development of transportation and communication lines, and 
provision of energy resources".34 This lack of results and plethora of general 
declarations was a clear sign that the Tashkent conference was designed less for 
fostering Central Asian inter-regional cooperation than for an outside audience.
The notion of creating a Central Asian bloc with close links to Iran and Turkey was 
obviously mean to pressure Russia into concessions over financial policy.
It is difficult to say to what extent Nazarbayev’s diplomatic manoeuvres 
influenced Russia’s position, but the Minsk summit of 22 January 1993 displayed 
some results in economic matters. The participants agreed to establish a CIS 
Interstate Bank, and endorsed CIS Charter.35 The latter provided for establishment
31 Communique of Results of Russo-Kazakli meeting in Omsk, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 12.01.93.
32 Kazakh and Russian Premiers on Omsk Meeting, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 12.01.93.
33 Trud, 06.01.93.
34 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 05.01.93.
35 The Charter was initially signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Armeniya, Belarus, Tadjikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan.
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of a Coordination and Consultative Committee (CCC) as a CIS permanent 
executive body, and of an Economic Court.36 All these proposals accorded with 
Nazarbayev’s program. But the summit’s decisions fell far short of Nazarbayev’s 
hopes. Russia still rejected CIS control of rouble emission, and the Interstate Bank 
was set up in the form suggested by Moscow. Its role was limited to facilitating 
trade and clearing between member states, and coordinating the monetary-credit 
policies of the participating countries. The bank's governing body was its council, 
comprising one representative from each member with a correspondent account. 
Settlements were to be in roubles issued by the Russian Central Bank, and clearing 
settlements in freely convertible or other currency. The bank's initial statutory 
capital of 5 billion roubles was to be contributed by the members.37
The Interstate Bank Charter, signed by all ten CIS members, specified that 
Russia would contribute more capital than other CIS states, and would have 50 per 
cent of its shares, but decisions required a two-thirds majority.38 The voting 
arrangements confirmed Russia’s central role in implementing monetary policy in 
the CIS. Other CIS states received a guarantee that Russia would be unable to 
impose decisions against their combined will, but correspondingly they could not 
impose their combined will on Russia. In general, the voting procedure simply 
institutionalised the status quo: Russia could continue to frame its monetary 
policies more or less as it wished. More importantly, the Interstate Bank had no 
power to re-establish a single rouble space. The republics made so many 
amendments to the draft charter that they emasculated the very idea of 
coordinating credit and monetary policy. In creating the bank, none of the CIS 
countries seriously thought of making their national banks coordinate credit and 
currency-emission policy with it. Thus the provision for coordination remained on 
paper. Vice-Chairman of the Russian Central Bank Solovov commented that the 
Interstate Bank would not even be able to solve the painfully urgent problem of 
settling accounts between enterprises in different republics. The only sphere in 
which it could play a certain role was in organising account-settling operations 
under intergovernmental agreements.39 The emerging monetary environment had 
no parallels in world practice. A number of republics were using their own 
variously-weighted roubles in non-cash transactions, but in cash circulation they 
were using a common rouble. Meanwhile Russia undertook to continue supplying 
cash to other CIS states. Thus, the difference between the cash and non-cash 
roubles was continuing to grow. This was against all economic logic, and fraught 
with serious complications for relations between members of the zone. Given the 
CIS leaders’ lack of political will to limit the sovereignty of their states, the rouble 
zone was doomed.
36 Ustav Sodrazhestva Nezavisimykh Gossudarstv // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sboraik 
dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 271, 273.
37 Banking - CIS Interstate Bank, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 29.01.93.
38 Reuters News Service, 22.01.93.
39 Izvestiya, 25.01.93.
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After the relatively unimpressive results of the Minsk summit, Nazarbayev 
tried to find a way of preserving the rouble zone by uniting a narrower circle of 
participants, naming Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan as potential 
members of a tighter-knit group. On 26 February he arrived in Moscow and 
discussed this with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin. Speaking after a meeting with 
Chernomyrdin, Nazarbayev said that the two countries’ leaderships “steadfastly 
support integration processes in the Commonwealth”. "The countries which want 
to enter the rouble zone must reach agreement and honour the single rules of the 
rouble zone”, he continued, adding that he thought these rules should include a 
concerted credit, emission and tax policy. “They will have to sacrifice some of their 
sovereignty, in this case for the sake o f improving the living standards of their 
peoples and strengthening the rouble”.40 This was probably the first time that 
Nazarbayev referred to self-limitation of sovereignty. Previously he had spoken 
only of strengthening Kazakhstan’s sovereignty.
On 27 February Nazarbayev met Yeltsin, and they agreed on a joint 
communique supporting early ratification of the CIS Charter adopted at the Minsk 
summit, calling for implementation of decisions on the Interstate Bank and CCC. 
They reiterated their support for the rouble zone, and agreed to take additional 
joint action in the field of monetary emission, budget policy and taxation, and 
resolved to pursue a coordinated customs policy. Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime 
Minister Daulet Sembayev told a press conference that customs duties would be 
introduced for the first time ever in bilateral trade; that was why it was vital for 
Russian and Kazakh businesses to “update their performance”, and for the two 
governments to act to avert any possible misunderstandings.41
Sembayev’s statement in fact disavowed all the many declarations in 
support of CIS integration made by the leaders of both countries. While talking of 
integration, they disengaged the national economies of Russia and Kazakhstan even 
more by introducing customs duties. Nevertheless the atmosphere of the meeting 
and some of the decisions taken there gave some impetus to the process of CIS 
integration. As Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin later revealed, "in March or 
thereabouts", Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan began confidential discussions on a 
possible deeper economic agreement within the CIS framework. Though these 
were initiated by Belorussian Prime Minister Kebich, the Kazakh leadership took 
an active part in them. According to Shokhin, "instead of trying to agree with all 
the states on the provisions of various documents, and implementing them 
immediately, we tried to show how cooperation should be built in reality”, and "the 
states which were sincerely interested in deepening integration and economic 
cooperation could best do this".42 Thus the idea of a CIS economic union was 
born.
40 Russia and Kazakhstan Agree on Closer Economic and Military' Cooperation, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 03.03.93.
41 Ibidem.
42 Shokhin on Economic Union's History, Details and Prospects, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 16.07.93.
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Yeltsin and Nazarbayev agreed at this meeting to coordinate moves to 
strengthen the CIS, and this became clear from their subsequent actions. On 17 
March Yeltsin advanced a set of proposals for closer CIS integration. In a 
declaration read out by Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Yeltsin described the 
association of former Soviet republics as amorphous and "unable to fulfil the hopes 
invested in it". He said the move was primarily intended both to address the 
burgeoning conflicts on Russia's borders, and to establish some financial discipline 
over those states which remained in the rouble zone. Kozyrev said the initiative 
was designed to increase economic cooperation, in particular through creation of 
"modern market techniques of integration" - setting up multinational companies, 
and encouraging investment in each other's projects.43
The next day Nazarbayev sent a telegram to Yeltsin stating his support for 
“strengthening the commonwealth, deepening economic reforms and democratic 
changes”. Similar telegrams were sent to the heads of states which had signed the 
CIS Charter. Nazarbayev proposed to hold in late March or early April a summit of 
the CIS states which had signed the Charter, to discuss such issues as: ensuring a 
viable economic space, single supra-national currency, free trade and a customs 
union; forming an interstate economic committee to which the states would 
delegate the necessary powers; and drawing up principles for relations with states 
which were not signatories to the CIS Charter.44
The summit was held a little later than proposed, on 16 April 1993, in 
Minsk, was the result o f a combined Russian-Kazakh initiative, and was devoted 
exclusively to CIS integration. Russia and Kazakhstan acted in unison, presenting 
similar proposals, obviously agreed beforehand. The leading role, of course, was 
assigned to Yeltsin. He gave an explicit speech, advocating a number of initiatives 
in various fields of CIS integration. He spoke in favour of coordinating foreign 
policy and setting up a CIS defence union, but devoted most of his speech to 
economic matters. He formally presented a concept of a CIS economic union, 
based on customs and currency unions. He warned that while Russia was ready to 
continue with talks on monetary union, in the end a decision had to be made on 
"either demarcating and creating our own monetary systems, or integrating...There 
is no third option: preserving the present situation would be dangerous for the 
economies of the commonwealth countries" .45 Nazarbayev also called for stronger 
economic links, a financial and currency union, coordinated credit and budget 
policies. He again raised the issue of setting up an economic coordination 
committee, but its implementation was postponed..46
The summit took no actual decision. But it was very important for Yeltsin, 
because of the internal political struggle in Russia, where he was locked in a deadly 
confrontation with parliament. Facing a referendum on his rule and political course,
43 Financial Times, 18.03.93.
44 Nazarbayev Telegram to Yeltsin with Proposals for Strengthening CIS, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
26.03.93
45 CIS Summit in Minsk - Yeltsin Proposes Greater Economic, Industrial and Military Integration, BBC Monitoring 
Service: Former USSR, 19.04.93.
46 Reuters News Service, 17.04.93.
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Yeltsin needed something to counter accusations of having been responsible for 
dissolving the USSR and failing to do enough for CIS integration. Suggestions 
worked out at secret negotiations with Nazarbayev and Kebich turned out useful 
for improving Yeltsin's political image. Nor was it accidental that the concept of 
Russian foreign policy approved by Yeltsin and made public in late April 
emphasised the importance of achieving the greatest possible integration among the 
former Soviet republics in all spheres, on the bases of voluntary participation and 
reciprocity. Moreover the concept treated attempts by outside forces to undermine 
the integrative processes in the CIS47 as a threat to Russia's national security
On 25 April Yeltsin won his referendum. This diminished his enthusiasm for 
CIS integration. The CIS summit in Moscow on 14 May 1993 was held in a 
slightly different atmosphere from the previous one. Yeltsin declared that "the 
rouble zone has in fact collapsed", and suggested that other republics' debts to 
Russia be settled by transferring debts resulting from technical credits to an 
interstate debt, to be repaid according to internationally recognised norms. This 
was another step away from preserving the common CIS economic complex. 
Yeltsin claimed that Russia was "ready for setting up a currency union as an 
inalienable part of the economic alliance". However, he considered such an alliance 
impossible "without a uniform economic space, without an agreed strategy for 
economic reforms, without coordination of our actions in the sphere of economic 
policy". The first step towards creating an economic union should be a customs 
union, which would make it "possible to remove all barriers to movement of 
goods, capital and services". He advocated accelerating the setting up of the inter­
state bank, to make it operational before 1 October 1993.48 The summit adopted a 
declaration "On Economic Cooperation", which called for establishment of an 
"economic union" within the CIS. But a treaty had first to be drafted, and then 
signed at the next CIS summit.
Nevertheless, Nazarbayev's assessment of the summit was explicitly 
positive, probably because it decided to go ahead with establishment of the CCC. 
The summit decided that the CCC would operate at the level of Deputy Prime 
Ministers for the Economy, and would be entrusted with coordinating and 
preparing documents and decisions in the economic, foreign policy and military 
fields. Nazarbayev hailed the concept of economic union, but warned that it should 
not be like the former Soviet-dominated Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, 
but rather like the European Community of equal, sovereign states. Another 
achievement of Nazarbayev was that the draft documents on the economic union 
contained a special protocol, signed by the heads of government, recommending 
deeper integration between the states remaining in the rouble zone.49
Nazarbayev's positive perception of the summit indicated that he probably 
had not grasped a major change in the political situation that took place between
47 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29.04.93.
48 Yeltsin Speaks in Favour of Economic Integration, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 17.05.93.
49 Yeltsin, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev Answer Journalists' Questions - Post Summit Press Conference, BBC 
Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 17.05.93.
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April and May, even though Yeltsin's speech contained obvious indications of a 
political turnaround. Firstly, there was his declaration on the collapse of the 
"rouble zone" and the necessity to replace existing credit relations in the CIS with 
recognised international practices. Secondly, he proposed a "currency union", 
which might mean either a new definition o f the rouble zone, or an arrangement 
that was new in principle. Thirdly, Yeltsin conditioned implementation of economic 
union on so many "ifs" as to make it virtually unfeasible in the conditions then 
prevailing in the CIS. Of course, Yeltsin could not change course by 180 degrees, 
because his opponents in parliament were still strong. So he continued to pay 
verbal tribute to CIS integration, while an absolutely different policy was 
simultaneously being hatched.
In June 1993 Russia informed all the other members of the rouble zone that 
it would no longer extend credit by means of Central Bank technical credits. 
Instead Moscow advised that from 1993 it would provide them with state credits, 
effectively equivalent to loans by foreign creditors. Among 800 billion roubles in 
such credits approved by the Duma for the forthcoming financial year, 150 billion 
was reserved for Kazakhstan.50 At the same time Moscow demanded that the 
balances in correspondent accounts of other CIS countries in the Russian Central 
Bank be converted into state debt to Russia.
Russia's move was caused by its obvious inability and/or unwillingness to 
continue subsidising the other CIS republics at previous levels. Official Russian 
estimates showed that in 1992 the Russian Central Bank transferred 1.5 trillion 
roubles, equivalent to 8% of Russia’s GDP, to other CIS members. In the first 
seven months of 1993 this increased to 2.3 trillion, mostly because of inflation, but 
in real terms roughly equal to the amount for the same period in 1992. Granting of 
credit to CIS republics accounted for 25% of Russia's inflation. Kazakhstan was 
the second largest per capita recipient (after Turkmenistan) of Russian currency. In 
1993 cash deliveries to Kazakhstan equalled 38,000 roubles per head, 30.1% 
higher than per capita emission in Russia. In 1992 Russian subsidies equalled 
25.1%, and in January-July 1993 48.8% of Kazakhstan's GDP.51
On 16 June 1993 difficult negotiations were held in Moscow between 
Tereshchenko and Russian Deputy Prime Ministers Fedorov and Shokhin. They 
resulted in signing of an agreement on monetary-credit relations in 1993 and on the 
size of Kazakhstan's debt to Russia in 1992. Kazakhstan acknowledged debts of 
247 billion roubles for 1992, and this sum was defined as Kazakhstan's state debt 
to Russia. The signatories also noted that Russian state enterprises owed 78.5 
billion roubles more to their Kazakhstan counterparts than Kazakhstan enterprises 
owed to their Russian equivalents, and that this difference might be used to offset 
part of Kazakhstan's state debt.
Kazakhstan undertook that its cash emission in the forthcoming quarter 
would not exceed 15% of the Russian emission for that period. But the negotiators
50 Megapolis-Express, 28.07.93.
51 Izvestiya, 16.09.93.
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failed to settle the issue of Kazakhstan's debt to Russia for January - April 1993, 
and decided to postpone the matter until signing of a bilateral agreement, due 
before 1 October 1993, on coordinated financial, monetary-credit and currency 
policy, based on use of the Russian rouble as the legal tender in Kazakhstan. If the 
agreement was not signed by that date, they would conclude another agreement on 
terms and periods of Kazakhstan's repayment of the Russian state credit.52 That 
provision was a blatant example of Russia trying to use the debt-credit issue as 
leverage to force Kazakhstan, and, implicitly, other CIS states, to accept common 
rules of monetary policy established in Moscow.
According to Tereshchenko, the key disagreement at the negotiations was 
that Almaty was willing, but Moscow was not, to take responsibility for debts 
incurred by state-owned enterprises. It was not therefore accidental that the 
provision on enterprise debts was subjectively formulated. The Russians allegedly 
told their Kazakhstan counterparts to settle all questions of enterprise debt via the 
economic courts. Russia also put forward special terms for provision of credits in 
1993, effectively equating them with loans by foreign creditors.53 As a result 
Kazakhstan refused to sign an agreement on state-to-state credits, and remained 
the only rouble zone country without such an agreement. Probably the major 
reason for Kazakhstan's refusal was the very modest credit of 150 billion roubles 
reserved for it.
After Tereshchenko's return Nazarbayev promptly arranged a conference, 
which took place in Almaty on 21 June, on the economic situation in Kazakhstan 
and the state of credit and monetary relations within the CIS. The conference was 
attended by members of the government, heads of province administrations, 
chairmen of parliamentary committees, and executives o f banks and major 
industrial enterprises. Summing up its results, Nazarbayev said that he had no 
radical change of policy in mind; "whether we want it or not the integration 
processes will continue". At the same time he emphasised the need for urgent steps 
to reduce Kazakhstan's dependence on imports, improve product quality to equal 
that of imported goods, introduce tough control over the use of strategic raw 
materials, and elaborate a specific action plan to meet the current difficult 
conditions. Nazarbayev recommended that Kazakhstan's enterprises satisfy the 
republic’s needs first of all, before entering into cooperation with foreign partners, 
by which he obviously meant Russian firms. 54 According to Shokhin, the Kazakh 
government sent telegrams to major enterprises ordering them to cease sending 
goods to Russia and other CIS states.55
In addition, Nazarbayev prepared a diplomatic offensive. For this he used 
the second meeting of heads of state and government of the Organisation for
52 Soglashenie o denezhno-kreditnykh otnosheniyakh v 1993 godu i o razmere zadolzhennosti Respubliki 
Kazakhstan po teklinicheskomu kreditu po rezultatam torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnosheniy s Rossiyskoy 
Federatsiey za 1992, Moscow [No publisher] 1993, pp. 1-3.
53 Izvestiya, 23.06.93.
54 President and Premier Address Meeting on Economy and Relations with Russia, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 07.07.93.
55 Megapolis-Express, 28.07.93.
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Economic Cooperation (OEC) in Istanbul on 7 July. This summit was a convenient 
occasion to put political pressure on Russia, because it united all the post-Soviet 
Central Asian states with three non-CIS Muslim countries, Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan. Nazarbayev's speech at the summit was shrewdly constructed. He did not 
miss a chance to mention Russia and CIS as potential OEC partners, but at the 
same time constantly emphasised the trade and economic advantages of 
Kazakhstan's cooperation with OEC, and spoke very strongly in favour of new 
transport and pipeline routes to link Kazakhstan with the Persian Gulf through 
Iran, and with the Mediterranean through Turkey. Thus Nazarbayev obviously 
tried not to overdo things, but to warn Moscow of the possible repercussions of 
disengagement from Kazakhstan. Not accidentally, the summit’s final communique 
referred to "giving priority to creation of an effective infrastructure network that 
not only links the OEC member-states, but also gives them access to other parts of 
the world".56
This time, however, the Russians did not hesitate to call Nazarbayev’s 
bluff. The counterblow came on 10 July, when the Prime Ministers of Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus signed a joint statement on urgent measures for closer 
economic relations. It said that they still remained committed to the treaty on CIS 
economic union, but "believe that measures for closer trilateral integration of their 
economies will help accelerate the implementation of this treaty's goals and 
principles". Deputy prime ministers were instructed to prepare by 1 September 
1993 a draft treaty on deepening economic integration among the three republics.57 
The event was later shown to be purely declaratory, but initially the fact that 
Kazakhstan was neither consulted about nor invited to the meeting seemed a 
serious rebuff, seeing that Nazarbayev had been a very active proponent of the 
concept of economic union.
The Slav republics’ trilateral accord caused bewilderment in Kazakh 
government circles, especially after Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin 
explained Russia's move at a press conference on 13 July. Shokhin said that the 
decision at the trilateral summit was the result of news from Turkey that a customs 
union, a common market in goods, capital, services and manpower, and a single 
bank were being established within the OEC framework, and "Since Kazakhstan 
has decided to enter a Customs Union with Turkey, it can no longer join our 
union".58 Shokhin's statement drew a harsh response from Almaty. State 
Counsellor Zhukeyev said, that "Shokhin's attempt to attribute what happened to 
'the desire of the Central Asian states to create an economic union with Turkey and 
Pakistan' is tactless, to put it mildly. And his suggestion that Kazakhstan and the 
other CIS partners chose between entering one of these two economic unions 
simply does not stand up to any common-sense criticism - if only because in 
Istanbul there was no discussion at all about creation of an economic union...". In 
addition Zhukeyev ascribed to Shokhin something he never said, that Russia
56 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14.07.93.
57 Izvestiya, 13.07.93.
58 Megapolis-Express, 28.07.93.
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intended to block the setting up of a free transportation system in Asia and "restrict 
the Central Asian states' possibilities for future free development".59
The Russian move caused genuine concern in Almaty, not least because it 
was very reminiscent of the Belovezhskaya Puscha agreement, when the three 
Slavic republics had easily dissolved the Soviet Union, without inviting or even 
consulting Kazakhstan, and could be taken to imply that it was now the CIS’ turn 
for dissolution. In all Kazakhstan's diplomatic position was substantially weakened. 
Thus Nazarbayev's bluff in Istanbul backfired, and gave Moscow a convenient 
justification for putting an end to the rouble zone. On 22 July he made a gesture of 
rapprochement to Moscow, when his press service released a statement entitled 
"Kazakhstan is for Economic Partnership". The statement said it was important "to 
overcome the individual differences in approaches to interstate economic 
cooperation that were reflected in conclusion of a treaty on economic alliance by 
the governments of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine", denied that there were any 
"undercurrents" with regard to Kazakhstan's membership in CIS and "trade and 
economic cooperation with the countries of the Asian continent", and insisted that 
the recent OEC meeting was to "serve the interests not only o f Central Asia, but of 
the entire CIS".60
But this was too little too late. Those members of the Russian government 
who were suspicious of Kazakhstan’s and other Central Asian states’ intentions 
with regard to the rouble zone got the upper hand in the internal struggle, and 
succeeded in portraying Kazakhstan and other republics which took part in the 
OEC conference as disloyal to the CIS. Obviously not all their suspicions were 
groundless. Besides Nazarbayev’s declarations, which were most probably a 
diplomatic game, there were other worrying facts. As later revealed by Shokhin, 
Moscow knew that at the July OEC conference Nazarbayev, Karimov and Niyazov 
had agreed on simultaneous introduction of national currencies.61 Moscow 
probably also knew that Kazakhstan had already ordered printing of its national 
currency in Britain, although it was among Nazarbayev’s most closely-guarded 
secrets. Combination of these facts could lead Russia’s leadership to conclude that 
Kazakhstan’s participation in the rouble zone was a tactic to get maximum 
advantage from Russian credits, then at a convenient moment to introduce a 
national currency, leaving Russia to bear the economic consequences of the move.
On 26 July Russia introduced new types of rouble banknotes, which was 
tantamount to introducing its own separate currency. All CIS states had stocks of 
the old notes, but could obtain new ones only on the basis of state-to-state credits 
or through sales to Russia. Now Kazakhstan and all other rouble zone states faced 
a very restricted choice: either to opt for their own currency, or to agree to 
Russia’s conditions. Nazarbayev decided to keep both options open. On the same 
day he ordered Kazakhstan’s National Bank to accelerate the printing of the entire 
amount of national currency. Simultaneously he telephoned Chernomyrdin, and
59 Izvestiya, 15.07.93.
60 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22.07.93. [Formal Central Bank announcement was made on 24 July 1992],
61 Moskovskie novosti, 21.11.93.
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asked when Kazakhstan would get the new roubles. Chernomyrdin said “very 
soon”, and Russian Central Bank Chairman Gerashchenko confirmed that he was 
only waiting for orders to release them.62 In Akmola on 19 August Nazarbayev 
announced that Kazakhstan was technically prepared to leave the rouble zone, but 
that he believed it would be more profitable to stay in it.63
Very probably Moscow wanted to use the question of providing 
Kazakhstan with new banknotes as a negotiating tool to force Kazakhstan into 
concessions on outstanding issues of economic cooperation. On 29 July two 
agreements on settling debt and credit matters between Russia and Kazakhstan 
were signed in Moscow. The first dealt with rearrangement of Kazakhstan's debts 
into state debt to Russia. Kazakhstan acknowledged 300 billion roubles in debt for 
the period January-May 1993 and agreed to its conversion into state debt to 
Russia. Thus Kazakhstan's debt to Russia for 1992-1993 was established at 547.6 
billion roubles, confirmed as equivalent to $1.25 billion. The state credit was to be 
paid off within 1996-2000 by quarterly instalments.64 The second agreement "On 
State Credit in 1993" allotted Kazakhstan the above-mentioned 150 billion rouble 
credit, to be paid off during 1995-1997.65 Both agreements provided a very mild 
repayment regime.
The credit for 1993 was substantially less than Kazakhstan had previously 
obtained through the Russian Central Bank, especially if high inflation and the 
steady fall in the rouble’s value are taken into account But the most important 
thing for Moscow was that both agreements ensured transformation of Russian- 
Kazakh financial relations into normal inter-state relations, a necessary 
precondition not for unification but for divorce of monetary systems. The 
agreements also equipped Moscow with a powerful instrument of influence over 
Kazakhstan, as if preparing the ground for a future dependent relationship.
On 7 August Yeltsin met Nazarbayev and Uzbek President Karimov in 
Moscow, and they adopted a joint statement favouring setting up "a common 
monetary system with the Russian Federation by using the rouble". They instructed 
their governments and central banks to hold " special negotiations within a period 
of two weeks to consider general and technical questions of setting up a collective 
monetary system", and "to sign an agreement on practical measures to set up a new 
kind of rouble zone". Other CIS members were invited to participate in the 
agreement.66 On 11-12 August Gerashchenko and Mashits, Chairman of Russia's 
State Committee for CIS Economic Cooperation, made a hasty visit to Almaty,
62 Nazarbayev, N.; Na poroge XXI veka, p. 145.
63 Kazakh President Visits Akinola Oblast; Talks of Rouble Zone and Grain Harvest, BBC Monitoring Service: 
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where they held meetings with the Kazakh government and National Bank on 
creating a Kazakh-Russian monetary system. In particular, they discussed the 
general concept of a new-type rouble zone, and settled the problem of urgent cash 
deliveries to Kazakhstan 67
At that time some Kazakh experts began expressing concern that Russia’s 
conditions for creating a common monetary system and providing Kazakhstan with 
1993 banknotes were difficult to meet. Some doubts were expressed by 
Nazarbayev himself At the republican conference of local leaders in Akmola on 19 
August he made it clear that it would infringe Kazakhstan's sovereignty if Russia 
set terms which obliged Kazakhstan to receive new rouble banknotes as credit, and 
to coordinate its budget, taxation and investment policies with Russia’s Central 
Bank, and said that it was for Kazakhstan’s parliament to decide how much of its 
sovereignty Kazakhstan might delegate to Russia.68 The next day these concerns 
were echoed by Baynazarov, Head of Kazakhstan's National Bank, who 
complained that Russia’s conditions, if accepted, would virtually turn Kazakhstan's 
National Bank into a branch of the Central Bank of Russia. He also said that 
parliamentary approval was needed for joining a Russian rouble zone.69 However, 
on 20 August Nazarbayev met Yeltsin in Moscow, and signed the second 
declaration that Kazakhstan would stay in the rouble zone. According to 
Nazarbayev, by that time Kazakhstan had already changed its customs and financial 
laws and the law on the National Bank to comply with Russia’s demands.70
On 7 September representatives of the governments and central banks of 
Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Armenia signed a 
document "On practical measures to establish a new-style rouble zone", to be 
approved by their parliaments. The agreement referred to the signatories’ desire for 
"a common monetary system using the Russian Federation rouble as the legal 
means of payment". It envisaged strict coordination of monetary, credit, interest 
and customs policy, and involved changes in the member countries’ legislation. 
Once implemented, access to the Russian rouble as sole legal tender would be 
open. Bilateral agreements were to define the conditions of the new rouble zone, 
and mechanisms for harmonising and unifying legislation on monetary and credit 
relations. They were to be followed by a comprehensive multilateral treaty on 
economic union, scheduled for signing on 24 September at the CIS summit in 
Moscow.71 Nazarbayev was evidently satisfied with the deal. Before leaving 
Moscow on 7 September he told journalists his visit had not been in vain, and had 
convinced him that there was no alternative to integration. He underlined that the
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States needed at least a month and a half to abandon old roubles and introduce 
temporary coupons or other monetary units.72
On 23 September in Moscow the Prime Ministers of Russia and 
Kazakhstan signed a bilateral agreement on unification of their monetary systems. 
Kazakhstan was the last of the five participants in the rouble zone to do so. 
Answering journalists' questions after the ceremony Tereshchenko noted that the 
agreement was very important for stabilising the economic situation in his 
republic.73 The strange thing about this agreement was that the next day saw the 
signing in Moscow of another document which to some extent contradicted it. On 
24 September the treaty “On Creation o f Economic Union" was signed by all CIS 
members except for Ukraine and Turkmenistan, which joined it as "associate 
members".74 The treaty defined aims and principles of the economic union, codified 
trade relations, entrepreneurial and investment activities, dealt with monetary, 
financial and currency issues, social policies and legal regulation of economic 
relations. It provided for "free movement of goods, services, capital and labour; 
coordinated monetary-credit, budget, taxation, prices, foreign economic, customs 
and currency policies; harmonisation of national economic legislation of the 
contracting parties; common statistical base". The treaty envisaged creation of the 
economic union in four stages: free trade association, customs union, common 
market of goods, services and labour, and finally monetary union.75 Thus the treaty 
regarded monetary union not as the initial but as the final stage of economic 
integration, and scarcely achievable in the immediate future.
True, Article 15 established that at the stage of free trade association the 
parties would use in their monetary-credit and financial relations either a "multi- 
currency system, embracing national currencies circulating in individual states" or 
"a system based on the Russian Federation rouble". Thus in principle the treaty did 
not exclude the possibility of a number of CIS members using the Russian rouble 
at the first, lowest stage of economic integration. But the irony was that even this 
lowest stage in Russian-Kazakh integration had not yet been achieved, and it was 
far from clear when it would be. The treaty itself did not introduce a free trade 
zone, because it was only a framework document, and envisaged that "for each 
form of integration" special agreements on substance should be reached and 
practical measures implemented. In expert assessment, to implement the treaty's 
provisions, the sides would have to sign more than thirty special agreements. Most 
of such agreements remained unsigned or unratified for at least two years.76 Thus
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the treaty provisions were in obvious contradiction with the ongoing negotiations 
on monetary union between Russia and Kazakhstan.
This contradiction supports the argument that Yeltsin and his entourage did 
not take the economic union treaty and rouble zone agreements seriously, 
regarding them not as instruments for real integration but as propaganda ploys in 
the domestic political struggle. The Kazakhs did not know, any more than the 
majority of government officials in Russia and the other CIS states, that the above 
documents had already become an element in a subtle combination prepared by 
Yeltsin for his showdown with the Duma. It was not accidental that their solemn 
signing in Moscow coincided with Yeltsin’s controversial decree of 21 September 
dissolving parliament. The situation was similar to that in April preceding the 
Russian referendum, but now the stakes were much higher. Yeltsin intended to 
move beyond constitutional bounds, because he had no legal power to dissolve 
parliament. To boost his popularity, and refute opposition claims that he was 
betraying Russian interests, Yeltsin needed to demonstrate real achievements in 
CIS integration.
But the parliament fought back, and on 3-4 October armed clashes took 
place between its supporters and Interior Ministry troops. Then tanks shelled the 
parliament building. Yeltsin who enjoyed the loyalty of the army command won the 
confrontation. The parliament was dispersed, and gone with it were the majority of 
Eurasianists in Russia’s leadership. The October events were an unequivocal 
victory for ethnic nationalists. A week later a new tone of Russian policy was 
readily apparent. On 11 October Finance Minister Fyodorov was already saying he 
feared his country's currency could be weakened by a too-hasty expansion of the 
rouble zone. 77 After that Russia put forward tough new conditions for providing 
new banknotes to Kazakhstan, insisting that the cash was to be given as a state 
credit for six months, with normal interest established by the Russian Central Bank, 
and Kazakhstan was to make a deposit equal to 50% of the credit. If however in 
six months Russia was satisfied that Kazakhstan’s economy was ready for joint 
functioning with Russia’s the deposit would be returned, the interest foregone, and 
the credit would not have to be repaid. Russia’s second condition was that 
Kazakhstan should not introduce a national currency within five years.78 
Kazakhstan perceived the new conditions as exceptionally harsh, and as 
deliberately aimed at ensuring failure of the negotiations. Deputy Prime Minister 
Sembayev stated in an interview that "principally new conditions unexpectedly 
presented by Russia" were "purposefully designed to be unacceptable". He felt 
Kazakhstan was simply being "pushed out of the rouble zone" .79
On 26 October Shokhin arrived in Almaty and met Nazarbayev. Their 
negotiations were difficult. Shokhin sincerely asked Nazarbayev what would be the 
advantage for Kazakhstan “of jumping into the last carriage of the departing 
Russian train”. According to Nazarbayev’s own account he was outraged, and
77 Reuters News Service, 11.10.93.
78 Moskovskie novosti, 21.11.93.
79 Izvestiya, 03.11.93.
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asked Shokhin if he had authority from Chernomyrdin to negotiate? Shokhin did, 
and told Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan could not be in the rouble zone.80 Shokhin’s 
account indicates that not everything was that straightforward. When he asked 
Nazarbayev if he could give a 100% guarantee that Kazakhstan would not 
introduce its own currency within a year, Nazarbayev allegedly replied that he 
could not.81 The rouble zone was no longer feasible.
On 28 October Kazakhstan's parliament gave Nazarbayev power to 
introduce a national currency. In a secret operation four hired cargo aircraft 
brought 60% of the new currency from London.82 In a TV address on 12 
November Nazarbayev announced introduction of the national currency, the tenge, 
from 8 a m. on 15 November. The rouble zone collapsed, highlighting another 
stage in the process of separation of the CIS states. This event received 
contradictory interpretations in Kazakhstan and Russia. Recalling those dramatic 
days Nazarbayev said in a recent interview: " The Russian government’s economic 
egotism manifested itself in the first place in abolishing the common currency, 
common economic complex. This did irreparable damage first of all to the 
integrative processes... I did everything possible and impossible to keep 
Kazakhstan in the common monetary and technological space with Russia and 
other CIS states. But alas, the vector of Russian development was pointed in a 
different direction".83 Strangely, in his memoirs Nazarbayev gave a slightly 
different interpretation. He said that Shokhin had been “probably right at that 
moment” . “Building your statehood, it is impossible to do without your own 
currency. Sooner or later it should have been introduced”.84 A similar view is 
voiced by Mansurov, Kazakhstan's Ambassador to Moscow: "...When Kazakhstan 
and Russia - two independent states... are not united into a common form of 
statehood, be it federation or confederation, the single rouble could exist only for a 
certain transitional period with the objective of mitigating the destructive 
consequences of the collapse of the overcentralised state which the Soviet Union 
was".85 Thus Mansurov recognised the objective nature of the break-up of the 
rouble zone in the absence of a common union statehood.
In fact, such a break-up was an inevitable outcome of the policies 
conducted by ethnic nationalists in both countries. Each side was thinking not so 
much of integration, but of extracting maximum benefit for itself at its partner’s 
expense. Russia’s interest in "integration" was determined by primarily political 
considerations - maintaining indirect control of the periphery through economic 
means, but as cheaply as possible. Kazakhstan's primary interest lay in the field of 
economic policies - getting cheap Russian credits and living on them without
80 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, pp. 146-147.
81 Moskovskie novosti, 21.11.93.
82 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, p. 147.
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84 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, p. 147.
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putting much effort into economic revival, and at the same time maintaining full 
independence from Moscow. Domestic politics were also important, since both 
Yeltsin and Nazarbayev experienced serious political pressure for integration, and 
could not simply reject the idea without damaging their political standing. 
Consequently an impression of active integrative interactions was created, with 
each playing into the other's hand. But when the process reached the point where 
real decisions had to be made, both sides showed a lack of desire to cooperate.
On 22 March 1994 Nazarbayev announced his most conspicuous 
integration initiative - the project for an Eurasian Union (EAU). At the Royal 
Institute o f International Affairs in London he said that the need had matured for 
reform of the CIS itself, to provide for creation in this region of a belt of stability 
and security". He suggested reviving the CIS as a Eurasian Union of sovereign 
states, drawing on both the European Union and British Commonwealth as 
models.86 Nazarbayev did not clarify why he chose London for advancing his 
initiative. Probably he wanted to test both Western and Russian reactions on the 
eve of a crucial meeting with Yeltsin scheduled for 28 March. But if this was 
Nazarbayev's intention, he failed, because no substantial reaction followed either 
from Russia or from Western capitals, and he had no alternative but to use 
opportunities provided by his visit to Moscow to promote his initiative. He actively 
publicised it at meetings with academicians and students of Moscow State 
University, businessmen and intelligentsia at the Moscow Mayor's Office, and chief 
editors of leading Russian newspapers.
He explained the motives behind the EAU concept by his concern that the 
CIS was turning into an organisation for "civilised divorce", and that attempts "to 
channel the process along the route of integration" had failed. His dissatisfaction 
was founded on two premises. Firstly, "political dynamics" had begun to damage 
"not only the obsolete and economically invalid forms" of relations between the 
former Soviet republics, but also "quite rational and mutually beneficial links". 
Secondly, attempts for prompt integration with other economic groupings and 
"hopes for foreign aid" had not succeeded. "The EAU project was prepared taking 
account of the fact that in the near future CIS countries would not join developed 
economic blocs as equal partners” .
He disclosed that he had reached the conclusion that CIS integrative 
processes must be activated "only after extensive study of the experience of other 
international associations, analysis of the situation in the CIS states and 
consultations with experts". He argued that the lack o f success in CIS integration 
was a result of a misconceived notion of integration, which was interpreted as 
contradicting and even threatening national sovereignty. But he believed 
sovereignty and integration were "interconnected" notions, "not excluding, but 
augmenting each other",87 and advocated "combining the process of national-state
86 Times, 23.03.94.
87 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, pp. 102-103, 108.
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construction with preservation and development on this basis of inter-state 
integrative processes".88
The EAU project, which was published on 6-8 June 1994 in Kazakhstan 
and Russia, started from the assumption that the existing CIS structure "did not 
allow for full realisation of the integrative potential" of the former Soviet republics. 
At the same time previous experience of CIS’ performance "showed the need to 
move to a new level of integration, which would guarantee fulfilment of jointly 
undertaken obligations by all member-states". While not excluding further 
improvement of CIS mechanisms, the plan suggested that the CIS "should not be 
regarded as the only form of unification". The formation of a Eurasian Union was 
seen as compatible with CIS and taking account of "multivariant integration, 
different tempos, non-homogeneity and divergence in the development of the CIS 
states".
The important element in the project was support for political integration. 
The document said: "Resolution of questions of economic integration dictates the 
need for setting up political institutions possessing ample authority. They must 
include functions for regulating relations between states in the economic, political, 
legal, ecological, cultural and educational spheres".89 The new entity was regarded 
as an "economic, currency and political union". This represented a significant shift 
in Nazarbayev's position. Previously he had defined integration exclusively in 
economic terms.
The Eurasian Union was perceived as a union of "equal independent 
states", aimed at realisation of their national interests and "strengthening stability 
and security, social and economic modernisation in the post-Soviet space". It was 
to be achieved through referendums in countries wishing to join and subsequent 
signing of a treaty creating the union. Decisions in the EAU would require a four- 
fifths majority, another breakaway from CIS principles, where decisions required 
unanimity. The project also established preconditions for joining the EAU. They 
included: mandatory observance of international obligations; acceptance of the 
existing state and political institutions of EAU member-states; recognition of 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders; repudiation of economic, political 
and other forms of pressure in inter-state relations; termination of military activities 
against each other. The project allowed EAU member-states to participate in other 
integrative associations, including CIS. Each member could leave the EAU on six 
months' notice.
The project provided for setting up what were termed "supranational" 
institutions. It named the Council of Heads of State and of Government as EAU’s 
highest political authority. Chairmanship of EAU was to rotate at six-month 
intervals. In addition the union was to have a Council of Foreign Ministers for 
foreign policy coordination. The project envisaged an EAU legislature, described
88 Proekt o fonnirovanii Evraziyskogo Soyuza Gosudarstv // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, 
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as a "consultative and counselling body". Two ways of staffing it were suggested, 
either by " equal representation from each member state, or by way of direct 
elections". To be legally binding, the parliament's decisions would have to be 
ratified by the member-states’ parliaments. Another proposed supranational 
structure was an Interstate Executive Committee, a "permanently functioning 
executive and controlling body". The proposal did not define its powers, specifying 
only that it should be composed of representatives of all member-states, and that 
its Chairmanship should rotate.
An interesting provision, reflecting Kazakh official policy, concerned 
citizenship. The project did not envisage common union citizenship, but suggested 
that persons changing their country of residence within EAU should be 
automatically granted citizenship of the receiving state. Another interesting 
proposal was for a capital of the new union, to be "a city at the juncture of Europe 
and Asia". The project named two possible candidates, both in Russia, Kazan, 
capital of Tatarstan, or Samara. In the economic field the project envisaged a 
number of "supranational coordinating structures": an Economic Commission 
under the Council of Heads of State and of Government, a Raw Materials 
Commission of EAU Exporter-States, a Fund for Affairs of Economic and 
Technical Cooperation, a Commission on Interstate Financial and Industrial 
Groups and Joint Ventures, International Investment Bank, Interstate Arbitrage, 
and a Commission on introduction of a new currency, the transferable rouble. The 
project also called for "creation of a common defence space aimed at coordinating 
defence activities", and made a number of proposals for cooperation in spheres 
such as science, culture, education and ecology.90
Nazarbayev's initiative received a positive reaction from a number of 
influential Russian politicians. On 30 March 1994 Shumeyko, Chairman of the 
Russian Federation Council and Head of the Council of the CIS Interparliamentary 
Assembly, told journalists that recreating a new Union, not the former USSR, was 
quite possible, that it did not matter what it was called, but that it could be based 
on existing CIS institutions, such as the Council of Heads of State, Council of 
Heads o f Government and Interparliamentary Assembly. He also expressed the 
opinion that supranational institutions would have to be established gradually, and 
that there could be discussion about united armed forces, a single monetary 
system, and abolition of borders.91
On 4 April, at a news conference at the State Duma, Shakhray, Russia's 
Minister for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy, presented for discussion a 
draft confederation agreement for establishing a union of Eurasian states on the 
basis of the CIS. The draft envisaged a "confederative economic community", to 
ensure "revival and development of a common market of member countries as a 
single economic space without customs barriers... creation of a common currency 
and banking system, based on preservation of the national currencies of these
90 Ibid., pp. 370-376.
91 Federation Council Speaker Supports Nazarbayev's Idea of a Eurasian Union, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 01.04.94.
127
countries and the agreed principles of credit and monetary regulation". It also 
provided for setting up a community governmental committee, a defence union, 
"the basis o f which would be formed by the members’ national armies", a general 
political council, a security council and a court of the confederation. Shakhray 
proposed to form an international working group to compose a confederation 
treaty, made up of representatives of countries which were ready to join the 
Eurasian Union.92 Kazakh Prime Minister Kazhegeldin appraised Shakhray's 
proposal as "similar to the EAU project in a whole number of provisions".93
But the Kremlin's reaction was much less enthusiastic. On 31 March 
Kostikov, Yeltsin's press secretary, described Nazarbayev's initiative as 
"unexpected". He said Yeltsin had heard about the EAU proposal with "reserved 
interest", and that Nazarbayev's idea was "geopolitically logical", but so were the 
CIS principles, "so there is hardly any need to replace one strong idea with 
another, though their mutual improvement would make sense". Kostikov said that 
Yeltsin reserved judgement until he had further studied the pros and con of 
Nazarbayev's initiative.94 Nazarbayev's project could at least serve as a basis for 
further negotiations, but this did not happen either. The official joint communique 
on Nazarbayev's visit to Moscow did not even mention the Eurasian Union. It said 
he and Yeltsin had discussed prospects for CIS development, that they welcomed 
the CIS’ expansion through accession of new members, and saw this as evidence of 
growing understanding of the importance of multilateral cooperation within the 
CIS. They confirmed readiness to cooperate in further strengthening the CIS and 
increasing its efficiency, specifically by accelerating the formation of an economic 
alliance and strengthening the role of coordinating institutions.95
Thus it was only economic integration that Yeltsin was prepared to proceed 
with at that stage. This found reflection in the treaty "On Further Deepening of 
Economic Cooperation and Integration between the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
the Russian Federation", signed during Nazarbayev's visit. The treaty contained a 
number of general provisions which would need to be made more specific. It said 
that both countries would cooperate closely "in fulfilling economic integration, 
creating a joint economic space and forming a common market". (Article 1). They 
undertook to "steadily lower customs tariffs in mutual trade, taxes, duties and 
other tariff and non-tariff restrictions, make the transition to a joint trade regime in 
relations with third countries, unify economic legislation on the most acute issues 
of trade and economic relations, implement unification of customs tariffs, rules and 
procedures and customs documentation". (Article 3). The treaty contained an 
obligation to implement by the end of 1994 "conditions for transition from a free
92 Shakhray Puts Forward Draft Eurasian Confederation Agreement, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
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trade zone to creation of a fully-fledged Customs Union, taking into account steps 
taken in this field on a multilateral basis within the Economic Union".96
The EAU proposal was coolly received not only by Russia but by other CIS 
states as well, including Kazakhstan's closest allies from Central Asia. This was 
clearly revealed at the CIS summit in Minsk on 15 April, which Nazarbayev did not 
attend, allegedly for health reasons. At the meeting Nazarbayev's Central Asian 
counterparts were the first to criticise the concept of a Eurasian Union. Rahmonov, 
chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan, said the EAU idea was good, but the 
CIS had not yet exhausted its possibilities and reserves. But the strongest criticism 
was voiced by Karimov, President of Uzbekistan. He stated that the concept of 
Eurasian Union "had no serious foundation", and "it would be incorrect to jettison 
the idea of strengthening the Commonwealth primarily via economic structures, via 
economic union, when we have only reached half-way, although we all put our 
signatures to this, and to put forward the new idea of a Eurasian Union. In general 
it smacks of populism".97 Thus both leaders associated themselves with Yeltsin's 
position, not Nazarbayev’s. Nobody supported Nazarbayev's plan.
Given the generally unfavourable reaction to the EAU project, it is perhaps 
surprising that Nazarbayev did not discard the initiative, but continued to advance 
it. On 3 June 1994 he officially forwarded a "Project for Formation of a Eurasian 
Union of States" to the CIS heads of state.98 On 1 July Kazakhstan circulated a 
draft paper describing the EAU proposal as an official UN General Assembly 
document. The EAU initiative figured high on the agenda of the Uzbek-Kazakh- 
Kyrgyz summit in Almaty on 8 July. One of Nazarbayev's major objectives at this 
summit was to reverse his Central Asian colleagues’ negative attitude to the EAU, 
and to use the occasion to promote it further. This aim was at least partially 
achieved. Karimov refrained from repeating his numerous previous criticisms of the 
EAU idea, and Akayev said at the press conference after the meeting that he was a 
supporter of the EAU initiative "first and foremost because I consider it as the final 
goal of our Commonwealth".99
Continuing his diplomatic offensive Nazarbayev also sought support from 
Belarus, the Slavic republic most disposed to CIS integration. On 11 August, while 
visiting the Ukrainian capital Kiev, Nazarbayev made a sudden telephone call to 
President Lukashenko of Belarus, and discussed further integration between the 
post-Soviet republics. Nazarbayev spoke about his idea of a Eurasian union and 
said that he saw Lukashenko as "an ally and partner in joint efforts aiming to 
achieve close integration among the CIS member-states".100 But Lukashenko was
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cautious, giving the opinion that when moving towards integration it was 
important to avoid "piling up of ideas" and to try to use all the CIS’ potential 
possibilities.101 Thus Nazarbayev failed to obtain Belorussian support.
On 19-21 September an international conference "The Eurasian Space: 
Integrative Potential and its Realisation", arranged by the Kazakh authorities, was 
held in Almaty. Nazarbayev himself addressed the conference, which was attended 
by 140 officials, politicians, diplomats, scholars, writers and publicists from several 
CIS countries. His Eurasian Union proposal was at the centre of attention, and 
many of the Russian politicians and public figures present voiced their approval of 
it. The final document adopted by the conference suggested "taking steps to 
strengthen the CIS’ integrative potential, using the idea of Eurasian Union of states 
and other integration projects".102 The conference was conveniently timed before 
the forthcoming CIS summit to give a boost to the EAU concept, which had been 
put on its agenda.
However the CIS summit, held on 21 October in Moscow, clearly remained 
unconvinced. As Yeltsin said, "We all studied it very carefully. However we all 
came to the conclusion that this is perhaps a good idea, but premature. Today the 
peoples are not ready to enter a new union...".103 The summit adopted a resolution 
which said that the Council of Heads of State had taken note of President 
Nazarbayev's information on creating a Eurasian Union of States, and had decided 
"to use the major ideas, enunciated in the Republic of Kazakhstan’s proposal, for 
deepening integrative processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States".104 
Nazarbayev expressed his displeasure at this decision at a press conference after 
the summit. Speaking about the other CIS leaders he said: "I started to ask my 
colleagues some questions: 'What's going to happen to everything we're deciding 
on? We've passed 451, 452, 453 resolutions since the creation of the CIS, but how 
will they be implemented?'... When I talk to them separately, especially if it's over a 
friendly lunch... they all agree that we can't live without each other. They even say 
we're doomed to togetherness. So why do they say something different to the 
press?"105
The summit decision clearly represented the dominance of Yeltsin's 
approach of continuing to develop integration within the CIS framework. If Yeltsin 
had supported Nazarbayev's initiative the outcome could have been quite different. 
Of course, the EAU concept would have still been actively opposed by Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. But it might have acquired support from 
Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, and that would already have been enough to create the 
nucleus of a future union between the four CIS nations which were inclined to go
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deeper in their integration than the others. But Yeltsin evidently opposed the whole 
EAU concept.
Yeltsin's restrained attitude was to a large degree explained by personal 
reasons. The personal element was always evident in Yeltsin's behavioural patterns, 
and Nazarbayev committed a major tactical error by not taking account of Yeltsin's 
extreme ambitiousness. Yeltsin could not accept anyone other than himself as the 
author of an initiative as important and potentially historic as the Eurasian Union. 
As a creator of the CIS, he had no intention of passing over the historical 
leadership to anyone else, even if it was in Russia’s interests to do so. Thus Yeltsin 
did not support Nazarbayev's proposal, even though it was warmly received by 
some influential members of his own team. But there were of course also some 
considerations of principle in the Russian position.
Russia's concerns over the EAU proposal were voiced by Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev at the summer meeting of the Russian Foreign Policy Council devoted to 
CIS integration. On one hand Kozyrev made it clear that Russia wanted "a more 
closely-knit Commonwealth, one advancing to integration...If some republics, or 
several republics, are willing to join a confederation or some other union with us 
on a bilateral or multilateral basis, they are welcome. I can say right away that our 
response would be positive. If anyone is ready to accept a Eurasian Union, our 
answer will be yes in this case as well". On the other hand Kozyrev expressed 
scepticism about the seriousness of Nazarbayev’s proposal. "If we try to imagine 
what the proposed Eurasian Union would be like, this would be somewhat strange, 
because we still cannot implement specific accords reached with, say, Kazakhstan, 
which were reaffirmed during Nursultan Nazarbayev's official visit to Moscow " . 106 
Thus Russian caution was explained by suspicions that the EAU concept was 
nothing more than another gesture of self-promotion by Nazarbayev, 
unaccompanied by any serious desire to achieve concrete results. These suspicions 
were largely caused by the existing difficulties in bilateral relations, particularly 
over ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, but also over implementation of the bilateral 
agreements already concluded.
One anti-EAU argument put forward by Russian experts explained 
Nazarbayev's various integration initiatives by the desire to remove the problem of 
human rights of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan from the agenda. For example Mark 
Khroustalev, Director of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations 
(MGIMO) Centre for International Studies, held this view . 107 Some Russian 
foreign policy analysts saw the EAU proposal as a plan to change the "rules of the 
game" in the CIS. Andrey Zagorsky, Deputy Vice-Chancellor of MGIMO, argued 
that the principal innovation in Nazarbayev's project consisted almost exclusively in 
changing the decision-making rules, from unanimity to a four-fifths majority, a 
voting procedure which he felt would prevent Russia from blocking decisions 
detrimental to her interests. 108 Said Zagorsky: "The strategy of the CIS ‘junior
106 Russian Interests in the CIS // International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, 1994, pp. 12-13.
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partners’ is well seen in the instance of Kazakhstan's proposal for Eurasian Union - 
this is a strategy of subordinating Russia to the collective will o f the union 
members, which would be ensured first of all by the rules for adopting binding 
decisions by a four-fifths majority of votes, while the strategic aim of the majority 
of the CIS states consists in consolidating their own statehood, overcoming their 
fated dependence on Russia" . 109
LDPR leader Zhirinovskiy wrote in a recent book: "As for projects for an 
Eurasian Union, they have an anti-Russian character, because they are designed to 
diminish Russia's role to that o f a third-rate country within a framework of the 
multiple components of a Eurasian association. To put it bluntly... this project 
contains vain plans by nationalists of Turkic origin to recreate the Golden Horde in 
a new form... Russians and other Slavic peoples comprised the overwhelming 
majority of Russia's (USSR’s) population, and their incorporation into some 
"Eurasian people" carries an anti-Russian, anti-Slav meaning" . 110 All these opinions 
in fact represented a very similar basic view. Russia, a great power, had no 
intention o f having its policy subordinated to some supranational structure 
controlled by former Russian dependencies, diminishing Russia’s own role in CIS 
and internationally.
Nazarbayev later claimed that his proposal had not been well received 
because it had been imperfectly understood. He wrote in his memoirs: "At that 
moment the project for an Eurasian Union was not fittingly received, though not 
categorically rejected. This attitude has prevailed for the two years since this 
project's publication. In general the position of many politicians reminded me then 
of the old bureaucratic principle, '... everything seems all right, but may it not lead 
to something wrong? " . * 111 Nazarbayev explained the restrained response to his plan 
by the other leaders’ reluctance to embark on CIS integration, an assertion 
obviously designed to divert attention from the project’s merits and defects. 
Meanwhile Kazakh officials and pro-government experts tried their best to 
substantiate this assertion. One example is an article by A.Akhmedzhanov, head of 
a Department at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies and A.Sultangalieva, 
a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Oriental Studies of the Kazakhstan Academy of 
Sciences. They claimed that the "dubious" reaction to Nazarbayev's proposal was 
caused by its being perceived as an "encroachment on sovereignty.. The ruling 
elites o f the majority of post-Soviet states were alarmed by the possibility of 
reintegration of the post-Soviet space, which could lead to their losing power". 
The authors obviously did not include Nazarbayev and his regime among these 
“ruling elites”; on the contrary, they tried to prove his staunch adherence to 
"reintegration", claiming"...The EAU project conscientiously proposed rather firm 
forms of integration - supranational bodies not only in the economic, but also in the
109 Zagorsky, A., Rossiya - SNG i Zapad // Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn’, No. 10, 1994, p. 83.
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political sphere. It is possible that it also took account of public opinion, which 
could put pressure on political elites through the mass media ",112
But the most ardent promoter of the EAU concept was Mansurov, 
Kazakhstan's Ambassador to Moscow. In one article he called it "the most 
promising among integrationist ideas proposed up to now, which meets the hopes 
of the majority of the population in the CIS states", and “...It is the project for 
forming a Eurasian Union of states which has recently acquired a reputation as the 
most comprehensive and popular integrationist initiative, not only among 
politicians and scholars, but also among the broad public o f a number of CIS 
states".113 The falsity o f this statement is obvious, given the generally negative 
reaction of most CIS leaders and of political scientists and other experts in Russia 
to Nazarbayev's initiative. It is not surprising that at Mansurov's defence of his 
doctoral thesis one of his examiners, N.Bugay, Head of a Department of the 
Russian Ministry for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy, dismissed 
Mansurov's praise of the EAU concept as "disputable" and "not scientifically 
researched in depth". He added "It is hardly desirable to overstate the role and 
significance of the Eurasian Union idea advanced by Nazarbayev. In my opinion, all 
these postulates downgrade the role of the Russian people (Nazarbayev proclaims 
one thing, but does another, hammering in the notion that Kazakhs were a 
"repressed" people)... In my assessment, the state policy conducted by the 
government of Kazakhstan and President Nazarbayev himself in the sphere of inter­
ethnic relations, and so much discussed in the dissertation, contributes to creation 
of a "new belt" of tensions on Russia's southern borders".114
Only a few Russian experts welcomed the EAU project. The most notable 
among them was probably Professor Bagramov, whose journal "Eurasia" was 
financially supported by Kazakhstan's government. He hailed Nazarbayev's 
initiative as "an adequate answer to the actual situation in which the peoples of the 
former USSR found themselves". Bagramov argued that the Eurasian Union could 
be of substantial benefit to Russia and stated that:
1. Creation of the Eurasian Union would mean the end or substantial 
weakening of centrifugal tendencies in the post-Soviet space.
2. Russia in alliance with the other CIS states would have a chance to revive 
itself as a mighty world power.
3. Russia would be able to overcome internal separatist trends more easily, 
and settle inter-ethnic conflicts in other parts of the CIS.
4. Russia would be able to provide for better protection of human rights of 
ethnic Russians discriminated against in the new independent states.
112 Aklimedzhanov, A., Sultangalieva, A., Ideya Evraziyskogo Soyuza dlya SNG i Kazakhstana (Pop\tka 
reintegratsii postsovetskogo prostranstva na printsipakh partnerstva) // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, 
No. 1(2), 1995, p. 31.
113 Mansurov, T., Integratsiya i suverinitet - strategicheskie prioritety kazakhstansko-rossiyskikh otnosheniy // 
Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No.2(3), 1995, p. 14.
114 Bugay, N., Otzyv na nikopis doktorskoy dissertatsii Mansurova Taira Aymukhametovicha "Razvitie 
kazakhstansko-rossiyskikh otnosheniy v protsesse suverenizatsii Kazakhstan (1991-1995 gg.)”, Moscow [No 
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Bagramov tried to refute claims that ideas of Eurasianism were used to 
belittle the role of the Russian people. He argued that those making such claims 
"ignore the Eurasian nature and Eurasian mission of the Russian people, whose 
national idea cannot be implemented in the narrow ethnic space, and includes the 
array of peoples historically formed around the Russian nation".115
Thus Bagramov's position reflected a common tendency among 
contemporary scholars in Russia to equate Nazarbayev's EAU concept with an 
ideology of neo-Eurasianism. This tendency is characteristic for such authors as 
Senior Fellow at the Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Science 
Narochnitskaya, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Myasnikov, or political scientist Iordanskiy. The latter wrote, for example, that 
Nazarbayev's proposals "fill the Eurasianist idea with specific political and 
economic substance".116 Bagramov, on the other hand, made the qualification that 
"modern Eurasianism and the Eurasianism of the 1920's are different phenomena" 
and that "this concept applied to present day conditions still waits to be worked 
out". But by dwelling on the EAU concept in the context of Eurasianism, 
Bagramov placed Nazarbayev's idea in the general stream of neo-Eurasianist 
thinking, creating a misleading impression and leading to inappropriate 
conclusions.
In reality Nazarbayev's proposals had nothing in common with the 
ideology of Eurasianism, and his use of a similar term was an attempt to capitalise 
on an ideological concept becoming increasingly popular in Russia. The 
centrepiece of the Eurasianist concept was the notion of common Eurasian 
nationalism, as opposed to the ethnic nationalisms of the various peoples 
inhabiting the Eurasian mainland.117
It was exactly the issue that Nazarbayev’s proposal conspicuously avoided. 
His plan did not envisage a common state, nor even common union citizenship. 
Nor could Nazarbayev's policies in regard to nationality relations in Kazakhstan 
be interpreted as directed at creating a multi-ethnic nation. The Kazakh leaders 
themselves did not deny that primarily economic considerations lay behind
115 Bagramov, E., Rossiya i proekt Evrasiyskogo Soyuza // Evrasiya: narody, kultury, religii, N o.1(3), 1995, pp. 21- 
22.
116 Iordanskiy, V., Evraziyskaya perspektiva: realnost ili mirazh? // Rossiya i musulmanskiy mir, Bulleten 
referativno-analiticheskoy informatsii, N o.11, 1995, p. 14; Miasnikov, V., Evraziyskaya ideya i ee perspektivy // 
Rossiya i musulmanskiy mir, Bulleten referativno-analiticheskoy informatsii, N o.3 ,1996, p. 8.
117 One of the founders of the Eurasianist philosophy Trubetskoy wrote: "The destinies of the Eurasian peoples have 
interlinked with each other, have firmly bound together into a single gigantic knot, which can no longer be 
disentangled. Hence disengagement of one people from this entity could be achieved only through unnatural 
compulsion and would lead to suffering”. He argued that “individual parts of the former Russian empire need a 
single substratum of statehood to be able to continue to exist as parts of one state”, and neither the Russian nor any 
other individual people in Eurasia could play the role of "substratum". According to Trubetskoy, “only all the 
conglomerate of peoples living in this state, perceived as a special multi-ethnic nation, and in this capacity 
possessing its own nationalism" could be the "national substratum" of the future Eurasian state, and "common 
Eurasian nationalism must be a sort of expansion of the nationalism of each of the Eurasian nationalities, a sort of 
integration of all these individual nationalisms into one whole... We call it the Eurasian nation, its territory Eurasia, 
its nationalism Eurasianism... Only the awakening of the multi-ethnic Eurasian nation can give Russia-Eurasia the 
ethnic substratum of statehood, without which it will sooner or later start to fall apart, causing grief and suffering of 
all its parts", he concluded. [Trubetskoy, N., Obscheevropeyskiy natsionalism // Etnopoliticheskiy Vestnik, No.4, 
1995, pp. 218-221],
134
the EAU initiative. Thus Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, at a conference on foreign 
policy issues held in Almaty on 15 February 1995, stressed that "bringing forward 
the EAU project was dictated first of all by economic motives".118
It seems that the EAU initiative was prompted by a combination of factors 
rather than a single factor. O f course, domestic policy considerations were 
paranount, with a desire to play up to the aspirations of Kazakhstan’s Slavic 
popilation, and thereby make them more tolerant towards the policy o f Kazakh 
natkn-state building. The other intention was to divert the attention of Russia’s 
government and public from the situation of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.
On the other hand there is little doubt that Nazarbayev sincerely wanted 
ecoromic integration, along lines he had already proposed more than once, but on 
his >wn terms, with no concessions of principle on the issues of Kazakh 
sove eignty or the role of Russians in the republic, a perspective unacceptable to 
Russa. The EAU concept’s major shortcoming was Nazarbayev's basic formula 
"integration and sovereignty". This in fact meant only token integration, because 
real ntegration usually involves acceptance of limitations on national sovereignties 
for tie common good. In his project Nazarbayev did mention the necessity to 
"delegate" sovereignty, but analysis of his proposal shows that he did not mean it. 
His suggested decision-making process was little different from that already 
existng in the CIS, except that it substituted a four-fifths majority for unanimity. It 
is doibtful that such a procedure could make acute problems within the union 
easie to resolve, especially over enforcement of decisions, given the CIS 
expeience of an exceptionally broad spectrum of different opinions on almost any 
issue It was especially unacceptable to Russia, since it would endanger Russia's 
cental role in the CIS, subordinating it to the collective will of the other members. 
Russa would want to be the leader, not just another member, of the proposed 
EAU
Despite its rejection by Russia, the EAU project played a role in stimulating 
furthtr discussion on re-integration of the post-Soviet space, and built up internal 
and external pressures on Yeltsin's administration in favour of increased 
integiation. Besides, Nazarbayev's proposal created an effect perceived in the 
Kremin as a danger of Russia’s losing ideological leadership in the CIS. This 
forcel the Russian government to seek ways of countering the EAU project. 
Consequently Russia prepared a special memorandum proposing tighter CIS 
integration in areas such as politics, defence and border protection, and Yeltsin 
presetted it to the next CIS summit, held in Moscow on 21 October. 119 The 
Memorandum, entitled "Major Directions of Integrative Development of the 
Comnonwealth of Independent States", was unanimously approved at the summit, 
togetler with a related "Perspective Plan for Integrative Development of the 
Comnonwealth of Independent States". The summit voted to “acknowledge”
118 Kahegeldin, A., “Evrasiyskiy Sovuz’: teoreticheskie diskussii i prakticheskie shagi // Vneshnyaya politika 
Kazakh tana, Sbomik statey, Almaty: MID Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1995, p. 25.
119 Reuers News Service, 21.10.94.
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Nazarbayev’s proposal on EAU “and use major ideas, conveyed in the Republic of 
Kazakhstan’s proposal for strengthening integration processes in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States”.120
The CIS leaders, except for Niyazov of Turkmenistan, also concluded an 
agreement to establishment an Interstate Economic Committee of the Economic 
Union (IECEU), a measure long advocated by Nazarbayev. It would be based in 
Moscow; its voting system gave Russia 50% of the votes, and required an 80% 
vote for decisions. This effectively gave Russia a right of veto.121 The full text of 
the agreement was, however, never released to the press. A brief communique 
from the CIS Secretariat indicated that the IECEU was given powers "to adopt 
binding decisions on a specific range of issues", including management of facilities 
which were transnational in nature, such as "energy systems, transportation, gas 
and oil pipelines, and jointly-owned installations".122
Another achievement of the summit was an agreement on a Payments 
Union, signed by all CIS states, and aimed at securing continual payments between 
CIS states in their national currencies. The agreement was based on acceptance of 
the members’ national currencies as means of payment for trade and non-trade 
operations, and banned administrative limitations on the choice of currencies to be 
used by enterprises when concluding contracts. The exchange rates between 
national currencies were to be established by "supply and demand on the currency 
markets of the member-states” They undertook to apply coordinated measures to 
maintain the stability of their national currencies. The agreement assigned an 
important role to the Interstate Bank as a "specialised body of the Payments 
Union", whose major task was to arrange "multilateral clearing" payments between 
the central banks of the CIS states. To facilitate multilateral cooperation in 
currency payments and credit relations, it was also agreed to establish an 
International Currency Committee.123
In an interview after the summit Nazarbayev claimed that his idea of a 
Eurasian Union “pushed all the politicians and presidents to take fair decisions to 
set up the CIS Interstate Economic Committee, work out a customs and payments 
union, and for more vigorous activity by the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly”.124 
He exaggerated the extent of his success. As usual, decisions taken by the CIS 
were largely symbolic. The agreement on the Payments Union provided only for 
very gradual introduction of the new payments regime, through conclusion of
120 Reshenie po predlozheniyu Respubliki Kazakhstan o formirovanii Evraziyskogo Soyuza Gosudarstv // 
Kazaklistansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, p. 356.
121 Reuters News Service, 21.10.94.
122 Segodnya, 22.10.94.
123 Soglashenie o sozdanii Platezhnogo sovuza gosudarstv-uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv // 
Kazaklistansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 357-362.
124 Nazarbayev on Greater Integration Among CIS States, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 05.01.95.
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special bilateral and multilateral agreements, a process which could take years.125 
The IECEU had little chance of becoming a really effective structure, because each 
national government and president would decide how much power to delegate to 
it. Besides the IECEU could not start work for at least several months, due to 
disagreements over its chairmanship; some republics objected to recommendation 
of a representative of Russian Deputy Prime Minister Bolshakov for the post.126
Only with the completion of negotiations on the Customs Union did a real 
opportunity for mutually beneficial and solid economic integration between Russia, 
Kazakhstan and other CIS states finally arrive. According to the treaty “On 
Creation o f an Economic Union”, signed in 1993, the Customs Union was to be 
the first step in movement to a fully-fledged economic union. On 20 January 1995 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus took this first step, by signing an agreement “On 
Customs Union". But what actually happened was that Russia and Belarus signed a 
bilateral agreement on Customs Union on 6 January 1995, and Kazakhstan joined 
it on 20 January. The three countries agreed that two Russian-Kazakh bilateral 
accords, "On Single Procedure of Regulation of the Foreign Economic Activity" 
and "Protocol on Introduction of Free Trade Regime without Exemptions and 
Limitations", would serve as "inalienable parts" o f the agreement, and resolved to 
create a special executive body for the Customs Union. Article 7 contained an 
important provision, with consequences for the Customs Union’s future. It said 
that the agreement would not affect the three countries’ obligations under other 
international treaties which "do not contradict the present agreement". The 
duration o f the agreement was not specified, though it contained a provision for 
unilateral withdrawal on one year’s prior notice.127
The memorandum signed by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus on 28 January 
stipulated that the Customs Union would be created in two stages. First, 
participants would abolish customs duties and quantitative restrictions on trade 
between themselves, and establish common customs schedules with regard to third 
countries. In the second stage the territories of the members would become a 
single customs space, and customs controls would be imposed only along their 
external borders. Prime Ministers Chernomyrdin, Chigir and Kazhegeldin also 
signed a memorandum under which foreign trade, customs, monetary and price 
laws were to be standardised, with a special executive body of the Customs Union 
to be formed to control the process. The signatories also undertook to meet the 
conditions necessary for creation of the common customs space, including 
unification of foreign trade, customs, currency, taxation and other economic 
legislation; drafting of common rules for organising currency markets, access to 
them by authorised banks and achievement of mutual convertibility of national
125 Soglashenie o sozdanii Platezhnogo soyuza gosudarstv-uchastnikov Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv // 
Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 gody, Sbormk dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 357-362.
126 Reuters News Service, 10.02.95.
127 Soglashenie o Tamozhennom soyuze // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sbomik dokumentov 
i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 230-231.
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currencies; conduct of coordinated foreign economic policy; and ensuring effective 
joint protection of external borders. Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus declared that 
other CIS members could join as soon as they met the above conditions.128 Kazakh 
Prime Minister Kazhegeldin gave a high assessment to the agreement: "The 
Customs Union is a most important component part of the Treaty on Creation of 
the Economic Union signed earlier, an important step along the way of creating a 
common market of goods, services, capital and labour. This agreement must 
influence the further process of development toward real integration".129
On 16 May 1995 in Moscow Chernomyrdin and Kazhegeldin signed an 
agreement on joint administration of their customs services, providing for each 
country to send a customs mission to the other's customs services. The missions’ 
functions would be to coordinate decisions, organise information exchange and 
interaction, including joint customs control, and to draft proposals for unifying the 
customs legislation.130
It took six months to standardise the regulations so that the Customs Union 
could begin functioning; it came formally into effect on 20 July 1995, thereby 
completing the first stage of implementing the agreement. At a news conference on 
19 July to mark this event, Kazakh First Deputy Prime Minister Isingarin said the 
signing of the agreement had had a definite positive effect on Kazakhstan, because 
since January its exports of goods to Russia had increased by almost 50%.131 On 
18 August 1995 Nazarbayev met visiting Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Bolshakov, and they discussed further steps in implementing the agreement. 
Bolshakov also passed to Nazarbayev a personal message from Yeltsin, welcoming 
completion of the first stage of the Customs Union. "In this way”, said Yeltsin, 
“comprehensive integration in the framework of an Economic Union Treaty 
becomes a reality".132 The next day Bolshakov and Kazhegeldin signed a document 
initiating implementation of the second stage of the Customs Union.133
On 20 September 1995 Nazarbayev issued a decree "On cancelling customs 
control on the border of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the Russian Federation". 
This lifted customs controls on Russian goods; in future only shipments in transit 
from third countries were to be checked. The decree also provided for joint 
Russian/Kazakhstan customs controls on the external borders of the Customs
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Union.134 This, however, was not followed by any reciprocal Russian action. 
Moscow was obviously still unsure whether Kazakhstan would be able or willing 
to abide by obligations undertaken within the Customs Union. There were some 
grounds for such concern. One of them may have been Nazarbayev's position at the 
Shymkent summit of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan held on 14 April. 
The summit agreed a communique which made a controversial impression, in view 
of the obligations previously accepted by Kazakhstan under the Customs Union. 
Some time later Kazakh First Deputy Prime Minister Isingarin tried to deny any 
contradiction between the two documents.135 But this economised on the truth. 
Kazakhstan on the one hand agreed on joint customs and foreign trade policies 
with Russia, and on the other undertook less than three months later to integrate 
economically with, and consequently to open its market to, countries outside the 
Customs Union. The Shymkent communique did contain a reference to 
Kyrgyzstan's and Uzbekistan's desire to join the Customs Union. But for the time 
being they were outside it, so Kazakhstan had accepted international obligations 
which contravened Article 7 of the Customs Union agreement .136 This suggested a 
somewhat nonchalant attitude to the Customs Union.
On 26 September an unidentified but high-ranking customs official in 
Moscow was quoted as saying that Russia "does not think it possible to cancel 
customs control on its border with Kazakhstan as long as the latter does not bring 
its system of regulating foreign economic relations in line with that of Russia and 
Belarus".137
Yeltsin issued a decree removing customs controls on the Russia- 
Kazakhstan border only on 3 January 1996. Theoretically this marked completion 
of the first stage of the Customs Union.138 But the reason for this move was not so 
much Moscow's satisfaction with Kazakhstan's observance of the Customs Union 
rules, but the new political situation that emerged in Russia after the Communists’ 
strong performance in the December 1995 elections to the State Duma created a 
high probability that their candidate would win the forthcoming presidential 
election.139 Yeltsin's team was close to panic.
One of the strong aspects of the Communists' pre-electoral tactics was 
active exploitation of the theme of integration of the post-Soviet space. They 
accused Yeltsin of breaking up the Soviet Union and failing to achieve real 
unification within the CIS. But this was not only a tactical ploy. The Communist 
Party program, adopted at the party congress on 22 January 1995, proclaimed as
134 Kazakhstan Lifts Customs Control on Russian Borders, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 22.09.95.
135 Kazakh-Russian-Belanis Customs Union Comes into Effect on 20th July, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 21.07.95.
136 Central Asian Summit - Text of Communique, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 17.04.95.
137 Russia Not Yet Ready to Cancel Customs Control on Kazakh Border, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
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138 First Deputy Premier Soskovets Stresses Need to Develop Cooperation with CIS, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 04.01.96; Yeltsin Orders End to Customs Controls on Russian-Kazakh Border, BBC Monitoring 
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139 Presidential elections were to take place on 16 June 1996.
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one of its immediate goals "denunciation of the Belovezhskaya agreements and 
stage-by-stage restoration of a single Union state on a voluntary basis".140 On 15 
March 1996 the Duma passed a Communist-sponsored resolution revoking the 
RSFSR Supreme Soviet’s decision of 12 December 1991 to abrogate the 1922 
treaty forming the USSR. The Duma then passed a second resolution affirming the 
"legal force" of the 17 March 1991 referendum on preservation of the USSR, in 
which 71% of those voting in Russia supported retaining the union. Taken together 
the Duma resolutions asserted that the USSR legally continued to exist, and 
rejected the December 1991 accords that formed the CIS.141 This fulfilled the first 
part of the above provision of the Communist Party program. The second part - 
restoration of a single Union state - was to be fulfilled if the Communist candidate 
won the presidential election.
Nazarbayev was seriously disturbed by the Duma decision. On 16 March he 
had a telephone conversation with Yeltsin, who confirmed that the Duma’s 
resolutions had no legal force. The next day, obviously in agreement with Yeltsin, 
Nazarbayev issued a statement that Kazakhstan would never relinquish its 
sovereignty and independence. He also warned that “any actions by political 
movements, parties and individual persons going against the constitution and 
pursuing the task of destabilising the situation in our country will be regarded as 
illegal and resolutely terminated”. On the other hand Nazarbayev could not simply 
ignore the political pressure created by the Duma’s resolutions in favour of 
restoring the USSR. He, Yeltsin and other leaders had to demonstrate some 
progress towards CIS integration, and there was none such except for a barely 
functional Customs Union. During their telephone conversation Yeltsin and 
Nazarbayev presumably discussed how to counter the Duma’s challenge, and came 
up with the idea of a “union of four”. Nazarbayev advised that by the end of March 
he and Yeltsin would sign “a comprehensive document, which would bring 
integration to a new level” .142
That document - a treaty “On Deepening Integration in Economic and 
Humanitarian Spheres” between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan143 - 
was signed in Moscow on 29 March 1996. It covered a number of issues in areas 
such as economic, social and cultural cooperation, financial and legal framework 
and management of integration. The parties pledged to coordinate directions and 
timing of economic reforms, and establish conditions for a common market, to 
coordinate financial and monetary policy with a view to achieving convertibility of 
their national currencies and at later stages common regulatory standards and 
practice of banking activity, with introduction of a common currency as the final 
objective, if the necessary level of integration were achieved. To achieve these 
goals the parties instructed their Central Banks to create a banking union. Other
140 Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Rossiyskoy Federatsii // Pravda, 31 January 1995, p. 2.
141 OMRI Daily Digest, No.55, Part I, 18.03.96.'
142 Zayavlenie Prezidenta Respubliki Kazakhstan N.A.Nazarbayeva po povodu resheniya Gosudarstveimoy Dumv 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 15 marta 1996 goda (17 rnarta 1996 goda, g. Almaty) // Diplomaticheskiy kurier, No.2, 
1996, pp. 31-32.
143 The accession of Kyrgysztan to the treaty became possible after in March 1996 it joined the Customs Union.
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undertakings included “preservation and strengthening of the common cultural 
space”, “coordination of actions in planning and realisation of foreign policy”, and 
“establishing and strengthening a common system of border protection” .144
They also agreed to create three bodies to manage the integration 
processes. The highest, the Interstate Council, would consist of the Heads of State 
and of government, the Foreign Ministers, and the Chairman of the Integration 
Committee (with the right to put forward initiatives, but not to vote). The 
Integration Committee was established as a permanent executive body, comprising 
deputy heads of government and ministers responsible for cooperation with other 
CIS states.145 The Inter-Parliamentary Committee would be composed of equal 
numbers of members of parliament from each country. Its major objective was to 
draft model legislation to serve as a basis for national legislation. The text of the 
treaty was declaratory. It contained generalities, expressing intentions, not binding 
obligations. The bodies of integration and the decision making process were 
reminiscent of those within the CIS, and it was difficult to say what new they could 
contribute to the integration process. The Interstate Council could take binding 
decisions only by unanimous vote of all the presidents at the Interstate Council. 
Nevertheless, official Kremlin propaganda hailed the treaty as establishing a much 
tighter-knit "community of four", and Nazarbayev described it as 98% comprised 
of his proposals.146 But both Russian and foreign experts dismissed it as an 
artificial arrangement designed to boost Yeltsin's image with some of the Russian 
electorate. Presidential candidates Yavlinsky, Fyodorov and Lebed’ denounced the 
treaty as a hasty election ploy. "The political games over the integration of CIS 
countries are becoming increasingly dangerous,"- they said in an unusual joint 
statement.147 Later events showed that neither the treaty, nor the bodies created by 
it, produced anything useful for fostering CIS integration.
Nazarbayev’s willingness to play up to Yeltsin by joining the "community 
of four" pointed to two things: firstly, that Nazarbayev had a vested interest in 
keeping Yeltsin in the Kremlin, thereby perpetuating his own future as 
Kazakhstan’s leader; and secondly, that Nazarbayev, representing the Kazakh 
national elite, had become seriously alarmed at the prospect of real integration. 
After the signing ceremony he made an important statement, which indicated 
reversal of his position on CIS integration. He said the time might now be right to 
steady the pace of integration: "Now I say: 'Don't rush with integration. Don't whip 
the horses". He also rejected the Duma's denunciation of the Belovezhskaya 
agreements, and hit out at Cossack activists for trying to destabilise ethnically 
diverse Kazakhstan. "What the Duma decides about foreign countries does not
144 Dogovor mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan, Respublikoy Belarus, Kyrgyzskoy Respublikoy i Rossiyskoy 
Federatsiey ob uglublenii integratsii v ekonomicheskoy i gumanitamoy oblastyakh // // Diplomaticheskiy kurier, 
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145 On 18 October 1996 the Integration Committee was also designated as the executive body of the Customs 
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concern us in any way...There can be no talk about recreating the Soviet Union. 
Kazakhstan will never support it — it makes no sense".148
At the third session of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, held in 
Almaty on 29 April 1996, Nazarbayev was even more precise On integration he 
said: "Kazakhstan is prepared to accept a level of integration which does not 
infringe its independence. Our republic will never agree, first of all on the basis of 
its constitution, to formation of any former unified state. We can only envisage 
close, friendly integrative ties of states in all spheres of people's life. But these are 
relations of independent states, and not some unknown and utopian federation. All 
irresponsible calls... in favour of restoration of the USSR or joining Kazakhstan to 
another state are calls for liquidation of Kazakh statehood, which cause righteous 
indignation and lead to serious confrontation".149 Nazarbayev's position clearly 
demonstrated no difference from the principles of relations already established in 
the CIS, and no desire for a more advanced integration model. Moreover, he once 
again demonstrated his allegiance to “Kazakh statehood", contrary to many official 
pronouncements that Kazakhstan was a “multinational state”. In his speech to the 
CIS summit in Moscow on 28 March 1997 Nazarbayev reiterated his position 
against more advanced forms of integration, stating that for the new independent 
states “national-state interest is higher than everything else, including chimerical 
associations and confederations”.150
Nazarbayev's anti-integration stance fully revealed itself in his reaction to 
the conclusion on 2 April 1997 of the Union Treaty between Russia and Belarus. 
Nazarbayev's spokesman Kusherbayev said Kazakhstan was happy to see a union 
between Russia and Belarus, but warned that it was concerned by some aspects of 
the treaty and by the speed of its adoption. To justify his stance Kusherbayev put 
forward a rather tenuous argument that "instead of working for the cause of 
unification, the union treaty may cause disagreements within Russia", and "a 
number of Russia's regions, Chechnya, for example, may demand a similar treaty 
for themselves".151 In reality the Kazakh authorities were concerned primarily with 
the effect that conclusion of the treaty could have on the internal situation in 
Kazakhstan. They obviously expected it to increase internal pressures, especially 
among the non-Kazakh population, in favour of following the Belarus example.
Nazarbayev’s interest in integration with Russia and other CIS states was 
motivated by the desire to extract immediate political and economic benefits for 
himself or Kazakhstan, while at the same time avoiding or ignoring obligations of 
substance. When the Kazakh leadership saw integration becoming a real political 
issue, their enthusiasm for it vanished. What contributed to this turnaround was the 
Russian leadership’s early 1996 change of mood towards favouring real 
integration, prompted by the very strong Communist showing in the Duma
148 Reuters News Service, 01.04.96.
149 Nazarbayev, N., Obschestvennoe soglasie - osnova demokraticheskogo razvitiya Kazakhstana, Doklad na tret'ey 
sessii Assamblei narodov Kazakhstana // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No.l, 1996, p. 7.
150 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 24.04.97.
151 Reuters News Service, 02.04.97.
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elections. At earlier stages Nazarbayev could readily advance integrative initiatives 
without worrying that they might be accepted. He could always be sure that 
someone else would block them, and this gave him opportunities to portray himself 
as a staunch proponent of integration without running any risk of becoming 
involved in any agreements that would undermine Kazakhstan's sovereignty. When, 
however, Yeltsin turned to real integration and achieved a positive result with 
Belarus, Nazarbayev understood that he could no longer proclaim initiatives and 
then blame Moscow for their failure.
Kazakhstan’s more reserved approach to integration was immediately 
translated into practical policies. In March 1996 the government issued a number 
of decrees relaxing trade controls and introducing new tariff rates. They took effect 
in two stages, from 14 April and 1 June. Export tariffs on many key commodities 
were halved, while duties on imported consumer goods such as clothing, furniture 
and vehicles were slashed. Joint tariffs within the Customs Union were higher than 
Kazakhstan wanted, and regulation was too tight, so Almaty decided to take 
advantage of Yeltsin’s preoccupation with the elections, and went back on 
obligations previously accepted within the Customs Union. Kazakhstan's Deputy 
Economics Minister Begakhmetov revealed that Kazakhstan had asked Russia in 
the previous year to agree to lower import tariffs for these items, and opted to go it 
alone when Russia declined. "We gained a lot from the Customs Union... But 
Kazakhstan is a sovereign state and has its own interests to defend. We don't 
produce cars. We were basically defending Russian industry".152 The Kazakh 
authorities artfully exploited Yeltsin's dependence on them in the election 
campaign. He could not afford even moderate criticism of Kazakhstan's decisions, 
because the image of the Customs Union was one of CIS integration’s few success 
stories.
When the election fever was over and the political situation in Russia 
stabilised, following Yeltsin’s successful heart operation, Moscow revisited the 
issue of Kazakhstan’s compliance with Customs Union obligations. On 14 January 
Yeltsin's press service announced that he had informed the Duma that he had not 
signed the law on Customs Union between Russia and Kazakhstan, because in his 
opinion it contained several inconsistencies.153. The law, ratifying the Customs 
Union and common foreign trade regulations of Russia and Kazakhstan, had been 
passed by the Duma on 15 December 1996, and by the Federation Council on 25 
December. The press service’s release said that Yeltsin's action amounted to 
temporary freezing of the Customs Union with Kazakhstan, and coincided with the 
Russian Federal Border Guard Service’s decision to deploy Russian Cossack units 
along the Russian-Kazakh frontier, effectively reintroducing border controls. This 
caused a painful reaction in Kazakhstan, and not only because Cossacks were 
involved.
152 Reuters News Service, 25.03.96; Financial Times, 17.04.96.
153Yeltsin Vetoes Several Laws, Including One on Customs Union with Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 16.01.97.
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On 18 March Kasymov, Chairman of Kazakhstan's State Customs 
Committee told a news conference that Kazakhstan “cannot allow our borders to 
be as open as they have been until now”, and "The economic security of our state 
is suffering, huge amounts of contraband goods are being brought in". He said the 
other members of the Customs Union — Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan — had not 
complied with the union's constrictions, which in turn entitled Kazakhstan to turn 
its back on it. "Our neighbours in all geographical directions are strengthening their 
own borders, their customs posts are now armed with armoured vehicles", - he 
said, and added that Kazakhstan would begin by tightening its customs regime at 
its 19 airports, then establish customs posts along its lengthy borders.154 This was 
obviously retaliation for the Russian action. At a press conference in Moscow on 
25 March, at the end of the CIS summit, Nazarbayev described the Customs Union 
as a temporary arrangement, and stated that it would no longer be needed once its 
members joined the World Trade Organisation.155
Exchanges of blows did not stop at that. In a statement on 20 May 1997 
Tuleyev, Russia’s Minister for Cooperation with the CIS States, criticised 
Kazakhstan's unilateral introduction of customs inspections at airports, railway 
stations and roads as “in defiance of agreements reached among the four members 
of the Customs Union”. He characterised Nazarbayev as “an energetic initiator of 
and participant in many blocs, projects and actions clearly of anti-Russian 
orientation", whose political and economic decisions are “aimed at CIS’ further 
disintegration".156 Thus the Customs Union, launched with widespread enthusiasm, 
proved a failure. In the first half of 1997 trade between its members fell by 33%.157
In September 1997 Kazakhstan and Russia made an attempt to revive the 
Customs Union. The issue was discussed during Nazarbayev’s visit to Moscow’s 
850th anniversary celebrations. Both he and Yeltsin advocated more efficient 
integration between the members of the Customs Union and strengthening 
interaction within CIS. They discussed preparations for a session of the Interstate 
Council of the “four” and for the next CIS summit.158 Nazarbayev spoke in favour 
of removing border controls, creating a common economic space, coordinating 
foreign trade and joint security, and said “Integration of the “four” should move in 
the direction of a Eurasian Union being created on the same lines as the European 
Union” .159 Following the meeting Russian presidential spokesman Yastrzhembsky 
told journalists Moscow was dissatisfied with the working of the Customs Union, 
and expected to hold a session of the Interstate Council of the “four” prior to the 
CIS summit in Kishinev, to give a boost to CIS integration.160
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The session took place in Moscow on 22 October. Nazarbayev’s speech at 
the session is of interest, because it contained a set of Kazakhstan’s complaints 
against Russia over the Customs Union, and a program for its future development. 
Nazarbayev made the following charges: introduction of “rates of customs tariffs”, 
which “violated the procedure for changing customs duties”; application of excise 
duties to Kazakhstan’s goods; tightening the regime for transit o f alcohol, 
including temporary depositing of customs duties as security; tightening of customs 
controls at the Russian-Kazakh border; introduction of customs controls on 
citizens of Kazakhstan, which “creates unwarranted social tensions and additional 
inconveniences”. Nazarbayev also complained about high Russian railway tariffs, 
which increased the costs of Kazakhstan’s exports, making them less competitive. 
He proposed an explicit set of measures to facilitate trade between the member- 
states, including introduction of norms common in international practice for 
levying indirect taxes on import and export of goods, and abolishing such taxes 
altogether on transit of goods between members o f the Customs Union; bringing 
closer trade regimes with third countries; establishing common approaches to tariff 
and non-tariff regulations, and common rules for foreign currency control and 
regulation; establishing free transit of goods through the territory of the Customs 
Union; strict control over observance of treaties, agreements and decisions; and 
decisions of the Interstate Council to be by qualified majority, not unanimity.161
Although Nazarbayev’s initiatives pragmatically suited Kazakhstan’s 
immediate economic interests, most of them were supported by the Interstate 
Council. A plan of action was accepted, to bring closer regulations on trade 
regimes with third countries, unify approaches to tariff and non-tariff regulation, 
and introduce common currency controls and freedom of transit, provided that the 
unified rules for commodity shipment under customs surveillance were observed. 
Decisions on a free trade zone for Customs Union member-states, and on 
coordinated principles for calculating and collecting indirect taxes, were also 
signed. The latter implied switching to a new tax system from 1 January 1998, 
which envisaged mutually compatible systems for calculating and collecting taxes. 
Value-added tax (VAT) was to be collected in the country of destination within the 
Union, and manufacturers to be exempt from VAT on goods exported to other 
Union members. The Prime Ministers issued a ruling on a draft treaty on common 
measures of non-tariff regulation. The agreement was to enable member-states to 
start agreeing unified lists of goods to which measures of non-tariff settlement 
would be applied.
The Interstate Council approved priority guidelines for implementing the 
“treaty of four”, which included forming a common market of goods, services, 
labour and capital, further development of the Union and progress in the drafting 
of laws encouraging integration. The council reacted positively to Tajik President 
Rahmonov's appeal for Tajikistan's admission to the Customs Union, and instructed 
the Integration Committee to examine the matter carefully and submit its findings
161 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 30.10.97.
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to the Council’s next session. One procedural decision established a Council of 
Heads of Government attached to the Interstate Council. Nazarbayev was elected 
Chairman of the Interstate Council, but selection of a Chairman of the Integration 
Committee was postponed until the Council’s next session.162
Though the session managed to stabilise the situation in the Customs Union 
and curbed the negative trends that had developed in the field of integration in 
summer 1997, it added very little of practical value to the Customs Union. It 
seemed that the “four” just returned to the very basics from which any Customs 
Union should have started, and from what could have been achieved in 1995, had 
the members had sufficient desire and will. But both remained in short supply, 
because disagreements resurfaced immediately after the session of the Interstate 
Council. On 24 October A.Kruglov, Head of the Russian Customs Committee, told 
a news conference that the Russian customs service did not favour introduction of 
the international practice of collecting VAT in the Customs Union. "In this case, 
customs control will have to be imposed on the borders between the countries of 
the union," he said. Therefore, other methods for unifying taxation principles must 
be found. Unifying excises, or indirect taxes, in the four countries would not lead 
to altering their rate in Russia. "Unification of excises in the union will most likely 
be based on the current rates in Russia".163 The Interstate Council session 
scheduled for 18 December 1997 was postponed, allegedly due to changes in 
Yeltsin’s work schedule,164 but the real reason may have been lack of progress in 
implementing decisions on the Customs Union.
It seems that Russian and Kazakh diplomatic moves in autumn 1997 were 
directed less at achieving a breakthrough in the integration process than at 
repairing the damage done to bilateral relations in previous months, and stopping 
centrifugal tendencies pushing the two countries further and further away from 
each other. Events developed on the cyclical pattern which had already become 
traditional in Russian-Kazakh relations: expectations and projects for deeper 
integration - failure to implement concluded accords - deterioration of relations - 
revival of hopes for further integration. A prospect of further disintegration suited 
neither Yeltsin nor Nazarbayev, for domestic political reasons. On the other hand, 
there were no visible signs that Nazarbayev was prepared to jettison his policies of 
nation-state building and turn towards real integration with Russia. So the 
Interstate Council’s decisions were no more than applications of previous practices 
of observing civilities and preserving a semblance of integration. In reality the 
Customs Union remains barely functional. If not completely dead, it drags on as a 
secondary commitment, whose provisions nobody intends to fulfil. It is difficult to 
imagine when and under what circumstances relations within the Customs Union
162 Russian, Belarusian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz Leaders Agree on Further Integration Steps, BBC Monitoring Service: 
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could be restored and turned towards real integration. Until this happens no 
possibility for any broad CIS integration is likely to be realised.
147
CHAPTER 4
RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND KAZAKHSTAN IN 
THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC SPHERE
One of the important issues that Russian diplomacy had to tackle in 
relations with other CIS states, including Kazakhstan, was the future of the vast 
military complex spread throughout all former Soviet republics. The agreement to 
create the CIS provided for preserving "a common military and strategic space 
under joint command, including joint control over nuclear armaments, to be 
regulated by a special agreement".1 By the decision of the Alma-Ata summit, 
command of the former USSR armed forces was entrusted to Air Marshal 
E.Shaposhnikov. But the plans to maintain unified command of the CIS Joint 
Armed Forces did not materialise, because some of the newly independent states 
(e g. Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan) were not inclined to impose constraints of 
centralised control over their activity in the military field.
Of all CIS leaders, the most ardent supporter of joint armed forces was 
Nazarbayev. His position was, of course, far from sentimental adherence to the 
unity of former Soviet republics, and was based on pragmatic considerations. 
Nazarbayev clearly had no illusions on what sort of army independent Kazakhstan 
could create, nor that it would be a match for the Russian army. In an interview he 
admitted that “in order to organise normal defence or armed forces, and to draw 
up a doctrine, a state like Kazakhstan, at least, needs time”.2 At the same time 
existence of joint armed forces would allow Kazakhstan to participate in the 
decision-making process on their use and prevent their employment against 
Kazakhstan’s interests. At the republic’s Security Council meeting in mid-January 
1992 he reaffirmed his conviction of the need to have unified armed forces on the 
entire territory of the CIS, even if only Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to this.3 At 
the CIS summit in Minsk on 14 February he proposed to impose a moratorium for 
two or three years on creating separate armies, but the other republics, including 
Russia showed little enthusiasm.4
Yeltsin, on the contrary, looked at both options. Separate armed forces 
would well suit Russia, but it did not want to be seen as initiating the break up of 
the common military complex. First signs that Yeltsin was exploring the option of 
separate Russian armed forces appeared in mid-January 1992, when the Russian 
leadership was reported to be preparing a draft presidential decree on armed forces
1 Soglasheiiie o sozdanii Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv // Kazaklistansko-Rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991- 
1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
1995, p. 321.
2 Nazarbayev: Summit and Documents "‘Not Particularly Comforting'’ BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
16.02.92
3 Nazarbayev: Republic May Be Forced to Form Own Army, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 14.01.92.
4 Nazarbayev: Summit and Documents "Not Particularly Comforting”, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
16.02.92
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of the Russian Federation. It allegedly provided that Russia would proclaim itself 
the legal successor of the USSR also in military matters, and assume the rights 
and duties of the former USSR with regard to armed forces, including those 
deployed outside Russian territory.5
On 7 May 1992 Yeltsin issued a decree on formation of separate Russian 
Armed forces, and Nazarbayev had to follow suit. On 8 May he signed a decree 
"On Formation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan".6 This started 
the process of formal separation of the armed forces between Russia and 
Kazakhstan. There was, however, the problem of nuclear weapons stationed in 
Kazakhstan. They could not be simply divided, because this would make 
Kazakhstan a nuclear weapon state.
Before the collapse of the USSR Kazakhstan had on its territory 104 RC- 
20 (SS-18) heavy ICBMs, each with ten 550 kiloton nuclear warheads, 40 Tu 
95MC (Bear) strategic bombers, with A total of 240 nuclear-armed cruise 
missiles,7 and an unspecified number of tactical nuclear weapons. This potential 
could turn Kazakhstan into a potent military power. Kazakhstan’s reluctance to 
relinquish this arsenal clearly manifested itself after it gained independence. The 
emergence of the problem could be traced back to the first days after the 
unsuccessful coup attempt in late August 1991. In those days some republics 
declared independence but met with threatening declarations by the RSFSR 
government on border issues.
The Kazakhs' reaction to these declarations was the harshest. In his 
telegram to Yeltsin Nazarbayev went so far as to refer to Kazakhstan’s nuclear 
potential. "Particular danger lies in the fact that Kazakhstan is a nuclear republic", 
he said.8 Such a phrase, translated from the language of diplomacy, could mean 
nothing but a threat to use nuclear weapons for protecting Kazakhstan's territorial 
integrity. On 16 September 1991 Nazarbayev stated in an interview that 
Kazakhstan did not intend to renounce the nuclear weapons stationed on its 
territory.9 In his memoirs he directly referred to the "days following the coup, 
when voices were heard about territorial changes" as the main reason for his 
decision to keep nuclear weapons.10
In practice Nazarbayev was bluffing. Kazakhstan had neither the technical 
ability to use nuclear weapons nor the power to take physical control of them, 
because the strategic nuclear forces were manned predominantly by ethnic 
Russians who would take orders only from Strategic Rocket Force or Air Force 
headquarters in Moscow. Nor could Kazakhstan attempt to take over the missile
5 Russian Government Reportedly Ready to Take Control of CIS Forces, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
13.01.92.
6 On 18 August 1993 Nazarbayev also signed a decree on creation of Kazakhstan's border guard troops to be formed 
on the basis of the Eastern border guard district of the former USSR.
7 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, p. 133.
8 Nazarbayev Warns of the Dangers of Border Claims, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third Series, 
31.08.91.
9 Nazarbayev: Kazakhstan Not to Renounce Nuclear Weapons, BBC Monitoring Service, Part 1, The USSR, Third 
Series, 17.09.91.
10 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, p. 66.
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sites or airfields by force, because it did not have its own army, and the former 
Soviet army would not take orders from it. Thus Nazarbayev's tough statements 
were nothing more than a gamble exploiting inexperience of the new Russian 
leadership.
But this was a gamble which soon involved Americans too. US Secretary 
of State J.Baker, who on 16 September was visiting Almaty, linked future Western 
support for Kazakhstan with a satisfactory solution of the nuclear issue. 
Nazarbayev, in his turn, tried to persuade Baker that nuclear weapons were vital 
for the defence and security of Kazakhstan.11 Following that in a speech at a public 
ceremony Nazarbayev stated that Kazakhstan "will take all necessary measures to 
establish reliable control over the strategic missiles located on our territory. This 
control should be exercised within the context of a unified defence of the country, 
with the mandatory participation of representatives of Kazakhstan” .12 This formula 
meant that Nazarbayev did not exactly want Kazakhstan to be a nuclear state, but 
objected against Russia's sole ownership of nuclear arms and wanted to have a veto 
on their possible use.
To a large degree this Nazarbayev’s position found reflection in documents, 
concluded at the Alma-Ata conference of the leaders of former Soviet republics on 
21 December 1991. Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to Nuclear 
Weapons, signed by the four nuclear republics, specified that nuclear arms were "a 
part of the Joint Strategic Armed Forces", which ensured "collective security of all 
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States". The Agreement stipulated 
that by 1 July 1992 Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus would "ensure the removal of 
tactical nuclear weapons to central factory depots for their disassembly under joint 
control". Tactical nuclear weapons were mobile and relatively easy to relocate into 
Russian territory even without consent and cooperation of the authorities of a 
particular republic. But Nazarbayev effectively avoided any obligations with regard 
to strategic nuclear forces (SNF). The agreement spoke of elimination of these 
weapons on the territory of Belarus and Ukraine, not Kazakhstan. Unlike them 
Kazakhstan did not pledge to accede to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NNP) as a non-nuclear-weapon state.13
Such a perspective was unacceptable to Russia. Moscow did not want to 
have nuclear armed neighbours, who could challenge its leadership in post-Soviet 
space. However, after the destabilisation of internal political situation caused by 
the collapse of the USSR Russia was simply not strong enough to pressure 
Kazakhstan in relinquishing nuclear arms. Besides such a pressure, if applied 
unilaterally, could have negative international consequences. Fortunately for 
Russia, Kazakhstan’s position was not acceptable to Washington either. NNP 
treaty had long been one of the highest US foreign policy priorities. The emergence
11 Ibid., pp. 64-67.
12 Krasnaya zvezda, 12.10.91.
13 Soglashenie o sovmestnykh merakh v otnoshenii yademogo oruzhiya // Kazakhstansko-Rossiyskie otnosheniya, 
1991-1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii, 1995, pp. 325-326.
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of Kazakhstan as a new nuclear power could create a dangerous precedent for 
other states to opt for nuclear status. Besides there were serious doubts that 
independent Kazakhstan would have sufficient means, expertise and devotion to 
exercise control over its nuclear arms and technology, including prevention of their 
leakage to anti-American regimes in the Third World and to terrorist organisations.
Basically, Russian and American interests on the issue of Kazakhstan’s 
nuclear weapons coincided, and Moscow decided to capitalise on this. It welcomed 
Washington’s role as a leader in arranging international pressure on Kazakhstan. 
The signs of Russian-American cooperation on the issue appeared on 5 February 
1992, when in a testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee US 
Under-Secretary of State Bartholemew revealed an unofficial plan, allegedly 
agreed with Russia, that all strategic nuclear missiles outside Russian territory 
would be disabled within three years and eliminated within seven years.14
Nazarbayev was concerned about these developments and said in an 
interview on the next day that Yeltsin did not speak for Kazakhstan on nuclear 
disarmament matters, and his discussions with Bush can only be regarded as an 
initiative.15 In this situation Russian diplomacy made its own move. On 13 
February Iwestici reported about Kozyrev’s remarks that Kazakhstan “has no other 
choice but to accede to the NNP treaty”. “Both credits and foreign aid could be 
jeopardised. When the Americans began having suspicions about Pakistani nuclear 
program, they imposed sanctions against that very close ally".16 The statement had 
two purposes. Firstly it made clear to the West Russian own position in favour of 
nuclear disarmament of Kazakhstan, indicating that in this important issue Russia 
would act as an ally. Secondly, it showed to Kazakhstan potential consequences it 
could face in case of non-compliance. Being a land locked country Kazakhstan did 
not have a chance of withstanding economic sanctions if imposed with Russian 
participation.
Nazarbayev tried to break Russian-American coalition on the nuclear issue 
by trying to provoke contradictions between Moscow and Washington. On 28 
April he sent a message to Bush stating that Kazakhstan would like to conclude a 
strategic alliance with the US and that Kazakhstan planned to retain the strategic 
nuclear weapons inherited from the USSR only temporarily.17 Nazarbayev 
evidently believed that if the Americans showed at least the slightest interest in his 
proposal it would immediately arouse Russian suspicions, and he could then 
bargain with Moscow dropping his proposed alliance with the US in exchange for 
Moscow's concessions on the nuclear issue.
But Nazarbayev's calculations did not work. On the day his message 
arrived in Washington J.Baker announced that in the event of a threatened nuclear 
attack against Kazakhstan or Ukraine the US would render political support by 
bringing the issue to the UN Security Council. But even limited political guarantees
14 Washington Post, 06.02.92.
15 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.26, 07.02.92.
16 Izvestiya, 13.02.92.
17 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 82, 29.04.92.
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would depend, he emphasised, on Kazakhstan and Ukraine signing the NNP treaty 
and renouncing nuclear arms. Baker firmly ruled out the possibility of extending a 
formal security guarantee or US military commitment to either country.18 Baker’s 
statement was obviously directed at removing Russian suspicions and making it 
clear to everybody that diplomatic games around such a sensitive issue as non­
proliferation of nuclear weapons were not permissible. The statement coincided 
with another important development. Nazarbayev was invited to come to 
Washington on 19 May to meet Bush.19 The invitation was obviously designed to 
persuade Kazakhstan to relinquish nuclear weapons.
Washington’s rebuff left Nazarbayev in a diplomatically weak position. On 
his way to the US capital he made a stopover in Moscow and had a long 
conversation with Yeltsin, after which he stated at a press conference that 
Kazakhstan would sign the NNP treaty as a non-nuclear state. He added that the 
Tashkent Collective Security Treaty20 provided the security guarantees that 
Kazakhstan had sought.21 But Nazarbayev's explanation of his change of attitude 
as motivated by receipt of security guarantees from Russia is unconvincing. Russia 
had never backtracked on its security obligations to the former USSR republics 
and had offered various security arrangements to other CIS states including 
Kazakhstan long before a formal treaty was signed in Tashkent. Kazakh leadership 
had been well aware of this, but Nazarbayev apparently not satisfied with Russian 
proposals had sought American guarantees instead. Moreover, it seemed that it 
was Russia that he regarded as the major security threat. Most likely, the 
conclusion of the Tashkent treaty simply gave him a chance for a face saving 
diplomatic retreat.
While in Washington Nazarbayev once again demanded American security 
guarantees, and claimed to have finally extracted from Bush a document promising 
such guarantees to Kazakhstan.22 The latter assertion is unsupported by any other 
evidence and may therefore be doubted. After Nazarbayev’s meeting with Bush 
Assistant Secretary of State Niles told the press that "full agreement" on all 
questions involving the START treaty had been reached and that Nazarbayev had 
promised to eliminate all nuclear weapons on Kazakhstan's territory within seven 
years,23 but mentioned no security guarantees to Kazakhstan. Neither were they 
mentioned in other subsequent comments by US officials.
On 23 May in Lisbon Kazakhstan together with Ukraine and Belarus signed 
the special protocol to the START-1 treaty. Article 5 of the protocol stipulated 
that they would adhere to the NNP treaty as non-nuclear states as soon as possible, 
and would begin immediately to take all necessary actions to this end in accordance
18 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 83, 30.04.92.
19 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 82, 29.04.92.
20 The treaty was signed on 15 May by Russia, Kazakhstan, other Central Asian states and Armenia. It said inter 
alia that “in the event of an act of aggression being committed against any of the participating states, all the other 
participating states shall give it tire necessary assistance, including military assistance”. [Treaty on Collective 
Security, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 25.05.92],
21 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 95, 19.05.92.
22 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, p. 69.
23 Reuters News Service, 19.05.92.
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with their constitutional practices.24 This provision was substantiated in Article 8 
of the Russian-Kazakh treaty “On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance”. It referred to Kazakhstan's obligation to adhere to the NNP treaty as a 
non-nuclear weapon state. The sides also pledged to cooperate for the purposes of 
"safe exploitation" of nuclear weapons before their complete withdrawal from 
Kazakhstan". This meant that until the withdrawal Russian specialists would have 
access and supervision of the nuclear weapons in the republic. This provision 
served as a deterrent against any attempt by Almaty to evade its obligations in the 
nuclear field. If such evasions were discovered it could be interpreted as violation 
of the treaty and free Russia of all its obligations under it.
Kazakhstan’s obligations to become a non-nuclear state did not, however, 
remove the nuclear issue from the agenda of Russian Kazakh relations. It was only 
the beginning of a prolonged diplomatic struggle leading to Kazakhstan’s de facto 
nuclear disarmament. The next objective that Moscow had to achieve was to 
establish its sole control of the CIS nuclear weapons including those deployed in 
Kazakhstan. But Moscow’s task was not easy. Though Kazakhstan, Ukraine and 
Belarus pledged to become non-nuclear, they had a formal right to the ownership 
of nuclear weapons on their territory25 and this allowed them to put forward 
demands for participation in control and use of such weapons.
On 19 August a Russian military delegation, headed by General V Dubinin, 
the Chief of General Staff, arrived in Alma-Ata and discussed a number of military 
issues, including the legal status of SNF units stationed in Kazakhstan.26 Before the 
CIS summit in Bishkek Russia and Kazakhstan reportedly finalised all provisions of 
a draft agreement on the status of SNF units stationed in Kazakhstan. But one 
issue remained unresolved: who would have jurisdiction over them. Russian 
Defence Minister Grachev said that if Yeltsin and Nazarbayev agreed, the issue 
could be resolved on the Belorussian pattern, with SNF transferred to Russian 
jurisdiction.27 On 8 October 1992 Shaposhnikov said in an interview that nuclear 
weapons should not be left “without control by a specific national state", and that 
his initiative had been fully agreed with Yeltsin.28 It was the first official Russian 
proposal to take full control of the CIS’ nuclear weapons. In Bishkek 
Shaposhnikov suggested that Russia should be given sole control over launch 
codes and dismantling of nuclear weapons. Belarus supported this proposal, but it
24 Reuters News Service, 24.05.92.
25 The agreement on property rights concluded between the CIS countries at the summit in Bishkek on 9 October 
1992 confirmed that the contracting parties "mutually recognize the transfer into their ownership of the property... 
under the former Union jurisdiction, situated at the territory of the Parties, accomplished in accordance with their 
national legislation ". The agreement covered all property, including military, located in the respective republics as 
on 31 August 1991. [Tsibukov, V., Problemy pravopriemstva v Sodruzhestve Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv, Moscow: 
MGIMO, 1994, pp. 44-45.]
26 Russia and Kazakhstan Conclude Military Agreements, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 22.08.92; 
Kazakh Official Hails Mutually Beneficial Defence Agreements with Russia, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 16.09.92.
27 Concern about Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 09.10.92.
28 Reuters News Service, 08.10.92.
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met strong resistance from Ukraine.29 Nazarbayev was also uncooperative. On the 
eve of the summit he indicated he was against changing the SNF status.30
Russia again raised the issue of control over the SNF at the CIS Nuclear 
Policy Committee meeting on 21 January preceding the CIS summit in Minsk.31 
Before the meeting Shaposhnikov reiterated Russia’s position that “according to 
the spirit and letter of the Lisbon Protocol, all nuclear weapons in what was the 
USSR are Russian”.32 At the meeting Russia counted very much on winning 
Kazakhstan’s support and diplomatically isolating Ukraine. Grachev even praised 
Kazakhstan’s position, saying it was close to that of Belarus.33 But this was clearly 
wishful thinking. At the meeting Kazakhstan sided with Ukraine, not Russia. 
Kazakhstan’s Defence Minister Nurmagambetov told reporters, following the 
meeting that SNF were not under Russian control, but "under unified command". 
According to L.Ivashov, Secretary to the CIS Council of Defence Ministers, there 
had been tough talking between the four members of the "nuclear club". The 
meeting failed to resolve the argument over ownership and control of the SNF.34 
Squabbling continued at the CIS Defence Ministers’ meeting in Moscow on 13 
May 1993.35
On 11 June 1993 in a diplomatically ingenious move Yeltsin appointed the 
CIS Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Shaposhnikov, to the post of Secretary of 
the Russian Security Council. In an interview on the next day Yeltsin said that 
Shaposhnikov had become available because the responsibilities of the CIS 
Command were shrinking as the former Soviet states built their own armies, and 
added that the SNF were being subordinated to the Russian Defence Ministry.36 
This move was very close to breaching Russia’s international obligations, but did 
not quite do so. The ingenuity was that Shaposhnikov relinquished the Command 
of his own free will and nobody could prevent his doing so, while no successor 
could be appointed, because the post could be filled only by unanimous vote of the 
CIS Council of Heads of State, and Russia would not approve any potential 
candidate. Shaposhnikov’s resignation therefore ensured de facto elimination of the 
post, and without a Commander-in-Chief the High Command of CIS Joint Armed 
Forces could not function. This effectively transferred operational control of the 
SNF to the Russian Defence Ministry.
The CIS Defence Ministers’ meeting in Moscow on 15 June therefore had 
no alternative to acceptance of Russia’s proposal to abolish the CIS High
29 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 195, 09.10.92.
30 Comments on Military' Issues; Nazarbayev Evasive about Nuclear Withdrawal, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 10.10.92.
31 Shaposhnikov Says It is Time to Decide on Nuclear Weapons Outside Russia, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 13.01.93.
32 Shaposhnikov on Future of CIS Nuclear Forces, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 23.01.93.
33 Grachev Says Finding Compromise on CIS Strategic Forces Will Be Difficult, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 23.01.93.
34 Reuters News Service, 21.02.93.
35 Foye, S., End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defence Policy? // RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, 
No.27, 02.07.93, p. 47.
36 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 110, 14.06.93.
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Command,37 and to replace it with a Staff for Coordination of Military 
Cooperation of CIS Member States, a looser body with only consultative 
functions, and with no authority over CIS nuclear weapons. Russia’s move also 
deprived Kazakhstan of any role in decision-making on the use of nuclear weapons.
Now Moscow had to solve only the final problem, physical removal of the nuclear 
weapons from Kazakhstan. And Almaty had only one option left - to exact the 
highest possible price for their removal.
In a speech at the UN on 5 October Suleimenov, Kazakhstan's Foreign 
Minister, indicated the possible price for Kazakhstan’s nuclear disarmament - $2- 
biliion in aid to dismantle the nuclear systems and clean up the Semipalatinsk 
nuclear test site.38 But Russia, with its own economic problems, had no intention 
of paying the bill. Russian diplomacy applied the tactic which by then had already 
become traditional, sustaining international fears of possible of nuclear proliferation 
from Kazakhstan, while referring the financial aspects of the problem to the West.
In December 1993 US Vice-President Gore visited Almaty, bringing an 
offer of $88 million of financial assistance for Kazakhstan's expenses in dismantling 
nuclear missiles. Kazakhstan also won recognition of its right to part of the 
proceeds of sale of highly enriched uranium extracted from the warheads. On 13 
December 1993, three hours after the American delegation landed at Almaty 
airport, Kazakhstan’s parliament ratified the NNP treaty, and accepted a loan of 
$214 million obtained from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development with American help.39 In return Kazakhstan signed a framework 
agreement on dismantling intercontinental ballistic missile launching silos.
Final details of the American denuclearisation aid package were formalised 
on 15 February 1994, during Nazarbayev's visit to the USA. Nazarbayev formally 
handed documents on Kazakhstan's accession to the NNP treaty to President 
Clinton, who more than tripled American aid to Kazakhstan, from $91 million in 
1993 to $311 million in 1994.40 To further encourage Kazakhstan's nuclear 
disarmament, US Secretary of Defence Perry visited Almaty on 19-20 March, and 
signed an additional agreement providing $15 million in aid for defence industry 
conversion. Perry also received assurances from Nazarbayev that all the SS-18 
ICBMs in Kazakhstan would be shipped to Russia for dismantling.41
The total sum received by Kazakhstan was not of course the $2 billion 
initially requested, but at least something to sweeten the disarmament pill. In any 
case it helped Moscow to achieve formal agreements with Almaty on the nuclear 
issue. A preliminary understanding had been reached in December 1993, when 
Chernomyrdin arrived after Gore had left. His talks with Tereshchenko resulted in 
signing of a memorandum which provided for negotiations to begin "in the
37 Foye, S., End of CIS Command Heralds New Russian Defence Policy? // RFE/RL Research Report, Vol.2, 
No.27, 02.07.93, p. 48.
38 RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 192, 06.10.93.
39 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16.12.93.
40 Segodnva, 16.02.94.
41 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.55, 21.03.94.
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immediate future on the timetable for detachment and withdrawal of all nuclear 
warheads from Kazakhstan to the territory of Russia, as well as to determine the 
procedure for elimination of the strategic offensive weapons, deployed in the 
Republic of Kazakhstan".42
On 28 March 1994, during Nazarbayev’s visit to Moscow, Russia and 
Kazakhstan settled the legal issues related to the SNF in Kazakhstan. The first 
document signed was a "Treaty on Military Cooperation between the Republic of 
Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation". It covered a wide range o f military and 
strategic issues, and contained several provisions on SNF. In this aspect the most 
important thing was recognition by Kazakhstan that SNF military formations in the 
republic had Russian status. In its turn Russia recognised Kazakhstan's right to 
compensation for " materials of nuclear forces" to be withdrawn from its territory. 
The Protocol on talks between Chernomyrdin and Tereshchenko contained special 
provisions instructing the respective ministries to prepare within three months an 
agreement on compensation to Kazakhstan for the uranium, and proposals on 
compensation for strategic bombers and air launched cruise missiles transferred to 
Russia.43 Neither of these directives was fulfilled in time.
The second agreement "On the Strategic Nuclear Forces Temporarily 
Stationed on the Territory of Republic of Kazakhstan" covered the period until all 
SNF presence in Kazakhstan was liquidated. It addressed a number of technical 
issues related to the SNF’s status and functioning during the transitional period. 
The procedure for SNF employment provided for consultations between the 
Russian and Kazakh presidents. General SNF activities in Kazakhstan were to be 
subject to consultations with Kazakhstan's Defence Ministry. Kazakhstan 
undertook not to impede the SNF’s performance of its functions. It also promised 
to provide the SNF with communal services, electricity, gas, accommodation and 
medical care pending withdrawal.44
Meanwhile the process of actual withdrawal was already under way. On 22 
February 1994 Colonel-General Deinekin, Commander-in-Chief of Russia's Air 
Force, advised the press that the last four Russian Tu-95MS (NATO designation: 
Bear H) bombers had been moved to Russia.45 But after that Kazakhs resumed 
delaying tactics, by hampering the transfer to Russia of the remaining 1040 ICBM 
warheads. As witnessed by Colonel-General Merkulov, Russian Defence Ministry 
representative at the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakh relations, the withdrawal
42 Memorandum po itogam vstrechi v Almaty 25 dekabrya 1993 goda Premier-Ministra Respubliki Kazakhstan S.
A. Tereshchenko i Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov - PravitePstva Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. S. Chernomyrdina // 
Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: PosoTstvo
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, p. 138.
43 Dogovor mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey o voennom sotrudnichestve //
Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol’stvo
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, pp. 168-169, 178.
44 Soglashenie mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey o Strategicheskikh yademikh silakh, 
vremenno raspolozhennikli na territorii Respubliki Kazakhstan // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 
godi, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moskva: Posolstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, 
pp. 163-166.
45 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.37, 23.02.94.
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of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan had been proceeding "with great difficulties"; 
the Kazakhs "systematically linked this issue with compensation for the aircraft and 
highly enriched uranium being withdrawn".46
It was only in early 1995 that the controversy over compensation was 
resolved. At that time, as stated by General Sergeyev, the SNF Commander-in- 
Chief, only 266 strategic nuclear warheads remained in Kazakhstan.47 On 20 
January 1995 Moscow and Almaty concluded an agreement "On Cooperation and 
Settling Mutual Accounts during Reprocessing of Nuclear Weapons". The 
agreement stipulated that highly enriched uranium would be transferred to Russia 
for recycling into low-grade uranium to be sold later to the United States. 
Kazakhstan was entitled to a fixed share of the profit from every such sale. 
Russia’s expenses incurred in dismantling nuclear warheads, transporting and 
recycling the uranium, and sales-related costs were to be deducted from the 
Kazakh share. Details of calculating such expenses, dates and terms of payments 
were to be specified in a special Russian-Kazakh contract. Plutonium extracted 
from the warheads was to be stored in Russia pending a joint decision on its future 
use.48 But immediately after signing, implementation of the agreement ran into 
difficulties, because the Russian Finance Ministry declined to make advance 
payments for work connected with recycling the uranium.49 Up to now it is still 
unknown how much compensation Kazakhstan has received for the uranium.
The situation was somewhat more precise with regard to compensation for 
the strategic bombers and cruise missiles. In January 1995 Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Soskovets authorised an interdepartmental commission, comprising 
representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and CIS Affairs, to 
draft an agreement with Kazakhstan to assist it in creating two Air Force regiments 
as a form of compensation.50 The agreement was concluded at the meeting of CIS 
heads of government in Moscow on 3 November 1995.51 It provided for the 
transfer of 73 combat aircraft (21 MIG-29s, 14 SU-25s and 38 SU-27s) to 
Kazakhstan, as compensation for strategic bombers withdrawn to Russia. 
However, by October 1997 only 41 planes had been transferred.52
It took Russia more than a year to complete the withdrawal and elimination 
of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan. But given the complexity of the task this
46 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikli slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodmzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 119.
47 New Data on the Strategic Arsenal of the Former Soviet Union // Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1995, p. 246.
48 Soglashenie mezhdu PravitePstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom Respubliki Kazakhstan o 
sotrudnichestve i vzaimnykh rasschetakh pri utilizatsii yademykh boepripasov // Bulleteiv mezhdunarodnikh 
dogovorov, No. 10, 1995, pp. 37-39.
49 Gosudarstvemiaya Duma Federal'nogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikli slushaniy 
Komiteta po delam Sodmzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami ”0  rossiysko- 
kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 106.
50 Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Analiticheskiy material o kliode razvitiya voennogo sotrudnichestva 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii s Respublikoy Kazakhstan, No.335/5/2/244, Moscow [No publisher] 15.04.95, pp. 2-3.
51 Kazakli-Russian "Breakthrough" Agreement on Military Aircraft, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
13.11.95; Russia Transfers Fighter Planes to Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 08.04.96.
52 Russia's Sergeyev to Discuss Cooperation With Kazakhstan, ITAR-TASS World Service, 28.10.97
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indicated that the Russians acted expeditiously. Finally, on 25 April 1995 Colonel 
General Yesin, Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Chief of Staff, made an official 
statement that all Soviet-era nuclear warheads had been transferred.53 This was 
confirmed on 26 May in President Nazarbayev's address to the nation, where he 
stated that "all deadly warheads have been removed from the republic's territory".54 
Kazakhstan had become a de facto non-nuclear weapon state.
In his memoirs Nazarbayev claimed that the major point of his diplomatic 
manoeuvring on the nuclear issue was to force the nuclear powers, including the 
USA, to provide Kazakhstan with security guarantees, and Kazakhstan renounced 
the nuclear weapons on its territory only after it received them. He claimed that the 
guarantees were provided in the Memorandum on Security Guarantees signed by 
the US, Great Britain and Russia at the CSCE summit in Budapest in December 
1994.55 It seems, however, that Nazarbayev overstates in claiming he obtained real 
security guarantees from the great powers including the USA. The Budapest 
memorandum does indeed contain a provision that the USA, Great Britain and 
Russia "confirm their obligations to seek immediate UN Security Council action in 
providing assistance to the Republic of Kazakhstan... if the Republic of Kazakhstan 
becomes a victim of aggression or subject to a threat of aggression with use of 
nuclear weapons".56 This provision, however, can not be regarded as a real security 
guarantee. Firstly, the Memorandum deals exclusively with the possibility of a 
nuclear attack against Kazakhstan. But neither Russia nor China,57 the countries 
Kazakhs were most concerned about, would need nuclear weapons in any conflict 
with Kazakhstan, because their military potential is immeasurably stronger than 
Kazakhstan’s. Besides both are permanent members of the UN Security Council 
and can veto any decision directed against their actions. Secondly, the only 
obligation contained in the memorandum is to ask the UN Security Council to do 
something. With this accomplished, the signatories of the memorandum can claim 
that they have fulfilled their obligations and not proceed with any practical actions. 
On the other hand, if they decide to take the matter further they can do this 
irrespective of, if there is a memorandum or not. In all, the memorandum gave the 
signatories the right to act as they wished at the time if the situation arises.
It is important to look at the difference between the Kazakh and American 
interpretations of the document. When visiting Kazakhstan in March 1994 US 
Secretary of Defence Perry made a statement about the memorandum at a news 
conference. He said that an agreement involving the United States, Britain and 
Russia was being prepared which would give Kazakhstan a "security assurance" 
from the nuclear states, which would assure consultations and help stabilise any
53 ITAR-TASS, 25.04.95.
54 Nazarbayev, N., Na poroge XXI veka, p. 76.
55 Ibid., p. 69, 76.
56 Memorandum o garantiyakh bezopasnosti // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No.l, 1995, p. 107.
57 On 8 February 1995 China provided Kazakhstan with similar guarantees to those envisaged in the Budapest 
memorandum. [Zayavlenie Kitayskogo pravitelstva o predostavlenii Kazakhstanu garantiy bezopasnosti // 
Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No. 1(2), 1995, p. 113],
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dangerous situations. Perry also clarified that there was "an important distinction" 
between "security guarantees" and "security assurance": "It is an assurance — it is 
not a guarantee. It is not a statement that we would go to war on any issue that 
arose with Kazakhstan."58 In practice Perry's statement did no more than confirm 
the stance taken by Bush administration in May 1992. This was the most the 
Americans were prepared to offer to Kazakhstan.
Directly relevant to military and strategic issues, and the source of many 
difficulties in Russian-Kazakh relations, was the Baykonur cosmodrome (space 
port). Baykonur, in Kzyl-Orda province of Kazakhstan, was a unique facility, 
sprawling over an area of 6717 sq. km and combining the infrastructure for 
transportation, storage, assembly and launching of space vehicles, as well as 
sophisticated communications equipment. Baykonur was especially valuable for 
launching satellites at high orbits of 20-40 thousand km. It accommodated 15 
launch sites for all major types of rockets - "Proton", "Zenith", "Energia", 
"Molnia", Cyclon", "Vostok" and "Soyuz".59 The space port provided for 
launching of all Russian manned spacecraft and telecommunication satellites, 85% 
of surveillance satellites, including heavy reconnaissance satellites and early 
warning satellites. In general not less than 50% of Russian space launches were 
conducted from Baykonur. Approximate value of all fixed capital at the 
cosmodrome amounted to 7601,8 billion roubles (in prices as on 01.01.94).60
After the collapse of the Soviet Union all this was on the territory of 
independent Kazakhstan which had neither technical nor material capabilities to 
operate it. Russia, on the other hand, was deprived of its major space base, without 
which it could not properly continue its space program. Russia had another 
operational cosmodrome, Plesetsk, on its own territory, but Baykonur and Plesetsk 
were designed for different tasks, duplicated each other’s functions hardly at all, 
and Plesetsk's geographical position made it unsuitable for launches to high orbits. 
While visiting Plesetsk in April 1992, Yeltsin said that Russia could not afford the 
10 billion roubles (100 million dollars) needed to enable Plesetsk to replace 
Baykonur.61 The Kazakh leadership was well aware of this, and decided to extract 
maximum advantage from it.
The initial documents establishing the CIS made no mention of jurisdiction 
over Baykonur. At the Minsk summit on 30 December 1991 Yeltsin, Nazarbayev 
and the leaders of nine other CIS republics signed an Agreement on Joint Activity 
in Research and Use of Outer Space. It prescribed that “interstate programmes for 
space research and exploitation” would be implemented on the basis of existing 
space complexes and infrastructure. For Russia the main problem of this 
formulation was that there were no interstate programs, and the only country able
58 Reuters News Service, 19.03.94.
59 See adjacent diagram.
60 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, pp. 149, 150-151.
61 Reuters News Service, 29.04.92.
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to conduct a space program was Russia. The agreement also stipulated that “the 
aforementioned infrastructure for conducting independent programs... is 
determined by separate agreements by the interested parties”.62 This meant that if 
Russia wanted to continue using Baykonur, it would have to negotiate a special 
agreement with Kazakhstan. But Moscow was in no hurry to do so, because under 
the agreement practical fulfilment of interstate space programmes “in the area of 
military and dual purpose (military and civilian) space facilities” was delegated to 
the CIS joint strategic forces. This effectively left most space activity at Baykonur 
in the hands of the Russian military, which continued to run it from Moscow as in 
Soviet days.
The first signs of Kazakhs’ discontent over Baykonur appeared in late 
January 1991. The head of Kazakhstan's Defence Committee Nurmagambetov 
complained in an interview that Kazakhstan did not have the means to control 
launches from its own cosmodrome.63 Following that Deputy Prime Minister 
E.Ezhikov-Babakhanov was quoted as saying that the issue of control over 
Baykonur would soon be raised with the CIS military.64
On 23 February military construction unit at Baykonur mutinied. The 
mutiny lasted for two days and left three soldiers dead. Barrack blocks and 
warehouses were burned and looted. But it did not look like a mere spontaneous 
riot. After arrival of a local television crew and the head of the city administration, 
the soldiers, mostly ethnic Kazakhs, demanded the removal of several Russian 
officers, creation of "normal" conditions for service, and a meeting with 
Nazarbayev.65 This attached an air of ethnic conflict to the incident. It was also 
significant that the mutiny occurred less than a week after a Russian official 
announcement that a joint Russian-German manned mission was to be launched on 
17 March.66 If the soldiers' problems were not resolved in time the flight could well 
be jeopardised. The dynamics of the whole event was very reminiscent of methods 
used by Kazakhs on previous occasions when they wanted their own way but were 
opposed by Moscow.67 This similarity suggests that the mutiny may have been 
orchestrated as a warning to Russia that the Kazakhs had ample opportunities to 
block the functioning of the cosmodrome if control over it was not handed over to 
Alma-Ata.
On 23 March Russian and Kazakh governmental delegations met in Uralsk 
in Kazakhstan to discuss a range of bilateral issues, including that of control over 
Baykonur.68 They signed seven protocols, including one on jointly supporting 
operation of the space infrastructure, including Baykonur and Plesetsk.69 However,
62 Agreement on Space Research, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 01.01.92.
63 Reuters News Service, 21.01.92.
64 RFE/RL Daily Report No. 16, 24.01.92.
65 Trad, 27.02.92.
66 Reuters News Service, 17.01.92
67 Similar events on a larger scale happened in Tselinograd in 1979, in Almaty in 1986, in Novy Uzen in 1989.
68 Reuters News Service, 23.05.92
69 Izvestiya, 24.03.92.
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this protocol, intended to establish a permanent settlement, hardly suited 
Kazakhstan; its references to both Baykonur and Plesetsk and to the whole of the 
space infrastructure were enough to cause the Kazakhs' dissatisfaction. Moscow 
had a definite interest in Baykonur, but Kazakhstan had none in Plesetsk or other 
space installations in Russian. Thus their basic differences over Baykonur were not 
resolved.
This soon manifested itself in new tensions that arose around the 
cosmodrome. In an unprecedented show of force, the Kazakhs blocked the launch 
of the Cosmos 2185 reconnaissance satellite scheduled for 29 April. This prompted 
Yeltsin to intervene personally in the dispute. When interviewed while attending 
the launch of a scientific satellite at Plesetsk, he said "Kazakhstan is playing up a 
bit...They want to show us that we have to have some sort of Russian-Kazakh 
agreement on Baykonur," and added that he would raise the issue with Nazarbayev 
at the CIS summit in Tashkent on 15 May.70 Yeltsin's statement was not worded as 
a threat, but it reflected Russia's serious concern at the situation around Baykonur, 
and Alma-Ata could not simply ignore it. Besides Yeltsin offered specific solutions. 
He suggested there were several ways of resolving the dispute, including creation 
of a joint venture between Russia and Kazakhstan, or Russian purchase of a share 
of the cosmodrome's real estate.71
Yeltsin's conversations with Nazarbayev brought some results. On 25 May 
1992 a broad “Agreement between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation on the Procedure for Use of Baykonur Cosmodrome” was signed in 
Moscow. This was the ‘separate agreement’, which was mentioned in Article 25 of 
the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance72, indicating that 
both documents were to be taken together as inalienable elements in the Russian- 
Kazakh settlement. Any Kazakh violation of the agreement on Baykonur could 
therefore be regarded as violation of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance.
Though a compromise, the agreement was quite favourable to Russia. The 
only concession of principle that Moscow had to make was to acknowledge 
Kazakhstan's jurisdiction. Article 2 of the agreement stipulated that "installations of 
the cosmodrome 'Baykonur', situated on the territory of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan are its property". But Russia managed to insert a formula into the 
preamble on the "need to use Baykonur for research and use of outer space in the 
interests of economy, science, international cooperation and ensuring security of 
the Commonwealth".73 It was not binding, but it reflected the spirit of the 
document, and left room for further argument that Baykonur should be used for 
common purposes, not only those of Kazakhstan.
70 Reuters News Service, 29.04.92.
71 Ibidem.
72 Dogovor o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoy pomoschi mezlidu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy 
Federatsiey // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya 1991 -1995 godi, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: 
Posolstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, p. 95.
73 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
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Another Russian success was the provision that both signatories transferred 
the rights to use Baykonur's real estate and movable property to the CIS Strategic 
Forces, thus effectively keeping its operational management in the Russian 
military’s hands. In addition Russia received the right for unimpeded import, 
export and transit through Kazakhstan of "technological equipment, weaponry, 
military hardware and other material resources necessary for functioning of the 
Baykonur cosmodrome ", free from duties and even customs inspection. This 
provision also covered the arrival and departure of officials, technical and military 
personnel working at Baykonur.74
Most importantly, Russia escaped any specific commitment to pay for the 
use of Baykonur. Obligations to cover costs of maintenance and use of Baykonur’s 
installations, industrial and social infrastructure were only vaguely expressed, the 
agreement stipulating only that such expenditures should be submitted by the 
cosmodrome military command and local authorities "to both sides" for 
endorsement, and that Kazakhstan's expenditures should not exceed 6% of 
Russia's.75 But it was not said what Russian expenses would be and they could be 
as little as Russia saw fit.
Russia’s promise, under Article 7 to pay Kazakhstan not less than 15% of 
the profits derived from commercial launches from Baykonur,76 amounted to very 
little in practice. Firstly, commercial launches employing Russian boosters were not 
yet customary on the international market, and some time would pass before they 
were. Secondly, Russia could make most such launches from Plesetsk, and retain 
all the profits. As a result, Kazakhstan’s potential income from commercial use of 
Baykonur was negligible compared to the benefits Russia derived from its use of 
the cosmodrome. Kazakhstan's decision to agree to such conditions was, 
probably, the result of its desire to keep intact the Joint Command of the CIS 
Strategic Forces, and free access to Baykonur played a role of stimulus for keeping 
alive Moscow's interest in this CIS structure. But Moscow's intention to establish 
its sole control over the CIS Strategic Forces led to the clash of both countries' 
interests in relation to Baykonur. In early April 1993 Yeltsin proposed to 
Nazarbayev to discuss the cosmodrome’s future.77 Moscow wanted the military 
space forces (MSF) deployed at Baykonur to have Russian status, and the launch 
facility's defence installations accorded the status of a military space base under 
Russian jurisdiction.78 But at that stage Yeltsin's proposals could not be acceptable 
to Kazakhstan, given its position on the need to maintain the CIS Joint Armed 
Forces Command. Not surprisingly in May the Kazakh side counterproposed that 
the MSF formations at Baykonur have joint status, that an interstate joint 
command and cosmodrome administration be set up to run Baykonur, and a
74 Ibid., p. 100; 102.
75 Ibid., p. 101.
76 Ibidem.
77 ITAR-TASS, 09.04.93.
78 Izvestiya, 02.07.93.
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coordinating council set up to manage it, headed by one of Kazakhstan's Deputy 
Prime Ministers.79
When Yeltsin appoint Shaposhnikov Secretary of the Russian Security 
Council, bringing about the abolition of the CIS Joint Armed Forces Command, it 
caused Russian-Kazakh complications on the issue of Baykonur. Almaty was 
frustrated at the transfer of the MSF, including those at Baykonur, to the 
jurisdiction of the Russian Defence Ministry .80 The visit to Kazakhstan by Grachev 
and Soskovets in early July 1993 to attend the launching of the joint Russian- 
French mission and their corresponding negotiations with Kazakh authorities failed 
to resolve the disagreements. Grachev said at a press conference that Kazakhstan's 
proposals to put the cosmodrome's military units under joint control, and to set up 
an interstate constitutional council headed by a deputy premier of Kazakhstan to 
manage them were unacceptable. He noted that the cosmodrome was financed 
entirely by Russia, and could not exist without Russia's technical and financial 
resources, and that any change in its status might disrupt space programs, and 
stated that he would insist the Russian status of the cosmodrome's military units be 
recognised. But Nurmagambetov said, Kazakhstan insisted on making Baykonur a 
joint facility.81
The abolition of the CIS Command gave Kazakhstan a viable legal excuse 
to renege on its previous undertakings with regard to Baykonur. The May 1992 
agreement stipulated that Baykonur's facilities were for use by the CIS forces, not 
Russian military units. The de facto difference was minimal, but formally 
Kazakhstan was entitled to demand withdrawal of Russian troops, especially since 
Kazakhstan's post-independence constitution banned foreign military bases. On the 
other hand Kazakhstan did not want to lose the substantial economic benefits that 
exploitation of Baykonur could bring about. Politically Almaty understood that 
complete exclusion of Russia could do irreparable damage to bilateral relations. 
Besides such exclusion would violate the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and 
Mutual Assistance, automatically allowing Russia to backtrack on its obligations to 
Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs therefore developed a concept for using Baykonur 
which they thought would allow them to achieve both aims, ousting the Russian 
military, but securing the cosmodrome’s future. They proposed creating an 
international space company with participation primarily by Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine, and possibly other countries.82
The concept of internationalisation of Baykonur was clearly designed to 
counterbalance Russia’s influence by that of others, such as Ukraine. But more 
importantly, the arrangement focussed primarily on commercial space programs,
79 Russian-Kazakh Talks on Baykonur End With no Real Result, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
05.07.93.
80 BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 06.12.93
81 Russian-Kazakh Talks on Baykonur End With No Real Result, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
05.07.93.
82 Russian-Kazakh "Public Showdown" at Press Conference on Baykonur, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
06.12.93
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marginalising Baykonur's military role and prospectively leading to full 
demilitarisation. Russia, with its military space program heavily dependent on 
Baykonur, inevitably could not agree to this arrangement. Another consideration 
behind the Kazakh move may have been euphoria undamped by technical expertise. 
They perhaps thought that they had only to open Baykonur to foreign economic 
interests to find a stream of investment pouring into Kazakhstan. But the reality 
was different. Technological differences between Russian and Western rockets 
made it impossible to employ Baykonur for launching both.
The Russian leadership was divided on how to react to the Baykonur's 
situation. Signs of political contention around the issue were revealed in 
contradictory statements by Russian officials. On 5 September Nezavisimayct 
gazeta, citing a government source, reported that Russia had decided to sever all 
links with Baykonur space centre and cease to use it. But this was denied by a 
Glavkosmos spokesman, who said Russia had too great an interest in the 
cosmodrome to take such a decision.83 However the controversy did not end there. 
On 9 September Assistant Director of the Transmash Design Office Bondarenko 
told the press that Russia had decided to stop using Baykonur. But Glavkosmos 
again denied this.84 There were two opposing camps. Russian Space Agency 
(RSA) advocated putting Baykonur under civilian administration, generally in line 
with Kazakhstan's position. But the Defence Ministry wanted Baykonur split into 
two parts, civilian and military, leaving to itself only launches for military 
purposes.85
Kazakhstan's aspiration to internationalise Baykonur was definitely 
unacceptable to the Russian military. They wanted to retain full control of their 
own programs, and exclude all possible outside interference with them. Hence the 
Defence Ministry's insistence that all or part of the cosmodrome should remain 
under its control, with the status of a Russian military base. MSF Commander 
Colonel-General Ivanov during his visit to Plesetsk in September 1994 said quite 
bluntly that the Russian Defence Ministry did not want to be dependent in 
launching its space hardware on the policies of any foreign state, including 
Kazakhstan.86
Initially the civilians appeared to be winning. Press reports on 9 September, 
quoting a RSA spokesman, indicated that a document determining Russia's 
position on Baykonur was to be submitted to the government before 15 
September, and that it acquiesced in transformation of Baykonur into an 
international space company.87 But suddenly dramatic events of a higher order 
intervened, and changed the entire picture. On 21 September Yeltsin issued a 
decree dissolving the Russian parliament. This led to armed clashes with the
83 Denial o f Russia's Reported Decision to Pull Out of Baykonur, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
06.09.93.
84 Further Questions on the Future of Baykonur, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 13.09.93
85 Kazakhstan: realii 1 perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, p. 151.
86 Russian M issile Troops to Be Transferred to Plesetsk, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 03.10.94.
87 Further Questions on the Future of Baykonur, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 13.09.93.
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parliament's defenders in the streets of Moscow on 3-4 October. It was only 
personal loyalty to Yeltsin of Russia's military command that saved the presidential 
side from defeat. But before moving to rescue Yeltsin the military exploited the 
situation to wrest some substantial concessions from him, most importantly a new 
version of the military doctrine the major of them. It is likely that support o f the 
Defence Ministry position on Baykonur was part of the "package". In any case the 
October events increased the Defence Ministry’s influence in the Russian 
leadership and their position was taken into account in the subsequent 
governmental moves with regard to Baykonur. In November the Council of 
Ministers decided to have a feasibility study made for a new space centre.88
Subsequently Russia actively exploited a possibility of full withdrawal from 
Baykonur to a new cosmodrome as a means o f diplomatic pressure on Kazakhstan. 
This pressure brought some results forcing Almaty to a partial compromise. During 
Chernomyrdin’s visit to Kazakhstan on 25 December 1993, he and Tereshchenko 
signed a memorandum which dealt with a number of bilateral issues, including the 
cosmodrome. For the first time the possibility of its lease by Russia was mentioned 
in a bilateral document. The memorandum also stated that exploitation of 
Baykonur would be conducted by the Russian government. On the other hand, the 
memorandum did not specify either the duration of the lease or the amount Russia 
would have to pay in rent. The status of Russian military units in Baykonur, a 
question of primary importance for Russia, was to be defined in separate 
agreements".89
Ahead lay a long and intensive period of further tough bargaining on the 
specific terms of the lease. This revealed itself pretty soon. The memorandum 
provided for establishing a special "working commission" to prepare an agreement 
on Baykonur by March 1994, when a summit between Yeltsin and Nazarbayev was 
to take place. When the Russian and Kazakh delegations began the negotiations in 
January 1994 the disagreements between them immediately came to the fore. 
Kazakhstan initially hinted at a figure of $7 billion in rent payments for two years, 
which was much more than Moscow was prepared to pay.90 Its initial offer was for 
only 80 million dollars a year.91
Besides it soon turned out that in signing the memorandum Kazakhstan 
intended to hand over only part of Baykonur to the Russian military. The Kazakhs 
continued to insist that the cosmodrome as a whole should be used primarily for 
economic and scientific purposes. Zhukeyev made clear at a special meeting with 
journalists that the Kazakh side rejected the Russian Government’s proposals for 
military units to be stationed in Kazakhstan with military base rights, and that the
88 Russian Space Chief Visits Svobodnyy, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 21.03.94.
89 Memorandum po itogam vstrechi v Almaty 25 dekabrya 1993 goda Premier-Ministra Respubliki Kazakhstan S. 
A. Tereshenko i Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov - Pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. S. Chernomyrdina // 
Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: PosoFstvo 
Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1995, p. 138.
90 Izvestiya, 14.01.94.
91 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
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Russian Government's conception of Baykonur as primarily as a military 
installation was wrong. The Kazakhs also refused to drop the idea of turning 
Baykonur into an international joint-stock company, even though the Russians 
more than once made it clear that that arrangement was absolutely unacceptable 92
On 8-10 February 1994 Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev made an urgent 
trip to Kazakhstan in the vain hope of settling the most complex bilateral problems, 
including Baykonur. The talks proved fruitless. Proposals for Baykonur’s future 
outlined by Nazarbayev included Russian troops withdrawing from there, and 
Russia selling military equipment cheaply to Kazakhstan in return for the right to 
lease some facilities there.93 On 24 February Kalybaev, Deputy Director-General of 
Kazakhstan's Space Agency, said that Kazakhstan would not agree to lease 
Baykonur to Russia until the status of Russian troops servicing the facility was 
resolved.94
The Kazakhs were apparently raising the stakes. On 14 February a meeting 
of the President’s administration and Cabinet of Ministers was held, to assess the 
ecological damage caused by use of Baykonur. At a press conference the same day, 
the ecology department of the administration reported that the cosmodrome had 
influenced the ecological situation in the Aral Sea basin "in a very harmful, even 
catastrophic way". Simultaneously it was pointed out that the proposed Kazakh- 
Russian agreement on Baykonur did not mention ecology, while Russia as 
successor to the USSR had to provide at least partial compensation for the losses 
inflicted on the region.95
But by now the Russians were already accustomed to Almaty's tough 
negotiating techniques, and were prepared to respond in kind. Firstly, Moscow 
linked the problem of Baykonur with the bilateral treaty on military cooperation 
and other important bilateral documents then under negotiation. Yeltsin refused to 
meet Nazarbayev and sign any agreement of substance until the question of 
Baykonur was settled. The scheduled meeting between them was postponed more 
than once.96 Secondly, the Russian side began to create the impression that it was 
seriously considering switching preferences to a cosmodrome in Russia proper. In 
early February an unidentified MSF official told journalists that the Russian 
authorities were considering building a new cosmodrome on Russian territory, and 
named a former ballistic missiles base "in the Far East, 300 km from the Russia- 
China border" as the likely site.97 This was confirmed on 9 March by the MSF 
Commander, Colonel-General Ivanov, who stated officially that Russia would build 
a major new cosmodrome near the settlement of Svobodnyy in the Far East by the 
year 2000 to ensure the independence of its space program. He added that the new 
base would be able to launch manned rockets and heavy Proton boosters, because
92 Izvestya, 14.01.94.
93 Russian Foreign Minister Visits Kazakhstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 17.02.94.
94 RFE/RL Daily Report, No.39, 25.02.94.
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of its favourable geographical location (It was just several degrees north to the 
equator in comparison to Baykonur). Ivanov added, in an obvious bluff,98 that it 
would not be expensive to set up the site, because as a former ballistic missiles 
base, it already had launching equipment.99 The statement was carefully timed to 
coincide with the arrival in Almaty of a RSA team led by Director-General Koptev 
for a new round of talks on Baykonur.
On 14 March General Ivanov flew to the Amur province with a group of 
officers and industrialists, for talks with the local administration on building 
Russia's new cosmodrome by the year 2000. After arriving at Svobodnyy, Ivanov 
claimed that the new cosmodrome would start launching Rokot lightweight rockets 
as early as 1996, and the new generation of Angara heavyweight rockets, used for 
placing satellites in geostationary orbit, in the year 2000. He also said that a 
decision to construct the new cosmodrome was expected to be signed by the 
Russian Government at the end of March.100
Tough bargaining continued until the eleventh hour. At iast signs appeared 
that the Kazakhs were beginning to yield ground. On 17 March Tereshchenko 
arrived in Moscow and met Chernomyrdin. Baykonur was the central issue under 
discussion.101 On 18 March a senior Russian representative at the Russian-Kazakh 
talks on Baykonur advised that "complete success" had been achieved. The 
delegations had found solutions to a whole series of points on which they had 
earlier disagreed. In particular, Kazakhstan's representatives responded favourably 
to Russia's arguments that the lease should be for at least thirty years. A positive 
solution also emerged to the issue of the status of Russian military personnel and 
civilians at Baykonur.102 This breakthrough paved the way for the Russian-Kazakh 
presidential summit and signing on 28 March of the "Agreement between the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on the Major Principles and 
Conditions for using Baykonur Cosmodrome".
The agreement mostly reflected Russia’s initial position. Russia leased 
Baykonur for 20 years, with automatic prolongation for another 10 years if neither 
side objected. It was probably not as long as Moscow would have preferred, but 
was at least a long-term arrangement, a major Russian requirement. The conditions 
of the lease were as follows. Operational management of the complex passed to the 
Russian MSF. On Baykonur's territory Russian legislation and military procedures 
and rules would be in force in relation to Russian servicemen, civilian personnel
98 Ivanov was clearly counting on Kazakh ignorance of the technology in general, and on no Kazakh ever having 
been allowed to see what was at Svobodnyy in particular. The need to install new and costly equipment for surface 
launching of large missiles accounted for its being expected to be five years or more before Svobodnyy could launch 
large boosters.
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and members of their families".103 Thus the agreement de facto gave Baykonur the 
status of a Russian military base. The annual rent was established at $115 million, 
much closer to Russia’s initial $80 million offer than to the initial Kazakh bid for 
$3.5 billion. Besides, part of it could be paid on a "compensatory" basis, ie by 
simply deducting it from Kazakhstan's debt to Russia. Nothing was said about 
previous ecological damage or Russian compensation for it. The only concessions 
made by Russia was agreeing to cover the costs of Baykonur's exploitation in 
1992-1993 and the provision that the Baykonur commander’s appointment would 
require the consent of the President of Kazakhstan, who would also have a 
permanent representative at the cosmodrome. Russia also agreed to assist 
Kazakhstan in "implementing its space projects and in training specialists in space 
technology".
The agreement on Baykonur permitted substantial reduction of the tensions 
between Moscow and Almaty, but failed to remove them altogether, because while 
addressing the major problems with regard to Baykonur, it left a number of 
technical issues unsettled. They were to be regulated by other agreements, the 
principal one being the Lease Treaty, to be concluded within three months after the 
Baykonur agreement came into force. Nevertheless, the initial impression was that 
the agreement on Baykonur would be implemented without difficulties. The Duma 
ratified it in June 1994, at the second attempt, and Kazakhstan's parliament did so 
in July. On 4 August 1994 the question of Baykonur was discussed by the 
presidium of the Russian government, which approved the main principles and 
conditions for using the cosmodrome,104 and on 29 August Chernomyrdin signed 
government order No. 996, which became the main legal document governing 
Russian activities on Baykonur.105 The Treaty of Lease of the Baykonur complex 
was formally signed by Chernomyrdin and Kazhegeldin in Moscow on 10 
December 1994. It was largely based on the agreement of 28 March 1994, and 
contained a number of clarifications and specifications of that agreement’s 
provisions.106
After the signing of the treaty Russian-Kazakh relationships with regard to 
Baykonur were plagued by permanent wrangling over the financial terms of the 
lease. In 1994 the Russian draft budget envisaged allocation of $115 million in rent 
to Kazakhstan, but it was never paid. In 1995 these allocations were not even 
included in the Russian budget. Moscow insisted that Kazakhstan should pay its 
debts to Russia, which Russia assessed at $1.25 billion.107 Kazakhstan in its turn 
revived counter-claims, including compensation for ecological damage caused by
103 Soglashenie mezhdu Respublikoy Kazakhstan i Rossiyskoy Federatsiey ob osnovnykh printsipakh i uslovivakh 
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previous use of Baykonur. Kazakh experts assessed this damage at around $2 
billion, while the Russian Defence Ministry argued that it could hardly exceed $40 
million.108
To avoid endless negotiations, Russia and Kazakhstan decided to agree on 
a "zero option" solution, that is to cancel all debts to each other. This formula 
found reflection in the Protocol on Settlement of Mutual Financial Claims Between 
the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, signed by the prime 
ministers on 20 January 1995. It stated that the sides "revoke their claims on each 
other: the Kazakh side on compensation for the damage, connected with 
exploitation of the Baykonur complex in 1991-1993; the Russian side on debts of, 
and credit to, the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991-1994".109 But this accord was 
soon eroded due to its broad interpretation by the Kazakhs, who tried to include 
Kazakhstan's $275 million of debts to two Russian companies, Roskontrakt and 
Rosenergo, in the settlement. Russia rejected these demands, on the grounds that 
debts between companies, state-owned or not, were not envisaged by the 
protocol.110 By the end of 1997 the problem of mutual debts still remained 
unresolved. Moscow has not allocated a single dollar for rent payments. The 
problem of settling mutual debts was discussed by Chernomyrdin and Nazarbayev 
at their meeting on 4 October 1997, but they again failed to reach agreement.* 111
Many Russian experts see the lease of Baykonur as disadvantageous to 
Russia. Some of them point to its unreliability as a prospective Russian launch site, 
given the expected onset of political instability in Kazakhstan due to economic 
depression and deterioration of administrative control.112 Others argue that Russia 
spends much more on the cosmodrome than it receives from it. Given the poor 
condition of the real estate at Baykonur, including the social infrastructure, 
Russia’s obligation, to maintain and develop the material and technological base of 
a complex which remains Kazakhstan's property, entails substantial financial loss. 
According to some assessments, in 1994 Russia spent $185 million on the 
cosmodrome’s upkeep, on top of the annual rental. Other estimates indicate that 
over the 20 years of the lease, Russia’s expenditure on Baykonur will be more than 
double the value of its fixed capital, or more than enough for Russia to build two 
similar cosmodromes on its own territory.113 These estimates were however 
rejected by RSA Director-General Koptev who said that the rental payments for 20
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years would be roughly equal to the value of Baykonur’s fixed capital and that 
such payments would be economically justifiable in comparison to a cost of 
building a new cosmodrome.114
Given this difference of opinion, it was no accident that on 4 August 1994 
the presidium of the Russian government linked discussion of the problem of 
Baykonur to the question of building a new Russian cosmodrome near Svobodnyy 
in the Far East. Although originally a diplomatic tool for bargaining with 
Kazakhstan, this idea had clearly acquired its own momentum. After the closed 
part of the sitting ended, Koptev told journalists that the possibility of building a 
new Russian cosmodrome was under consideration. He noted without much 
optimism that a total of 4-4.5 trillion roubles at present prices would be needed to 
implement such a project, that it would take 10-12 years, and that the issue would 
be finally decided by 1 November.115 At this stage a divergence of views still 
existed in Russia’s leadership on how to treat Baykonur in long-term perspective.
Interestingly, it was the Russian military which continued to push for the 
new cosmodrome. This soon became apparent through statements made by the 
Missile Space Forces leadership. In December 1994 Major-General Venediktov 
said in Blagoveshchensk that Svobodnyy must fully replace Baykonur as Russia’s 
main space port. He said that Baykonur could be fully operational for another few 
years, a decade at most, after which all its technical structures would no longer 
satisfy safety requirements. Venediktov made no bones about the fact that the new 
space centre would be used primarily for military purposes.116 On 26 January a 
similar statement was made by MSF Commander Colonel-General Ivanov in a 
speech to the Duma. He stressed that Russia wanted to phase out Defence Ministry 
satellite launchings from Baykonur by the year 2003.117
What lay behind the Russian military’s position were their distrust of the 
Kazakh leadership and doubts as to Kazakhstan's reliability as an ally. These fears 
were based on certain Kazakh actions. In January 1994, when Russian-Kazakh 
negotiations over Baykonur were in full swing, Kazakhstan signed an agreement 
with the United States on joint monitoring of outer space and space debris, which 
could pose a threat to orbiting satellites. During Nazarbayev's visit to Washington 
in February 1994 Kazakhstan and the United States allegedly concluded an 
unspecified space agreement which dealt with joint use of Baykonur.118 Despite 
direct questions from journalists, Nazarbayev refused to disclose details of the 
agreement, and confined himself to saying that it related only to know-how and to 
non-proliferation of US-provided space technology.119 Some Russian experts saw
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these actions as "an element of blackmail with regard to Russia".120 Undoubtedly 
they increased Russian suspicions of the Kazakh leadership’s policies.
These considerations explain why the Russian MSF began moving military 
space programs from Baykonur to Plesetsk. On 21 September 1994 a group of 
military experts and engineers led by MSF Commander Colonel-General Ivanov, 
arrived at Plesetsk to discuss the transfer of a number of facilities belonging to the 
missile troops. Plesetsk cosmodrome's head, Major-General Ovchinnikov, new 
launch sites for Zenit, Rus (new version of Soyuz) and Angara (new version of 
Proton) would be built at Plesetsk.121
By now a certain compromise between the MSF and RSA obviously 
emerged. This was reflected in a document "Program of Development of the 
Surface Cosmic Infrastructure of the Russian Federation (for the period until 
2014)" submitted to the Duma in connection with ratification of the Baykonur 
Lease Treaty and signed by RSA Director-General Koptev and MSF representative 
Borisiuk. The document contained the following conclusion: "Implementation of 
Russian space programs within several forthcoming decades is practically 
impossible without the use of Baykonur cosmodrome... Together with using 
Baykonur cosmodrome and allocating funds for its maintenance and 
modernisation, Russia should ensure further development of the infrastructure for 
preparing and launching space vehicles from Russian cosmodromes. For this 
purpose the Plesetsk range must be developed further, and analyses made of the 
possibility and practicability of preparing and launching medium- and heavy-class 
rockets from Svobodnyy cosmodrome".
The program stipulated that Svobodnyy be assessed as a prospective 
launching site for heavy launch vehicles “sending military space apparatus into 
orbit" starting in 2011. The draft plan proposed that in 2014 Svobodnyy should 
have five launching pads for three classes of boosters. Functions of space apparatus 
launched from the cosmodrome would cover such areas as strategic 
reconnaissance, navigational support, communications and TV broadcasting from 
geostationary orbits, as well as the "Rokot" program. On the other hand, the plan 
indicated that in 2014 Baykonur would continue fulfilling all aspects of the Russian 
space program, including all those designed for Svobodnyy and Plesetsk, and 
would in addition retain two not duplicated by the other two cosmodromes - 
piloted space flights and international commercial space launches.122 This can be 
interpreted to mean that Russia does not completely discard the possibility of using 
Baykonur for military purposes in the future. On the other hand, the duplication of 
all Baykonur's military functions by two Russian cosmodromes gives reason to 
believe that the proportion of military launches from Kazakhstan would
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substantially decrease, or cease altogether, and Baykonur be employed for military 
purposes only in extraordinary circumstances.
On 1 March 1996 Yeltsin signed a decree endorsing the establishment of 
the second Russian cosmodrome at Svobodnyy. The MSF press service 
commented that a new cosmodrome, capable of full-weight space launches, would 
help to completely eliminate Russia's dependence on other countries for launching 
spacecraft to various orbits.123 Russia carried out its first launch from Svobodnyy 
on 4 March 1997, of a Zeya military satellite on a Start-1 booster rocket.124 There 
have since been several other launches of low earth orbit satellites from there, 
indicating that the new cosmodrome's development program is on schedule.
At present Russian policy on Baykonur can be described as gradual 
disengagement. Russia’s military is diminishing its reliance on the Kazakh 
cosmodrome, pending full withdrawal of military programs, facilities and 
personnel. In the short term Russia is likely to continue relying on Baykonur for its 
civilian space program, including commercial launches, and it remains Russia’s 
only launching site for manned space flights. Baykonur’s role will be crucial for the 
successful launching of many components for the International Space Station, but 
once that station’s program is complete, further Russian withdrawal can be 
expected. Given the previous and current difficulties with Kazakhstan over 
Baykonur, Russia is unprepared to commit significant funds for future maintenance 
and upgrading. Hence much will depend on Kazakhstan’s own ability to maintain 
the cosmodrome’s operational potential, but there are serious doubts whether it 
can. Moreover, unfavourable conditions for renting Baykonur forced Russia to 
search actively for alternative commercial launching sites in other countries. RSA 
and Russian commercial launch operators have already approached countries such 
as Australia, Brazil and India, with a view to setting up a commercial cosmodrome 
on their territory. Launch sites in these countries are geographically advantageous, 
because they are nearer the equator, much lower rent than that paid for Baykonur, 
and a more stable and predictable political environment. Russia also intends to 
solve the problem of manned space flights by developing a new heavy-lift launch 
vehicle “Rus” (also known as Soyuz 2), designed for launch from Plesetsk.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia had three options for 
securing its military and strategic interests in the post-Soviet space: maintaining 
and developing bilateral military relations with the countries of the region, acting 
within the legal framework provided by CIS, or a combination of both. But in the 
independence euphoria that engulfed the post-Soviet space, bilateral military 
cooperation between Russia and other CIS countries presented major difficulties. 
Any Russian proposal for stationing troops, weapons and military facilities in other 
former Soviet republics could be interpreted as continuation of Russia’s "imperial” 
policy, with likely negative effects not only in the republics concerned but
123 Yeltsin Issues Decree Approving Creation of Svobodnyy Cosmodrome, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 04.03.96.
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internationally. This was the reason why Russia initially decided to put the major 
emphasis on multilateral military cooperation within the CIS, though naturally only 
to the extent that it suited Russia’s own interests. The "Basic Provisions of the 
Russian Federation's Foreign Policy Concept”, signed by Yeltsin in April 1993, 
specifically mentioned Russia's responsibility "for strengthening stability and 
security on the territory of the former USSR". It contained provisions for 
developing military and political cooperation with other CIS states with a view to 
creating an effective collective security system, for protecting CIS’ external 
borders, and for preserving the military infrastructure and installations that 
constituted an integrated system for ensuring CIS members’ military security. The 
directive attached special importance to developing and improving peacekeeping 
mechanisms within the CIS with Russian participation.125
Kazakhstan has a central role in securing Russia’s military and strategic 
interests in Central Asia. Firstly, it is the largest and most influential of the former 
Soviet Central Asian republics. Secondly, apart from limited access via the Caspian 
Sea and Turkmenistan, all surface routes from Russia to Central Asia pass through 
Kazakhstan. Thirdly, Kazakhstan has the largest Russian-speaking community in 
post-Soviet Central Asia. And finally, Kazakhstan inherited from Soviet times the 
largest and most important military infrastructure in all Central Asia. Moscow 
therefore sought to secure Kazakhstan's support in establishing a collective security 
structure for Central Asia and Kazakhstan responded positively.
Kazakhstan joined Russia acted as co-sponsor of the Tashkent Treaty, and 
was one of the first to ratify it (23.12.92), six months before the Russian 
parliament.126 Nazarbayev was also the most ardent supporter of a CIS “defence 
alliance”, an idea he first proposed at the CIS summit in Bishkek in October 
1992.127 “Kazakhstan’s leadership is firmly convinced, even today, that the security 
of every sovereign state will be more reliably ensured through collective defence by 
the countries of the Commonwealth”, Nurmagambetov, Kazakhstan’s Defence 
Minister, wrote in a program-style article in November 1992.128 In a telegram sent 
to Yeltsin and heads of other CIS states on 18 March 1993, Nazarbayev 
specifically proposed “establishing clearly functional bodies in a defence alliance, in 
accordance with the Collective Security Treaty” .129 Nazarbayev’s project for a 
Eurasian Union, put forward in March 1994, contained a special section on defence 
which envisaged conclusion of a treaty on joint measures to strengthen the EAU 
member-states’ national armed forces and protection of EAU’s external borders; 
creation o f a "common defence space" for the purpose of coordinating defence
125 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29.04.93.
126 izvestiya, 16.05.96; Informatsionnyy bulleten’ Mezhparlamentskoy Assamblei Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
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129 Nazarbayev Telegram to Yeltsin with Proposals for Strengthening CIS, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 26.03.93.
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activities; formation of collective EAU peacekeeping forces, assigned official 
peacekeeping status by the UN Security Council.130
There were several reasons for Kazakhstan to support the concept of CIS 
collective security. The main one was that it lacked the potential to provide for its 
own defence. After the collapse of the Soviet Union it met a number of problems in 
creating its own army. On top of the economic difficulties, Kazakhs, like the other 
Central Asian peoples, lacked a modern-time tradition of military service, few of 
them pursued military careers, and hardly any reached senior rank.131 There was 
therefore no “pool” of trained indigenous officers to fill the gaps created by the 
massive post-independence exodus of Slav officers who chose to continue their 
service in the armed forces of Russia, Ukraine or Belarus. Kazakh military officials 
admitted that this exodus "caused an irremediable shortage of command, engineer 
and technical cadres".132
Kazakh leaders saw a clear danger coming from instability in neighbouring 
Tajikistan, which they felt could easily spread into their own territory, and needed 
military support in order counter it. On 4 November 1992 the leaders of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan met in Almaty to discuss how 
to end the fighting in Tajikistan, and issued a five-point statement, calling for the 
Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan to maintain a 
peacekeeping role until a joint CIS peacekeeping force could be formed.133 Russian 
Foreign Minister Kozyrev attended the meeting as an observer, though it is safe to 
assume his role was not limited to listening to the others. As Nazarbayev later 
explained: "Bloody conflict, which engendered real danger of penetration into that 
country [Tajikistan] of extremism from neighbouring Afghanistan, mobilised us 
into forming collective peacekeeping forces to protect the Tajik-Afghan border".134
On 30 November 1992 at a meeting in the Uzbek town of Termez, the 
defence ministers of Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and then CIS 
Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov took a decision on a combined 
CIS peacekeeping force for Tajikistan, including the Russian 201st division, a 
motorised regiment from Uzbekistan, and a battalion each from Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan.135 For Russia it was essential that the operation in Tajikistan be 
collective, to legitimise it internationally, and to spread its costs. Kazakhstan’s 
willingness to provide a battalion was evidence of its leaders’ apprehensions of the 
danger emanating from Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Nazarbayev faced strong 
domestic opposition, primarily in Kazakhstan's parliament. At that time power of
130 Proekt o fomiirovanii Evraziyskogo Soyuza Gosudarstv // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991-1995 
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presidents in the CIS states was not yet strong enough and they could not proceed 
with implementation of such sensitive agreements without parliamentary approval. 
And parliaments were reluctant to sanction deployment of troops beyond national 
borders, especially in the areas of inter-ethnic conflicts. This caused delays in the 
establishment of CIS peacekeeping force in Tajikistan.
On 22 December 1992 Nazarbayev presented the agreement “On 
contingents of military observers and CIS collective peacekeeping forces”, which 
had been signed at the March 1992 CIS summit in Kiev for ratification by 
Kazakhstan’s Supreme Soviet. The ratification would have opened the way for 
formation of Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping unit for Tajikistan.136 But two days later 
the parliament voted not to discuss the issue, on the grounds of insufficient 
information on the state of affairs in Tajikistan.137 It then adjourned for the 
holidays, and Nazarbayev’s first attempt to send Kazakh peace-keeping troops to 
Tajikistan ended in failure.
In January 1993 Marshal Shaposhnikov had to admit that the Tashkent 
Treaty was “to all intents and purposes inoperative”.138 On the eve of CIS summit 
in Minsk he again complained that not all states had ratified the treaty, and that 
only Russian troops were acting as peace-keepers. He said that it was very 
important “to ensure joint participation in peacekeeping actions”. When Yeltsin 
arrived in Minsk he stated firmly that he would raise the question of Tajikistan, and 
specifically emphasised that besides Russia “other states must take part in the 
peace-keeping process”.139
The CIS Charter adopted by the summit contained a number of provisions 
on military issues. Article 12 provided for consultations and measures, directed at 
the “removal o f the emerged threat” by peacekeeping operations and if necessary 
use of armed forces. Article 13 stipulated that member-states must take adequate 
steps to ensure stability of their external borders, coordinate activities of their 
border guard forces and other services responsible for border controls.140 The 
Charter was signed by seven states, including Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as 
other Central Asian states at the exception of Turkmenistan. The important 
element in the Charter was that it was of indefinite duration and was to 
automatically substitute for the Tashkent treaty after the latter expired.
The signing of the Charter did not however mean the creation of the 
defence union. Article 15 specifically pointed out that concrete issues of military- 
political cooperation between member-states would be regulated by special 
agreements. In the absence of such detailed agreements regulating cooperative
136 Kazakh Supreme Soviet Discusses General Bill on CIS Peace-Keeping Troops, BBC Monitoring Service: 
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defence measures the Charter’s provisions were doomed to remain another empty 
declaration. Nevertheless, it meant that the first step towards realisation of 
Nazarbayev’s idea was, in fact, made. And to have the process moving ahead he 
himself needed to prove a real commitment to joint peace-keeping operations 
within the CIS. Correspondingly before the forthcoming CIS summit Nazarbayev 
applied strong pressure on Kazakh deputies, and on 14 April they voted in closed 
session in favour of sending a battalion to the Tajik-Afghan border, provided it 
consisted entirely of volunteers.141 A Kazakh Border Guard battalion was deployed 
to the border of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region of Tajikistan.142
On 7 August 1993 the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan met in Moscow to discuss the deteriorating situation on the Tajik- 
Afghan border. Yeltsin told the Central Asians that unless they increased their 
contributions o f men, material and money to the peacekeeping force, he would 
withdraw the Russian troops. The Central Asian leaders accepted his terms in 
full.143 On 24 August the Foreign and Defence Minsters of Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan met in Moscow, and reached agreement to 
establish "collective peacekeeping defence forces" in Tajikistan, under command of 
a Russian officer, Colonel-General Boris Pyankov, and with headquarters in 
Dushanbe. The defence ministers also decided on the main supply base to be set up 
in Tajikistan, and on a standby base in Khorog, capital of Gorno-Badakhshan. Each 
signatory would finance its own contingent.144 Russia would contribute 50% of 
funds to maintain the force, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 15% each, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan 10% each.145 On 24 September 1993 the CIS heads of state summit in 
Moscow formally endorsed these decisions.146
Over the period 1993-1995 Kazakh combat losses comprised 36 dead and 
at least 38 wounded.147 The Kazakh leadership several times threatened to 
withdraw the battalion, but did not do so, and remained committed to joint CIS 
protection of the Tajik-Afghan border. Kazakhstan signed almost all the CIS 
collective security agreements.148
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The Russian Defence Ministry approved of Kazakhstan's position on 
collective security, assessing Kazakhstan as "an active participant in the Collective 
Security Treaty", which "supports the idea of creation of a collective security 
system on the basis of it". It further stated that Kazakhstan’s and Russia’s positions 
on a collective security system generally coincided, and consisted o f : unification of 
main legislative provisions in the fields of defence and security; devising common 
approaches to issues of putting troops on higher stages of alert, forms and methods 
of training, operational and combat use, and coordinated mobilisation preparedness 
of the member-states’ economies; reaching agreements on joint use of elements of 
infrastructure, airspace and waterways; permanent consultations on problems of 
military construction and armed forces’ training; coordinating questions of 
operational preparation of members’ territory for purposes of collective defence; 
joint operational and combat-training exercises o f armed forces and other troops; 
coordinating military personnel training programs; coordinating plans for 
developing, producing, supplying and maintaining arms and equipment; working 
out common approaches to parameters of stockpiling and storing material 
resources; creating common (joint) air defence and other systems.149
But in reality the Russian and Kazakh approaches to the collective security 
system in Central Asia are far from concurrent. From the very beginning there were 
obvious problems and contradictions. Kazakhstan tried to evade some of its 
obligations to contribute to the peacekeeping force in Tajikistan. At the CIS 
defence ministers’ meeting in Ashgabat in December 1993, the force commander, 
Colonel-General Pyankov, openly criticised Kazakhstan for failing both to send the 
required number of troops and to allocate funds stipulated by the agreement.150 
This behaviour clearly indicated that Almaty regarded the collective peacekeeping 
force largely as a convenient way to shift responsibility for fighting and finance 
onto Russia.
The other problem was that although formally allied to Russia, the Kazakh 
leadership was still suspicious of Moscow's intentions in Central Asia. Some of 
Nazarbayev's staff, including U.Kasenov openly voiced such suspicions. Kasenov 
argued that Russia "seeks to keep its military presence not so much to prevent 
external threats, as to maintain and strengthen its control over development of the 
internal situation in the Central Asian states and limit their sovereignty, especially 
in foreign policy and foreign trade".151 While addressing Britain's Royal Institute of 
International Affairs on 22 March 1994, Nazarbayev made it clear that he opposed 
deployment of entirely Russian peacekeeping forces in CIS trouble spots, warned 
of hard-line tendencies in Moscow and said the time had come for the Russians to 
reconcile themselves to the existence of truly independent neighbours.152
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Reluctant to accept a Russian military presence in Kazakhstan, but unable 
to provide for Kazakhstan’s security with its own resources, Nazarbayev tried to 
solve the problem by invoking various concepts of alternative collective security 
mechanisms for Central Asia. At the 47th session of the UN General Assembly on 
5 October 1992, he suggested establishment o f a new collective security 
organisation in Asia - a Conference on Interaction and Confidence Measures in 
Asia (CICMA), clearly based on OSCE. The essence of this initiative was “creation 
of an effective mechanism of preventive diplomacy in Asia”. CICMA should be a 
system of relations between the states of the region which would guarantee their 
political and economic independence, territorial integrity and security.153
However, progress in implementing Nazarbayev’s initiative was 
unimpressive. The first CICMA preparatory meeting took place in March 1993. It 
was attended by representatives of 10 states and 2 international organisations. At 
its third meeting, in October 1993, 26 states and 4 international organisations were 
represented, and it was decided to create a working group, with a view to 
preparing a CICMA conference of Foreign Ministers. The group, initially of 14 and 
later 15 permanent members and 2-3 observers, met three times in 1995, but failed 
to reach a decision on the Foreign Ministers’ conference. Instead a conference of 
Deputy Foreign Ministers was held in Almaty on 7-8 February 1996, attended by 
representatives from 23 states (15 members and 8 observers)154 and observers from 
the UN and OSCE. The conference decided to complete the drafting of founding 
documents, and to convene a Foreign Ministers’ conference not later than the 
second half of 1997.155
But the conference did not materialise. Instead deputy foreign ministers 
from 16 countries once again met in Almaty on 3 December 1997. In their final 
statement they confirmed their commitment to the goals and principles of the UN 
Charter and expressed preparedness to implement a mechanism of confidence 
measures and promote cooperation in Asia in order to increase production, 
develop technologies, encourage international trade and set up joint economic and 
financial institutions. They decided to hold a conference at the level of foreign 
ministers in Almaty in 1998.156 But given the previous unsuccessful attempts to 
convene such a conference there is no guarantee that it will be held, and even if it 
will it is not clear to what practical decisions on collective security issues it can 
actually arrive. In all the political dynamics around the CICMA initiative shows a 
clear decrease in international interest to it.
Another element in Kazakhstan’s national security strategy can be 
described as diversification of military alliances. Philosophically this concept was
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clearly represented in Nazarbayev’s recent address to the nation, where he 
identified as a priority “initiation stability, through the state’s foreign policy bodies, 
of the already emerging strategic parity around Kazakhstan, which would meet our 
country’s long-term strategic interests” .157 Nazarbayev saw the balance of power 
as desirable, because it permitted manoeuvring between the different poles of 
world power, and avoidance of slipping into unilateral dependence on any 
particular country, especially Russia.
In more precise terms these ideas found reflection in the works of some 
Kazakh military analysts. L.Bakaev, for instance, did not hide his concern at some 
elements of Russian military doctrine, considering that "increased military danger 
for Kazakhstan" could arise from its proviso that Russia regards "suppression of 
the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian Federation citizens in 
foreign countries" as a major source of military threat.158 Asker Kusmanuli shared 
these concerns, but saw the above proviso as "not a military danger to Kazakhstan, 
more an attempt to psychologically influence the situation in the republic".159 
Despite this difference, both analysts evidently see military alliance with Russia as 
insufficient to ensure Kazakhstan's national security, and call for increased military 
cooperation with NATO including eventual membership.160
The strategy of expanding Kazakhstan’s links with NATO was officially 
outlined by Nazarbayev as early as May 1992, in his program work “Strategy for 
Kazakhstan’s Emergence and Development as a Sovereign State” .161 Although 
formally in alliance with Russia, and over its vigorous opposition, Nazarbayev 
opened contacts with NATO, and even welcomed its expansion to the east. In a 
speech at Columbia University in New York on 16 February 1994 he said. "We 
regard the initiative of the 'sixteen' to expand NATO as a timely and entirely 
prospective action, which would serve to strengthen the security system in Europe 
and adjacent areas. Of special importance for us are the opportunities which are 
being opened within NATO's Partnership for Peace Program for strengthening 
regional security and the defence potential of states participating in it".162 
Meanwhile Russia's concerns were aroused by precisely that program's possible 
negative effects on the CIS collective security system. The Duma Committee on 
CIS Affairs concluded that the program "will block the prospects for military and 
political consolidation of the CIS space around Russia" and "invalidate the Treaty 
on Collective Security, concluded between the CIS member-states". The
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Committee recommended support for Yeltsin's postponement o f Russia's 
adherence to the program, and use of "all possible means... to achieve coordination 
and a joint position within the CIS in relation to the NATO initiative".163 These 
"means" obviously did not work with regard to Kazakhstan.
On 24 January 1995, after a meeting in Brussels with NATO Secretary- 
General W.Claes Nazarbayev disclosed that they had discussed drawing up "an 
individual partnership programme for Kazakhstan and NATO" as well as issues 
pertaining to security on the Eurasian continent. During the meeting Nazarbayev 
allegedly stated that increasing military cooperation between Kazakhstan and 
Russia did not conflict with the "Partnership for Peace" program.164 At a 
conference on foreign policy issues held in Almaty on 15 February 1995, 
Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Tokaev stated that Kazakhstan had “no intention of 
declining to cooperate with NATO within the "Partnership for Peace" program... 
NATO's leadership agrees that rapprochement between Kazakhstan and Russia 
does not contradict this program, because the Russian and Kazakhstan armies 
remain separate armed forces...".165
The same strategy underlay Nazarbayev's proposal to create a Central 
Asian peacekeeping battalion, without Russian participation, advanced at his 
meeting with the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the Kazakh town of 
Dzhambul on 15 December 1995 The presidents agreed that the battalion should 
be created under UN auspices, as a UN reserve force, including UN provision of 
financial, material and technical assistance in forming it. They sent an appeal to UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, saying that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Uzbekistan were ready to join the UN's system of agreements on military reserves 
and to start consultations with UN experts. They wanted to deploy the new force 
in southern Kazakhstan, near the border with Uzbekistan, but said it would not just 
have a regional remit. "This battalion will not be formed for maintaining stability in 
Tajikistan, where CIS-mandated troops are already acting," said Kazakh 
presidential spokesman D.Kuanyshev. "It will not be created just as a regional unit, 
and could even be used in Bosnia or other hot spots".166
From the diplomatic angle, a Central Asian battalion under UN auspices 
was an ingenious idea. It did not have the direct anti-Russian implications of, for 
example, an approach to NATO. In addition, it was aimed at acquiring non- 
Russian material support, combat training and equipment, probably free of charge, 
and was therefore a way of diminishing the Central Asians’ military dependence on 
Moscow. At the same time it opened the way for other powers, primarily the USA, 
to increase their presence in the region under UN auspices. It was therefore no
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surprise that the USA immediately spotted the initiative and offered help. On 3 
April an American military delegation led by R. Hunter, US Ambassador to NATO, 
arrived in Kazakhstan for talks on international and regional security issues and on 
cooperation on defence issues. Hunter was reported to have told First Deputy 
Foreign Minister N.Danenov that the USA was willing to assist financially in 
creation of a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion under UN auspices. 
Kazakhstan's plans to join NATO's Partnership for Peace program were also 
approved.167
On 5 May 1996, at a meeting in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the Presidents 
of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan agreed to create a 500-strong Central 
Asian battalion, to be trained under the “Partnership for Peace” program. 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would each provide 40% of its funding, and 
Kyrgyzstan 20%. At a press conference after the meeting Nazarbayev said that it 
would be able to acquire vital military know-how, and help quell any disturbances 
in the three participating states, as well as operate as UN peacekeepers abroad. 
"We don't have any territorial claims against other states, but we don't want other 
states to have territorial claims against us," he said.168 His statement indicated 
firstly, that Kazakhstan was dissatisfied with existing collective security 
arrangements and secondly that the battalion might be used to quell internal ethnic 
unrest. It was not hard to guess against whom it would be used in that event. This 
also explained why Nazarbayev preferred it to be trained by NATO: absence of 
Russian connections would be crucial if the force were ever to be used against 
Russian separatists. In August 1996 the battalion, including troops from all three 
countries, took part in the cooperative Osprey-96 military exercise under the 
“Partnership for Peace” at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. The decision to send it 
to the USA was taken despite Russia’s refusal to participate in the exercise.169
In 1992-93 Russian-Kazakh bilateral relations in the military sphere were 
characterised by major difficulties and contradictions. The only major event in this 
period was signing of the treaty “On Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance”. It extended Russian security guarantees to Kazakhstan on a bilateral 
basis. Article 5 stipulated that in any situation which "threatens peace, or breaches 
peace in the Eurasian region, or violates essential security interests" of Russia or 
Kazakhstan, they will consult without delay and if necessary "implement 
coordinated measures for overcoming such a situation". In case of aggression 
against either, each pledged "to give each other all necessary assistance, including 
military".170 For Kazakhstan this provision was crucial, because the country was
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not equipped to deal with any serious threat to its national security, in the unstable 
region of Central Asia. The most obvious danger was that the civil war in 
Tajikistan could spiral out into other Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan. 
Russia also promised to help Kazakhstan to create its own armed forces (Article
3).
Of course, Moscow received substantial military advantages from the treaty 
too. In Article 4 the parties agreed "to allow joint use of military bases, firing 
ranges and other defence installations situated on their territories, as well as the use 
by one side’s armed forces of defence installations situated on the other’s 
territory". This provision allowed Russia to station troops and conduct military 
operations from Kazakhstan, including southward transit of troops. Article 6 said 
that they "would not participate in any alliances or blocks directed against one of 
them". This precluded Kazakhstan’s joining a military alliance (e.g. NATO) which 
could pose a potential threat to Russia’s security. Theoretically these provisions 
ensured that Kazakhstan would be effectively kept in the Russian sphere of 
influence, at least in the military-strategic field.
Formally the treaty consolidated the relationships of military alliance 
between the two countries. But it did it in rather general terms. To achieve 
practical realisation of each of the provisions more specific and detailed agreements 
on military cooperation were needed, and that was where the problems began. 
According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov negotiations with 
Kazakhstan on military questions went “very hard”.171 On 19 August a Russian 
military delegation, headed by General V Dubinin, the Chief of General Staff 
visited Alma-Ata. They discussed 12 draft agreements but managed to sign only 
two.172 The first dealt with the training of Kazakh officers in Russian military 
educational establishments, and granted free training for officer cadets from 
Kazakhstan, a privilege accorded to no other CIS country. The second agreement, 
signed on 19 August 1992, dealt with transfers of officers and warrant officers 
between the two countries’ armies, and stipulated that such transfers were to be 
free from interference by either country’s military authorities.173
By December 1992 Kazakhstan closed four major military test ranges, 
depriving the Russian military of the ability to use them.174 Russia in its turn 
refused to satisfy Kazakhstan's request for arms supplies in 1993 totalling 14.6 
billion roubles (at 1 July 1993 prices) due to Kazakhstan's chronic inability to pay
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its bills.175 Overall in 1993 Russia and Kazakhstan concluded only three minor 
military agreements. Two were signed by prime ministers at the CIS summit in 
Minsk on 22 January 1993. The first regulated the procedure for using the 
remaining test ranges in Kazakhstan, the second established principles for mutual 
material and technical maintenance of both countries’ armed forces. The third 
agreement, signed by the Prime Ministers in Almaty on 25 February 1993, covered 
cooperation and interaction on border issues. These agreements were of secondary 
importance, and did not establish a framework for comprehensive military 
cooperation. During Nazarbayev’s visit to Moscow on 26-27 February, Russia and 
Kazakhstan reached an understanding to draft a bilateral agreement on military 
cooperation within a month.176 But the subsequent negotiations dragged on for 
over a year.
It was only in 1994 the emphasis in Russian-Kazakh military relations 
began to shift to a bilateral basis. This was probably a result of the abolishment of 
the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command and realisation that the Tashkent 
Treaty would not provide an effective mechanism for military cooperation. During 
1994 the Russian Defence Ministry actively worked with Kazakhstan to find 
solutions to the following problems: organisation of communications and warning; 
procedure for interaction between Kazakhstan and Russian air defences; joint 
planning and use of military formations, inter-state military transportation, status of 
Russian military formations in Kazakhstan; training of Kazakhstan officers in 
Russian military-educational establishments; social guarantees to personnel serving 
in Kazakhstan; status of several military installations in Kazakhstan, including four 
test ranges and the “Balkhash” Missile Attack Warning Centre.177 Some of these 
questions were mentioned in two key documents, the "Treaty between the 
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation on Military Cooperation" and 
the "Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on Military and Technological 
Cooperation" concluded in Moscow on 28 March 1994.
Besides a large block of provisions on nuclear weapons (which duplicated 
formulas contained in the agreement on strategic nuclear forces) the treaty 
mentioned a number of issues which Russia had actively sought to resolve. Article 
4 permitted the signatories to lease military installations and facilities to each other, 
thus opening the way to agreements on the test ranges. Article 8 envisaged 
concluding special agreements on "joint planning and use of troops" and " joint 
training of control bodies and troops". Article 10 bound them to coordinate their 
activities in the military intelligence field, and not to conduct military operations or
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RISI, 1995, pp. 138, 146.
176 Russia and Kazakhstan Agree on Closer Economic and Military Cooperation, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 03.03.93.
177 Ministerstvo Oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Analiticheskiy material o kliode razvitiya voemiogo 
sotradnichestva Rossiyskoy Federatsii s Respublikoy Kazakhstan, No. 33 5/5/2/244, Moscow [No publisher] 
15.04.95, p. 2.
183
espionage against each other. Article 19 dealt with communications, warning and 
inter-state transportation, and said that "the sides will keep all existing systems of 
liaison, anti-aircraft and anti-missile defences, warning and communications, and 
will take agreed measures for their development". The signatories undertook to 
cooperate in military inter-state transportation, and to conclude a special 
agreement on this issue, to retain joint airspace for military and civil flights, and a 
unified system for controlling them.178
Kazakhstan also obtained some advantages. One such was in Article 11, 
which provided for agreement on joint use of naval forces in the Caspian Sea. 
Kazakhstan had neither a navy nor trained sailors, so Russian assistance in this area 
was essential. Article 17 stipulated that arms and military equipment be supplied at 
domestic, not world, prices. Article 18 retained the free of charge regime for 
educating and training in Russia Kazakh officers and warrant officers.
Article 1 of the agreement "On Military and Technological Cooperation" 
stipulated that the signatories would ensure preserving ties between designers and 
manufacturers o f military equipment; supplying each other with military products 
and documentation on manufacturing, maintenance and exploitation of military 
equipment; coordinating mobilisation plans; Article 2 obliged them to define the 
types and quantities o f military supplies for each other, and the conditions and 
forms of payment for them, in special annual agreements. Under Article 4 they 
agreed to cooperate in the arms trade with third countries. Each also undertook 
not to sell or give military equipment supplied by the other, nor information about 
it, to third countries "without previous written consent of the supplier".179
The agreement "On Military and Technological Cooperation" was mostly 
tailored to satisfy Kazakhstan's needs. It was Kazakhstan that needed Russian 
military supplies, not vice-versa. Although (and because) it inherited a large part of 
the former Soviet arsenal, Kazakhstan remains highly dependent on Russia for 
military hardware and spares. Kazakhstan’s military- industrial complex is poorly 
developed. It has neither enterprises manufacturing complete military equipment, 
nor the material base for repairing them.180 One major problem is that most 
weapons systems produced in Kazakhstan in Soviet times were intended for the 
Navy.181 Russia, however, is happy to continue receiving naval weapons from 
Kazakhstan, because this saves it the trouble and expense of converting enterprises 
to produce them itself. At present defence enterprises in Kazakhstan continue to 
supply 200 types of naval weapons, equipment and components to 45 Russian 
plants, including torpedoes, mine-torpedo and mine-rocket complexes, air- and
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ship-laid sea-bed mines, contact and non-contact trawls, shore defence missile 
complexes, onboard equipment for cruise missiles, and steering-control systems for 
submarines.182 Russia is also interested in supplies of strategic raw materials from 
Kazakhstan; were there no agreement, it could still purchase them, but would have 
to pay higher free market prices.
The general impression is that the treaty "On Military Cooperation" and the 
agreement "On Military and Technological Cooperation" were comprehensive but 
not well prepared, and resembled mere declarations of intent. They defined spheres 
of interest of both Russia and Kazakhstan in military cooperation, and indicated 
potential agreements of substance, but they contained very few specific obligations.
Their shortcomings revealed themselves pretty soon, and many important 
provisions simply remained on paper. For example, in 1994 Russia again refused to 
fulfil Kazakh requests for weapon and equipment supplies, because of Kazakhstan's 
inability to pay.183 Kazakhstan accused Russia of failing to adhere to the letter of 
the treaty, alleging that Moscow' had demanded payment at world, not domestic, 
prices.184 Disagreements also spread into the sphere of military education. 
Kazakhstan expected that under Article 18 free education of Kazakhs in Russian 
military-educational institutions, provided under the 1992 agreement, would 
continue. But the Russian Defence Ministry suddenly began demanding payment of 
fees.185
According to Kazakh military experts, in 1994 achievements in military 
cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan found reflection "primarily in a 
number of mutually signed agreements, leaving general military problems 
practically unsolved".186 This conclusion seems to be substantiated. But it is also 
important to identify the reasons for it. Most probably Russia’s uncooperativeness 
was deliberate policy. Moscow put restraints on bilateral military cooperation while 
waiting for progress on a number of issues of primary importance for Russia, such 
as test ranges, status of military formations and inter-state transportation. Besides 
Russia obviously conditioned its military cooperation with Kazakhstan on progress 
in negotiations on Baykonur and fulfilment of Kazakhstan's obligations to remove 
nuclear warheads to Russia. It was only after considerable progress was made on 
these matters that a real turn for the better occurred in Russian-Kazakh military 
relations.
The turn for the better in Russian-Kazakh military relations occurred in 
autumn 1994, first on the issue of cooperation in protecting CIS external borders.
On 8 September 1994 Russia and Kazakhstan signed an agreement, dealing with 
transportation through Kazakhstan of border guard troops, materials and 
equipment in the interests of protecting the CIS’ external borders. In accordance
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with this agreement, Kazakhstan pledged unimpeded and free transit to Russian 
border guards protecting the external borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan, and undertook to ensure fulfilment of schedules and security of 
transportation through its territory. The agreement covered all forms of transit - by 
air, rail road, sea or rivers.187 This was followed on 21 October 1994 by the treaty 
“On Cooperation in Protecting External Borders".
The parties agreed that with open borders between them, protection of the 
external borders was their common duty (Article 3). In the event of destabilisation 
or threat of destabilisation anywhere along the external border, they pledged 
immediate consultation and joint measures to restore stability (Article 4). They 
undertook to coordinate their activities and take joint measures against terrorist 
acts, illegal traffic in drugs, weapons and other contraband, illegal entry to and exit 
from Russia and Kazakhstan (Article 4), and to cooperate in conducting 
intelligence operations "in the interests of protecting the external borders" (Article 
7) Russia promised to assist Kazakhstan in training officers and warrant officers 
for border guard service, and to supply Kazakh border troops with military and 
technical equipment (Articles 8 and 9). Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to form a 
Consultative Control Council, consisting of the Commanders-in-Chief of Russia’s 
and Kazakhstan’s Border Guard Forces, their Deputies, and other persons 
appointed by them. Its main functions included: ensuring fulfilment of the treaty; 
consultations on measures for improving efficiency of border protection, 
determining current and prospective needs for officers; exchanging information on 
questions of common interest; organising cooperation between Border Guard 
troops in situations of destabilisation or threat of destabilisation at the external 
borders; developing and implementing proposals to unify legislation on border 
guards’ functioning; taking decisions on training at border guard military- 
educational establishments; consultations on questions of military equipment 
deliveries.188
In December 1994 - January 1995 Russia and Kazakhstan signed ten more 
agreements on bilateral military cooperation, some of them of utmost importance 
for Moscow.189 The countries finally agreed on conditions of lease of such
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Strategie military objects as "Balkhash" Missile Attack Warning Centre and test 
ranges: "Emba" (tactical anti-aircraft defence systems), "Sary Shagan" ( strategic 
anti-aircraft and anti-missile defence systems, including laser weapons), 929 GLIC 
(tests of military aircraft) and 4GSP (State Central Test Range). The agreements 
were modelled on a standard pattern. The objects were given for use and 
administration by the Russian military, their commanders to be appointed by the 
President of Russia after consulting the President of Kazakhstan. Russia undertook 
to restore and maintain the objects' infrastructure, to conduct tests within the 
ranges' limits, to ensure security of works and missile launches, allow Kazakhstan's 
armed forces to use the ranges after consulting with the Russian side, improve the 
ecological situation at the objects, provide for timely cleansing of them, removal of 
hazards caused by accidents, and compensation for damage resulting from such 
accidents. The agreements were for ten years with automatic prolongation for 
another ten years if neither side declared intent to terminate them six month before 
the end of each ten year period. But the agreements could be suspended in case the 
sides failed to agree on, or subsequently breached, the conditions of lease.190
Another very important agreement was the one on the status of Russian 
military formations in Kazakhstan. It placed Russian military units in their 
deployment areas in Kazakhstan under Russian legislation and Russian military 
procedures, provided they did not contravene international law, and put 
supervision over their compliance with Russian legislation into the hands of the 
appropriate Russian authorities. Russian units could employ citizens of 
Kazakhstan. (Article 2), but should respect Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and 
legislation, not interfere in its internal affairs, nor take part in its domestic political 
life, including internal conflicts. (Article 3). Russian military units could leave their 
bases or enter or leave Kazakhstan only after consultation with Kazakhstan’s 
Defence Ministry, and the same applied to flights by Russian military aircraft in 
Kazakhstan's airspace. (Article 6). Counterintelligence protection of Russian 
military units, and operations relating to Russian personnel or members of their 
families, would be conducted by Russia’s counterintelligence services. (Article 11). 
Each country undertook to compensate the other for material damage resulting 
from Russian military activities or actions by Kazakh authorities, citizens or 
organisations affecting Russian units (Article 22). The agreement would be in force
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for ten years, and would be extended automatically for another ten, unless either 
side gave six months’ notice of intent to terminate it.191
Of crucial importance was the agreement allowing transportation through 
Kazakhstan of Russian troops and military equipment. It covered rail, road and air 
transportation, but dealt mainly with rail transport, most significant for Russia. It 
placed responsibility for administering such transportation on the Central Military 
Communications Directorate of the Russian Defence Ministry, and the Military 
Communications Service of Kazakhstan's General Staff, which were to resolve all 
rail transport questions cooperatively. The Russian side would prepare an annual 
schedule for military trains, and notify its Kazakh counterpart before 1 November 
of the preceding year. Applications to dispatch military trains were to be sent "to 
the military-transport institutions after these transportations (supplies) have been 
endorsed by the relevant authorities of both sides". (Article 7). The Russian and 
Kazakh transport organisations would allocate rolling stock, locomotives, materials 
for securing weapons and equipment, train crews, loading and unloading 
equipment, and ensure scheduled movement and security of the troops and 
equipment through their territory. (Article 9). Overflights by military aircraft would 
also take place only after consultations with the "appropriate authorities", 
responsible for air transportation, and controlled by territorial air transport 
authorities. (Article 12). Transport by road could be conducted "either singly or in 
column, on the basis of plans and applications, and after obtaining agreement from 
the appropriate authorities". (Article 13). The agreement was to be valid for five 
years, and would be automatically extended for subsequent five year periods unless 
either side declared intent to terminate it six months before the expiry of each five- 
year period.192
This agreement, together with the earlier one on transporting border guard 
troops, finally resolved one of Russia’s most acute strategic problems, stability of 
lines of communication to the CIS’ southern border. Its only disadvantage for 
Russia was the procedure for obtaining permission to transport, which could 
become victim to bureaucratic inefficiency, and hamper the prompt movement of 
troops in crisis situations. But generally the agreement served mostly Russian 
interests, since it is difficult to see what need Kazakhstan would have to transport 
troops through Russia.
Thus despite mutual objurgation, scolding and scuffling, Russia and 
Kazakhstan in 1995 moved substantially closer in their bilateral military ties. By the 
mid-1995 the process of building a solid legal base for bilateral military 
cooperation was generally complete. By October 1997 they had signed 46 treaties
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and agreements, covering almost every possible sphere of military relations.193 
These agreements formalised a deep Russian involvement in ensuring Kazakhstan's 
defences, and in return bound Kazakhstan tightly to Russia in the military field. 
Their conclusion helped Moscow to solve some important military and strategic 
problems related to its interests in Central Asia. In the event of an international 
crisis, Russia could rely on using Kazakhstan's territory for forward defence, power 
projection, logistical support and mobilisation of extra personnel into the Russian 
army. It ensured stability of troops and armaments transportation to the CIS’ 
southern border, facilitating a rapid buildup of military power there. Finally, the 
Russian military presence in Kazakhstan was legally validated, retaining 
Kazakhstan in Russia’s sphere of military influence, and ensuring protection of the 
ethnic Russian population in the event of inter-ethnic violence.
These developments made for a fairly optimistic forecast by the Russian 
Defence Ministry with regard to military cooperation with Kazakhstan.194 Kazakh 
official experts also hailed Russian-Kazakh military relations as an alliance. For 
example Bakaev unhesitatingly called Russia Kazakhstan's "strategic ally".195 At a 
press conference in Moscow on 16 May 1997 Nazarbayev confirmed the alliance 
nature of relations with Russia by referring to the Treaty on Friendship, 
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, and specifically stating that in case of an 
attack against Russia or Kazakhstan, both countries would defend each other by all 
available means, including armed forces 196
Nevertheless, some Russian foreign policy analysts expressed scepticism 
about Kazakhstan's reliability as a military ally. S.Solodovnikov, a Senior Fellow at 
the Centre for Strategic Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International 
Relations, stated at the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakh relations that none of 
the treaties and agreements with Kazakhstan was working, and "there can be 100,
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195 Bakaev, L., Voennaya doktrina Respubliki Kazakhstan // Evrasiyskoe Soobshchestvo: economica, politica, 
bezopasnost', No.4-5, 1995, p. 48.
196 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.05.97.
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200 and 300 agreements but they remain on paper".197 Experts at the Russian 
Institute of Strategic Studies noted that during his visits to the USA and Western 
Europe in 1994-1995, Nazarbayev "more than once spoke on issues involving, 
among other things, Russia’s security interests, in a way somewhat contrary to an 
allied approach...". This was interpreted as "an element of pressure on Russia to 
make it more conciliatory over a whole range of issues, including the military 
sphere".198 These judgements are not unfounded, and reflect elements of instability 
in the military and strategic relationships between Russia and Kazakhstan.
It is obvious that certain undercurrents of uneasiness, suspicion and 
mistrust continue to plague Russian-Kazakh military relationships. Thus after the 
agreements on the test ranges had been signed, the talks on the lease treaties 
dragged on. Most of the differences revolved around procedure for and amounts of 
rent payments. A Russian Defence Ministry report said that some substantial 
differences emerged over determining the cost of individual facilities, 
characteristics of weapons to be tested, and amount of land tax to be levied. The 
Russian Defence Ministry representative at the Duma hearings on Russian-Kazakh 
relations, Lieutenant-General Merkulov, publicly described the Kazakh
negotiators’ approach as "unconstructive".199 Only on 18 October 1996 were 
treaties on leasing the ranges finally signed by Chernomyrdin and Kazhegeldin.200
But immediately afterwards, the Kazakh leadership initiated a public 
campaign against Russian use of the ranges. From December 1996 
Kazakhstanskaya Pra\>da began to publish regular articles under the rubric 
“Military Ranges - Bleeding Wounds on the Body of Kazakhstan”. In one such 
article E.Gabbasov, a member of Kazakhstan’s Senate Committee for International 
Relations, Defence and Security called for the ranges to be closed down, and also 
complained that the proposed rent for their use was ridiculously low at $26.5 
million dollars, and should be around $1.5 billion.201 Following the article a group 
of members of the Senate and Majilis sent a collective letter to Nazarbayev, 
demanding closure of the ranges.202 It is likely the campaign was sanctioned by 
Nazarbayev himself, to secure either a higher rent for the ranges or new 
concessions from Russia in other matters. Naturally, the campaign caused strong 
displeasure in Moscow.203
In November 1996 in Bishkek defence officials from Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan decided to hold the first international military exercises
197 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Federarnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh 
slushaniy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O 
rossiysko-kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh”, Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 142.
198 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: 
RISI, 1995, p. 119.
199 Gosudarstvennaya Duma FederaFnogo Sobraniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Stenogramma parlamentskikh 
slushaniy Komiteta po delam Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv i svyazyam s sootechestvennikami “O 
rossiysko-kazakhstanskikh otnosheniyakh", Moscow [No publisher] 18.04.95, p. 121.
200 Kazakhstan and Russia Sign Cooperation Agreements, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 23.10.96.
201 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.12.97.
202 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 24.12.96.
203 Russian Minister Responds to President Nazarbayev's Remarks, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
22.05.97.
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in Central Asia under the “Partnership for Peace” program.204 The Russians could 
do nothing to stop it, so decided to take part, if only to validate their regional 
presence. On 15 September the exercise, termed “Centrazbat-97”, was held in the 
Sayram district of South Kazakhstan province. Besides the Central Asian battalion, 
500 American, 40 Turkish and 40 Russian troops took part. The exercises proved 
the ability of the USA, Turkey and Russia to deliver airborne troops to 
Kazakhstan. The scenario of the exercise assumed a military conflict between the 
government and separatists had erupted, and UN “collective peacekeeping troops” 
had been sent to prevent the separatists’ capturing Sayram airport, where they 
intended to receive weapons and ammunition flown in from an unidentified 
neighbouring state.205 In principle such a scenario could be directed at Islamic 
militants wanting to break away from secular Kazakh state to form their own 
Islamic republic and being supported from the territory of Afghanistan. On the 
other, the scenario could be equally directed against potential Russian separatists, 
for example, in Semirechye, where large Russian population, but also in other 
areas. Kazakh leadership could not afford to stage such an exercise in the northern 
provinces, simply because in that case it would have been clearly directed against 
ethnic Russians and would have caused political complications.
According to some Russian experts Kazakhstan spies on some Russian 
military installations on its territory.206 Russia also expressed concern over the US- 
Kazakh remote sensing experiment in Kazakhstan near the Russian border 
involving US Orion P-3 aircraft, claiming it was an intelligence gathering 
exercise.207 This question was raised by Primakov during his negotiations with 
Tokayev at their meeting in Moscow on 26 June 1997. Tokayev replied that 
Kazakhstan had informed Russia about the experiment, and emphasised that as an 
independent country Kazakhstan has a right to conduct any “scientific 
experiments” on its territory.208
On 28 October 1997 Russian Defence Minister Sergeyev arrived in Almaty 
on a three-day visit. His negotiations with the Kazakh side concentrated on sorting 
out outstanding military issues. During the meeting with Nazarbayev on 29 
October Sergeyev promised to hand over four more SU-27 aircraft by the end of 
1997, as compensation for strategic bombers withdrawn from Kazakhstan. They 
also discussed creation of a joint security system in Central Asia, with Russian 
participation.209 The negotiations resulted in signing several documents. One was 
an agreement between the Defence Ministries on joint planning of operational 
activities and training of Russian and Kazakh military personnel. Joint command
204 Meeting on Central Asian Military Exercises Ends in Kyrgyzstan, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
09.11.96.
205 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 19.09.97.
206 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: 
RISI, 1995, p. 120.
207 Russia Denounces Plans for US-Kazakli Reconnaissance Mission, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR,
28.06.97.
208 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 28.06.97.
209 President Nazarbayev, Russian Defence Minister Discuss Military Cooperation, BBC Monitoring Service: 
Former USSR, 30.10.97.
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staff exercises were scheduled to be held in 1998. Th Russian and Kazakh armed 
forces’ Chiefs of General Staff were to plan them jointly.
Sergeyev and Kazakh Defence Minister Altynbayev initialled an agreement 
on Russian payments for leasing the test ranges. According to reports, the Russian 
Defence Ministry is to pay $US 28 million a year. $3 million of this will be, another 
$4 million will cover training of 1,000 Kazakh personnel a year at Russian higher 
military schools, and the rest would comprise supplies of weapons and materiel. 
Another agreement set out conditions for storing and transporting highly toxic 
missile fuel and other compounds from the Sary Shagan test site. The latter two 
agreements were to be submitted for review at governmental level in both states. 
Sergeyev claimed that the visit had accomplished everything it was meant to, but 
this appears an overstatement, given the real results of the negotiations. Even 
where agreements were reached, progress was very qualified. Four more aircraft 
(in addition to 41 already supplied) fell far short o f the 73 that Russia had promised 
to Kazakhstan. No firm agreement was reached on the transfer of two mine­
sweepers and two gunboats, which. Altynbayev said might take part in joint 
patrols of the two states' national sectors in the Caspian Sea, adding that "this is in 
the interests of both Russia and Kazakhstan,". But Sergeyev confined himself to a 
general statement that Russia would “ seek possibilities” to transfer the boats. 
Russian reluctance to proceed with the deal was presumably due to disagreement 
on the status of the Caspian Sea.210
Fulfilment of the agreement on rent payments for the test ranges remained 
conditioned on the Russian Duma’s attitude, which was far from positive given 
Russian-Kazakh disagreements on the status of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. The 
Duma is unlikely to abandon its previous practice of blocking allocation of funds 
for the test ranges and Baykonur, and the budget for the current financial year did 
not include funds for them. This was probably why Sergeyev told journalists that 
Russia might be prepared to reduce the size of the test sites.211 Besides the 
situation around Baykonur again deteriorated when on 24 November 1997 
Kazakhstan’s parliamentary international affairs, defence and security committee 
rejected the draft law on the status of the cosmodrome, on the grounds that it 
discriminated against Kazakhstan. The head of the customs service, G.Kasymov, 
strongly objected to the draft law, saying that it did not specify whether Kazakh 
law was effective on the site. Senator Engels Gabbasov said Russia had launched 
foreign commercial satellites from Baykonur, in breach of the agreement. 
A.Kalybayev, Head of the Kazakh National Aerospace Agency, said Russia had 
paid none of the $US 115 million fee for the lease. The committee also said that 
the draft law said nothing about ecology, law-enforcement or customs services.212
210 The analysis of Russian-Kazakh disagreements on the status of the Caspian Sea is given in Chapter 6.
211 Russia's Sergeyev to Discuss Cooperation with Kazakhstan, ITAR-TASS World Service, 28.10.97; Russia, 
Kazakhstan Sign Military Cooperation Accords, ITAR-TASS World Service, 30.10.97; Reuters News Service, 
30.10.97; Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 31.10.97.
212 Parliament Committee Questions Space Site Lease, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 27.11.97.
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The new difficulties over Baykonur’s status prompted Russia to speed up 
its military disengagement from there. On 17 December 1997 Yeltsin issued a 
decree instructing the government "to approve, within two months, plans for 
handing over facilities of the Baykonur cosmodrome from the Defence Ministry to 
the Russian Space Agency”. The decree provided for setting up a state enterprise, 
Baykonur Federal Space Centre, to take over and operate the cosmodrome's 
facilities. The Defence Ministry would gradually reduce its personnel there, and 
hand over the facilities in 1998. 755 Russian military officers would stay, but 
would be seconded to and paid by the RSA.213
Kazakhstan continued expanding its military ties with the USA. During 
Nazarbayev’s visit to Washington on 17-18 November 1997, he concluded a 
number of agreements on military matters. They included a Defence Cooperation 
Agreement which outlined plans for high level visits, additional progress on 
cooperative threat reduction and defence conversion, and US assistance in 
professionalising the Kazakh military, with particular emphasis on English language 
instruction, and training for a non-commissioned officer corps. The sides also 
signed a Program of Military Contacts for 1998 which called for more than 40 
events and exchanges. As Secretary of Defence Cohen noted at the signing 
ceremony, US and Kazakhstan were “currently working both bilaterally and 
through the Partnership for Peace program to build new structures for regional 
stability in Central Asia” .214 This was clearly a challenge to the Russian-sponsored 
Tashkent Treaty security system.
Thus despite all the military agreements concluded between Russia and 
Kazakhstan, they failed to resolve the major problems in their military relations. 
Differences over cooperation with NATO, on the principles of a collective security 
system for Central Asia, the scale of the Russian military presence in Kazakhstan, 
and unresolved military-related financial matters remain significant stumbling 
blocks in the way of military cooperation between them. These problems will 
remain high on the agenda of bilateral relations, and to a large degree affect those 
relations, for some years to come.
213 Baykonur Cosmodrome to Be Run by Civilian Authorities, ITAR-TASS World Service, 18.12.97
214 Transcript: Cohen, Nazarbayev at Signing Ceremony, File ED:97111809.GWE, USIA Database, 18.11.97.
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CHAPTER 5
RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR 
KAZAKHSTAN’S ENERGY RESOURCES
After the collapse of the USSR Kazakhstan's energy resources became an 
area of vigorous diplomatic struggle between major world powers, including 
Russia. In the new geostrategic situation both the economic and the political 
importance of these resources in Russia’s CIS strategy increased substantially. 
Initially Russian policy was motivated by immediate economic concerns, but later, 
with identification of Russia's new national interests, geopolitical considerations 
moved to the fore. At first sight Russian economic interest in Kazakhstan's energy 
resources seemed unnecessary. Russia's own energy reserves were several times 
those of Kazakhstan. According to 1991 assessments, Russia possessed 86% of the 
former USSR’s proven oil and gas, and 70% of its coal reserves, versus 
Kazakhstan's 14%, 2% and 12% respectively.1 In 1992 Kazakhstan's oil output 
was only 5.56% of Russia’s.
But the Russian oil industry had been experiencing difficulties for some 
time, due to lack of investment and deteriorating infrastructure. Russian crude oil 
output had been shrinking steadily for years, but the most dramatic fall occurred in 
1992. The Russian Ministry for Fuel and Power Engineering spotted the 
unfavourable trend as early as April, and warned that oil production in 1992 would 
be 360 million tonnes, 90 million tonnes less than in 1991.2 The gravity of the 
problem was revealed at a government conference in the Kremlin on 30 May 1992, 
devoted to improving the performance of the Russian oil and gas complex. Yeltsin, 
who chaired the meeting, expressed serious concern over the unprecedented fall in 
oil and gas production. The conference promulgated a set of measures to revitalise 
the industry, including developing new oil and gas fields and encouraging foreign 
investments.3 Thus in 1992 Russia's immediate concern was to stabilise its own oil 
and gas production.
Russia’s enormous gas reserves ensured that it could supply its domestic 
and foreign markets for many years to come.4 The situation regarding proven oil 
reserves was less good, but it would be a long time before they fell too low to meet 
domestic demand. A 1993 estimate by the Minister for Fuel and Power
1 Kazakhstan: realu i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, pp. 10, 13.
2 Russian Oil Production Set to Fall by 90 Million Tonnes in 1992, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
01.05.92. Actual drop in oil production in 1992 was a bit less than predicted. It fell from 460 to 395 million tonnes 
[Reuters News Service, 22.01.93], Obviously aictive rescue measures, undertaken by the Russian government 
helped reduce the damage.
3 Yeltsin and Government Discuss Oil and Gais: Deputy Premier Replaced, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 01.06.92.
4 Russia accounts for 34.5% of the world's gas reserves.
194
Engineering indicated that domestic demand, at 240 million tonnes per year,5 was 
well below annual output. But Moscow had had an interest since Brezhnev’s time 
in maintaining high levels of oil and gas exports, which had provided an easy way 
of earning much needed foreign currency and postponing the urgent task of 
technological modernisation. The new Yeltsin regime looked at the oil and gas 
industry from the same perspective, but now required oil and gas exports to 
finance the costly social and economic transformation of Russian society towards 
capitalism. Maintaining production and exports became especially important for the 
regime’s political survival. For Russia the problem was not a lack of energy 
resources, but of capital for extracting and exporting them.
Nazarbayev’s regime had a similar agenda. In his strategy of nation-state 
building, independence had the highest priority. After the collapse of the USSR, 
the Kazakh leadership had no illusions about the real level of independence it had 
achieved. In an interview to Kazakh TV on the first anniversary o f independence, 
Nazarbayev was quite frank about this: “So far we have not reached real 
independence...To achieve independence, the economy must be independent. To 
have an independent economy, we will have to face many future problems, because 
we will have to change the economic structure itself’.6 Nazarbayev’s government 
turned to the energy sector as the major lever for economic restructuring, industrial 
modernisation and political survival. Kazakhstan’s known oil and gas reserves, 
though smaller than Russia’s, were large relative to its population, and it had 
regularly held second place in oil and gas production in the former USSR. At the 
beginning of 1993 its proven energy reserves were 2.21 billion tons of oil, 0.69 
billion tons of gas condensate and 2.49 trillion cubic meters (nv) of natural gas, or 
2% of the world’s proven oil and gas deposits. Estimated reserves looked even 
more substantial - 8 billion tons of oil, and 5 trillion nv’ of gas.7
Almaty based its strategy on the premise that achievement of full economic 
independence should start with energy independence. A report on Kazakhstan's 
economic security, prepared in 1994 by Sh.Zhaksibekova, a Research Fellow at the 
Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies, identified "formation of the policy of 
economic independence" as the major objective, and pointed at Kazakhstan's "vast 
energy resources" as the basis for securing such independence, by "providing 
sufficient financial means for reorientation of the entire economy". It said that 
"expansion of oil production and growing revenue from exports open great 
possibilities for financing requirements for imported products and technologies, 
and for sustaining new investments", and concluded that "If Kazakhstan cannot 
acquire appropriate power and potential in the immediate future, it will risk being 
drawn into the gravitational orbit of its stronger neighbours (China and Russia),
5 Intergovernmental Council on Oil and Gas Established, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 05.03.93.
6 Nazarbayev on Kazakh TV: Talks about Economy, Religion, Nationality Mix, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 18.12.92.
7 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, pp. 73-74.
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becoming a satellite of their economies, and losing real economic and political 
independence".8
The Kazakh leadership shared this view. Deputy Prime Minister Isingarin 
explained in an interview that Almaty "gives priority to development of pipeline 
transport, primarily directed towards export, because this will determine the future 
flow of investments and credits into Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry, and that will 
predetermine economic development...The objective is to abolish the economy’s 
current excessive dependence on supplies of energy resources from neighbouring 
states".9 Official pronouncements to this effect had begun to be voiced much 
earlier. In late September 1992, during a working tour of East Kazakhstan, Prime 
Minister Tereshchenko had said "We extract our own oil, but are forced to import 
petrol from Russia. This dependence must end".10
At first sight, to speak of Kazakhstan's "energy dependence" looked 
strange, given its large oil and gas deposits. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's energy 
dependence on Russia was a fact of life, mainly because of the structure of its oil 
and gas complex inherited from Soviet times. The distribution of major industrial 
enterprises in the USSR was based on a single economic space, and ignored inter­
republican borders. As a result Kazakhstan's two major refineries, Pavlodar in the 
north-east and Shymkent in the south-east, were far from the main oil and gas 
deposits in Kazakhstan. They processed West Siberian crude, delivered via the 
Omsk-Pavlodar-Shymkent pipeline, and had no pipeline connection to the West 
Kazakhstan fields.
Western Kazakhstan had only one refinery, in Atirau (Guryev), capable of 
processing just over 4 million tonnes of crude per year,* 11 only a fraction of 
Kazakhstan's annual oil production of more than 20 million tonnes, 15 million of 
which came from West Kazakhstan.12 The rest was pumped via the Uzen-Samara 
pipeline to refineries in Russia’s Volga region. Before the USSR's collapse, 
Kazakhstan's three refineries processed about 18 million tonnes of crude a year, 
almost equal to its domestic demand of 20 million tonnes. But locally-produced 
crude provided less than 30% of the feedstock.13 As a result Kazakhstan found 
itself very unfavourably placed after independence.
For example, in 1994 Kazakhstan exported 8.14 million tonnes of oil to 
Russia, and imported 8.87 million tonnes from it. But the price correlation was 
very unfavourable. Russia charged Kazakhstan $382.49 million, an average of 
$43.12 a tonne, for its oil, but paid only $239.04 million, an average of $29.37 a 
tonne, for Kazakhstan’s oil.14 This was very disadvantageous for Kazakhstan, but
8 Zhaksibekova, Sh., Faktory povisheniya economicheskoy bezopasnosti Kazakhstana (analiticheskiy doklad), 
Almaty: KISI, 1994, p. 5, 10-12.
9 Kazakhstan budet rasshiryat’ svoe prisutstvie na mirovom rynke (intervyu s pervym zamestitelem Premier 
Ministra Respubliki Kazakhstan Isingarinom N.K.) // Politika (Almaty), No.4, 1996, pp. 15-16.
10 Izvestiya, 23.09.92.
11 Auken, B., Julamanov, R., Nett' i gaz Kazakhstana (ekonomicheskiy obzor), Almaty: ERK, 1995, pp. 4-5.
12 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 17.10.96.
13 Petroleum Economist, July 1995, p. 3.
14 Mimsterstvo Ekonomiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Spravka o postavkakh vazhneyshikh vidov produktsii mezhdu 
Rossiyskoy Federatsiey i Respublikoy Kazakhstan v 1994 godu, Moscow [No publisher] 04.04.95.
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it could do nothing about it, as it was dependent on Russian oil, whereas Russia 
was not dependent on Kazakhstan oil, and could buy or not as it saw fit. From 
1991 to 1994 there was a decline in the volume of oil processed annually by 56% 
at Pavlodar and 41% at Shymkent, while Atirau’s output remained at the 1991 
level.15
A similar situation existed with Kazakhstan's gas production, also 
concentrated in Western Kazakhstan and oriented towards exports to Russia. 
Russia had no dependence on Kazakhstan’s gas, while Kazakhstan could meet its 
domestic demand of 15 billion nr a year only by importing gas from Russia, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.16 E.Azerbaev, President of the state gas company 
"Kazakhgaz", complained that Orenburg gas processing plant would pay only "a 
lower than dumping price" for gas and condensate from the Karachaganak field.17 
From 1992 to 1994 Kazakhstan's gas production fell from 7.56 billion m3 to 4.05 
billion, and gas exports from 5.1 billion nr to 1.49 billion.18
The Kazakh leadership was uncomfortably aware of its weak energy 
position, and devised various plans to eliminate its dependence. One such 
contemplated building a pipeline from Atirau via the Kenkiyak and Kumkol 
oilfields to join the Pavlodar-Shymkent line. Technical and economic surveys 
assessed the pipeline’s length as 1195 km, annual capacity as 23 million tonnes, 
and cost as $1.1 billion.19 For gas transportation, the Kazakh leadership envisaged 
building a pipeline from the Karachaganak oil and gas field via Aksay and 
Aktyubinsk to Krasnyy Oktyabr’, with subsequent north-eastward extension via 
Kustanay and Kokchetau to Akmola.20 In addition, a small (400,000 tonnes a year) 
refining unit was planned for the Karachaganak gas and condensate deposit.21 
Kazakhstan had only two potential sources of capital for these pipelines, its own oil 
and gas exports or foreign investment.
Kazakhstan began actively seeking foreign investment in its oil and gas 
industry very soon after independence. In April 1992 the French state-controlled 
oil company, Elf Aquitaine, concluded a deal to explore for oil in Atirau province. 
In May 1992, during Nazarbayev's visit to the USA, a contract was signed with 
Chevron Oil to develop the Tengiz oil field. In July 1992 British Gas and the Italian 
state oil company Agip bid successfully to exploit the Karachaganak oil and gas 
field.22 The Kazakh leadership was evidently heartened by these developments,
15 Petroleum Economist, July 1995, p. 3.
16 Reuters News Service, 02.11.92.
17 Azerbaev, E., V edinstve nasha sila // Evrasiya: narody, kultury, religii, No. 1(3), 1995, p. 25.
18 Petroleum Economist, January 1996, p. 6.
19 Kabildin, K., Lobaev, A., Rakhmetova, K., Neff' Kazakhstana v tsentrafnoaziatskom, rossiyskom i mirovom 
kontekste // Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, No.3(4), 1995, p. 14.
20 Kazakhstan budet rasshiryaf svoe prisutstvie na mirovom rynke (intervyu s pervym zamestitelem Premier 
Ministra Respubliki Kazakhstan Isingarinom N.K.) // Politika (Almaty), No.4, 1996, p. 16.
21 Petroleum Economist, July 1995, p. 3.
22 Tengiz oil field is situated in the very north-west of Mangistau province on the Caspian Sea coast. Discovered in 
1970, it is one of the five biggest fields in the world. Its oil reserves are estimated at 500-800 million tonnes. 
Karachaganak oil and gaz field is situated in the north-east of West Kazakhstan province. Discovered in 1979, its 
reserves are estimated at 200 million tonnes of oil, 650 million tonnes of gas condensate and 1.3 trillion cubic
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because in November 1992 N.Bekbosynov, First Deputy Energy Minister, 
announced a long-term program forecasting a rise in oil and gas output to 33.5 
million tonnes and 16.1 billion nr by 1995, and 42 million tonnes and 22 billion nr 
by 2000. He stressed that Karachaganak and other deposits being developed 
should increase Kazakhstan's natural gas resources by 2.4 times by 2000, enabling 
gas imports to be reduced by a similar proportion.23 Addressing a conference on 
Kazakhstan's energy resources in Almaty on 6 October 1993, Baykenov, Minister 
of Power Engineering and Fuel, said that the national program for developing the 
oil and gas industry would make Kazakhstan self-sufficient in energy within three 
to four years.24
Kazakhstan's energy policy rested on maximising involvement by Western 
companies in its oil and gas sector. In his address to the nation in October 1997 
Nazarbayev justified it as follows: “Major companies and money from the USA, 
Russia, China, Britain and other leading states will be involved in development of 
the Caspian shelf and the Karachaganak field. This will increase the leading 
powers’ interest in our independence” .25 The mention of Russia as only one among 
several equals was meant to stress that it would have no predominant influence in 
its former domain. Thus besides raising funds to modernise Kazakhstan's energy 
infrastructure and production base, Nazarbayev had a political objective, to involve 
the major powers in competition for access to Kazakhstan’s energy resources, 
thereby achieving de facto independence from Russia without falling into 
dependency on any other country.
Nazarbayev's plans were definitely at odds with Russia’s strategic line of 
stabilising its own oil industry. Competition with Kazakhstan for foreign 
investment in the energy sector weakened Moscow’s bargaining position vis-a-vis 
Western companies, limited its choice of potential investors, and potentially 
threatened prices in the traditional and new markets the Russian oil and gas 
industry sought to penetrate. Moscow began seeking ways to put the brakes on 
Kazakhstan's unrestrained cooperation with foreign investors. Its biggest lever was 
the fact that all the pipelines between Kazakhstan and its potential foreign markets 
ran through Russian territory, and it was prepared to use its control to enforce its 
own energy policy within the CIS.
The Kazakh leadership well understood their geographical disadvantage, 
and made every effort to secure Moscow's cooperation in ensuring transit for 
Kazakhstan’s oil and gas exports through Russia's pipelines. Moscow could not 
openly reject Kazakhstan's approaches, because to do so could harm relations not 
only with Almaty but with major Western oil companies which were actual or 
potential investors in Russia, and had the ear of their respective governments. Thus 
in enforcing its energy policy towards Kazakhstan, Russia had to tread delicately.
meters of natural gas. Both fields are difficult to exploit because of their depth - 4-5.5 km. [Kazakhstan: realii i 
perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 1995, p. 75-76].
23 Reuters News Service, 02.11.92.
24 International Oil and Gas Conference Opens in Alma-Ata, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 15.10.93.
25 Nazarbayev, N., Kazakhstan - 2030: protsvetanie, bezopasnosC i uluchshenie blagosostoyaniya kazakhstantsev, 
Poslanie Presidenta strany narodu Kazakhstana // Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.10.97, p. 29.
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The above considerations may be the clue to the essence of the game 
started by Moscow with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which has 
become the major mystery in the web of intrigues surrounding the pipeline issue. In 
the centre of the controversy was the Oman Oil Company (OOC) owned by the 
government of Oman, but managed by “Transworld Oil Ltd”, based in Houston, 
Texas.26 The intrigue started to unfold in May 1992, when immediately after the 
signing of the deal with Chevron Tereshchenko, then Kazakhstan's Prime Minister, 
and Chernomyrdin, then Russia’s Minister of the Oil and Gas Industry, went to 
Bermuda. Their visit resulted in a deal with the OOC to form what is now known 
as the CPC.27 Everything in this deal looked suspicious, the place where it was 
concluded, the choice of partner, and the personality of John Deuss, President of 
“Transworld Oil Ltd”.
John Deuss, a Dutch oil trader, was rumoured to be the originator of the 
CPC project. He allegedly promised the Kazakhs much investment, and political 
support from Washington, and in return demanded many things almost free of 
charge, including a one-third share in the CPC project.28 His business reputation 
was far from perfect. In the 1970s and 1980s he was allegedly involved in shipping 
oil to South Africa in contravention of UN sanctions.29 He was well and 
unfavourably known to Russian oil exporters. In 1978 the Soviet oil export agency 
Soyuznefteexport filed a complaint against Deuss and his company JOC Oil, 
alleging he had defrauded it of more than $100 million by not paying for oil 
delivered in 1976 and 1977. A protracted legal battle ensued. The contract 
between the two companies was ruled invalid, on the technicality that only one 
official of Soyuznefteexport had signed it, whereas Soviet law mandated two 
official signatories for contracts with foreign firms. The contract did, however, 
contain an arbitration clause which stated disputes would be settled by a Moscow 
tribunal. The tribunal subsequently ordered JOC to pay approximately $100 million 
for the oil, and a further $100 million in costs and profits from its sales of the oil. 
In 1989 a Bermuda appeal court upheld the ruling.30 Some later publications in the 
Russian press termed Deuss "an international swindler with a scandalous 
reputation", who "would hardly promote the undertaking’s success".31 The Russian 
decision to deal with Deuss again seemed strange, except that if they were planning 
something tricky, Deuss might be the right person for them.
On 15 June 1992 Tereshchenko left for Oman, for talks on cooperation in 
joint prospecting, extracting and transporting oil in Western Kazakhstan.32 What 
exactly Tereshchenko discussed in Oman is unknown, but the likelihood that CPC 
was the main issue is very high, because two days after the visit the CPC was
26 111 1991, when Kazakhstan was still a part of the USSR, OOC assisted the republic’s government in working out 
the Tengiz agreement [Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 11.07.97],
27 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30.11.95.
28 APS Review Gas Market Trends, 15.07.96.
29 Times, 28.04.96.
30 Euromonev, January 1994, p. 89.
31 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30.11.95.
32 Kazakh Premier Leaves for Oman, BBC Monitoring Service: Fonner USSR, 18.06.92.
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formally launched, initially by Kazakhstan and the OOC. Within three months, 
Oman extended a $US 100 million credit to Kazakhstan, allegedly to be used for 
“improvement of oil and gas extraction” .33 In practice no noticeable upgrading of 
Kazakhstan’s energy sector took place; in fact its situation continued to 
deteriorate.
On 22 June CPC signed a memorandum of understanding with Chevron, 
detailing Chevron’s desire for preferential access to the pipeline to transport oil 
from Tengiz. The memorandum did not impose any formal obligations on Chevron, 
but gave CPC the aura of the only pipeline partner that Chevron would have to 
deal with in the future. Russia joined the consortium, after some token delay, on 24 
July 1992, obviously to prevent possible future accusations that it had dragged 
Kazakhstan into the venture. Each CPC member had an equal interest in the 
consortium, which was to be registered as a limited liability company incorporated 
in Bermuda. The original plan envisaged that the pipeline would take three years to 
build, and cost between $700 million and $1.5 billion, depending on the route 
chosen.34
On 24 October 1992 CPC announced its plans to build an oil pipeline to 
link Tengiz and Baku (in Azerbaijan) with the Russian deep-water port of 
Novorossiysk. Other options, including routes through Azerbaijan and Iran to the 
Persian Gulf, and through Turkey to the Mediterranean, had been discarded. The 
cost of the project was given as about $850 million The existing pipeline from 
Atirau via Astrakhan to the refinery at Grozny (Chechnya) was to serve as basis for 
the new pipeline. This involved building a new 750-kilometre, 42-inch pipeline, and 
expanding Novorossiysk port with new terminal and storage facilities. The 
pipeline’s capacity would initially be 300,000 barrels a day, but capable of increase 
to 1.5 million. The project also envisaged modernising the existing Grozny-Baku 
oil pipeline35
In December 1992 Chernomyrdin was appointed Prime Minister, which 
substantially strengthened the oil and gas lobby’s position with the Russian 
government. In exchange for cooperation in CPC, Moscow demanded a share in 
the exploitation of Kazakhstan’s energy resources. Immediately after his 
appointment Chernomyrdin went to Almaty, where he and Tereshchenko signed an 
agreement "On Cooperation in the Industries of the Fuel and Energy Complexes" 
(24 December 1992). It was designed to secure Russian involvement in 
prospecting Kazakhstan’s energy resources, and said that the sides would 
"maintain existing business ties in conducting survey, exploration and prospecting 
drilling for oil and gas". Kazakhstan gave the right to drill on its territory to the 
Russian company "Prikaspiyburneft". The signatories promised to assist in 
concluding contracts between each other's firms to drill on their territories. (Article
33 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 05.09.97.
34 Reuters News Service, 24.07.92.
35 Caspian Oil Consortium Announces Pipeline Construction Plans, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
30.10.92.
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6), thereby preserving Russian access to Kazakhstan's oil and gas deposits. Other 
similar provisions were contained in Articles 7 and 13. They stipulated that the 
sides would continue to cooperate and maintain existing business ties in 
constructing main pipelines for transporting oil, gas and oil products, and in 
preparing oil and gas fields for commercial production. While this last point mainly 
suited Russia, interested in maintaining its access to Kazakhstan's energy resources, 
the first obviously favoured Kazakhstan, since Almaty knew that it would need use 
of Russian territory for connecting its oil and gas fields to world markets.
Kazakhstan received other concessions from Moscow. Article 3 of the 
agreement provided that the sides would "secure mutual deliveries of the most 
important fuel and energy resources in 1993", to be made on the basis of contracts 
between each other's companies, and at Russian domestic market prices, 
considerably lower than world market prices, thus guaranteeing Kazakhstan cheap 
oil and gas. On the other hand, Russia avoided specifying how much oil and gas it 
would purchase from Kazakhstan, or how much it would pay for them. The 
signatories also promised to ensure "unhampered transportation" of each other’s 
fuel and energy products through each other’s their territory, including those 
destined for export "in volumes established by Russian-Kazakh agreements, as well 
as agreements with third countries". Here Moscow met Kazakhstan halfway, 
retaining for itself the right to decide how much oil Kazakhstan would be allowed 
to sell on foreign markets.
Of particular importance for Russia was Article 16, which stipulated 
establishment of a working group on "creating a coordinating body for interaction 
of the oil and gas extracting industries".36 Behind it was Moscow's desire to draw 
Kazakhstan into a multilateral arrangement within the CIS, which would limit 
Almaty's freedom of manoeuvre in attracting foreign investors into its energy 
sector and exporting its own oil and gas. This clearly ran contrary to the Kazakh 
leadership’s strategic plans, but with the launching of CPC Almaty had every 
reason to feel optimistic, and did not want to vex Moscow by refusing to 
cooperate. Consequently Nazarbayev initially endorsed the Russian proposal. At 
the International Congress of Industrialists and entrepreneurs on 26 January 1993 
he mentioned that a conference of the ministries of CIS states responsible for oil 
and gas would be held soon in Tyumen province, a major Russian oil producing 
region, and that a “mini-OPEC” would be formed in the immediate future within 
CIS.37 He said "Kazakhstan is ready to take part in such a 'mini-OPEC"38
The meeting in Surgut, Tyumen province, took place on 2 March, and was 
attended by the heads of government of all former Soviet republics except Latvia, 
Estonia and Turkmenistan. The participants signed an agreement to create new
36 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel'stvom Respubliki Kazakhstan i Praviterstvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii o 
sotrudnichestve v otraslyakli toplivno-energeticheskikh kompleksov // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991- 
1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: Posol'stvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
1995, pp. 122-126.
37 "Izvestiya” and "Pravda' comment on Alma-Ata Industrialists Congress, BBC Monitoring Service: Former 
USSR, 30.01.93.
38 Reuters News Service, 19.12.92.
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mechanisms to halt Russia's collapsing oil production and ensure adequate fuel 
supplies to areas suffering shortages. It provided for setting up an inter­
governmental council on oil and gas, tasked to unite the republics' forces in the 
areas of investment, scientific, technological and other forms of cooperation, and 
to devise a common policy to promote stability and development in the oil and gas 
sectors. The highest body of the inter-governmental council would be the 
conference of heads of state, to be held at least twice a year. The council's 
executive body would be the council of ministers and heads of national fuel and 
energy administrations. The council of ministers would meet at least once per 
quarter. Tyumen, Siberia’s oil capital, was chosen as the council secretariat's 
headquarters.
Shafranik, Russia’s Minister for Fuel and Power Engineering, reportedly 
said the agreement would lay the foundation for restoring Russia's coordinating 
role in the fuel and energy complex, and, in an interview, that Russia would like to 
receive shares in oil extracting and processing enterprises in other member states, 
and was ready to offer its partners shares in its own enterprises. Kazakhstan also 
welcomed the agreement. According to Tereshchenko, in Surgut "at least 
everybody finally understood that the oil problem should be resolved together".39 
However, later events showed that the agreement remained on paper. Kazakhstan 
had no intention o f fulfilling it.
On 13 February 1993 the Kazakhstankaspiyshelf State Company was 
formed, for the purpose of exploring for oil and gas in the Kazakh zone of the 
Caspian shelf. On 22 April, while in Washington, K.Baikenov, Kazakhstan’s 
Minister of Energy and Fuel Resources, told reporters that by September the 
country planned to form a consortium with up to ten Western oil companies, to 
study development of oil and gas deposits under the Caspian Sea. He said the study 
should take about three years, and that companies joining the consortium would be 
given priority in obtaining licenses to extract the oil.40 Russian companies were not 
invited to participate in the project, so would not get this “priority” .
On 6 April 1993 Almaty signed an agreement with Chevron, establishing a 
joint company, Tengizchevroil.41 Initial plans for Tengiz development assumed 
production and export of 3 million tonnes of crude in 1993-94, to double by 1995, 
and reach its maximum capacity of 30 million tonnes a year by 2010. The project’s 
cost was assessed at $20 billion, and its duration as 40 years. Kazakhstan and 
Chevron each held a 50% share, but the profits would be divided in the proportions 
80.4% to Kazakhstan and 19.6% to Chevron.42 Russia was neither consulted nor 
invited to participate.
39 Reuters News Service, 02.03.93; Intergovernmental Council on Oil and Gas Established, BBC Monitoring 
Service: Former USSR, 05.03.93.
40 Kazakhstan Seeks Western Investment to Produce Energy, USIA Database, File ID: ECO404, 22.04.93.
41 Reuters News Service, 06.04.93.
42 Kazakhstan: realii i perspektivy nezavisimogo razvitiya / Pod obschey redaktsiey E.M.Kozhokina, Moscow: RISI, 
1995, pp. 75-76.
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The first signs of Russian dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan’s behaviour 
appeared in early February 1993, when the Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft 
demanded that Kazakhstan lower the level of mercaptan43 in oil from Tengiz 
exported through Russian pipelines. Vinnichenko, Director of Transneft, warned 
that the Tengiz project’s future would be in doubt if the mercaptan problem was 
not solved44 Meanwhile the Uzen-Samara pipeline, which was linked to the 
Druzhba export pipeline, was the only one Chevron could use for taking its oil out 
of Tengiz. The section leading to Samara had a capacity of around 10 million 
tonnes per year, more than enough to meet Chevron's initial demands. 
Tengizchevroil agreed with Russia on an export quota of 3 million tonnes for 1993. 
But problems were soon encountered. First, some mechanical constraints affected 
output and exports, and later the Russians simply refused to let Chevron put 
through as much crude as it wished. Chevron consequently managed to export only 
0.98 million tonnes from Tengiz in 1993.45 It was also faced with the prospect of 
having to build an expensive refinery complex at Tengiz.
The situation naturally affected Kazakhstan's overall oil exports, which fell 
substantially, instead of growing as predicted. In September 1993 Baykenov, 
Energy and Fuel Resources Minister, complained in an interview that Kazakhstan’s 
oil production and exports were being hampered, because Russia was limiting 
access to its pipelines. He said that oil exports in 1993 would be one million tonnes 
less than in 1992, due to the mercaptan problem 46 In fact, Kazakhstan exported 
6.2 million tonnes of crude through Russia in 1993, only slightly down from 6.5 
million in 1992.47 But this was little consolation for Chevron, which remained a 
major loser. But Chevron did not try to find an accommodation with the Russians, 
seeking instead decided to play from a position of strength. Various projects for 
possible alternative pipelines routes from Kazakhstan, by-passing Russian territory, 
began to be actively discussed, and the pipeline issue soon became the major 
element in a diplomatic struggle involving leading world powers.
The decision to form CPC worried Turkey. After the USSR’s collapse 
Ankara was making vigorous efforts to strengthen its position among the Turkic 
nations of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan. A major pipeline through Russia 
would perpetuate Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on its northern neighbour, 
and deprive Turkey of an opportunity to exercise economic leverage on Central 
Asian politics. For Ankara the prospective route of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan 
acquired not only economic but geopolitical importance. Turkey openly showed its 
dissatisfaction with the CPC decision at the summit of leaders of Turkic nations in 
Ankara on 31 October 1992. Opening the meeting, President Ozal suggested that
43 A highly corrosive sulphur derivative, which in high concentrations in oil can destroy pipelines and storage 
tanks.
44 Business Times (Singapore), 08.02.93.
45 Petroleum Economist, February' 1994, p. 22.
46 Reuters News Service, 17.09.93.
47 Reuters News Service, 04.08.94.
203
pipelines be built to carry Azeri, Kazakh, Turfmen and Uzbek crude and gas to 
Turkey's Mediterranean coast, for further export to the West.48
In late February 1993 Turkey began a campaign to prevent any increase in 
the number of tankers passing through the Straits. It told the International 
Maritime Organisation that the risks of pollution and accidents were unacceptable, 
that it was not yet contemplating unilateral action, but that while traffic separation 
measures and traffic services might reduce congestion in the Oospores, they could 
not solve the problems which would follow a traffic increase.49 The main thrust of 
the Turkish argument was clearly against oil and gas exports from Novorossiysk. 
Another Turkish move came on 9 March 1993, when it signed an agreement to 
build an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to a Mediterranean terminal at Yumurtalik.50 
This was the first bid for an alternative to CPC, to which Kazakhstan could later be 
connected.
Turkey’s actions well suited Chevron as a counter to Russian 
obstructionism over exporting Tengiz oil, and had a definite interest in the outcome 
of the growing Turkish-Russian dispute over oil transportation through the 
Bosporus. Limitations on tanker traffic would make the economics of oil 
transportation from Novorossiysk less attractive, and thereby invalidate the 
economic rationale behind the Tengiz-Novorossiysk pipeline project, making 
alternative pipeline routes (including one through Turkey) more viable. After 
experiencing Russian pipeline obstructionism, Chevron would probably prefer a 
pipeline from Tengiz to run through some other country, desirably America’s ally. 
Of course Turkey was acting in its own interests in pushing for a pipeline through 
its territory, but they coincided with Chevron’s.
On 23 April 1993 Chevron announced that the arrangements within the 
CPC were unsatisfactory. Chevron Overseas Petroleum President Richard Matzke 
said, after a joint press conference with Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Baykenov, 
that plans to split the equity in the CPC among Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman, but 
giving oil companies no real equity in return for their investment, were 
unacceptable, and added that Chevron was also interested in other pipeline projects 
besides the CPC.51 On 25 May Espy Price, Vice-President o f Chevron Overseas 
Petroleum, told an oil conference in London that three pipeline projects were being 
considered, but none yet met Chevron's five investment criteria, and that there was 
"a great deal of uncertainty about how and where a pipeline would be 
constructed".52 Turkey also used the London conference to issue a warning about 
the viability of channelling Kazakh crude to the Black Sea. Its Transport Minister,
48 Middle East Economic Digest, 13.11.92.
49 Lloyd's List, 24.02.93.
50 Reuters News Service, 09.03.93.
51 Reuters News Service, 23.04.93.
52 The five criteria comprised: ownership equitable and in proportion to the cash contribution of each participant; 
risks and rewards shared in proportion to capital contribution; non-discriminatory access and tariffs for shippers; 
fair tariffs; and protection from political risks. [Reuters News Service, 25.05.93].
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Yasar Topcu, said that increased tanker traffic through the Bosporus would not be 
possible, for environmental and strategic reasons.53
It was evidently Turkey's actions that prompted Russia to reconsider its 
priorities with regard to Caspian energy resources, and geopolitical considerations 
then pushed economic ones into the background. Russia could not accept removal 
of former Soviet republics from its sphere of influence into that of Turkey, a 
traditional geopolitical rival. In April 1993 Yeltsin decreed formation of a large 
partially state-owned oil company LUKoil, through the merger of three "oil 
production associations".54 It was assigned the task of "coordinating" Russian oil 
projects in the Caspian Sea basin,55 which in practice meant penetrating the 
Western companies’ various energy projects. In October 1993 LUKoil managed to 
obtain a 10% stake in the consortium led by British Petroleum to develop 
Azerbaijan's oil fields.56 Entry into such projects by a Russian state-controlled 
company was clearly designed to preserve Moscow's economic and political 
influence in the region. Firstly, Russia would receive access to internal information 
in the joint ventures. Secondly, it would benefit from profits made by the project. 
Thirdly, it would participate in decision-making, theoretically with no decisive 
voice, but with substantial weight given by Moscow’s backing.
Meanwhile the CPC project stalled for lack of funds. Kazakhstan counted 
on securing finance from international financial institutions. Baykenov, Minister for 
Energy and Fuel Resources, told reporters in Washington on 22 April 1993 that 
Kazakhstan would seek funding and assistance from the World Bank and Western 
official export credit agencies and oil companies.57 According to some reports, 
CPC approached the World Bank for a loan. Publicly the bank said it hoped to 
process loans to Kazakhstan by 1995, but privately bank sources said it was not 
prepared to lend to the project, probably because of Deuss' involvement.58 The 
bank's report of 8 April 1994 said its decision not to help fund the pipeline had put 
the consortium 'in crisis'.59 Thus Deuss' personality started to have a direct negative 
effect on implementation of the project, an outcome expected and welcomed by 
Russia.
The chosen tactic was simple. Kazakhstan was drawn into a venture, 
implementation of which was constantly delayed for technical or financial reasons, 
thus hindering Kazakhstan’s exports to western markets. At the same time 
involvement in the venture was distracting Kazakhstan from turning to alternative 
projects. Oman's role in the undertaking might be unclear at first sight, but was 
also quite explicable. The West was interested in diversifying sources of oil 
imports, to reduce its dependence on the Persian Gulf region. If it succeeded, the
53 Petroleum Economist, July 1993, p. 38.
54 Izvestiya, 06.06.95.
55 Economist, 16.07.94.
56 Ibidem.
57 Kazakhstan Seeks Western Investment to Produce Energy, USIA Database, File ID: ECO404, 22.04.93
58 Euromoney, January 1994, p. 89.
59 Financial Times, 17.05.94.
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economic and political influence of the Persian Gulf states would be diminished. 
Probably Oman’s involvement was encouraged by other major oil exporters to 
prevent such an outcome. In this Russia’s and Oman’s interests coincided.
Time was playing into Russia’s hands. Kazakhstan was failing to 
accumulate funds to restructure its energy complex, and Chevron was losing 
money. By April 1995 Tengizchevroil's reported losses totalled $10 million.60 
There was, however, one unfavourable development that interfered with Russia’s 
plans, namely Turkey with its alternative pipeline projects. Turkey's entry into the 
game substantially raised the stakes in the diplomatic struggle around the pipeline 
issue. Russia undoubtedly had an advantage, because a pipeline through Russian 
territory would be shorter, could utilise the existing pipeline network, transit the 
territory of only one country, and that quite stable compared to others in the 
region, and hence would be more economically viable. But this was the case only if 
the pipeline’s construction went ahead. If Kazakhstan saw nothing emerging from 
the CPC it could turn to alternative projects, including through Turkey. For 
example, speaking to financial analysts and industry executives on 17 February 
1994, Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan was still considering various options for new 
export pipelines, but no decisions had as yet been taken. Besides the pipeline to 
Novorossiysk, other options could include a line via the Caspian, Baku and Turkey 
to the Mediterranean although, he said, it was a very complicated route, or through 
Turkmenistan and Iran to Turkey, or through Iran to the Persian Gulf.61
Ankara had one strong trump card, its control over the exit from the Black 
Sea, and intended to use it to the full. In early August 1993 Tevfik Okyayuz, a 
senior Turkish Foreign Ministry official, stated that Turkey would be forced to 
introduce some kind of quota system for the congested shipping lane if 
supertankers became common. "It is not possible for large amounts of oil to pass... 
We don't want to raise Montreux. But we are not afraid to challenge it". Moscow's 
reaction was at once voiced by its ambassador to Turkey, Chernyshev, who 
pointed out that the pipeline route favoured by Ankara was plagued by fighting in 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey's Kurdish south-east. He said the Montreux 
Convention was vital to Russia, and small tankers could provide the best interim 
solution.62
But Turkey was undeterred. In January 1994 it announced new navigation 
rules for the Straits, effective from 1 July 1994, under which oil tankers must give 
24 hour’s notice before entering the Straits, must transit only one at a time, if over 
150 metres long would be subject to new, more stringent, minimum visibility rules, 
and fined if they moved without permission. The potential effect of the new rules 
was clear - more time-consuming and perhaps more costly tanker traffic. In 
February Russia warned Turkey that the new rules could create tension.63 But 
Turkey’s position was strengthened by an accident in the Bosporus on 14 March,
60 Euromoney, May 1995, p. 16.
61 Reuters News Service, 17.02.94.
62 Independent, 10.08.93.
63 Reuters News Service, 14.03.94, Reuters News Service, 07.07.94.
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when the Cypriot tanker Nassia and Cypriot cargo ship Ship Broker collided in 
clear weather just before midnight. Turkish diplomacy capitalised on the accident 
to the utmost. "It's like having atom bombs passing every day through Istanbul, a 
city of 10 million people," said Environment Minister Rize Akcali, and vowed that 
Turkey would not flinch from implementing the new navigation rules.64
Due to Turkish pressure a special session of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) was convened in London on 25 May 1994. It was specifically 
devoted to drafting rules to improve the safety of ships passing through the 
Bosporus, Sea of Marmara and Dardanelles. Russia had to endure a fierce 
diplomatic battle with Turkey, but by mobilising the support of other nations 
dependent on trade through the straits managed to block the most radical Turkish 
proposals. The measures adopted fell short of Turkey's initial demands. They 
included recommendations that all vessels entering the straits comply with the 
Turkish reporting system, use qualified pilots, and if over 200 metres long, pass 
through only in daylight. It also required ships to observe traffic separation 
schemes. The new rules were to come into effect on 24 November 1994.65 The 
recommendations could help avoid the delays arising from Turkey's original plans, 
but on a longer-term basis the problem of transiting the Bosporus looked set to 
continue. The Turkish authorities could suspend two-way traffic if a vessel was 
deemed unable to comply with the traffic separation scheme. There was little 
mention of criteria for judging this inability, and this could result in arbitrary bans 
on vessels.
Despite the IMO's recommendations, on 1 July 1994 Turkey went ahead 
with introducing its new rules. Moscow, naturally, protested that the new 
regulations went beyond ensuring safe navigation "by imposing unwarranted 
restrictions, up to and including the complete halting of navigation". This was 
interpreted as "direct violation" of the Montreux Convention and "other generally 
accepted norms of maritime law", and Russia "cannot recognise as lawful the 
introduction, in effect, of a procedure, requiring permission for passage through 
the straits, and imposing unilateral restrictions up to and including de facto 
prohibition of such passage for certain classes of ships. In conclusion the Russian 
memorandum expressed serious concern over the new regulations, asked Turkey 
to refrain from implementing them, and warned that Russian vessels passing 
through the straits would comply with only those provisions of the Turkish 
regulations that were not in conflict with international legal norms and decisions of 
specified international organisations.66
This protest, and Russia’s declared refusal to obey the new rules, could not, 
however, remove the business uncertainty caused by the dispute over the Straits. 
Russia needed another measure to alleviate concern, and found it in a draft project 
for a pipeline from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Bourgas to the Greek 
Mediterranean port of Alexandropoulis, bypassing the Straits. First reports of this
64 Independent, 15.03.94.
65 Reuter News Service, 25.05.94.
66 Nezavisimaya gazeta, 01.07.94.
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plan appeared in June 1994. During negotiations in Moscow in late August 1994, 
Russia officially invited Bulgaria to take part in the new project and Bulgaria 
acquiesced.67 In September 1994 Russia's Gazprom signed a protocol with a 
consortium of Greek companies to build an oil pipeline through Bulgaria and 
Greece, to be completed in three years, and to be able to pump 20-40 million 
tonnes of oil a year.68 The agreement was most likely a ploy, at least from the 
Russian side, but it effectively neutralised Turkey’s claims for a pipeline through its 
own territory, and re-established the validity of the CPC.
Russia’s diplomatic duel with Turkey developed in the background of 
Moscow's push to penetrate the Tengiz project. On 25 December 1993, during 
Chernomyrdin’s visit to Almaty, he and Tereshchenko signed an agreement "On 
Cooperation and Development of the Fuel and Energy Complexes", which to a 
large extent repeated the previous one, but also contained several new elements. 
The agreement contained an obligation "to facilitate creation of joint ventures" 
between each other's companies. The task of "conducting the transfer of respective 
packages of shares" was assigned to Kazakhstan's Ministry of Energy and Fuel 
Resources and Russia's Ministry of Fuel and Power Engineering. The signatories 
agreed to consult each other "when developing energy programs" and "bearing in 
mind strengthening integrative ties".69
In principle the agreement gave Russia legal grounds to demand an interest 
in Tengiz and other energy projects under way in Kazakhstan, and also to request 
consultations with Almaty on future projects. Not surprisingly, in January 1994 
LUKoil started to press for a share of the Tengiz project..70 In March this pressure 
intensified.71 LUKoil received unequivocal backing from Fuel and Energy Minister 
Shafranik, who in early 1994 demanded a 10% stake for Russia in major oil and 
gas projects initially developed by the Soviet Union outside Russia's boundaries.72 
But the Kazakhs obviously did not see things his way. On 22 March 1994, shortly 
before his official visit to Moscow, Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan would not give 
Russia any equity in Tengiz or Karachaganak.73 During his negotiations with 
Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin he maintained his refusal, and despite numerous 
declarations favouring increased integration, the documents agreed during his visit 
mentioned neither of the projects.
This outcome was hardly conducive to implementation of the CPC project, 
nor a strong move on Nazarbayev's part. At least that is how Kazakhstan's position 
was assessed in a World Bank report of 8 April 1994. It concluded that
67 Reuters News Service, 27.08.94.
68 Reuters News Service, 15.09.94.
69 Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel stvom Respubliki Kazakhstan i Pravitel'stvom Rossiyskoy Federatsii o 
sotrudnichestve i razvitii toplivno-euergeticheskikli kompleksov // Kazakhstansko-rossiyskie otnosheniya, 1991- 
1995 gody, Sbomik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow: PosoPstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 
1995, p. 135.
70 Financial Times, 21.01.94.
71 Financial Times, 18.03.94.
72 East European Markets, 18.08.95.
73 Financial Times, 23.03.94.
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Kazakhstan "has little choice" but to surrender some equity shares to Russia, 
because "without Russian cooperation on pipelines, Kazakhstan cannot attract the 
high levels of foreign investment needed to develop its oil and gas sector".74 
Probably encouraged by the World Bank findings, LUKoil's President Alekperov 
arrived unexpectedly in Almaty in May 1994 and demanded unsuccessfully that 
LUKoil be given the equivalent of $1 billion in free equity in oil projects under way 
in Kazakhstan. Later LUKoil denied that it had asked for free equity, but 
Alekperov reiterated in an interview that LUKoil "is in a position to demand 
participation in all oil and gas projects in the region".75 Meanwhile Chevron 
expressed "grave concern" at Almaty's and Moscow's inability to agree the terms of 
the CPC project, and said that until all pipeline issues were resolved, it "will be 
unable to finance development of the Tengiz deposit, because it is already making 
significant losses".76
As a result the Kazakhs' irritation with the CPC and Deuss increased. In 
late October 1994 Nazarbayev commented that Kazakhstan might support a plan 
for Chevron to take OOC’s place in the consortium. But this trial balloon 
immediately met determined opposition from Russia. On 31 October 1994 a 
spokesman for the Russian Fuel and Power Engineering Ministry said that Russia 
"joined the Caspian Pipeline Consortium which was initiated by agreement between 
Kazakhstan and Oman", that "any drastic changes in the consortium are 
undesirable for successful implementation of the project", and that Russia 
supported an option whereby Chevron could join the consortium, provided it paid 
$US 400 million to cover initial expenditure.77 Moscow was well aware that this 
proposal was intrinsically unacceptable to Chevron, which had already rejected it 
as "unfair and inequitable".78 Talks in Moscow on 10 November 1994 between 
Chevron's Chairman Kenneth Derr and Chernomyrdin failed to resolve the 
controversy. Moscow also rejected Chevron's request to reduce tariffs for 
transporting oil across Russian territory.79
On the other hand, given Kazakhstan's dissatisfaction, CPC could not just 
sit idle. Some ostensible progress over the pipeline was necessary. This led to 
announcement of new initiatives. On 19 January 1995 CPC said it would proceed 
to implement the first phase of the project, costing about $300 million, by 
constructing a 250 km pipeline from the city of Kropotkin to a newly constructed 
marine terminal on the Black Sea coast north of Novorossiysk. Construction would 
begin by January 1996, and the pipeline would become operational by January 
1997. The OOC agreed to provide all the equity and guarantee financing for this 
stage.80
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In an attempt to alleviate Kazakhstan's concerns, the Russians invited Qays 
Abd al-Mun'im Zawawi, Omani Deputy Prime Minister responsible for financial 
and economic affairs, to Moscow. On 11 March he and Shafranik signed an 
agreement to begin the first phase of pipeline construction.81 Kazakhstan joined the 
agreement, after some delay, on 14 March, notably only after the Omani 
government was reported to have confirmed its commitment to invest $250-300 
million in the first phase of the project, and guaranteed to provide a loan if 
international financial organisations refused to do so.82 In mid-April the Kazakh 
government confirmed that it would go ahead with the transfer of assets to the 
CPC, reportedly after assurances by Shafranik that the CPC project was a priority 
for Russia, which would "support its speedy launching", and that work on the first 
phase of the pipeline would start "on 1 January 1996 at the latest".83
This upsurge in activity around CPC was the direct result of a US decision 
to play a more active role in Caspian energy policy. The new US line became clear 
when on 3 February 1995 State Department announced that the United States had 
notified several governments in the region that it would endorse construction of a 
pipeline through Turkey to carry oil from the Caspian region of Azerbaijan.84 Thus 
for the first time the Americans openly challenged Russia’s role in transporting 
energy resources from the Caspian, and this had direct repercussions for 
Kazakhstan, which could now count on more solid .American support. In April 
1995 US Ambassador Courtney told a ceremony marking Tengizchevroil's second 
anniversary: "In the decades to come, we believe Kazakhstan and the Caspian 
region will be one of the world's main sources of oil. We believe several pipelines 
will promote healthy competition in transport of oil" .85
In late April 1995 US Energy Department Deputy Secretary White made a 
ten-day tour of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia 
and Russia, where he discussed the possibility of alternative pipelines from the 
Caspian region. After the trip, White told a news conference there were sufficient 
oil reserves to warrant two pipelines - one to the Mediterranean and the other to 
the Black Sea, and said "I think the most significant thing was that every country— 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey—expressed 
support for a southern pipeline route that would give them access to the 
Mediterranean".86 Only Russian First Deputy Minister of Fuel and Power 
Engineering Anatoliy Fomin, had expressed doubts, telling White that 
"construction of two pipelines would be unwise for this area, because its oil 
resources are not large enough".87
It was not clear whether at that stage American actions were motivated 
simply by an attempt to help their major oil companies in negotiations with the
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recalcitrant CPC, or already reflected an emerging US strategy for the Caspian 
region. The former seems more likely, given the substance of White's talks in 
Moscow. Discussing the oil transportation issue with top Russian pipeline and 
government officials, White suggested that pumping capacity on the existing 
pipeline from Kazakhstan through Russia be increased to as much as 260,000 
barrels per day by January 1997. He said the Americans were waiting for Russia’s 
response.88
American’s active support for multiple pipelines encouraged Kazakhstan to 
put pressure on CPC. On 6 April 1995 Prime Minister Kazhegeldin told a news 
conference in Almaty that he was not sure the CPC pipeline project alone would be 
sufficient, and that Kazakhstan could in future be forced to look for other 
options.89 In May 1995 Kazakhstan signed a protocol of intent with Iran on 
building a pipeline from Tengiz to Aktau, for onward transportation by tankers to 
the Iranian Caspian Sea port of Anzali. The plan envisaged supplying up to 2 
million tonnes of Kazakh oil annually to Iranian refineries in Tehran, Tabriz, Arak 
and Isfahan, with Iran releasing an equivalent amount of oil at its Persian Gulf 
terminals for export to world markets.90 On 13 June 1996 Nazarbayev and Demirel 
signed an agreement to push ahead with a pipeline project through Turkey. 
Nazarbayev told a joint news conference that a consortium would have to be 
formed to implement the plan, and partial financing could come from international 
lending agencies.91 This was followed by the signing on 15 August 1995 of a letter 
of intent between the heads of the Kazakh Oil and Gas Ministry and the Turkish 
Energy Ministry, providing for establishing an international corporation to build the 
pipeline, and a joint venture company to make feasibility studies.92 The stakes in 
the oil gamble were apparently rising.
But Kazakh officials who applied that sort of diplomatic pressure obviously 
overplayed their hand. Moscow was well aware of the problems alternative oil and 
gas routes would incur. The pipeline through Turkey would be much longer than 
the Russian one, require much more capital investment, and pass through several 
states, each charging for transit. There was no guarantee that the total charged 
would be less than Russia’s tariff. Of course, small states such as Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan could be more easily coerced than Russia into lowering tariffs. But 
they would be hard put to provide for the pipeline’s security, especially given the 
political instability and ethnic conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkish 
Kurdistan. The Iranian route had its advantages, but was politically unacceptable 
for American oil companies, given the enmity in American-Iranian relations and the 
US government-imposed trade embargo on Iran.93 Besides, Iran, like Russia, was a 
major oil producer, with no interest in increasing competition on the world oil
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market, so there could be no guarantee that Iranian transit charges would be lower 
than Russian. Hence all the plans for alternative pipelines looked like bluffs, 
designed to make Russia more conciliatory.
On 4 October 1995 Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister Tokayev indicated that 
plans for the CPC had come to a standstill since the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development had declared the proposed pipeline through 
Russia "not financible".94 Meanwhile the OOC had managed to attract only the $35 
million needed to prepare a feasibility study, against an estimated total requirement 
o f $1.5 billion.95 It was also in October that Kazakhstan's Oil and Gas Minister 
Balgimbayev sent a letter to Shafranik, calling for a meeting in Almaty on 6 
November to discuss a new pipeline from Tengiz excluding the OOC, which had 
failed to meet the 1 October deadline for attracting finance to the CPC. 
Balgimbayev said Chevron, other Western oil companies and LUKoil had already 
started work on an alternative export project.96
As revealed on 19 October by a LUKoil spokesman, all this time the 
company had been negotiating secretly with the Kazakh authorities for a share in 
the Tengiz project.97 Thus the struggle over the pipeline routes and LUKoil's 
participation in the Tengizchevroil joint venture were closely interlinked.98 The first 
breakthrough came on 31 October 1995, when Kazakhstan's Oil and Gas Ministry 
and LUKoil signed a protocol giving LUKoil a stake in Tengizchevroil.99 Though 
the size of LUKoil's share had not yet been fixed, the decision in principle to 
involve it in the joint venture cleared the way for sorting out the situation within 
the CPC. On the day the protocol was signed, Balgymbayev announced that 
Kazakhstan was seeking agreement with Russian and US oil companies to set up a 
new pipeline consortium. He added that the OOC "can also participate in the new 
international company on equal terms; it will receive as much as it invests",100 and 
also confirmed that Kazakhstan was prepared to sell part of its share in 
Tengizchevroil to the US Mobil company.101
Subsequent Russian steps were not hard to predict. Naturally, CPC did not 
begin construction of the first phase of the pipeline, scheduled for 1 January 1996, 
because of the time taken for "structural overhaul" of the consortium. John Deuss 
had played his part, and now had to go. The first rumours about his intention to 
leave the OOC presidency and the CPC began to circulate in January 1996,102 and
94 Reuters News Service, 06.10.95.
95 Segodnya, 19.09.95.
96 Reuters News Service, 19.10.95.
97 Ibidem.
98 Russia applied similar tactics to others of Kazakhstan's projects. For example, on 14 February 1995 M.Alimov, 
an aide to Rosneft' Chairman A.Putilov, said the company was considering plans to take part in the consortium 
exploring Kazakhstan's Caspian shelf. On 18 August 1995, during a visit to Kazakhstan, LUKoil's President 
Alekperov said his company wanted to take part in the Kazakhstankaspiyshelf project. [Reuters News Service, 
14.02.95; Segodnya, 21.02.95; Reuters News Service, 18.08.95],
99 Kazakhs Ready to Give Russian Finn Stake in Tengiz Oil Deal, BBC Monitoring Service: Fonner USSR, 
07.11.95.
100 Kazakhs Set up Alternative Pipeline Consortium, BBC Monitoring Service: Fonner USSR, 10.11.95.
101 Reuters News Service, 31.10.95.
102 Reuters News Service, 19.01.96.
212
his resignation followed in late February.103 Deuss and Omani Petroleum and 
Minerals Minister Said Bin Shanfari resigned from the CPC board, and were 
replaced by Omani Commerce and Industry Minister Maqbool Bin Sultan and 
OOC Deputy Chairman Mohammed Bin Nasir A1 Ghusaibi.104 A period of tough 
and prolonged bargaining over redistribution of shares within the CPC then 
followed. Progress on this was hindered by hold ups in the parallel negotiations on 
LUKoil's stake in Tengizchevroil.
Only on 16 April 1996 did LUKoil's President Alekperov announced that 
Chevron had agreed to transfer one-tenth of its 50% stake in Tengizchevroil to 
LUKoil, in return for a $30 million bonus payment.105 As a reciprocal gesture, 
Russia agreed on 17 April to increase Tengizchevroil's quota of oil to be pumped 
through the existing pipeline by 4.5 times over the previous quota of one million 
tonnes per year.106 Finally, on 23 April Nazarbayev revealed that all problems had 
been resolved, and all documents were ready for signing during Yeltsin’s 
forthcoming visit to Almaty.107 The signing took place on 27 April 1996. Under 
the protocol on CPC reorganisation Russia received 24% of the shares, 
Kazakhstan 19%, Oman 7%, Chevron 15%, LUKoil 12.5%, Mobil and Rosneft 
7.5% each, AGIP and British Gas 2% each, Kazakhstan's Manaigas and Oryx 
1.75% each.108 This was a significant success for Moscow's oil diplomacy. The 
combined Russian share was 44%, and in cooperation with Oman it could control 
all decision-making in the consortium.
The final batch of documents establishing the CPC’s new structure was 
signed in Moscow on 6 December 1996. Officials said the pipeline's forecast cost 
was $2 billion, up from previous estimates of $1.2-1.5 billion.109 The first phase of 
the project was to be completed in 1999, and the pipeline was to become 
operational at the end of 2000. In the first stage 28 million tonnes of Kazakh oil 
was to be exported annually via the pipeline, and this was expected to increase 
later to 67 million tonnes. It was estimated that over the project’s 40-year life 
Russian central and local government bodies would collect over 20 billion dollars 
in taxes and transit charges. In addition, much of the pipeline capacity would be 
used for Russian exports, stimulating the development of Russian oilfields.110 It 
was decided that the CPC management team would be headed by a general 
director from LUKoil, and composed of representatives from the other parties 
involved.111
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On 16 January 1997 LUKoil and Chevron agreed on all the main terms for 
transferring one-tenth of Chevron's stake in Tengizchevroil to LUKoil. "The price 
of LUKoil's stake has been agreed, and talks are now focusing on when and how 
much LUKoil will pay,"- Alekperov said.112 He added that LUKoil’s next step 
would be to buy into Kazakhstan's stake, and an official proposal to that effect had 
already been made to Kazakhstan.113 On 25 April Yeltsin endorsed the agreement 
on division of equity in the CPC. His decree contained measures for implementing 
the final CPC restructuring agreement, and rules governing the company, CPC- 
Russia, set up to represent the Russian government.114
The situation with Karachaganak oil and gas field developed on similar 
lines to Tengiz. Initially the Karachaganak project looked very promising for the 
new investors, British Gas and Agip, doubling British Gas' oil and gas reserves, 
and pushing it into the big league in the world energy industry. The reserves were 
expected to last for 70 years, yielding four times as much gas as British Gas' 
Morecombe field, and as much oil as the North Sea’s giant Forties field. After an 
initial investment of $20 million, British Gas and Agip would spend up to $6 billion 
in the next decade to develop the field. British Gas said that once it had worked 
out a profit-sharing deal with Kazakhstan, oil and gas could be piped to Europe 
within months. 115 Unlike Tengiz, Karachaganak was an active field, linked by 
pipeline to the Orenburg gas processing plant in Russia. From there the gas could 
be exported by the main pipeline to Western Europe.
The major problem for the investors was securing guaranteed access to the 
Russian pipeline to Western Europe. They pressed the Kazakh government to 
obtain guarantees, and refused to make major investments until an agreement on 
transportation was reached. The Russians, because of the substantial amount 
already invested in Karachaganak in Soviet times, naturally wanted a share in it, 
but were not invited. When Chernomyrdin visited Almaty in December 1992, he 
and Tereshchenko signed an agreement "On Cooperation in the Industries of Fuel 
and Energy Complexes", which said the two countries would continue cooperation 
"in exploitation of gas fields, and primarily the Karachaganak field", and Russia 
undertook to accept deliveries of Karachaganak gas to the Orenburg processing 
plant. Kazakhstan needed the agreement to convince its Western partners that they 
would have no problems with gas transit through Russia. The agreement did not 
oblige Kazakhstan to give Russia a stake in Karachaganak, but neither did it 
specify the quantity of gas Russia would accept, or the price it would pay. Russia 
refused to include them in the agreement; they were to be determined by a contract 
to be concluded between Russia’s gas monopoly "Gazprom" and Kazakhstan's
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state company "Kazakhgaz".116 Unless and until that contract was concluded, the 
agreement was valueless, because Russia could price its services high enough to 
make the project uneconomic.
Not surprisingly, the agreement failed to convince Kazakhstan’s Western 
partners that they had valid guarantees for gas transportation, and the negotiations 
on a production-sharing agreement with Kazakhstan stalled. Originally scheduled 
for 1 October 1993, signing of the agreement was postponed several times. An 
Agip executive in Almaty said that there were "no problems left to deal with in 
Kazakhstan, but we are concerned about the state of relations with Russia...The 
question of transportation of course must be resolved, and that is the subject of 
governmental talks between Russia and Kazakhstan".117 Oleg Kireyev, head of the 
foreign-trade association handling the deal for Kazakhstan, explained that the sides 
were "unable to agree the terms of the deal without Russia's participation".118
On 6 December 1993 Kazakh Energy and Fuel Resources Minister 
K.Baikenov announced that the deal could be signed in the "first quarter of next 
year".119 As in the case of CPC, Kazakhstan tried to put pressure on Russia by 
proposing an alternative gas pipeline, by-passing Russian territory. For example, in 
March 1994 on the eve of his visit to Moscow Nazarbayev suddenly revealed a 
hitherto "secret" project to build a pipeline from Karachaganak to the West via 
Turkey.120 But during the visit no agreements on Karachaganak were reached, and 
the project was not even mentioned in the associated documents. The topic was 
raised again during a meeting between Chernomyrdin and Tereshchenko in Uralsk 
on 28 August 1994, but they again failed to reach agreement.121 Meanwhile the 
situation at Karachaganak continued to deteriorate. In 1993 gas production shrank 
to 3.6 billion nT, and in 1994 was expected to fall to 50% of the 1991 level. Only 
15 of 130 oil and gas wells and only one of 32 drilling machines were 
functioning.122 According to Azerbayev, President of Kazakhgaz, workers and 
engineers at Karachaganak had not been paid for several months, and this had led 
to an exodus of highly qualified personnel.123
These critical conditions precipitated a change in the Kazakh position. On 4 
October 1994 Deputy Oil and Gas Minister Lobayev revealed to the press that 
British Gas and Agip had agreed to give 15% of their share in the Karachaganak 
deal to Gazprom. He added that agreement with Gazprom was necessary to gain 
access to the Russian gas pipeline network, "to avoid any repetition of the sad
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experience of Tengizchevroil". Kazakh Oil and Gas Minister R.Cherdabayev told 
Reuters a final contract could be signed by the end of 1994, but Lobayev was more 
cautious, saying only "within the next year".124
On 14 November 1994 formal talks began between British Gas and 
Gazprom. A British Gas official said "it is normal for Russia to join this project, 
and even a logical step, since from the very beginning there were plans that gas will 
be transported through a Russian pipeline and processed inside Russian territory in 
Orenburg".125 British Gas Project Director Peter Dranfield stated that "since mid- 
1992 it has become evident that involvement of Gazprom in the project would 
greatly assist in achieving full development of the field".126 These statements 
indicated that the participants in the project thought that by drawing Gazprom into 
it they would secure guaranteed gas transits from Kazakhstan to Western Europe. 
They were mistaken.
Initially, everything went as it was meant to. On 8 December 1994 
Kazakhstan's Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Gazprom signed an agreement 
"On Joint Activity in Exploitation and Development of the Karachaganak Field". 
The document said Gazprom would participate on equal terms with Kazakhgaz, 
British Gas and Agip. Kazakh Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, who attended the 
signing ceremony in Moscow, was quoted in an official press-release as saying 
Russia and Kazakhstan "were together again".127 This agreement was backed up by 
one at governmental level, signed on 10 February 1995 by Chernomyrdin and 
Kazhegeldin, which said both sides recognised the desirability of Russian 
participation in exploiting and developing the Karachaganak field, and endorsed the 
agreement of 8 December 1994.128
These documents opened the way for concluding a production-sharing 
agreement. It was signed by British Gas, Agip and Gazprom on 2 March 1995 and 
was termed an "interim production-sharing agreement". The accord envisaged 
investment estimated at around $320 million over an initial development period of 
up to four years. During this phase annual output was expected to be 4-4.5 million 
tonnes of oil and up to 4 billion nr of gas. Kazakhstan would receive 85% of 
profits, and the remaining 15% would be shared among the three contractors, with 
6.375% each to British Gas and Agip, and 2.25% to Gazprom. In addition, 
Kazakhstan was to cover contractors’ production costs, estimated at $70-80 
million per year. If phase one was successful, the contractors would commit 
themselves to a far more extensive project, involving a 40-year investment worth 
$10 billion to develop the field to its full potential.129
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Gazprom later failed to pay its share of the costs, and in summer 1996 
withdrew from the project,130 ostensibly because of the other partners’ refusal to 
recognise Russia’s previous investment in Karachaganak as a contribution towards 
Gazprom’s share in the project. But the real reason was that from the outset 
Gazprom had not intended to help Kazakhstan export its gas. As the major supplier 
of gas to Europe (60% of all European gas imports)131 Gazprom had no intention 
of creating a competitor for itself on this lucrative market, especially since Russia, 
with huge gas reserves, did not need Kazakhstan's gas for re-export. This was 
made very clear by Gazprom’s Chairman R.Vyakhirev, who said at a news 
conference in Moscow on 7 August 1997 that his company would "under no 
circumstances" agree to give Kazakh gas an outlet through Russia to world 
markets. "Surrendering one's market when there is a lack of sufficient capacity is, I 
believe, nothing less than a crime against Russia," he said. However, Vyakhirev 
promised to accept some Kazakh gas for processing at the Orenburg plant.132
After Gazprom’s withdrawal, the other participants in the Karachaganak 
project sought new partners. In October 1996 Kazakh Oil and Gas Minister 
Balgimbayev announced that the project would be joined by US Texaco and 
LUKoil.133 Gazprom's replacement by LUKoil appeared logical for Russia, since 
LUKoil, not Gazprom, was responsible for "coordinating" Russian energy projects 
in the CIS. Besides LUKoil is an oil, not a gas company, and the change denoted a 
shift in Russian perception of Karachaganak, as primarily an oil rather than a gas 
field. This combination also indicated establishment of a closer link between 
Karachaganak and the CPC, where LUKoil plays a major role and British Gas and 
Agip have a 2% share each.
On 18 November 1997 a 40-year production-sharing agreement with the 
Kazakhstan government to develop the Karachaganak field was signed in 
Washington in a ceremony attended by Nazarbayev and US Vice-President Gore. 
Agip and British Gas will continue as joint operators, Texaco received 20% of 
their combined share and LUKoil acquired Gazprom’s share. Initial production is 
projected at 3.6 million tonnes of oil and gas condensate annually, to peak from the 
year 2002 at 12 million tonnes per annum. Around 6.0 million tonnes of 
hydrocarbons annually would be transported along the new pipeline developed by 
CPC .134 The agreement, however, failed to tackle the issue of what to do with the 
natural gas. It is highly unlikely that Gazprom will change its position and agree to 
export gas to Europe through its pipeline system. Some of the gas will be used for 
Kazakhstan’s own needs, and transported to other parts of the republic either 
through Russia or by means of swap arrangements. Another alternative is to sell 
the gas to Gazprom at the Russian-Kazakhstan border, but, naturally, Gazprom 
will pay only a very low price. Gas can also be injected back into the field to
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improve oil output, but the economic rationale behind this option is still to be 
seen. Of course, there is always an option of building an alternative pipeline 
eastwards to north-east China or to India and Pakistan. But the cost of such a 
pipeline will be high, and will require investors ready to take economic risks.
The diplomatic struggle over the pipeline issue was closely interlinked with 
that over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Caspian shelf energy resources are 
without doubt of great importance for Russia’s energy strategy in CIS. Earlier 
estimates, based on satellite photography and some preliminary ground research, 
indicated that the Caspian shelf bordering Kazakhstan could contain 3-3.5 billion 
tonnes of oil and 2-2.5 trillion m3 of gas.135 In a recent statement, US Secretary of 
Energy F.Pena estimated proven oil reserves in the Caspian region as between 2.1 
and 4.1 billion tonnes, comparable to those in the North Sea. The Caspian region's 
possible reserves could yield another 23 billion tonnes, roughly a quarter of 
Middle East reserves. Proven gas reserves are estimated at 6.7-9.5 trillion m , 
comparable to North America’s reserves. Possible gas reserves could yield 
another 9.3 trillion m3.136 Before the collapse of the USSR, Kazakhstan opposed 
oil and gas prospecting in the northern Caspian, on environmental grounds. But at 
the end of 1992 Minister for Energy Baykenov, while in the USA, officially stated 
that Kazakhstan was prepared to start work in the area.137. These plans 
encountered opposition from Moscow.
The controversy started to develop when on 3 December 1993 a consortium 
of Western companies signed an agreement with Kazakhstan to explore the 
geological, geophysical and ecological features of the Kazakh region of the 
Caspian shelf. The consortium, formed in June 1993, included seven companies - 
AGIP (Italy), British Gas, the joint British Petroleum and Statoil (Norway), Mobil 
Oil (United States), Shell (Holland/UK) and Total (France). Kazakhstan's 
contribution consisted solely in granting authorisation. The project was to be 
coordinated by the Kazakhstankaspiyshelf State Company, formed in February 
1993. The project’s cost was estimated at $500 million, and its duration three 
years, after which the consortium would be dissolved and the firms to undertake 
extraction determined by auction. Consortium members were promised 
preferential terms. Kazakhstan reserved the right to all the geophysical 
information.138 Russia was not invited to participate.
The contract was concluded even though after the collapse of the USSR the 
Caspian Sea’s legal status was indeterminate. Previous Russian (Soviet)-Iranian 
agreements were inapplicable to the new situation manifested by the emergence of 
three more littoral states. Moscow's first serious attempt to tackle the issue was 
made on 15 October 1993, when the prime ministers of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Turkmenistan met in Astrakhan to discuss the Caspian’s status. At the
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meeting Russia outlined its position, to the effect that all questions related to the 
use of natural resources should be settled jointly by all the Caspian states. The 
participants agreed to set up a council to coordinate economic cooperation in the 
Caspian region. At the press-conference after the meeting Chernomyrdin 
announced that they had decided to formulate a common view on the Caspian 
problem, and that ways of protecting its natural wealth would be discussed at the 
next conference of CIS heads of government. Tereshchenko told reporters that his 
cabinet had not yet prepared a plan to develop oil and gas deposits on the Caspian 
shelf. He pledged that exploration of the shelf would be examined and supervised 
by an intergovernmental council on oil and gas, to be formed under CIS 
auspices.139 But despite these assurances, Kazakhstan less than two months later 
decided unilaterally to have the shelf explored by Western companies.
Not surprisingly, Kazakhstan's move caused irritation in Moscow, 
especially aggravated by the circumstance that Azerbaijan was negotiating a deal 
with a British Petroleum-led consortium to prospect for oil on Azerbaijan's Caspian 
shelf. If both projects went ahead unhindered, Russia would have lost control over 
a large part of Caspian energy resources, and consequently a large share of its 
influence over the policies of the CIS states with Caspian coastlines. The Russians 
raised the issue of the Caspian Sea’s status during Nazarbayev's visit to Moscow in 
March 1994, but with little result. The joint protocol of the meeting between 
Tereshchenko and Chernomyrdin was limited to instructing their Foreign Ministries 
"to draft initial proposals within one month on the whole range of problems 
connected with the use of the Caspian Sea basin, for the purpose of submitting 
them for consideration by the Caspian Sea states".140
With the issue of the Caspian’s legal status heating up, Kazakhstan sought 
to establish at least a semblance of a naval presence there, and, during US 
Secretary of Defence Perry’s visit to Almaty on 19-20 March 1994, requested US 
assistance in forming a coast guard, ostensibly to prevent infiltration by Islamic 
“fundamentalist movements”. Perry promised aid, and before the end of February 
1996 American-made patrol boats were delivered.141 Almaty made similar 
approaches to Russia, but Moscow, not wanting a Kazakhstan naval presence in 
the Caspian, was unresponsive.
On 28 April 1994 the Russian government notified the British Embassy that 
Caspian projects "cannot be recognised" without its approval, on the grounds that 
"the Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single eco-system, and 
represents an object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues or activities 
including resource development have to be resolved with participation of all the 
Caspian countries", and that "no steps by any Caspian state aimed at acquiring any
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kind of advantage with regard to the areas and resources can be recognised... any 
unilateral actions are devoid of a legal basis".142 The note was directed to the 
British Embassy because of British Petroleum’s leading role in the Azerbaijan 
project, but it had very direct repercussions for Kazakhstan. On 2 June 1994 
Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Karasin said "the Caspian Sea should not be 
divided into sectors" and "all questions related to the use of natural resources 
should be settled by all the Caspian states".143
Initially Kazakhstan's reaction to these Russian demarches was passive.
After all Kazakhstankaspiyshelfs project was only at the preliminary exploration 
stage, not the developmental, as was Azerbaijan’s. But some members of 
Nazarbayev's entourage obviously decided that Kazakhstan should take a more 
active stance as a preventive measure. In a report on Kazakhstan's foreign policy 
objectives, published in June 1994, Kasenov suggested that Kazakh diplomacy 
should pay greater attention to the Caspian’s legal status, because "it could turn 
out to be explosive for the relationships between all five Caspian littoral states".144 
On 12 July B.Kuandykov, President of Kazakhstankaspiyshelf, said in an interview 
that foreign oil companies exploring the shelf off Kazakhstan were perturbed by 
Russian statements on the sea's legal status.145
Thus Kazakhstan's position on the Caspian contradicted Russia’s. 
Moreover, Almaty immediately began to form a coalition with Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan to counter the Russian demands. On 19 July 1994 Kazakhstan sent a 
draft "Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea" to the other Caspian 
States. The draft was based on the concept of a land-locked sea, and attempted to 
apply the provisions of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea. It envisaged 
delimiting the coastal states' borders on the Caspian, including internal waters, 
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, as well as determining each state’s 
continental shelf. Coastal states were to possess national jurisdiction and exclusive 
rights to explore and exploit the mineral resources in their sector of the seabed.146 
The draft contained some concessions to the Russian position, recognising the 
need for unhampered navigation and fishing, each state’s ecological responsibility, 
and need for a coordinating body, to ensure a balance between the interests of all 
the littoral states.147 But these were token concessions.
An important element of Kazakhstan's diplomatic tactics was 
internationalisation of the Caspian Sea dispute, by involving other powerful players 
likely to support Kazakhstan against Moscow. This was hinted at in a report by 
Kazakhstan's Deputy Foreign Minister Gizzatov at a conference on foreign policy 
issues held in Almaty in February 1995. He said "the Caspian problem has
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transcended regional boundaries, and even more clearly is becoming a factor in 
world politics". Among those whose interests were involved, Gizzatov named 
Turkey, Georgia, USA and Western Europe.148 However, among these, only the 
USA had power to exercise pressure on Russia. US policy towards the Caspian 
was just being developed at that time, but its basis was already recognition of the 
area’s importance for American economic interests.
On 27-28 September 1994 during Yeltsin's visit, Clinton raised the issue of 
the Caspian Sea, and urged him to disavow his Foreign Ministry's statements that 
Moscow would not recognise contracts to exploit the Caspian fields. Yeltsin 
replied that the issue should be discussed bilaterally by experts.149 This was the 
result of pressure on Yeltsin by the powerful oil and gas lobby, which was not 
prepared to forego its interests in the Caspian without a fight. On 5 October 1994 
the Russian mission to the UN distributed a document entitled "The Russian 
Federation’s Position on the legal regime of the Caspian Sea”, which reiterated that 
unilateral action by any single state there was unlawful, and would be resisted.150 It 
asserted that the International Law of the Sea could not be applied to the Caspian 
Sea, which has no natural connection to the oceans. In Russia’s opinion the legal 
regime determined by the Russian-Iranian Treaty of 1921 and Soviet-Iranian 
Treaty of 1940 was still in force. Therefore exploration and exploitation, 
conservation and management of the Caspian seabed should be subject to 
agreement by all the littoral states. The existing legal regime could be improved by 
concluding new agreements between the Caspian States, but must not be replaced 
by a totally new regime. Finally, the document warned that Russia did not exclude 
undertaking whatever measures it considered necessary to make other Caspian 
states comply with the existing legal regime.151
Release of the document preceded the opening on 11 October of a two-day 
conference in Moscow of the five Caspian littoral states, called to discuss the 
establishment of a joint legal body on the Caspian Sea. The main idea was for it to 
regulate all aspects of use of the Sea and its resources, and it was an Iranian 
initiative, first put forward in October 1992. Iran was concerned about the growing 
Western, especially American, presence in the Caspian, and seeking to put a check 
on it by drawing the former USSR republics into a regional organisation.152 Iran 
followed Russia in condemning as "illegal" the agreement between Azerbaijan and 
the Western consortium, signed on 20 September 1994. Thus a coincidence of 
interests emerged between Russia’s and Iran’s positions, and Moscow took full 
advantage of this.
At the conference the Iranian delegation expressed concern about the 
"irreparable damage that uncoordinated exploitation was likely to cause to the
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fragile marine environment".153 Initially it seemed that combined Russian-Iranian 
pressure would make the other Caspian states agree to creation of a joint body to 
monitor the Caspian. During a break in the conference, Kozyrev told journalists 
that "some progress has been made towards an agreement on regional cooperation 
around the Caspian Sea."154 But in the end Kazakhstan's and Azerbaijan's desire to 
revise the legal status, and their insistence that further cooperation in the Caspian 
region be conditional upon such revision, prevented conclusion of this 
agreement.155 The maximum the five nations tentatively agreed was "to coordinate 
approaches to various aspects of their activity in the Caspian Sea in order to make 
the region a zone of stability, good neighbourliness, peace and security".156
Kazakh diplomatic tactics at the subsequent negotiations consisted in trying 
to undermine the existing legal regime, and replace it with a new regime, based on 
international Law of the Sea. To do so Kazakh diplomacy needed to remove legal 
obstacles embodied in the Russian/SovieUlranian treaties. Initially Kazakhstan 
simply claimed that in the new international situation previous agreements on the 
Caspian had become invalid, and a new legal status for the sea should be defined.
This line was reflected in Gizzatov's speech at a conference on foreign policy issues 
held in Almaty in February 1995. Gizzatov claimed that "The Caspian Sea regime 
in the form defined in the Russian-Persian Treaty of 1921 and the Soviet-Iranian 
Treaty of 1940 does not correspond to the changed political situation and new 
realities”, because they did not contain "any reference whatsoever to the most 
important components of the legal status of international water reservoirs i.e. 
regimes for exploitation of the seabed and what lies beneath it, for ecology, for use 
of air space over the sea, not to mention such basic questions as the territorial sea 
and adjacent exclusive economic zone, continental shelf, etc".
Kazakhstan advanced several arguments to justify its position. For example, 
Gizzatov disagreed with the argument that the Caspian Sea was exempt from the 
Law of the Sea Convention because the convention did not mention it. He noted 
that "the convention does not contain a list of the seas to which its provisions 
could be applied", and that if the argument was valid, any part of the world ocean 
not specifically mentioned could be claimed as exempt from the Convention. 
Another Kazakh argument was that the Convention should apply because the 
Caspian is connected to the high seas through the Volga-Don river system. 
Following this logic, the Law of the Sea Convention would be applicable to, say, 
Kazakhstan's Lake Balkhash, because it is connected to the high seas through the 
Ob-Irtysh river system, or to the Great Lakes between the USA and Canada. But 
nobody has ever seriously tried to apply the Law of the Sea in this overextended 
way.
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Russia’s position on the Caspian issue was based on two main postulates. 
First, that the Caspian Sea, a land-locked water reservoir with no connection to 
any ocean, could be regarded only as a lake. Second were international obligations 
assumed under the principle of continuity by the former USSR’s legal successor- 
states. These were contained in the Alma-Ata declaration, signed by all former 
Soviet republics on 21 December 1991, and more specifically in the memorandum 
"On the Question of Legal Succession in Relation to Treaties of the Former USSR, 
Constituting a Common Interest", signed by Nazarbayev at the CIS summit in 
Moscow on 6 July 1992. The memorandum singled out international agreements 
concluded by the former USSR which touched upon the interests of several CIS 
states, and described as requiring "decisions or actions on the part of those CIS 
states to which they were applicable".157 Both Russian/Soviet-Iranian treaties on 
the Caspian fell into that category.
At an international oil conference on the Caspian Sea in London in late 
February 1995, Director-General Khodakov of the Russian Foreign Ministry Legal 
Department explained that treaties between the former Soviet Union and Iran had 
established the Caspian Sea as an "object of common use by the Caspian countries, 
open for utilisation by them on an equal basis". He claimed that right by any one 
state to use the sea for its own purposes "can only be acquired on the basis of an 
international agreement”, and “unilateral moves by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to 
declare they owned sectors of the sea and sign deals with Western oil companies 
would be contested by Russia".158
Khodakov argued that the principle of "common use" was introduced by 
Article 2 of the 1921 Treaty, which said that Russia and Iran "both have the right 
of free navigation on the Caspian Sea under their own flags", and was further 
developed in the 1940 Soviet-Iranian Treaty on Trade and Shipping, Article 12 of 
which stipulated that "trading vessels carrying the flag of one of the Contracting 
parties in the Caspian Sea will be treated in the ports of the other party... on a 
totally equal footing with national vessels". At the same time, paragraph 4 of the 
article reserved fishing rights up to ten nautical miles from the coast to vessels of 
the littoral states. In Khodakov's interpretation, combination of these provisions 
established the Caspian "as an object of common use by the Caspian countries, 
open for utilisation by them on an equal basis across its entire area". Khodakov 
claimed that the "clearest indication" of the Caspian Sea as an object of common 
use was contained in the exchange of notes which accompanied conclusion of the 
1940 Treaty. They noted that both countries considered the Caspian Sea "a Soviet 
and Iranian sea". Khodakov stressed that "enlargement of the "Caspian Club" did 
not per se imply any change in the Caspian's legal status". "Its legal regime as an
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object of common use by all Caspian countries, remains the same until such time as 
they conclude a new agreement altering this status".159
Russian adherence to the “common use” principle was economically and 
geopolitically logical. Semi-official Russian geological estimates showed that if the 
Caspian were divided into sectors, firstly, the potential recoverable resources in the 
Russian sector (2 billion tonnes of oil equivalent) would come below Kazakhstan’s 
(4.5 billion) and Azerbaijan’s (4 billion), and not far above Turkmenistan’s (1.5 
billion).160 Secondly, all former Soviet republics would have sovereign rights in 
their respective sectors, and Russia would be unable to influence with whom and to 
what extent they would cooperate in the future. On the other hand, a “common 
use” regime would necessitate some multilateral body to govern exploitation of 
Caspian resources, and on it Russia, as the major power, would have a decisive 
voice.
Not surprisingly, at the London conference Russia’s position met with 
objections not only from Kazakhstan, but also from the USA.. G.Rose, Director of 
International Energy Policy at the State Department, openly sided with Almaty. 
Rose said Russia could not impose its proposals on other states: "differences of 
opinion should be settled quickly in international courts, and through direct talks 
among the parties". He also argued that old treaties on the Caspian Sea had not 
meant cooperation, even before the break up of the Soviet Union. "At no time did 
the former Soviet Union offer to share development of the Caspian with Iran, nor 
did it seek Iran's approval of Caspian region developments that might have 
environmental impacts".161 Interestingly, American diplomacy, more experienced 
than Kazakh, chose not to challenge the validity of the Caspian Sea legal regime 
established by the Russian (Soviet)-Iranian treaties, but to question Moscow's 
interpretation of it. The Americans also tried to internationalise the dispute by 
bringing it to world legal forums, evidently expecting that there they could muster 
the necessary support against Russia.
American intervention in the Caspian Sea dispute caused irritation in 
Moscow. On 22 July 1995 an unidentified high-ranking Foreign Ministry official 
said that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan were acting under US influence. He was 
quoted as saying that "the Americans, who are interested in Caspian oil, absolutely 
overtly exert pressure on Baku and Almaty, appealing for division of the Caspian 
Sea and promising beneficial cooperation and large investments," that dividing the 
sea into national zones not only posed a threat to its ecological system, but would 
also leave Russia with a very small sector of the sea.162 Kazakhstan's reaction 
followed without delay. On 26 July Gizzatov publicly denied that the USA was
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exerting pressure on Almaty. "We determine our position proceeding from our 
own national interests".163
A major shift in Kazakhstan’s position occurred at the conference of Heads 
of Legal Departments of the Caspian states' Foreign Ministries, except Russia’s, 
held in Almaty on 26-27 September 1995. Probably realising that their initial stance 
was difficult to defend, the Kazakhs dropped their insistence on application of Law 
of the Sea to the Caspian, and agreed to regard it as a lake, and submitted a new 
version of a draft Convention on the Caspian Sea’s legal status.164 Gizzatov 
explained that despite the change in Kazakhstan's position, Almaty still insisted that 
territorial waters, subsea resource rights and fishing zones should be awarded to 
coastal states, on the grounds that "the idea of general ownership of the Caspian 
would not appeal to foreign investors who have already signed contracts with one 
of the five coastal states".165
To prove its point Kazakhstan tried to appeal both to international legal 
practice with regard to frontier lakes, and to the particular practice that had 
developed in the USSR and Iran. Recent statements and publications by Gizzatov 
centred on the argument that the Caspian legal regime provided for de facto 
division of the sea. In an article he asserted that "the coastal states’ practice proves 
the de facto division of the Caspian between Russia and Iran". To substantiate his 
point Gizzatov noted that neither the USSR nor Iran had consulted each other 
when they started prospecting for oil on the Caspian shelf. "If there was a 
condominium, one could have expected consultations with co-owner Iran, but no 
such consultations took place... This practice unambiguously proves that neither 
the Soviet Union nor Iran regarded the Caspian’s mineral resources as an object of 
common ownership".166 The force of this argument is, however, undermined by the 
fact that the Russian position was based, as was shown, on the principle of 
"common use", not "common ownership". Russian interpretation of "common use" 
from the outset rejected the notion of condominium, despite Gizzatov's attempts to 
prove otherwise. As explained by Khodakov, the 1921 and 1940 treaties 
"contained no provision establishing any joint ownership, or extending national 
jurisdiction of the USSR and Iran, separately, or jointly, over the Caspian. For both 
states the Caspian, apart from the 10-mile exclusive fishing zone, was, in legal 
terms, territory beyond their national jurisdiction, where they had equal rights to its 
utilisation".167
Another argument used by Gizzatov entailed citing various internal 
documents of Soviet ministries which he contended established de facto division of
163 Kazakhstan Denies US Pressure Over Caspian's Legal Status, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
28.07.95.
164 Itogi vtorogo soveschaniya rukovoditeley pravovykh sluzhb MID prikaspiyskikh gosudarstv po voprosam 
pravovogo statusa kaspiyskogo morya // Diplomaticheskiy kurier (Almaty), No. 1, 1996, p. 93.
165 Reuters News Service, 26.09.95.
166 Gizzatov, V., Pravovoy status Kaspiyskogo morya: kondominium ili delimitatsiya // Kazakhstan i mirovoe 
soobshchestvo, No.l, 1996, p. 44.
167 Khodakov, A., The Legal Framework for Regional Cooperation in the Caspian Sea Region // Central Asian 
Quarterly, Vol.2, No.3, 1995, p. 31.
225
the sea. One such document was the USSR Ministry of Oil Industry’s 1970 
decision to divide the Soviet part of the Caspian between Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Turkmenistan "on the centre line basis accepted in international 
practice". As if anticipating possible objections, Gizzatov claimed that such an 
"administrative decision" could have international legal consequences because "in 
the former USSR borders had an administrative and territorial character and later, 
after the USSR’s collapse, were mutually recognised by the new independent states 
as inter-state borders". This position became government policy in Kazakhstan, and 
Nazarbayev referred to it at a press conference after the CIS summit in Moscow in 
March 1997.168
In practice, allusion in the Caspian Sea dispute to the administrative nature 
of the former USSR borders was no more than verbal acrobatics, linking without 
any logical reason two notions, "administrative borders" and "administrative 
decision". Administrative borders between republics in the former USSR could not 
be established by administrative decision. They were established or changed only 
by the highest legislative authority, the USSR Supreme Soviet. And it never passed 
any law dividing the Caspian into republican sectors. USSR Ministries could make 
internal administrative orders, for example for economic purposes, but these were 
binding only within a ministry’s sphere o f competence, and could not have 
international legal consequences. Overall, Kazakh diplomacy failed to establish a 
position from which it could force Russia into making substantial concessions.
In early 1996 the Kazakh leadership tried to use Yeltsin's interest in 
securing Almaty's support in the Russian presidential race for extracting 
concessions on the Caspian issue. The topic was raised during Yeltsin's visit to 
Almaty on 27 April 1996, and a joint Russian-Kazakh statement signed after the 
visit said that completing a Caspian Sea convention was "top priority and an urgent 
task". The statement allowed for each to carry out exploration in its own waters, 
and called for the signing of a consensus-based convention respecting "sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence".169 Though it was obvious from the 
text that Yeltsin did not yield on any questions of principle, the Kazakhs hastened 
to turn the document’s wording to advantage. At a news conference in Almaty on 
30 April, Gizzatov said that Russia had opposed offshore seismic work carried out 
by Kazakhstan and Western oil companies in Kazakhstan’s waters as "illegal and 
unilateral", but that both parties now recognised it as legal and were ready to 
cooperate.170 In the interests of political expediency, Yeltsin for the time being 
refrained from refuting these assertions.
But after winning re-election, Yeltsin lost interest in courting Nazarbayev, 
and toughness returned to Russia’s position. Two meetings of the five Caspian 
states, in Teheran on 24 October 1996, and in Ashgabat on 12 November 1996 
produced no noticeable results. The communique of the Ashgabat meeting barely
168 Kazakhstanskava pravda, 01.04.97.
169 Reuters News Service, 30.04.96.
170 Kazakhstan Seeks Cooperation with Russia in Caspian Development, BBC Monitoring Service: Former USSR, 
03.05.96.
226
went beyond repeating that a convention on the Caspian Sea's legal status was 
"priority and an urgent task", but did establish a working group, to meet regularly 
so as to speed up the negotiating process. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov 
proposed as a compromise to recognise a 45-nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone, much larger than initially envisaged by Moscow, and indicated Russia’s 
willingness to accept other coastal states' jurisdiction over oil sites outside the 45- 
mile zone, under certain criteria to be defined by experts, and provided they were 
already being or were about to be developed.171 Obviously, the major “criteria” 
would be whether or not Russian companies were involved in the “development”.
Shortly before the meeting Russia scored an important diplomatic victory 
by attracting Turkmenistan into its camp. A separate meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan signed a memorandum agreeing to 
cooperate in development of Caspian mineral resources and to establish for this 
purpose a tripartite joint company before the end of 1996.172 Turkmenistan's 
Foreign Minister Shikhmuradov said that Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan had 
agreed on a 45-mile national limit, inside which they would have exclusive rights to 
oil or gas, and the remaining area in the middle of the Caspian would be common 
territory. Explaining Turkmenistan’s position, Shikhmuradov said suggestions that 
the former Soviet republics could go it alone without Russian and Iranian 
agreement were unrealistic.173
Nevertheless Almaty adhered to its position, and declined to accept 
Russia’s compromise offer. Addressing a news conference after the Ashgabat 
meeting, Gizzatov said that "fundamental differences" over the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea still remained, that Primakov’s proposals were "unpolished", but his 
government would study them carefully, and that "Almaty does not reject them, 
but this does not mean that it will accept them either".174
Russia’s proposals were unacceptable to Kazakhstan, because the just- 
completed seismic survey of its Caspian shelf indicated estimated reserves of 10 
billion tonnes of oil and 2 trillion nT of gas.175 These were great deposits, but not 
in the category of "being or about to be developed". Gizzatov made it clear that 
“differences between the Caspian states and lack of a convention on the Caspian 
Sea’s legal status will not deter Kazakhstan from exploring its resources”.176 He 
also criticised the tripartite memorandum, and announced that Kazakhstan opposed 
the creation of the company and had no intention of joining it. He disclosed that 
the memorandum was "initially formulated to extend the company's activities all 
over the sea", but "as a result of talks, we managed to limit this area to the coastal 
zone of the three countries signing the memorandum...The company will not
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operate where Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan's own work is under way".177 
However, Russia’s real intentions regarding the company are not known. It is quite 
likely that the idea of a tripartite company to operate throughout the Caspian was 
generated simply to apply pressure to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.
On 18 December 1996 at a meeting in Moscow, delegations from Russia, 
Iran and Turkmenistan resolved to form a special committee to accelerate the 
establishment of a joint company to prospect for and develop oil and gas reserves 
in the Caspian Sea countries.178 After that, obviously with Russian support, 
Turkmenistan claimed part of the Kyapaz/Serdar Caspian oilfield, which the 
Azerbaijan State Oil Company SOCAR intended to develop.179 Baku had decided 
to develop it several years previously, and until then Ashgabat had never contested 
its right to do so. Though the claim was aimed at Baku, it had direct repercussions 
for Kazakhstan, because it introduced an element of instability into the whole 
Caspian basin, undermining business confidence.
Almaty saw all the disadvantages that Turkmenistan's changed position 
brought to Kazakhstan’s diplomatic stance on the Caspian issue. Nazarbayev 
invited President Niyazov to Almaty for confidential talks. They took place on 27 
February 1997, and the Caspian Sea issue was at the centre of the discussion. But 
Nazarbayev failed to persuade Niyazov to reverse his stance. The most he managed 
to extract was a joint declaration that "the sides recognise each other's right and 
the right of each of the coastal states to prospect for mineral resources on the 
Caspian seabed”.180 This provision added nothing new, because clearly every 
coastal state had rights for exploitation of the seabed.
The declaration did not address the major controversy, concerning the 
geographical limits within which such unilateral exploitation was permissible. 
Niyazov neither abandoned his commitment to the Russian proposal, nor withdrew 
his claim to the disputed part of the Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield. Yeltsin rewarded 
Turkmenistan for its cooperation by cancelling Rosneft’s and LUKoil’s deal with 
SOCAR for joint exploitation of the Kyapaz/Serdar field.181 On 22 May 1997 a 
meeting of the working group on defining the Caspian’s legal status took place in 
Almaty. All littoral states attended, but once again failed to achieve any tangible 
results.182
Despite its inability to push through its version of the Caspian Sea 
settlement, Moscow could at least be satisfied that its policy effectively prevented 
Kazakhstan from acquiring energy independence. In fact the Kazakh leadership
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failed to reach any of the proclaimed targets in its energy policy. The following 
table shows the dynamics of Kazakhstan’s gas production in 1991-1996.
Table 6.1
Gas production in Kazakhstan (in millions m3)183
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
7885 8113 6685 4490 5900 6400
Thus gas production in Kazakhstan not only fell far short of domestic demand of 
16.1 billion nr but remained below the levels achieved in the last years of the 
USSR. Kazakhstan continues to import gas in large quantities. In 1994 it imported 
7.56 billion nT,184 but in 1995 this fell to 4.27 billion m3, because of inability to 
pay. As a result gas consumption in 1995 reached a record low of 7.5 billion nT, 
little more than half normal domestic demand,185 with negative effects on industrial 
production and households. Yet Kazakhstan cannot cut its gas imports to zero, at 
least until the projected Karachaganak-Akmola gas pipeline is built.
Kazakhstan is still forced to export its gas from Karachaganak to Orenburg 
at exceptionally low prices. For example, in 1995 Gazprom took 3 billion nr of 
Karachaganak gas but paid only 10 months later, at less than the Russian domestic 
price.186 N.Balgimbayev, when still in charge of the Kazakh State Oil company, 
complained that Kazakhstan received a mere 17 cents "change" on each dollar 
equivalent in the course of such operations. The rest is eaten up by exorbitant 
tariffs, product regrading, etc. In other words, Kazakhstan is forced to sell 
Karachaganak’s products at well below their true value.187
Thus despite its substantial gas reserves, Kazakhstan has not only failed to 
become a significant exporter of natural gas, but remains dependent on gas imports 
from Russia. The Duma’s Committee on Property, Privatisation and Economic 
Activity estimated that "Kazakhstan's dependence on Russia will remain not only in 
immediate but in middle-term perspective, because with its vast but still unused gas 
deposits it will import 17 billion cubic metres of gas per year from Russia, at least 
until the year 2000".188 The latest manifestation of this dependence was the 
conclusion of an agreement with Gazprom to supply Almaty and southern regions 
of Kazakhstan with Russian gas. Kazakhstan had to turn to Russia, because
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Turkmenistan terminated gas supplies in late September 1997, and Kazakhstan 
cannot transport its own gas to the south of the country.189
The situation was only slightly better in Kazakhstan’s oil industry. The 
following table shows the dynamics of Kazakhstan’s oil production in 1991-1996.
Table 6.2
Oil production in Kazakhstan (in millions of tonnes)190
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
26.6 25.8 23.0 20.3 20.5 23
The table shows that despite reversing the negative trend of declining oil 
production, the republic still produces less oil than in the last years of the USSR.191 
Moreover, oil production fell far short of the 33.5 million tons planned for 1995.192 
The Atirau-Kumkol internal oil pipeline has still not been built Kazakhstan’s 
domestic market therefore remains heavily dependent on Russia for imports of 
crude for the Pavlodar and Shymkent refineries, or of processed oil products. 
Unfortunately figures for imports of the latter are unavailable, but as on 1 March 
1995 Kazakhstan’s debt to Russia for oil supplies amounted to 136.8 billion 
roubles.193
In 1995 Kazakhstan's oil export amounted to 11.2 million tons.194 In 1996 
it increased slightly to 12.3 million, but this too was far less than the 21.1 million 
tons exported in 1990.195 Moreover, the bulk of it remains dependent on Russia’s 
goodwill. Russia thwarted the possibility of alternative pipeline routes from 
Kazakhstan, thus perpetuating Russian control over the flow of oil from the 
republic. In 1997 Kazakhstan planned to export seven million tons of oil through a 
pipeline across Russia, and one million each by tankers across the Caspian to Baku, 
through swaps with Iran, and by rail through Russia to Europe.196 This means that 
80% of Kazakhstan's oil exports continue to transit Russian territory, and this 
dependency on Russia is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future. Currently 
the CPC remains the only projected new export pipeline, but even it still did not 
enter the phase of practical implementation due to new problems connected with
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inability to agree on transit fees with local authorities in the Russian provinces 
through which it will pass.
Of course Kazakhstan has not abandoned its efforts to find alternative 
energy transportation routes. This was clearly reaffirmed by Nazarbayev in his 
address to the nation in October 1997, when he said “The second element of our 
strategy is creation of a pipeline system for export of oil and gas. Only a large 
number of independent export routes can prevent our dependence on any one 
neighbour and monopoly price dependence on any one consumer”.197 But so far 
Almaty is still unable to find a solution to this problem.
On 11 August 1996 representatives from the National Iranian Oil Company 
(NIOC) and the Kazakh government signed a two million-tonne annual oil swap 
deal.198 The first trial shipment of 70,000 tonnes of Kazakh oil to Iran took place in 
March 1997. It went badly, because the Teheran refinery could not process it, even 
after its high mercaptan content was removed, primarily since it was of a type 
unsuitable for the refinery’s elderly technology.199 Shipments to Iran had to be 
interrupted. Only on 17 November 1997 did Ali Majedi, Iran’s Deputy Minister for 
Caspian Sea Oil and Gas, announce that Iran was prepared to resume oil swaps 
with Kazakhstan, after reduction of the high level of impurities in Kazakh crude.200 
But even if the swaps are renewed, their actual volume will be very insignificant, 
and dependent both on northern Iran’s refinery capacity, and on Iran’s domestic 
demand
Another route, called the "Caucasian corridor", entails trans-Caspian transit 
in tankers, and rail transport through Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Black Sea 
ports of Batumi and Poti. Chevron planned to transport 1.2 million tonnes of oil by 
this route in 1997. In March 1997 the first two trainloads, carrying 5,000 tonnes of 
Kazakh oil, were loaded into a tanker and sent to Europe from Georgia.201 
Nazarbayev claims that after modernisation of the Caspian port of Aktau 
Kazakhstan will export 5-6 million tonnes of oil annually by this route.202 Two 
factors, however, militate against the economic viability of the "Caucasian 
corridor". The first is that transhipments from tanker to rail and vice versa are 
time-consuming and costly. The second is the limited capacity of the Georgian rail 
network, which may prove unable to handle a large regular oil traffic, and could 
certainly not cope with output which, according to official Kazakh predictions, will 
reach 170 million tonnes by 2010.203
Not surprisingly, during Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev’s visit to Almaty on 
10 June 1997 he and Nazarbayev proposed a plan for a trans-Caspian pipeline to 
Azerbaijan, which would enable Kazakhstan to increase its oil deliveries to 10
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million tonnes a year, and signed a memorandum on cooperation in oil deliveries to 
international markets.204 Nazarbayev discussed the same plan with Georgia’s 
President Shevaradnadze when he visited Almaty on 11 November 1997.205 
However, the economic and political viability of such a pipeline remains to be seen, 
primarily because of failure to define the Caspian Sea’s legal status.
In the second half of 1997 three factors substantially intensified the 
diplomatic struggle around Kazakhstan’s energy resources. The first was China’s 
entry into the game. On 4 June 1997 the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) beat off rival bids from the United States and Russia in the auction of a 
60% share of Aktobemunaigaz.206 On 24 September Nazarbayev and Chinese 
Prime Minister Li Peng signed agreements on cooperation in the oil and gas sector, 
and between the Kazakh Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and CNPC. 
China obtained concessions to three hydrocarbon deposits in Aktyubinsk region 
and the Uzen oilfield on the Mangyshlak peninsula, second only to the Tengiz 
oilfield. Iimplementation of the Aktyubinsk project will require construction of a 
3,000 km pipeline to Xinjiang, China’s most westerly province. Under the Uzen 
project, a 250 km pipeline will be built to the northern border of Iran. The Uzen 
project and construction of the pipelines are estimated to cost $US 9.5 billion.207
It was no accident that provisions for pipeline construction found their way 
into the Kazakh-Chinese agreements. Almaty counted on solving its oil and gas 
transportation problems in this way, both to refineries in the East and for exports 
to international markets, by-passing Russia. This move also corresponded with 
Nazarbayev’s strategy of balancing between the various poles of power, and 
manifested his intention to avoid slipping into a new foreign policy dependence, 
this time on the West. However, from the point of view of diversification of 
Kazakhstan’s oil exports this success can be regarded only as limited. The 3,000 
km pipeline to Xinjiang will require some time to build, and China will be building 
it for its own oil consumption. To turn it into an export pipeline to world markets 
will require building another section of the pipeline to Chinese ports. It will have to 
be at least as long as the first one through Kazakhstan. To what extent China may 
be interested in committing its resources to such an enterprise remains unknown. 
Nothing in recent Chinese statements suggests that at this stage it is contemplating 
such a possibility. On the other hand, a pipeline through Iran, build with Chinese 
investments, might be a viable alternative for diversification of Kazakh oil exports 
to international markets.
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The second factor was the growth of American involvement in Caspian Sea 
politics. A State Department report released in April 1997 recommended increased 
support for US energy companies' activities in the Caspian Basin. Emphasising the 
region’s rich oil and gas reserves, the report said the US government "needs to 
enhance its efforts throughout the region to support American companies...and 
continue to bring US companies to this market". To try to develop alternative 
routes to the Bosporus, the report called for encouraging market development in 
the Black Sea region to build the infrastructure to transport Caspian energy to 
other markets.208
Washington redoubled its efforts to push through the concept of the so- 
called Eurasian Transportation Corridor, a major oil export pipeline running from 
Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan on the Caspian seabed, then through Georgia to Turkey. 
In early November 1997 US Secretary of Energy Pena led a mission from the 
Departments of Energy, State and Commerce to the countries in the Caspian 
region, where it met the leaders of Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, 
and Georgia. Pena actively propagated a plan for an East-West pipeline route from 
Baku to Ceyhan in Turkey, and stated after the visit that Turkey, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia and Turkmenistan had endorsed the proposal.209 This was a direct 
challenge to Russian influence and strategy in the Caspian Sea basin.
During Nazarbayev’s visit to Washington on 17-18 November 1997, the 
issue of Caspian energy development was discussed extensively in several 
meetings, including with Clinton, Vice-President Gore, Energy Secretary Pena, and 
Acting Secretary of State Talbott. Both sides agreed on the importance of giving 
priority to developing a secure Eurasian Transportation Corridor with trans- 
Caspian segments as one of multiple pipelines to deliver Kazakhstan energy 
resources to world markets. Nazarbayev agreed to establishment of a working 
group, and Gore, who led the US side in the talks, told a press conference that he 
was satisfied that Nazarbayev had made his support for the transport corridor 
clear.210 Nazarbayev’s endorsement was important for Washington, because it was 
aimed not only at undermining Russian influence, but also at isolating Iran. On 
every occasion American officials stressed that Iran must be excluded from pipeline 
projects in Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
In its turn Washington fully supported Kazakhstan’s position on dividing 
the Caspian Sea into national sectors as a counter to Russian-Iranian advocacy of 
the “common use” principle. The joint statement by Clinton and Nazarbayev 
especially emphasised the “need to adopt a Caspian Sea legal regime that 
establishes a clear division of property rights based on the division of seabed 
resources”.211 Gore was conspicuously present at the signing of an agreement 
between Kazakhstankaspiyshelf and Agip, British Gas, British Petroleum, Mobil,
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Shell, Statoil and Total on prospecting and drilling in an area of the Caspian shelf 
covering some 6,000 square km in the north-east of the Caspian, part of which had 
been claimed by Russia.212 Gore’s presence was meant to demonstrate strong 
American support not only for the deal, but also for Kazakhstan’s position of 
dividing the Caspian into national sectors. Undoubtedly American support 
substantially strengthened Kazakhstan’s position vis-a-vis Russia in the Caspian 
dispute. However, it remains to be seen to what extent this support can change the 
balance of forces in the region.
Having initially planned to create an “equilibrium of forces” Nazarbayev is 
now risking being caught in the cross-fire. There have already been signs that he is 
retracting promises he made during his visit to Washington about the Eurasian 
Transportation Corridor and relations with Iran.213 On the other hand, China’s 
entry into the game improved Russia’s diplomatic position vis-a-vis the USA. Until 
recently Russia could rely only on the support of Iran among the larger players. 
Now it can forge ad hoc alliances with Beijing to counter American pressure. It is 
already clear that some of China’s interests in the Caspian are in contradiction with 
those of the US, primarily with regard to oil shipments through Iran, since 
Washington categorically objects against pipeline projects going through Iranian 
territory.
The third factor was that in the second half of 1997 Russia sharply raised 
the stakes in the struggle for control of the Caspian In August, Russia's Natural 
Resources Ministry announced a tender for the right to explore a vast area in the 
northern Caspian, estimated to hold anywhere between 150 and 600 million tonnes 
of recoverable oil. A part of the area put to tender overlaps that sector of the 
Caspian which Kazakhstan considers its own. Almaty reacted harshly. The Foreign 
Ministry expressed "strong disagreement" with Russia's plans, pointed out the 
“inadmissibility of unilateral actions, uncoordinated with Kazakhstan but taken on 
its territory and the necessity to reconsider the decision", and stated "From the 
location of the blocks put up in the tender it is clear that some of them are in 
Kazakhstan's sector of the Caspian Sea".214
During Chernomyrdin’s visit to Almaty on 4 October, disagreements on the 
Caspian were a major topic in his discussions with Nazarbayev, but neither 
convinced the other. Soon after Chernomyrdin’s return to Moscow, a senior 
Russian Foreign Ministry official said Kazakhstan’s position “is, to say the least, 
inaccurate...There have never been any borders in the Caspian Sea legalised via 
treaties," and “the tender conditions will include terms requiring the winner to 
adhere to any agreements that may be reached thereafter, including adjustments to 
sector boundaries".215 On 10 December LUKoil was named winner of the 
tender.216
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Interestingly, the Russian tender coincided with one called by 
Turkmenistan. But if the Russian tender targeted Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan’s 
targeted Azerbaijan. Both tenders were presumably a coordinated action designed 
to weaken the Azeri-Kazakh axis. A few days after meeting Yeltsin, who described 
the Russian and Turkmen positions as “quite close”, Niyazov suddenly invited 
tenders for oil and gas fields on Turkmenistan’s Caspian shelf. Ashgabat’s plans 
envisaged exploiting the disputed Kyapaz/Serdar field together with the National 
Iranian Oil Company and an unnamed Russian company.217 The first two rounds of 
the tender were held on 10-11 September and Turkmen sources claimed that they 
attracted "more than 57 major foreign companies”. This caused an angry reaction 
in Azerbaijan, SOCAR even issuing a statement threatening unspecified reprisals 
against any Western oil companies that tendered for the disputed Kyapaz/Serdar 
field. Moreover, Turkmenistan reaffirmed its claims on the Chirag and Azeri fields, 
developed by a BP-led consortium, insisting that the Azerbaijani government give 
it a share of the profits.218 On 19 November 1997 Turkmenistan lodged an appeal 
with the UN for assistance in settling its dispute with Azerbaijan over ownership of 
the Kyapaz/Serdar oilfield.219
Given the present correlation of forces in the Caspian basin, it is unlikely 
that the dispute will be resolved in Kazakhstan's favour. Up to now the Russian 
government has demonstrated no intention of retreating from its initial stance.
Quite the opposite, there are signs that Russia intends to be a more active player.
On 21 November 1997 Russian deputy Prime Minister Nemtsov, speaking at the 
presentation of new Minister for Oil and Gas Industry S .Kiriyenko, said that Russia 
“must in no way allow our influence in the Caspian region to weaken".220
The most probable scenario is that negotiations will drag on indefinitely, a 
prospect quite suitable to Moscow. Unlike Kazakhstan, Russia is not interested in 
speedy clarification of the Caspian’s legal status. Unclarity in no way obligates 
Russia, nor deprives it of freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre, nor does it prevent 
Russian participation in various profitable projects exploiting Caspian energy 
resources. Primakov said that Russia does not fear the attraction of American 
capital to develop oil fields in the Caspian Sea. "Russian capital also participates in 
their development and we plan to continue our participation".221 Moscow is not 
inclined to rely on the Kazakhs’ word, that they would like to see Russian 
companies take part in developing Kazakhstan's Caspian shelf. Were the legal 
status of the Caspian settled to Kazakhstan’s satisfaction, Almaty would be free to 
go back on its promises. Russia can lose the struggle in the Caspian only if it 
becomes completely isolated from all the other littoral states, and if they form a 
US-backed coalition against Moscow. But at present such a scenario appears 
highly unlikely.
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CONCLUSIONS
The emergence of independent Kazakhstan was a result of objective 
processes predetermined by the creation and consolidation of Kazakh statehood 
within the former USSR and by the formation of a powerful Kazakh national elite. 
By the mid-1980’s it had established firm control over Kazakhstan’s domestic 
affairs, and acquired the potential to make a bid for full independence. Gorbachev’s 
attempt to reassert central control met with resistance, including violent riots on 
the streets of Alma-Ata in December 1996. After suppression of the riots, the 
Kazakh elite temporarily retreated, waiting for a suitable opportunity to re­
establish control. The opportunity arrived when the rise of ethnic nationalism 
engulfed the USSR, including Russia, which opted for more autonomy from the 
central government.
Nazarbayev, a new leader of the Kazakh elite, played the major role in 
guiding his republic to independence. He was not a passive follower of the course 
of events leading to the USSR’s disintegration, but an active initiator of various 
political combinations undermining the power of its central government. By 
exploiting the antagonism between Yeltsin and Gorbachev Nazarbayev managed 
on the one hand to accumulate a substantial number of new powers in preparing 
Kazakhstan’s independence, and on the other to neutralise Russian separatists in 
northern areas of Kazakhstan, who called for unification of those areas with 
Russia.
While striving for independence Nazarbayev at the same time wanted to 
preserve some sort of a loose confederation or economic union, which would not 
have imposed any strict obligations on Almaty’s domestic and foreign policies, but 
would provide privileged access to the vast post-Soviet market, and to the 
transportation system for export of natural resources. Besides, Kazakhstan wanted 
to maintain a defence union which would allow it to participate in decision-making 
on vital military and strategic issues, while avoiding large expenditures on creating 
and maintaining its own armed forces. The USSR’s breakup frustrated these plans.
In the first months after independence the dynamics of Russian-Kazakh 
relations were determined by three sets of factors: the historical legacy, the Kazakh 
elite’s vision of Kazakhstan as a nation-state, and the necessity to divide the assets 
and responsibilities of the former Union. Disagreements and conflicting interests 
identified themselves at an early stage. The main problem which Moscow and 
Almaty had to tackle was the position of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan. Moscow 
tried to use Kazakhstan's economic dependence on Russia as a leverage for 
drawing the republic into bilateral agreements which included obligations towards 
the rights and freedoms of ethnic Russians. But the Kazakh side, through subtle 
diplomatic manoeuvring, managed to avoid undertaking any precise obligations.
At a later stage various elements in Kazakhstan’s policy of nation-state 
building acquired anti-Russian overtones. The policy pursued two goals: making 
Kazakhs the dominant nationality by concentrating all the major levers of political
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and economic power in their hands, and eradicating the remaining levers of internal 
Russian influence on Kazakhstan’s policy. In public the Kazakh authorities denied 
the existence of ethnic bias in their policies, and portrayed Kazakhstan as a 
multinational state, in which all citizens had equal rights. But their practical actions 
indicated otherwise.
The policy of nation-state building had a dual effect on the Russian 
population. On the one hand, it caused a massive emigration of those Russians who 
had no close ties with the republic, and on the other, it forced consolidation of the 
other part of the Russian community, who perceived the land where they lived as 
their own. This resulted in the emergence of Russian community organisations 
which began a political struggle against official policy, and also lobbied the Russian 
government to take a stance on the issue of ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan.
The implications of the Kazakh policy of nation-state building caused 
concern in Moscow. This was not exclusively the result of complaints by 
Kazakhstan’s Russian activists. For Russia important strategic interests were at 
stake. The presence of a large Russian community in Kazakhstan, and its broad 
representation in government, public service and the economy were regarded by 
Moscow as insurance of the republic’s loyalty in strategic perspective. Attitudes to 
ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan became the main criteria by which the real, not 
declared, intentions of the Kazakh leadership were judged.
Hence Moscow's insistence on a “dual citizenship” agreement covering 
ethnic Russians, which could legitimise Russian military intervention in case of 
need. For the time being Kazakhstan managed to avoid entering into such a 
commitment. Moscow also provided political and diplomatic support for Russian 
community activists and organisations in Kazakhstan, and encouraged their 
cooperation with Kazakh democratic opposition groups.
The non-Kazakh population’s opposition to the policy of nation-state 
building, and the growth of internal Kazakh opposition, made it difficult for 
Nazarbayev’s regime to operate in a democratic political environment. Unification 
of even a small part of the Kazakh electorate with all the Russian-speaking 
electorate could inevitably give them victory in parliamentary and presidential 
elections. This stimulated the evolution of Nazarbayev’s regime towards 
authoritarian rule, and intensification of repression and obstruction against all 
forms of opposition, reinforcing Russian suspicions about Nazarbayev’s real 
intentions.
There are clear indications that for the foreseeable future the problem of 
Kazakhstan’s Russians will remain the major issue in Russian-Kazakh relations. 
The Kazakh leadership’s hopes for an early resolution of the inter-ethnic situation 
to their satisfaction did not materialise. Besides obvious failures in the economic 
field, the government was unable to achieve a decisive demographic shift in favour 
of Kazakhs; Russians and other non-Kazakhs still make roughly half the republic's 
population, and in the north and north-east Russians are still the overwhelming 
majority. The potential for Russian areas to secede from Kazakhstan remains real.
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An important indicator of the status of relations between Russia and 
Kazakhstan is the level of their cooperation in promoting integration within the 
CIS. Kazakhstan’s attitude to integration was predetermined by its large-scale 
dependence on economic relations with other CIS states, especially Russia. From 
the very first days of independence Nazarbayev took a firm stance in favour of 
economic integration. However, his vision of integration did not go beyond 
satisfying Kazakhstan’s immediate interests in foreign trade and defence. He 
wanted such integration without making any concessions on Kazakhstan’s 
sovereignty or the role of its Russian community. Russia so distrusted 
Nazarbayev’s intentions on economic integration that it pushed Kazakhstan out of 
the rouble zone.
Moscow in its turn did not want integration with former Russian 
dependencies on equal terms. It had no intention to see its policy subordinated to 
some supra-national structure, controlled by other CIS countries, diminishing 
Russia’s own role in the CIS and in the international context. The only 
arrangement suitable to Moscow would be acceptance of its own terms, while 
Nazarbayev's proposals ran contrary to this.
Despite these basic differences in approach to CIS integration both Yeltsin 
and Nazarbayev actively used pro-integration rhetoric and declarative initiatives to 
further their domestic policies. Yeltsin applied this tactic in the struggle against 
parliamentary opposition. Nazarbayev played up to the aspirations of Kazakhstan’s 
Slavic population, trying to make them more tolerant towards his nation-state 
building policy.
Nazarbayev’s most prominent initiative, the concept of a Eurasian Union 
(EAU), had only semantic relevance to the ideology of Eurasianism. It avoided 
addressing the issue of common Eurasian nationalism, the basis of the whole 
Eurasianist concept. Besides being designed to appeal to Kazakhstan’s Russians, 
the proposal was motivated by Nazarbayev’s desire to take their problem off the 
agenda of Russian-Kazakh relations.
Kazakhstan’s negative attitude to real integration demonstrated itself in its 
failure to observe its obligations within the Customs Union, and in its reaction to 
the conclusion of the Russian-Belarus Union Treaty. If not completely dead, the 
Customs Union is moribund. Not only did the union become dysfunctional, but 
both countries reinforced customs and border controls between them. The 
Kazakhstan leadership’s stance on integration proved that it was not interested in 
real economic, much less political, union with Russia. Instead Kazakhstan’s 
strategy consists in preserving its independence by balancing between the major 
centres of world power.
The prospects of real economic integration between Russia and Kazakhstan 
will depend on a multitude of factors. The most important of them is Russia's 
economic development. If Russia overcomes its present economic stagnation and 
achieves even moderate economic growth it will become a more attractive partner 
for Kazakhstan, and its own ability to stimulate the integration process 
economically will also increase. If at the same time Kazakhstan's economy shows
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no signs of recovery, internal pressure for economic integration with Russia will 
grow, not only among Russians, but also among Kazakhs. A certain pressure for 
further integration may be created if the Russia-Belarus Union is clearly successful.
Russo-Kazakhstan relations within the CIS’ collective security system were 
affected by similar problems. Moscow regarded this system, embodied in the 
Tashkent treaty, as an instrument for keeping Central Asia in its military sphere of 
influence. Almaty’s attitude was motivated by immediate concerns - inability 
independently to provide for its own defence, and perception of a clear threat from 
instability in neighbouring Tajikistan. Almaty wanted Moscow to bear the burden 
of preventing the export of instability into the rest o f Central Asia, but its pro term 
acceptance of Russian security patronage did not mean that it consented to 
perpetuation of Russia’s military dominance of the region. Russian and Kazakh 
approaches to collective security in Central Asia were far from concurrent.
To diminish dependence on Russia as sole guarantor of Kazakhstan’s 
security Nazarbayev started invoking various alternative collective security 
concepts for Central Asia, and also began diversifying Kazakhstan’s military ties, 
including expanding its links with NATO, despite Moscow’s obvious displeasure.
Bilateral Russian-Kazakh military relations were also characterised by 
major difficulties and tensions. The most pressing issue was that of control over the 
ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed in Kazakhstan. Almaty’s reluctance to 
renounce them was caused by suspicion of Moscow’s intentions with regard to 
Kazakhstan’s territorial integrity. Kazakhstan wanted unequivocal security 
guarantees and perceived possession of nuclear weapons as means of obtaining 
them. Moscow in turn did not want nuclear-armed neighbours, who might 
challenge Russia’s leadership in the post-Soviet space. To push Kazakhstan 
towards nuclear disarmament, Russia forged a temporary alliance with the USA, 
and their combined pressure forced Almaty to accept the status of a non-nuclear 
weapon state.
A subsequent diplomatic struggle between Moscow and Almaty was 
precipitated by Russia’s intention to establish sole ownership of the former USSR’s 
nuclear arsenal, while Kazakhstan insisted on its’ being subordinate to the joint CIS 
command. Almaty perceived joint command of the nuclear forces as an instrument 
preventing possible Russian attempts to use military pressure or armed force 
against Kazakhstan, but Russia outmanoeuvred it, took sole control over CIS 
nuclear weapons, and quickly removed all such weapons from Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan in its turn failed to obtain any valid security guarantees from any other 
great power at the exception of Russia.
Another point of contradiction was the problem of Russian access to 
several important military and strategic installations in Kazakhstan, primarily the 
Baykonur cosmodrome. For Russia such access had a dual purpose. The first was 
economic, to escape the high costs of creating similar installations on Russian 
territory. The second was geopolitical, to retain a military presence in Kazakhstan. 
After long and painful negotiations Moscow and Almaty concluded a set of
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agreements on military cooperation, including conditions for Russian use of these 
installations. However, some of these agreements remain only on paper, others are 
being fulfilled only partially, and the Russian military presence in Kazakhstan 
remains under constant propaganda fire.
Almaty’s official claims that its relations with Moscow are a military 
alliance arouse serious doubts. Kazakhstan under its present leadership, is unlikely 
to be a reliable ally of Russia. Given Kazakh hostility to the Russian military 
presence, and Almaty’s tactic of using Russian defence installations in Kazakhstan 
as a bargaining tool for concessions in other fields, Russia will further reduce its 
dependence on military-strategic installations in Kazakhstan, but is likely to 
attempt to retain at least a token military presence, as a manifestation of its military 
and strategic role in the region.
Soon after the USSR’s collapse, Moscow found itself involved in a 
diplomatic struggle for Kazakhstan’s energy resources. In the new geopolitical 
situation the role of these resources for Russia’s CIS strategy increased 
substantially. Initially Russian policy was motivated by immediate economic 
concern, and attempted to neutralise Kazakhstan’s competition for Western 
investment in energy projects in the former USSR. But later, with identification of 
Russia's new national interests, geopolitical considerations moved to the fore.
In Kazakhstan the government saw prompt development of the energy 
sector as the main prerequisite for the success of its policy of nation-state building. 
Almaty based its strategy on the premise that achievement of economic 
independence from Russia should start with acquiring energy independence. 
Besides, abundant revenues from exporting Kazakhstan’s oil and gas could serve 
as an investment base for modernising other sectors of Kazakhstan’s economy, 
making it more self-reliant and less dependent on Russia. Almaty put its stake on 
maximising the involvement of Western companies in its oil and gas sector, while 
cold-shouldering Russian firms.
Nazarbayev's plans were at odds not only with Russia’s plans to stabilise its 
own oil industry, but with Moscow’s strategic line of keeping Kazakhstan in its 
sphere of influence. Initially Russia attempted to draw Kazakhstan into a 
multilateral OPEC-style arrangement, which would force Almaty to consult with 
Moscow on issues of energy cooperation with the West. When this failed Moscow 
started to apply economic pressure.
The major lever in Russia’s hands was control of the pipeline network for 
transporting Kazakhstan’s hydrocarbons to world markets. Russia established a 
low annual quota for export of Kazakhstan’s oil, and denied it any opportunity to 
export gas. To prevent Kazakhstan from initiating alternative pipeline projects 
circumventing Russian territory, Moscow drew Almaty into the CPC project, 
which is still unable to proceed.
Russia used its control over pipelines as an instrument of pressure for 
penetrating energy projects in Kazakhstan either started or about to start without 
Russian participation. This tactic brought some results, with Russian companies
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being offered shares in the Tengiz, Karachaganak and some other smaller projects. 
Kazakhstan in its turn failed to overcome its energy dependence on Russia, and 
even less its dependence on Russia’s transportation network for its hydrocarbon 
exports.
Russian diplomacy successfully exploited the uncertainty over the Caspian 
Sea’s legal status, preventing a division into national sectors by which Moscow 
would have lost both economically and politically. The Russian sector’s energy 
reserves would be substantially smaller than Kazakhstan’s and Kazakhstan would 
have acquired sovereign rights in its sector, reducing Russia’s ability to influence 
with whom and to what extent it would cooperate. The regime of “common use” 
advanced by Russia provided for joint exploitation of Caspian resources, an 
arrangement giving Moscow levers of influence on Kazakhstan’s future energy 
policy.
Russia’s policy met with strong opposition from the US and Turkey, which 
actively propagated plans for alternative pipelines by-passing Russian territory. 
Washington also supported Kazakhstan against Russia on the issue of the Caspian 
Sea legal regime. As a counter-move Russia proceeded to strengthen its diplomatic 
alliance with Iran on the Caspian issue, and managed to draw Turkmenistan into its 
camp. Under the present correlation of forces in the Caspian it is unlikely that the 
dispute will be solved to Kazakhstan’s satisfaction. The most probable scenario is 
that negotiations will drag on indefinitely, a prospect viewed with equanimity in 
Moscow, which has no incentive to speedy clarification.
Overall, Russian-Kazakh relations in the post-Soviet period were 
characterised by extreme controversy, uneasiness and mutual suspicion. Despite 
concluding multiple agreements, the two states failed to create a solid basis for 
cooperation. At the core of the problem is the fact that Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policies are motivated by conflicting sets of interests. While Russia is 
interested in maintaining control of the post-Soviet space and keeping Kazakhstan 
within its sphere of influence, the Kazakh leaders’ major aspiration is to construct a 
nation-state enjoying real, not nominal independence.
At present the delicate balance achieved in relations between the two 
countries rests primarily on personal relations between Yeltsin and Nazarbayev. 
However, it can be expected that after Yeltsin’s retirement Russian policy towards 
Kazakhstan will acquire more defined traits, representing personal attitudes less 
and Russia’s strategic objectives more. Arrival of new political forces to the 
leadership of Russia will not alter Moscow’s already obvious thrust for a change in 
the status quo, but will affect the forms and tempo of change.
Nowadays Russian strategy towards Kazakhstan consists in drawing it 
gradually and gently into a closer relationship, with a long-term view to its 
incorporation in a new form of union. The ethnic composition of Kazakh society, 
the cultural legacy of its presence within the Russian state, its disadvantageous 
geographical position, the structure of its economy, and its inability to provide for 
its own defence still make it very dependent on relations with Russia. Six years
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after the collapse of the USSR Kazakhstan’s future as an independent state is still 
far from certain. The processes of separation between Russia and Kazakhstan and 
unification within Kazakhstan have not yet become irreversible.
The main obstacle to implementation of Russia’s strategy is the ideology 
and policy of Nazarbayev’s regime. It can be expected that some time in the future 
the removal of Nazarbayev from power will become a major Russian foreign policy 
priority. Whether this objective can or cannot be achieved will depend on 
Nazarbayev’s ability to deliver on his promises to improve the economic situation 
and raise living standards. It is already clear that the policy of nation-state building, 
at least in the form it is being implemented, has failed to improve the average 
Kazakh’s quality of life. Moreover, since the last years of the USSR the economic 
situation has noticeably worsened, and there are no indications that it will improve 
significantly in the foreseeable future.
Continuation of the current situation will indubitably result in further 
growth of internal opposition to Nazarbayev, and its consolidation across ethnic 
lines. It is unlikely that Nazarbayev’s regime could survive against both strong 
internal opposition and outside pressure from Russia. If the regime falls, and more 
democratic forces come to power, it can be expected that the negative trends in 
Russian-Kazakh relations will be reversed. However, another scenario is possible, 
with the regime refusing to yield to popular pressure, intensifying internal 
repression and turning for support to the most radical nationalist elements in 
Kazakh society. In this case the outcome becomes unpredictable, not excluding 
armed inter-ethnic conflict and Russian involvement in it. Neither of these options 
promises anything good to Nazarbayev’s regime; both compel it to race against 
time in pushing through major energy projects expected to bring in large revenues 
and by so doing stabilise the economic situation in Kazakhstan. Whether 
Nazarbayev can win this race remains to be seen.
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APPENDIX 5
Table A.3
Production of Some Industrial Commodities in Kazakhstan
(1913-1985)
Commodity 1913 1928 1940 1954 1965 1985
Electricity 
(millions of kwh) 1.3 7 632 4795.3 19 237 81 263
Coal
(millions of tons) 0.09
0.037 7 23.7 45.8 131
Crude steel 
(thousands of tons) - - -
221.7 1123.4 6155
Rolled ferrous metals 
(thousands of tons) - - - 208
391 4200
Crude petroleum 
(thousands of tons)
118 251 697 1384 2000 22 800
Cement
(thousands of tons) - - -
330.6 4036.9 7549
Construction bricks 
(millions) -
6.3 220.2 587.4 1548 1940.4
Fertilisers 
(thousands of tons) - - - 322.5 776.5 7440.3
Sulphuric acid 
(thousands of tons) - - 49 581 863.6 1670.8
Metal processing 
machines - - - 5012 1915 4143
Metallurgie
equipment - - - 28571 9005 11 210
Leather shoes 
(thousands of pairs) 4703 1189 5980 14 995 32 260
Cotton fibre 
(thousands of tons) 1.9 5.8 35 72.1 70.4 91.9
Fabric of all types 
(thousands of meters) 1394 1294 4725 17 4985 31 300 227 800
Sources: SSSR - strana sotsializma, Statisticheskiy sbomik, Moskva: CUNXU Gosplana SSSR i V/O 
Soyuzorguchet, 1936, p. 157. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhskoy SSR, Statisticheskiy sbomik, Alma- 
Ata: Kazakhgosizdat, 1957, pp. 35-44. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 g., Statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1959, p. 234. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1961 g., 
Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 197, 240. Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 
1965 g., Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Moskva: Gosstatizdat, 1966, pp. 182, 215. Narodnoe 
khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1976 g., Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1977, p. 
33. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1977 g., Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: 
"Kazakhstan", 1978, pp 36-42. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1980 g., Statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1981, p. 40. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1982 g., 
Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1983, pp. 41, 45. Narodnoe khozyaistvo 
Kazakhstana v 1985 g., Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1986, pp. 42-52.
1 Data for 1950.
2 Data for 1955.
3 Data for 1932.
4 Wool fabric only.
5 Wool and cotton fabric.
APPENDIX 6
Table  A . 4
Education  in K azakhstan  (1914-1985)
Category 1914 1928 1940 1954 1965 1985
Literacy of population in 
Kazakhstan (in %)
15.71 25.2 83.6 96.9 100 100
Number of schools of all 
types
2006 3927 7790 9043 10 728 8728
Number of pupils in 
schools
105 059 273 584 1 138 187 1 290 634 2 852 000 3 348 000
Number of teachers in 
schools
3319 7883 44 381 70 128 124 044 237 000
Specialised secondary 
educational institutions
7 24 118 130 169 246
Students in specialised 
secondary education
302 3620 30 276 61 729 171 000 277 600
Number of tertiary 
educational institutions
- 1 20 26 39 55
Number of students in 
tertiary educational 
institutions
- 75 10 419 45 430 144 700 273 300
Table A.5
Medical Care in K azakhstan  (1914-1985)
Category
»v
1914 1928 1940 1954 1965 1985
Number of doctors of all 
specialisations
244 807 2747 9153 22 494 59 400
Number of trained nurses 393 1308 11 953 27 952 76 443 180 500
Medical institutions of all 
types (hospitals, clinics, 
surgeries, obstetric 
stations etc)
257 724 3499 5347 4934 6239
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhskoy SSR, Statisticheskiy sbomik, Alma-Ata: Kazakhgosizdat, 
1957, pp. 284-285, 322-327, 338-339. Itogi vsesoiuznoy perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda, Kazakhskaia 
SSR, Moskva, Gosstatizdat, 1962, p. 59. Narodnoe khozyaistvo Kazakhstana v 1977 g., Statisticheskiy 
ezhegodnik. Alma-Ata, "Kazakhstan", 1978, p 188, 191, 195, 220. Narodnoe khozyastvo Kazakhstana v 
1985 g., Statisticheskiy ezhegodnik, Alma-Ata: "Kazakhstan", 1986, pp. 280; 253; 260.
1 Estimate.
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